Rethinking Peace and Security
New Dimensions, Strategies and Actors
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This publication is the result of the Fifth Intensive Programme of the European Doctorate Enhancement Programme on Peace and Conflict (EDEN). During ten days in July 2008, around fifty students and a dozen professors from twelve different European universities met at the University of Coimbra to discuss the new dimensions of peace and security studies. Chapter 1 presents the Intensive Programme’s theme underlying concepts and questions. Paula Duarte Lopes and Maria Raquel Freire (Intensive Programme organisers) argue that the link between research and action, which characterises Peace Studies has not (yet) been attained, although, they argue, the conditions for that realisation exist. The authors provide a critical analysis of the current model of peace interventions, offering a different way of thinking those interventions: from a linear, eventually circular, model of intervention towards a web-like one.

The meeting followed the usual EDEN Intensive Programme organisation, with morning lectures by EDEN participating university professors, and afternoon sessions dedicated to PhD students’ work presentation and discussion. The afternoon sessions were split in two groups. PhD candidates (IP2) were invited to discuss their on-going work with their peers and professors. They were subsequently asked to submit a chapter based on their work related to the overall theme under discussion during those ten days. Chapters 2 to 6 are the result of these IP2 sessions. Alex Fedorov traces the historical trajectory of the so-called Eastern Question, framing the current international dynamics regarding the Balkans within this question (Chapter 2). In Chapter 3, Elisa García-Mingo argues that certain aspects are being neglected from Peace Journalism analyses, namely a reflection on operational and strategic tools for intervention and the critical review of projects, discussing their underlying ethical and philosophical approaches. A critical analysis of
conflict prevention models is developed by Daniela Nascimento (Chapter 4). The author argues that the disregard for economic and social rights in Sudan is undermining conflict prevention efforts. The link between development aid and security is addressed in Chapter 5. Ricardo Pereira argues that the United States' emergency plan for AIDS relief (PEPFAR) is actually an instrument of foreign policy to promote United States' security. Chapter 6 discusses the role of symbols within contexts of violence and how these relate to the (re)construction of identities. Gorka Roman-Etxebarrieta analyses these dynamics in the case of the Basque Country.

Students who were not as far advanced in their research (IP1) were asked to develop a joint paper on a topic related to new dimensions, actors and/or strategies of peace and security. Chapters 7 to 11 constitute the result of that joint effort. Valentina Bartolucci and Maria João Barata argue that Moroccan official actors have been targeting the legitimacy of the Sahrawi people's identity (Western Sahara) as a political strategy (Chapter 7). Jeannette Bell, Kadiye Suel, Daniel Rodrigues and Jorge Silva revisit the discussion on ‘Fortress Europe’ through the current migration dimension. In Chapter 8, they analyse the dynamics of migration towards Europe at its Southern border, discussing the legal frameworks and practices concerning illegal and irregular immigrants, asylum seekers and victims of human trafficking. Chapter 9 provides a critique of ‘post-armed conflict reconstruction’ projects. Marisa Borges and Sofia Santos argue that the underlying modernity project has structural impacts at the global governance level and contradicts efforts towards empowerment by promoting social normalisation. Simone Kumor and Aybars Görgülü focus on the reconstruction of the security sector in Afghanistan. The chapter discusses who, how and when associated to this reform, framing their findings in the overall ‘post-reconstruction’ peace model adopted (Chapter 10). Finally, Floortje Toll and Ariel Sánchez Meertens provide an in-depth analysis of the dynamic emergence of new actors in the violent contexts of Sri Lanka and Colombia. The authors argue that although these dynamics transform the existing conflicts, they also sustain violence (Chapter 11).

Peace and Conflict studies only emerged as a distinct area of study in the second half of the 1950s. This means that nearly all the contributors to this volume make up just the third generation of scholars in this field. Their concerns reflect the research agendas of this new generation, who continue to address enduring themes in peace and conflict studies, but whose formative influences are those of a complex post-Cold War world. It is the belief of the editors that the EDEN Intensive Programmes have an important role to play in the strengthening
and development of expertise and collaborative initiatives in this young and emerging field of study, and can make important contributions to the consolidation of a European Area of Research on Peace and Conflict Studies. The diversity and quality of these PhD students’ on-going projects, included in this publication, clearly reflect this contribution.

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Introduction

In a post-post-cold war setting, the peace studies look at the international system must reflect the multi-dimensional character of peace and conflict, as not self-excluding. It must also reflect the multi-level dynamics (individual, communitarian, societal and international) where the continuum of peaces and violences takes place. The demands of a post-Westphalian order, in contrast to a still much state-centric international system, assist in this process where an evolving nature of violence and peace approaches is visible.

Peace studies have, from their inception, argued for a paradigm change, which has fallen short of taking place. This paradigm shift requires a different approach that should be adopted regarding terminology, means, personnel, instruments, etc. This should start by transforming the linear conflict cycle into a peace web where different areas of intervention are interconnected and focused on peace.

This chapter starts by outlining our concept of peace, providing the framework for the literature review of peace studies that ensues. This review ends with the analysis of current trends in peace studies, identifying critical issues that our conceptual proposal picks up and develops. The conceptual proposal begins by criticizing the conflict narrative underlying peace studies and the way it is rendered operational. It then presents and develops our proposal regarding the conditions for a paradigm shift, based on the concept of a peace web sustained by a culture of peace. We argue that the disconnection between research and action in peace studies results from a linear phased conflict narrative which cannot adequately respond to the challenges posed by organised armed violence and violent formal peace contexts. Therefore, our contribution identifies four correlated areas of intervention—peace promotion, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuild-
ing—that are not sequential phases, but have different levels of intensity. These different areas of intervention are embedded in a culture of peace and, combined, result in an overall sustainable strategy for peace.

**Peace studies: then and now**

Peace studies distance themselves from the state-centric realist paradigm in international relations, defining themselves as a ‘rejectionist’ approach (Dunn, 2005: 37). It also rejects the security and strategic studies premises, where conflict and war are a constant and need to be managed and mitigated. Peace studies reject the assumption that violence is “a fundamentally inescapable condition associated with being human” (Dunn, 2005: 40). In reality, for strategic studies “peace has been of little significance” (Terriff et al, 1999: 65), which determined that after the Second World War, peace studies were “viewed as essentially an intellectual protest movement” (Terriff et al, 1999: 65).

Peace studies assume that although humans have the capability to cause harm, they also entail the capability to cooperate and collaborate, and to choose a non-violent path to resolve their conflicts. To ignore this duality and the possibility of choice, and dooming mankind to a “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” life (Hobbes, 1651: chap. xxviii), is to “distort the capacities human beings have, it is an illfaith idealism” (Martinez Guzmán, 2005: 45-46).

Despite this ‘rejectionist’ approach, early peace researchers, such as Johann Galtung in Britain and Kenneth Boulding and Anatol Rapaport in the United States of America, did not embark in a simple rejection of the interpretation of the mainstream realist paradigm’s main assumptions. Following a Kantian tradition, they were interested in ‘peace’ itself, not in order to “manage the status quo to the advantage of one side or the other, but to change it” (Terriff et al, 1999: 70). The main contributions of Boulding and Rapaport “helped define particular areas of concern and method for peace studies” (Mason, 2002: 17), such as ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, ‘stable peace’ and ‘cultures of peace’. Their work has shifted the emphasis from violence to peace by opposing cultures of peace to cultures of violence — a change that embodies a paradigm shift.

Johann Galtung went further to define peace as more than the absence of war (direct violence), construing it in a positive way to include structural and cultural violences (Galtung, 1969). Direct violence includes physical and psychological violence exerted directly on some-
one. Structural violence is an indirect violence which is a result of “the social structure itself — between humans, between sets of humans (societies), between sets of societies (alliances, regions) in the world” (Galtung, 1996: 2). Cultural violence constitutes the network which legitimises the other two types of violence, through its system of norms and behaviour (Galtung, 1996: 2). Each of these violences is a vertex in Galtung’s violence triangle. The author argues that peace studies as a field of study does not (and should not) simply elaborate and apply so-called neutral theories, which are then verified by collected data. For the ‘father of peace studies’, values are an intrinsic part of the research this approach presents, with peace as the “core value” (Galtung, 1996: 13). This is essential not only for the kind of conclusions drawn, but also, and most importantly, for the action recommended. Peace studies have been defined as an approach mainly directed to action, a ‘research-action’ approach.

Galtung’s trilogy of violences unveils the global dynamics of exploitation. And it is from this conclusion that some authors, such as Ekkehart Krippendorff, Lars Dencik and Gunder Frank, identify “capitalism as the key source of war and violent conflict” (Terriff et al, 1999: 71). This led to a line of radicalization of peace studies, calling for “exposure of the global dynamics of exploitation and, if necessary, their resolution by revolution, a strategy that was anathema to the process of rational transformation envisaged by Galtung” (Terriff et al, 1999: 71). Traditional peace studies were portrayed as embracing the dominant paradigm, where Western development was the model to be adopted elsewhere if progress was to be achieved, “and doing little more than tweaking the power balance underlying the status quo” (Terriff et al, 1999: 71). Consequently, peace studies changed its focus from “the strategic relationship of the superpowers”, in the end still dealing essentially with direct violence, “towards the dynamics of the North–South relationship”, enlarging the object of research to include global structural violence (Terriff et al, 1999: 71). This enlargement, however, was followed by further stretching the peace studies’ object of analysis. Soon, each and every social problem seemed to be connected with dynamics of peace and conflict and, therefore, should be analysed within peace studies (Tromp, 1981). As Håkan Wiberg put it, peace studies became a ‘black hole’ encompassing every social dynamics (2005: 25). Nevertheless, this broadening movement allowed for a better contextualization and definition of the concept of peace, analyzed at the individual, community, societal, regional and international levels, and finally consolidating a research approach that goes beyond the state-centric relationships of peace and conflict.
With the end of the cold war, this ‘black hole’ started gaining some consistency, especially after Kaldor’s ‘new wars’ started being discussed. Mary Kaldor (1999) argued that most of the wars of the 1990s differed from the traditional international wars. The most striking difference was the erosion of the state’s legitimate monopoly of the use of force, most of these ‘new wars’ were intrastate; the belligerent groups were often not in uniform or organized in an army-like fashion; violence was internationally (and illegally) financed and supported in a scale never registered before, having connections with arms, drugs and human trade networks; and a growing number of victims were civilians (Kaldor, 1999). Ken Booth goes further, recognizing that it is not a matter of “either old or new [wars], but rather a complex recognition of both old and new” (2001: 165). Moura (2005) adds a new dimension to Kaldor’s proposal based on the continuum of peaces and violences by highlighting war-like violences in formal peace contexts.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, most peace researchers agree peace studies have to undergo a fundamental rethinking of its raison d’être (Pureza and Cravo, 2005). This concern comes from the realization of a too broad research agenda (Mason, 2002; Rogers and Ramsbotham, 1999), which came to include development (Duffield, 2001), security (Buzan et al, 1997), and feminist (Brock-Utne, 1985) studies. On the one hand, this broadening and interdisciplinarity approach enriched peace studies, but, on the other hand, it resulted in a dilution of focus. In addition, the distinctive characteristic peace studies had from their inception, a research-action oriented field, has lost momentum due to the incapacity to successfully translate into action the results of peace research.

Paul Lawler summarizes these concerns in three points that we seek to address in this chapter: “the absence of a substantial theoretical or conceptual core, a tendency to deploy uncritically key terms such as ‘structural violence’ or ‘positive peace’, and an unclear standpoint with regard to direct violence, particularly the use of violence in the pursuit of justice or other values” (2002: 9). We propose the return and consolidation of the theoretical and conceptual peace studies core, by not only recovering the core value of peace, but also framing the research and the action in a culture of peace. This proposal is grounded on a critique of the terminology peace research has put forward and practitioners have adopted. The unclear standpoint with regard to direct violence is addressed conceptually by the continuum of peaces and violences and our peace definition. This reflection aims at making a contribution towards addressing the disconnection between research and action.
Conceptual framework

The connection between research and action has followed a conflict-oriented narrative, which is too narrow and misleading. It does not allow for a working concept of structural peace and it confuses conflict with violence. As a result, peace has to be defined not as opposed to conflict, but in relation to violence. This relation is dialectic, reflecting what we call a continuum of peaces and violences.

Conflict narrative: a critique

We acknowledge that conflict exists in every society. However, this acknowledgement does not constitute an endorsement of the realist-hobbesian approach to conflict. In our understanding, conflicts cannot be resolved in the sense of being eliminated. What can be mitigated is violence, i.e., the choice of violence as opposed to the choice of peace in addressing conflicts.

This understanding allows for a constant focus on the establishment of the basic structural conditions for peace, even when addressing organized physical and psychological violence. That is why these issues cannot be properly understood unless we reject the segmentation of the ‘conflict cycle’ and conflict-oriented narrative: conflict prevention → conflict management → conflict resolution → post-conflict reconstruction. This narrative confines and directs strategies, instruments and actors to conflict. For peace studies, violence is the problem, but if the framework of action is bounded and rooted in conflict, the outcomes can hardly be framed outside a conflict-oriented narrative.

This narrow and misleading perspective raises two main critiques. First, conflicts cannot be prevented or resolved, but only managed. This means that referring to post-conflict reconstruction does not make sense. Second, what ‘conflict’ should explicitly mean in this narrative is ‘violence’. And violence can be prevented, managed, and resolved in the sense of being mitigated whereas conflict is intrinsic to life in society. Thus, there is a traditional assumption that conflict and violence are interchangeable concepts, which has resulted in a distortion of the premises underlying action.

Although peace studies brought a new vision and approach to the study of conflict, they have remained, to a certain extent, attached to the conflict narrative. This is clear when we think of the conflict cycle: conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. This terminology does not reflect the ‘core
value' of peace. And this cycle reflects confusion between conflict and violence, because, although it sets out to resolve the conflict, in reality, it only settles the conflict by containing violence. Conflict is inherent to society, violence is a choice. Consequently, conflict cannot be resolved just by containing violence. Violence, however, can be avoided if the basic structural conditions for peace are in place.

What peace?

Peace is a complex concept and each attempt to better define it always finds criticism. Nevertheless, this is a central concept for peace studies informing our vision regarding goals, instruments and policies. Consequently, we understand peace as a holistic process that implies the existence of basic structural conditions. These include the absence of organized physical and psychological violence, the satisfaction of basic human needs, and at the institutional level, representative and proportional power-sharing structures and the promotion and protection of human rights1.

To some extent this understanding of peace coincides with Galtung’s positive and negative peace (1969), though we assume these should not be, even if only conceptually, separated. In our understanding, this separation further reinforces the sequential approach to peace, where, first, violence is managed or eliminated and only then the structural conditions for peace are addressed. The holistic framework for peace put forward here implies the existence of correlated areas of intervention as opposed to sequential phases of intervention, since positive and negative peaces are intrinsically connected, as explained below.

The dichotomy between peace and war is too simplistic. In order to better understand the peaceful and violent dynamics of conflictual situations, it is better to adopt the concept of a continuum of peaces and violences, where violent options are chosen in different intensities, even in formal peace contexts. This is based on the premise that violence as well as peace are a choice. As a result, the choice of peaceful or violent means reflects the basic structural conditions above men-

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1 This conceptual frame has also been used by other authors, such as Håkan Wiberg: “Since the 1960s, different values were put forward to overcome the absence of physical violence; the main candidates, nowadays, seem to be the following: 1) equity and wellbeing (i.e., absence of a structural violence); 2) freedom (absence of oppression); 3) identity (absence of alienation or cultural violence).” (2005: 28)
tioned. When these are fulfilled there is a higher tendency to resort to peaceful means in order to resolve conflicts. In addition, the concept of peace is embedded in a normative framework, where peace is the core value guiding theory and action. We act by peace and not only to mitigate or manage organized physical and psychological violence. To illustrate this logic, think how peacekeeping operations, although directed at 'peace', use instruments and personnel trained for war.

The peace studies’ research presents a new paradigm with a new ontology based on the core value of peace, and the concepts, terminology and vision have seeped into the international system, framing the intervention strategies. This is clear regarding United Nations documents, strategies and mandates, where the “peace support elements, [are] themselves in part drawn from peace research terminology” (Rogers and Ramsbotham, 1999: 750).

preventive diplomacy → peacemaking → peacekeeping → peacebuilding

Source: Adapted from Boutros-Ghali, 1992.

Fig. 1. Agenda for Peace

The structure of the Agenda for Peace has not lost its linearity, though the terminology reflects a peace approach, demarcating itself from the conflict oriented narrative. However, this demarcation is not enough to trigger a fundamental change in the nature of the associated interventions, which remain conflict, i.e. violence, focused. Peacekeeping is not only a good example of this demarcation, but also of the shortfalls it embodies.

Peacekeeping as illustrative of the research-action disconnection

Peacekeeping is probably the best example of the above mentioned disconnection between research and action. And, yet, it is also the best example of a clear attempt to bridge this gap. The United Nations Charter does not foresee peacekeeping missions, although it contains elements and principles that reflect the spirit within which peacekeeping and peacebuilding are envisaged. So, the reasoning agreed to frame peacekeeping missions was somewhat between Chapter VI (Pacific resolution of disputes) and Chapter VII (peace enforcement measures when peace is threatened or violated or when there are acts of
aggression). Some call it ‘Chapter VI ½’: soldiers are sent but with a restrictive mandate regarding the use of force. Most of the times, their mandates forbid the use of force except for self-defense. This first type of peacekeeping missions was in charge of observing the fulfillment of the conditions established in the peace agreements, settlements, and cease-fires. Their main goal was to ensure physical violence was not perpetrated by any of the belligerent groups (Galtung’s negative peace, where direct violence is absent). Two main problems arose from these missions with these mandates. First, the belligerent groups were not that easily identified, which made it harder for the mission to check who was keeping or breaking the peace conditions agreed upon. The peacekeeping soldiers are trained to defend and fight against an identified opponent. Second, although some kind of peace was agreed upon, before the peacekeeping missions went in, the main problem is that even in formal peace contexts violence might persist.

The continuum of peaces and violences explains how in formal peace contexts one can still find acts of aggression like in a war. These soldiers are not supposed to engage in fighting, unless fired upon and in very restrictive conditions. Consequently, acts of aggression perpetrated between the belligerent groups, or any other groups for that matter, do not qualify for the peacekeeping soldiers to intervene. The most they can do is to report that one or several groups are not keeping up to the peace agreement or cease-fire. The disconnection between research and action is clear. The idea was to incorporate the need to install, restore and guarantee the peace. However, the instruments and personnel used do not embody this vision, since their training is directed at violence. Furthermore, the conventional dichotomy of war and peace subverts the mandates of these soldiers. For the sake of peace, they should not fight and, because of the violence still occurring, not qualified as war, they fail in fulfilling their mandates and protecting both the civilians and themselves. The underlying causes for the violence remain. Sometimes, it may fall short of civil war or armed conflict that developed before the peacekeeping mission arrived, but it just becomes socialized, not spoken of, more dissimulated. The violence becomes invisible for soldiers, since it transforms itself from a threat to the international peace into a matter of domestic/transnational criminality.

The United Nations, in face of these issues and of the fact that peace studies were broadening its meaning of peace to include social, economic and cultural conditions, realized the need to adjust the peacekeeping missions. And, for that purpose, in the 1980s and 1990s, a second type of peacekeeping took shape. It was felt that there was
a need to adapt the peacekeeping missions’ mandates to include more than observing and keeping the peace, namely, human security, confidence building, power sharing agreements, electoral support, rule of law strengthening, and social and economic development. These new missions went beyond the initial mandates and included besides soldiers and police, civilian personnel. Until then, peacebuilding was usually in the hands of development aid official agencies, both bi- and multilateral, and of non-governmental organizations. These would wait until it was safe to go in and then peacebuilding would start, in the so-called ‘post-conflict reconstruction phase’. Incorporating these concerns into the peacekeeping mandates reflects an understanding that peacebuilding has to start much earlier than after the suspension of violence.

This perspective also reflects a significant change in the United Nations operational concept of peace: peace is more than the end of armed violence. The goal of these interventions becomes the creation of a ‘culture of peace’, through responding to immediate security and humanitarian needs as well as to the causes of the violence. This is an absolute innovative element. The peacekeeping missions become multidimensional, involving security, institutional, economic and psycho-social dimensions. The security perspective follows the original peacekeeping mandates, guaranteeing peace through the absence of violence. The institutional dimension is related to the political regimes and systems, in order to frame the efforts developed, and to create a peaceful system to settle conflicts. This usually includes the judiciary, political parties, and multi-level governance. The economic dimension envisages the creation of a liberal market economy favorable to investment and focused on economic growth and development. The integration of the ex-combatants is crucial for this dimension. Finally, all these efforts are insufficient unless the issue of social reconciliation is addressed, including all stakeholders. This constitutes the psycho-social dimension.

Again, there is a clear attempt to respond to reality while taking into account the peace studies research results. But two structural problems remained: the instruments and the personnel. Although including a greater number of civilians, these were still soldiers, trained to war; and suddenly the mandates seemed almost impossible to fulfill, since this multidimensionality became too broad. The idea was to guarantee peace through peaceful means and frame these missions clearly within Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, but soldiers are not trained with that focus. Furthermore, although the concept of peace in a broader sense seeped into this second type of peacekeeping
missions, the concept of a continuum of peaces and violences did not. Consequently, soldiers were given peaceful missions, but were still not allowed to fight to protect civilians and themselves, like, for instance, in Somalia.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, a third type of peacekeeping missions has taken form, again, in an attempt to respond to cumulative experience and to conceptual evolution in research. If with second type of peacekeeping (multi-dimensional), the move was towards Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, with the third type, the movement swung in the opposite direction towards Chapter VII. It seems there is an intention to finally give ‘teeth and claws’ to these missions and the focus is on collective human security, and, to that intent, some peace enforcement. This move was accompanied by two factors in order to provide consistency and coherence to these concerns. First, in 2000, the Brahimi Report sets the stage for the creation of a peacekeeping system on two levels: on the one hand, peacekeeping missions led and coordinated by the United Nations (blue helmet missions) and, on the other hand, peacekeeping missions authorized by the United Nations, but led and coordinated by one state-member, a group of states-members or an international organization. The latter envisaging the resort to violence if necessary to fulfill the implementation of the operational mandate.

Two issues should be noted here: one, this corresponds to a militarization of the peacekeeping missions, since it includes the possibility of resorting to the use of force beyond self-defense; and two, there seems to be some distancing of the United Nations in what concerns peacekeeping missions with ‘teeth and claws’, preferring to leave these to the leadership and coordination of a/or several state/s-member/s. The second factor that is important to refer is the creation of a Commission for Peacebuilding (UNSC Res. 1645, 2005) by the United Nations Security Council. This Commission has as its main goal to coordinate the peacekeeping efforts and the peacebuilding ones and to become the link between peacebuilding and violence prevention.

But, once again, there are some major concerns with this tendency. To start with, there is an actual potential for the United Nations peacekeeping missions to remain unchanged, following the second type mandates, with all the problems that entailed. Second, the ones that are delegated to state/s-member/s seem to be militarized, giving soldiers, finally, a mandate do defend not only themselves but the civilian population. We obviously agree that soldiers and the civilian population should be protected, but then, they should not be within a peacekeeping mandate. This modus operandi reveals, once again, the discon-
nection between terminology and overall goals, and implementation. Third, how are these missions going to be organized, even with a Commission to coordinate everyone’s efforts? Third type of peacekeeping missions include soldiers (for peace enforcement, if needed), police and other civilian security forces (for creating and implementing a rule of law and security and judicial institutions), development aid workers of all ‘shapes and forms’ (for creating the conditions for a peaceful reconstruction), and these missions will have to implement their mandates in collaboration with local actors at all levels and sectors. How is this going to be rendered operational if soldiers trained for war remain the key actors in these missions?

Furthermore, this joint collaborative intervention should keep in mind the ultimate goal of preventing more violence. Not only the underlying causes may still linger, with a potential to re-escalation, but new causes may arise due to the model of reconstruction promoted. This follows the Western development model based on a liberal market economy and democracy. This model is not only imposed from outsiders, but it also has a predatory nature, preventing other alternative development models from (co-)existing. Consequently, it may create new reasons for violence based on frustration and resentment. This model implicitly assumes that peace will follow economic development and democracy. Development and democracy obviously may contribute to a peaceful society, but this is not an automatic causal relation. There is a need for a culture of peace to be sown and take root in a society. It is this culture of peace which will prevent and avoid future violence from occurring. This culture of peace will have to be articulated with the values and traditions of each society, in order to flourish. This process of peace creation and consolidation implies already a preventive nature. The incorporation of a culture of peace creates the conditions for peaceful means to be used to address conflicts, instead of violent ones. The root causes for conflicts do not disappear, but the process of dealing with them changes. Besides the assumption that a successful ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ will bring peace, when faced with early warning signs, preventive diplomacy is usually the instrument used.

Preventive diplomacy usually takes place before violence has erupted and therefore it is not articulated with a ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ process. In other words, during the ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ process, prevention is essentially promoted through the ‘reconstruction’ and not through regular, consistent, coherent diplomatic monitoring and involvement with the different stakeholders. The ‘preventive’ element is lost, with the personnel involved and the tasks usually performed before violence takes place, being left out from the ‘re-
construction’. However, it is not enough to close the linear ‘conflict cycle’ articulating ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ with preventive diplomacy. We argue this process should be taken a step further. It should not be viewed as a linear phased process, but rather as a complex network, where all the different elements are interconnected and are developed within an explicit culture of peace.

**Connecting research and action: new avenues for conceptual and operational peace interventions**

As defined by the United Nations, the “Culture of Peace is a set of values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life that reject violence and prevent [violence] by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations” (United Nations, 1998 and 1998a). Celia Cook-Huffman identifies this transformation as a “challenge of integrating structural analysis into conflict resolving and waging practices so that cultures of violence can be transformed into cultures of peace” (2002: 46). This builds on the work developed by John Paul Lederach, who considers conflict transformation a key element in this process.

Conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships. (Lederach, 2003: 14, emphasis in the original.)

Here, the peace studies research-action nature has as its ontology a culture of peace, which, in our understanding, should frame the different areas of intervention in the form of a web (as opposed to the linear ‘conflict cycle’).

Within the web, the relations between the nodes are bi-directional and non-linear. In other words, every node is influenced and influences each of the others. For this approach to have peaceful results, these dynamics should be imprinted with peaceful values, attitudes and modes of action, as defined by the culture of peace. This holds for every node, independently on where or when the intervention takes place.

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2 This concept of transformation is further developed in research where «culture of peace» (PUREZA 2001) and «sustainable peace» (REYCHLER 2001) are discussed.
This peace web reflects differentiated intervention strategies which incorporate distinct instruments. These are correlated and applied with different levels of intensity according to the situation they are responding to. This means that peace promotion, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are not sequential but correlated areas of intervention. These areas are not contained; they support each other in an articulated though flexible way towards the common goal of peace. Peace promotion implies a strategy of confidence building, which aims at creating the conditions for a non-violent choice of means when in face of conflict. This strategy includes instruments such as the creation of lines of communication, of power sharing scenarios, of a conducive environment to discuss issues of grievances, resentment and/or justice. These instruments should always be present even if in a formal peace context. As argued earlier, formal peace contexts still include violent means in a continuum of peaces and violences, which should not be ignored.

Peacemaking is an area of intervention essentially salient when responding to organized armed violence and violent formal peace contexts. It includes not only the traditional instruments of negotiation, mediation, second track mediation towards attaining cease-fires and peace agreements, settlements, and accords, but also building open lines of communication, representative power-sharing arrange-
ments and, overall, confidence building measures. Peacekeeping, as an area of intervention, focuses on keeping the peace by responding to organized armed violence and violent formal peace contexts. This implies the deployment of peacekeepers, understood here as civilians and security forces (police), besides soldiers with a third type of peacekeeping mandate. Along with these, there should be more institutional instruments, such as the establishment of the rule of law, a functioning judicial system, proportional power-sharing and representative structures, the promotion and protection of human rights, and the creation or re-empowerment of domestic security forces in order to (re-)establish the monopoly of the legitimate use of force by the state.

Peacebuilding aims at consolidating and promoting peace. Following on the peacekeeping institutional instruments, peacebuilding further implies economic reconstruction, measures to assist in reconciling society, integration of ex-combatants, all of these sustained by confidence building measures. These areas of intervention contribute and are upheld by a culture of peace, which advocates peaceful values, attitudes, modes of behavior and ways of life. By framing these areas of intervention in this peace web, the result is a dynamic and integrated approach to peace, which is correlated instead of sequential and phased, allowing for a comprehensive approach that renders the research-action agenda an attainable goal.

This conceptual proposal demands a structural revision at the operational level. We argue that the existing instruments formally have the potential to address peace and violence concerns. However, these same instruments are premised in concepts and rendered operational in such a way that limits their success. In this way, we do not advance with a proposal for the creation of new instruments, rather we argue for a differentiated articulation and implementation of the existing ones. Our proposal falls upon an operational shift. First, regarding timing, meaning that interventions should not be delineated as sequential depending on their focus, but rather correlated as put forward in the peace web. Second, this requires that interventions include military, police and civilian personnel, in a joint-coordinated and correlated manner. This means that strategies, implementation plans and decision-making processes have to be tripartite in order to be comprehensive enough to address the complexity of the realities on the field. This way of rendering operational the existing instruments corresponds to the multiple linkages identified in the peace web. Moreover, these interventions should be explicitly and specifically committed to sets of values, modes of behavior and ways of life that reject violence and promote peace.
Only when research and action depart and act by this same ontology can a culture of peace take root.

**Conclusion**

Peace studies have advocated from their inception a paradigm shift. They have put forward a new ontology to address violence and peace, which has seeped into the political discourse and instruments. This move has made it into the field of operations, mainly through peacekeeping missions. However, the results have not lived up to the expectations. On the one hand, the broadening of the peace studies’ agenda along with the disconnection between the operational results and the research proposals rendered the peace studies field fragile. On the other hand, these same dynamics have allowed for a legitimization of the operational instruments in a perverse manner. Incorporating the peace studies terminology and research results legitimized the use of traditional instruments under these new language and understandings. This resulted in frustrating and unsuccessful outcomes regarding the peace studies’ research-action implementation.

We argue that the conditions are ripe for the paradigm shift so long advocated by peace studies, if we concentrate in keeping ‘action’ coherent with ontology. Building upon Peter Hall’s policy paradigm shift model (1993), we believe the paradigm shift into a culture of peace is being thwarted by the fact that a second order change has not taken place. According to Hall, a paradigm shift entails first, second and third order changes. Paradigms are structured by overall goals, policy instruments and the settings where these instruments are applied. First order change occurs when the settings change, but the overall goals and instruments remain the same. This change takes place on the basis of past experiences and projections for the future. Second order change involves a modification in both settings and instruments of policy whereas the overall goals remain the same. These two orders of change correspond to Kuhn’s ‘normal science’ (1996). The third order of change entails a change in settings, policy instruments and overall goals, implying a paradigm shift (Kuhn’s new scientific paradigm).

Peace studies have put forward an explicit proposal for a paradigm shift, where the overall goal is peace, by peaceful means. For a long time, this proposal remained just an intellectual alternative due to the cold war setting, where the goal was to contain violence without ignoring the eventual need to use force if need be. With the end of the cold war, the setting allowed this overall goal to become a fea-
sible alternative. The post-cold war setting unveiled types of violence that differ from cold war ones. Along the lines of Kaldor and Moura, the intra-state nature of violence and the continuum of peaces and violences, including in formal peace contexts, denote a setting change, even though the policy instruments remained untouched (first order change). Gradually, the need was felt to respond to this setting change by adjusting the policy instruments. This adjustment was mostly noticeable in the evolution of peacekeeping missions. Conceptually, these adjustments incorporated the terminology of peace studies in an attempt to reflect the overall goal of peace (second order change). And yet, the so longed paradigm shift into a culture of peace did not take place. This was mainly due to implementation procedures, which revealed a disconnection between the terminology and the overall goal pursued, and the instruments and personnel involved in rendering these operational. This remains as such, because cultures of violence still prevail over cultures of peace regarding training, equipment, mandate and personnel. Therefore, the paradigm shift towards a culture of peace, with the overall goal of peace by peaceful means, will not take place unless cultures of violence are replaced by cultures of peace (third order change). This means reconnecting peace studies research and action, as advanced in our peace web proposal, overcoming the shortcomings in second order change. A challenge that remains for the future of peace studies.

References


The Evolution of the Eastern Question?

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Non amat veritas angulos: in medio stat.

Introduction

The subject of this article, once being capable of causing considerable unrest amongst Europe’s most prominent leaders and politicians for nearly two centuries, is both of historic and political value. The Eastern Question and its echoes, forming one of oldest surviving dilemmas of international politics, which have been preserved in an unsurprisingly familiar state, in spite of the history changing boundaries and participants many times over. With the West facing yet another set of issues in the Balkans, it is logical for one to attempt to draw parallels between the region’s contemporary misfortunes and similar-seeming events in its past: since the geopolitical situation in and around the South-Eastern Europe is renowned for generating tensions amongst the key players on the international arena the Eastern Question appears to be a sensible place to begin.

Viewed in a more ‘classic’ political context, the Eastern Question asked what would happen to the acquisitions of the Sublime Porte in Europe as the power of the Sultans weakened gradually throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. The first official use of the term is frequently dated to the 1822 Holy Alliance conference in Verona (Sоловьев, 1876; Borejsza, 2002: 225), with alternative indications pointing towards the question originating within the series of Russo-Turkish wars in the late 18th century. From the historic point of view, the Eastern Question is normally divided into four chronological periods: the first —from the 1760s until the end of the Napoleonic Wars at the congress of Vienna in 1815, the end of the second period being marked by the 1856 Paris Treaty, the end of the third— by the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, with the fourth and final period ending with the disappearance of the Ottoman empire in 1922. In order to assess the rele-
vance of the modern Balkan crisis to its earlier counterpart it could be considered necessary to look into the content of these periods.

The first period saw the emergence of the Russian Empire as a dominant power in the South-Eastern Europe due to three successful wars with Turkey (1768-1774, 1787-1791 and 1806-1812) followed by multiple territorial gains. After an alliance between the emperor Alexander I and Napoleon Bonaparte—a result of the peace of Tilsit following the defeat of Russo-Austrian forces at Austerlitz—most of Russia’s competitors with interests in the region concerned by the question were effectively kept out of the action, with the Balkan rivalry already involving the interests of Great Britain, Austria and the Kingdom of Prussia. Following the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Russian influence in the question grew even greater, largely due to the fact that Emperor Alexander was among the principal victors.

During the second period, the Russian hold on the Balkans had started to gradually decline. The latter process is generally considered to be linked to Alexander’s unwillingness to provide support for the anti-Ottoman uprising in Greece (Soloviev, 1876), which began in 1821 and continued until 1829 resulting in the establishment of the Republic. By 1841 it seemed that the Russian Empire had abandoned its plans to control Turkey, with Alexander’s successor Nikolai I ratifying the London Straits Convention under which the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were to remain closed to the navies of all Great Powers. The defeat in the Crimean war and the terms of the Peace of Paris in 1856 had ensured a continued demise of Russia’s influence over the states of South-Eastern Europe as the remaining major players in the European arena had aligned their interests with maintaining the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire.

The third period was dominated by Russia's attempts to regain its control over the ‘Danubian Principalities’, after the collapse of the Treaty of Paris following the defeat of France in 1871. This situation had enabled the Russian Empire to play a more active role in the Question: Emperor Alexander II chose to actively support the anti-Ottoman insurrection during the Great Eastern Crisis, resulting in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. This concluded with the Treaty of San-Stefano. However, the Russian re-emergence that was the consequence of the defeat of Constantinople was objected to by the Great Powers, leading to the revision of the treaty of San-Stefano that granted independence to the majority of the Ottoman Balkan provinces. The Congress of Berlin in June 1878 had reversed the San-Stefano protocols, greatly diminishing the Russian War achievements together with re-drawing the boundaries of the newly independent Balkan states in Turkey’s favour.
and placing Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Dualist Monarchy.

The fourth and final period, extending into the second decade of the twentieth century, witnessed a rapid polarization amongst the Great Powers. This polarization could be best represented through the formation of the Austro-German Dual Alliance (1879) and the Franco-British Entente Cordiale (1904) that was formally joined by Russia in 1907. Both parties, and on occasion, their individual members, saw their own interests in the question, with Germany making extensive political investments in Turkey and Bulgaria, the Austrian Empire looking towards the annexation of Bosnia and the Russian government attempting to unilaterally secure access to the Straits in order to regain its status in Question d’Orient (Grishina, 2006: 318). The Russian political bid, however, was unsuccessful: a diplomatic blunder by Nicholas II’s foreign minister, Izvolsky, had resulted in a successful Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, whilst the claims of the Tsarist government towards the Straits were blocked by its allies Britain and France. During the years preceding the start of the First World War the region that had been dominated by this question had seen additional disturbances, this time courtesy of the Balkan states’ territorial claims on each other, represented by the local hostilities known as the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). The conclusion of the First World War in 1918 and the capitulation of Turkey, followed by the Peace Conference in Lausanne (1923) determined the new borders of post-war Turkey.

In theory, after the 1923 alterations to the borders of Turkey, it is possible to speak of the end of the Eastern Question in its ‘classic’ sense. With the Second World War and the Cold War distancing us from this issue even further, resulting in the formation of Federative Yugoslavia, an entity that united the majority of the most unstable former Ottoman provinces in Europe, the Question can be seen as having fallen victim to the bi-polar trend in the international relations that existed until the mid-1980s. Changes to conventional military doctrines and the increased reliance on nuclear weapons by the major powers of the 20th century had brought down the significance of the Balkan Peninsula’s strategic attractiveness. However, global developments at the concluding stages of the Cold War resulting in the weakening and collapse of the Soviet Union, and the internal processes within the Balkans resulting from the death of Tito, had contributed to the creation of the environment that can allow us to come back to the specifics of the Question. This comeback was largely made possible by the events in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, namely the period commonly known as the Yugoslav Wars of Secession, and the political situation around them.
The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia collapsed in a bloody civil war after a prolonged crisis of power dominated by regional specifics, with some of them being ethnicity-related. The crisis, originating out of a decentralization of the federal and party institutions after the death of Yugoslavia’s charismatic leader, Marshal Josef Broz Tito, deepened after a number of steps towards exiting the federation had been taken by the richest member republics: amendments to the Yugoslav constitution introduced by Serbia to prevent the separatist tendencies in Slovenia and Croatia had eventually resulted in the involvement of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) in the crisis. The Yugoslav Wars of Secession begin in the summer of 1991 with violence in the Republic of Slovenia (Chuksin, 2003: 130).

In general, Europe’s attitudes to the unfolding wars in Yugoslavia could be argued to have been determined by two factors. Avoiding the overly-debated arguments surrounding the European reaction to unilateral declarations of independence by the Yugoslav member republics, it is possible to say that, firstly, the ‘Old World’, represented by the European Community, was pursuing a logical objective to emerge as an active political conglomerate on the international arena, which after the departure of the USSR fell victim to the undisputed dominance of the United States (McCormick, 2007). With the Yugoslav Wars of Secession being a major test for European diplomacy, the second factor guiding the EC in the Yugoslav matter could be argued to have been directly related to the American challenge faced by the European Community, with an opportunity to discourage a possible US intervention into the area of international relations that has always been traditionally European. The latter point is supported by the chronology of the major diplomatic steps accompanying Yugoslavia’s wars: it is possible to see that the political surroundings of the Yugoslav crisis at its opening stages are dominated by the EC, whereas the American political influence in the crisis increased with the escalation of the hostilities (Holbrooke, 1998: 116).

Coming back to our subject, it is possible to say that the behaviour of the principal participants of the Yugoslav Wars of Secession and the actions of the main international ‘parties concerned’ could easily fit into the patterns of the Question that existed that the beginning of the century. With the new Eastern Question asking what will happen to the Yugoslav legacy, it is relatively easy to draw historic parallels between the conditions surrounding the start of the Balkan wars of the 1990s —such as, for instance, a well-known debate about the initiative taken by the German government to accept the independence of Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991 (Silber, 1991)— and their
‘sister’ wars in 1912-1913. Similarly to the later versions, the ‘original’ Balkan wars can also be seen to have a variety of superpower policy behaviours around the conflicting parties: the facts remind us of the French and Russian support for Serbia and German and Austrian aid to Bulgaria during this period.

Speaking of the revival of the Eastern Question it is essential to make a note of several similar trends and comparisons, as well as investigations made earlier by Balkan researchers. In the 1990s a British journalist Misha Glenny famously coined a term ‘Third Balkan War’ referring to the invasion of Serbia by Austria-Hungary during the opening stages of the First World War (Glenny, 1999: 312). Although, used in the context of description of a historical event, the ‘third war’ could be argued to have become an accurate description of earlier attempts to provide a history-based explanation to the events in Yugoslavia. Maria Todorova in the introduction to her work *Imagining the Balkans* reminds us of a Carnegie Endowment report published in 1993 with a preface by George Kennan entitled *The Balkan Crisis 1913-1993* that aimed to show “how much of today’s problem has deep roots and how much it does not” (Todorova, 1993: 4; Kennon et al, 1993: 1). Todorova also assesses the notion of the Ottoman legacy and its implications for the Balkan states, arguing that the “Ottoman legacy proved much more persistent” (Todorova, 1993: 180) for the area affected by the ‘Question’. Indeed, if one chooses to look at the policy peculiarities of the newly independent Yugoslav states, it is possible to see that the old social processes originating from the days of the Ottoman decline still exist in the majority of cases. It is therefore, sensible to refer to the past in its Balkan context when formulating the policies and solutions destined to tackle the dilemmas of present-day South-Eastern Europe; however, it is also important to remember that the past is at times a misleading adviser.

The ‘Great Power side’ of the participants in the Yugoslav crisis, even though it had undergone considerable changes in the course of the last century, appears to be driven by motives similar to those that existed amongst its predecessors during the advanced stages of the Eastern Question. The interests of the EC and the United States are once again located within the area of geopolitics, foreign policy and ideology. Both parties can be seen competing for the establishment of influence over the new available territory, with the Wars of Secession being a suitable situation for promotion of the Western values. The United States would logically be interested in taking the leading role in the European Yugoslav crisis resolution initiative, depriving the EC of an opportunity to establish its position internationally, together with the
goal of establishing the American presence on the Balkans, which, if to refer to Mackinder’s concepts of ‘world-island’ and ‘heartland’ (Mackinder, 2004), is an important vantage point en route to the East. Out of the obvious differences between the European and American interests in the modern version of the ‘Question’, it is also possible to speak of polarization, with Europe and the United States approaching the Yugoslav Wars of Secession from different perspectives. Whilst the US refrains from direct involvement in a de facto European problem at first, it then chooses to intervene due to still existing geopolitical opportunities on the Balkans, after the European initiative towards the newly independent Yugoslav states fails?

It could be added that the polarization mentioned above in the context of the revival of the Eastern Question, occurs at an individual state level as well as on a ‘bloc’ level. Each of the new Great Power conglomerates and their members have a designated party in the Yugoslav conflict that enjoys their continued support. However, by contrast with the beginning of the twentieth century, these parties are not characterized by borders of a particular state, but more often by a particular ethnic or religious group. In some aspects, such behaviour could be argued to have had a much greater overall destabilizing effect on the participants of the Yugoslav Wars of Secession (Malinov, 2000) than the ‘conventional’ pre-First World War divisions. With the multi-ethnic tensions being a long-surviving part of the history of the Balkans a selective Great Power assistance to one of the parties directly involved in the crisis would have automatically deepened the ethnic hatred from the others that were naturally to feel ‘left out’.

Did we learn our historic lesson? With regard to most of the comparisons and matching facts between the old and modern it could be said that, sadly, we did not. In the same manner the Great Powers ‘scrambled for Turkey’ a century earlier, they were now scrambling for a former part of its European territories, once again guided by similar motives. With the situation in the Balkans looking relatively stable at the current moment in time, it could be deemed necessary to look at what the future may hold for the Eastern Question and its modern participants.

If we briefly come back to the European initiative towards the independence of the Yugoslav states it is possible to see an intriguing pattern: whilst the European community is actively (although, perhaps, involuntarily) involved in ‘unleashing the Balkan demon’ (Holbrooke, 1998: 22), the United States on the contrary, appears to be participating in containing the dangerous situation by being a successful initiator and designer of peace agreements during the Yugoslav Wars of Seces-
In this sense, the positions of the EC and its successor, the European Union, were at first in a disadvantaged position in comparison to its American competitor. However, the continuation of the Balkan conflict followed by the US involvement in Kosovo had significantly damaged the international reputation of the Clinton administration. It can be argued that by the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century Balkan ‘reputation’ of both poles was resting on an approximately equal amount of questionable and one-sided policies. Therefore, the current EU initiative for the further stabilization of the situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia could be understood as an attempt to restore the balance in its favour.

Speaking of stabilization and peace in former Yugoslavia, it has to be noted that the political mentality of the ‘Great Powers’, disguised, as Misha Glenny had noted ‘by their brand new name of the “international community”’, could contain a potentially problematic trend within the overall attitude to the failures of policies directed towards the Yugoslav crisis. In the case of the European Union, this trend emerges in a form of belief under which some consider it possible to refer to the failed European Balkan initiatives as ‘expectations running ahead of capabilities’ (McCormick, 2007: 113). Sadly, despite the relative neutrality of the term, such rushed policies (McCormick, 2007: 113) had and, in several cases, continue to have far-reaching side-effects amongst the populations of the Yugoslav successor states: in the case of the Yugoslav Wars of Secession, failed policies had often resulted in the loss of human lives, a collective memory which is likely to continue to affect social responses to the current EU policies in former Yugoslavia.

The emphasis on Europe’s role in the resolution of the present day Balkan tensions must also consider the reliability of European Union membership as a valuable peace building factor for the Yugoslav Successor States. By involving the latter in the joint European structures, Brussels appears to be overly confident with the idea that the values promoted by the EU will prove sufficient for the nations of former Yugoslavia to forget their recent past, not paying attention to the warning signs indicating that the European attraction of the former Yugoslav nations could also be explained through their economic interests (EUbusiness, 2008; McCormick, 2007: 126), dominating those of culture and politics. The main question in this case is whether Europe would succeed in securing the departure of the collective memories of the Yugoslav peoples, and not limit itself to the establishment of the image of the Balkan tensions being resolved. Needless to say that by starting the process of incorporating the former Yugoslav states into the European Union its leaders had in fact, agreed to inherit and re-
solve conflicts and tensions in the region. Considering the continued necessity to compete with the United States on the international arena as well as the general complexity of the Yugoslav crisis-induced problems, there is danger that the European leaders could resort to sweeping the remaining Yugoslav dilemmas ‘under the carpet’, rather than embarking on a costly journey to find a solution that could also damage the EU position internationally. The most recent example of such an ‘image of stability’ could be found within Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008.

With the Kosovo independence issue now officially resolved, it is possible to declare the matters surrounding the modern descendent of the Eastern Question as stable. However, the strategies and policies used by the key players on the international arena to achieve this stability allows us to suggest that we may be forced to ‘answer’ the Eastern Question once again in future.

References


Pitfalls of the Academic Approach to *Peace Journalism*

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**Introduction**

The Peace Journalism (PJ) model can be considered as a very interesting attempt to find an answer to the claims made by Peace Studies scholars, who, astonished by the horror and grief caused by the violations in the last decades and the responsibility that the mass media had in them, declared the need for a paradigmatical shift (Pureza, 2003: 86; Manoff, 1998: 2 et seq) in the study of the mass media. Peace Journalism has carried out an extended reflection about its postulates and stakes at many different levels and promotes different kinds of interventions in the frame of Peace Building (Reychler and Paffenholz, 2001) and conflict prevention (Howard *et al*, 2003), but there still remain some aspects that have been regarded as a “no-issue”.

While a great effort is being done at the paradigmatical level in order to go beyond the paradigms of conventional journalism (Peleg, 2006: 1 et seq) and to conceptualize the values and professional practices of this new paradigm of the media (Shinar, 2007: 2) some aspects are being neglected. These relate to project designing, systematization and critical revision of Peace Media projects that are being developed in many war-torn countries, that continue under-reported and non-evaluated. Therefore, my interest is to point out these flaws and to attempt to reflect about them in order to reinforce the theoretical pillars of the projects and to promote a critical revision that will help to unveil potential perverse uses of the so-cited projects and underlying discourses related to specific agendas (José, 2008:7).

I will explore three of the aspects that need to be examined, in order to revise them. As we will see, two of these aspects that will be dealt with in this article are related to the practical dimension of interventions by the Peace Media: the need for reflection on operational and strategic tools for intervention. The third aspect, the critical review of projects, is more connected with the ethical and philosophical approach that aims to understand these projects and their limitations.
Peace Journalism: an ambitious and rich model

The “power of the media” to become highly effective vehicles of *cultural violence* that legitimates, and sometimes promotes, violences is well known and there is thereby a very ample bibliography on “Media and conflict”. A more recent approach has emerged in the last years: the study of “Peace and Media”. It includes, like a big umbrella, many proposals that have finally come together, including: Peace Journalism theory (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005); Conflict-sensitive journalism (Howard, 2004); and conflict de-escalation coverage (Kempf, 2007).

These approaches claim that the media have a positive role in the promotion of peace (Irvan, 2006: 34) and that the media owners and professionals have an unavoidable responsibility to create options for peaceful solutions to conflicts (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005). This involves both the short-term objective of intervening in conflict prevention and peace building in order to promote peace and, a medium-long-term objective of shifting the media professionals’ attitudes towards peace and war (Shinar, 2007:2). Some authors have opted for low-profile approaches such as “conflict-sensitive journalism” or “de-escalation oriented coverage”, but the will to include journalism in Peace Studies and in the dynamics of Peace building is very powerful and will allow us to walk unexpected paths, as so happened in the 1960s when Galtung came up with the term and with the basic ideas of the so-called Peace Journalism (Ruge and Galtung, 1965).

Peace Journalism theory is still a controversial idea in academia and it would be unfair to ignore such debates¹; but some other topics have remained unnoticed or have been very poorly studied and further “peace-journalistic research” should assume the task of researching on them (Kempf, 2007: 7). In this article I draw on some of the assumptions of the Peace Journalism theory, but I conceive the PJ model as a complex scheme that can be understood as a dynamic model that articulates initiatives that have been developed separately.

Thus, I believe that Peace Journalism can be conceived as a three-dimensional model. That is to say, it is a model (Figure 1) that departs from a core idea —the idea of the potential peace building/conflict prevention role of the media— and is developed in different arenas and uses diverse strategies, which allow us to classify and understand the varied ways of approaching Peace Journalism.

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¹ If the reader is interested in obtaining more information on this debate my suggestion is to revise the Vol. 6, No. 2 (2007) of the on-line journal *Conflict & communication online*, entitled “The Peace Journalism controversy”.
In the first place, we find the paradigmatical level (Manoff, 1998: 5), that refers to the efforts of journalists and scholars to reflect about the media to overcome the paradigms of conventional journalism in order to reinvent the media and face the ethical challenge of building peace (Galtung, 2006: 2). In this level the contributions can be divided into: conceptualization efforts and critical analysis efforts (Shinhar, 2007: 2). Conceptualization tries to reflect about and build the philosophical premises of the professional practices that take place in both the operational and the paradigmatical level; and critical analysis refers to the multiple practices of critical evaluation of the coverage of violence.

In the second place, there is an operational level (Manoff, 1998: 5), where intervention in contexts of conflict that use media as a tool to build and consolidate peace take place. At this level, we can appreciate the most ostensible shift of the conventional roles of the media, as it is considered an instrument of conflict resolution that presents reliable, respects human rights and represents diverse views (Howard, 2004: 3). Every initiative consistent of a journalistic practice aiming to promote “positive peace” (Manoff, 1998) can be considered as a “Peace journalism operation/intervention”. This can be divided into three categories. The first is Peace Media, projects that direct the “media information and programming towards bringing closer together parties in a conflict and inverting or preventing the structural and cul-
tural dynamics, widely known as fuelling and legitimizing violence” (José, 2008: 7). In some cases this could involve strategies of countering the “hate media” (Gardner, 2001: 306). The second is Media Monitoring, that denounces the activity of the Mass Media that promotes the “war discourse” (Galtung, 2006) and has war-oriented coverage of regional, national or international conflicts the media. Thirdly, we have to consider the proposal made by Galtung (2006) and Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) of peace-oriented coverage in the conventional media, who have developed a model to cover stories with a peace-orientation: “Peace Journalism is when reporters and editors make choices —about what stories to cover, and how to cover them— which create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent, developmental responses to conflict.” (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005: 5).

In the third place, we find the institutional level, which refers to the structures that can help promote Peace Journalistic research and Peace Journalism initiatives through funding, institutional support and social backup, such as journalist networks, international organizations or academic associations. The institutional dimension has been very scarcely examined, but we should take into consideration the contributions made by Majid Tehranian (2002), which have been acknowledged by other pre-eminent authors (Peleg, 2006; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005: 230). The Persian scholar states that broader attention must be paid and bigger efforts must be made in order to obtain major resources to promote the development of the global information infrastructure (Tehranian, 2002: 30). We can divide the different projects that share this aim into three categories: journalism networking, aiming to reinforce the activity of journalism; media regulation, this is, the revision and promotion of norms in order to enshrine the principles of the Peace Journalism; and, lastly, Peace Journalism institutions such as research groups, training and research centres, sections in international organ-

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2 It is a very common practice because it is related with the traditional role of the media as watchdogs; this activity is normally carried out by NGOs and foundations an is very developed in the United States of America, let us consider the experience of FAIR (Fairness and accuracy in reporting): http://www.fair.org/index.php.

3 Let us consider the PECOJON (Peace and Conflict Journalism Network) as a good example, more information at http://www.pecojon.org/.

4 The most solid Media Regulation until the present day is the UNESCO declarations related issues of 1978 and 1983 (IRVAN, 2006: 34).

5 Beyond the proposals made by Majid Tehranian, very interesting, but yet un-reached, I would like to point out the example of the Division for Freedom of Expression, Democracy and Peace of UNESCO.
izations which aim to promote media organizations committed to a peace journalism code of ethics, directed at audiences with low access to the media and supporting independent media and interactive communication (Tehranian, 2002: 32).

**Tracing the pitfalls**

It is my understanding that the three levels of Peace Journalism are deeply connected one to the other, for instance, the different interventions change the theoretical approaches and philosophical premises, or solid structures and networks promote interventions. Some of the categories have been studied, but others have remained marginalised or their analyses have been postponed for future researches. Some of the scholars who have pleaded for the Peace Journalism option claim the need for further research on various topics in the frame of the so-called “Peace Journalistic research” (Kempf, 2007: 7) and it is my opinion that in the development of a theoretical approach to the interventions made at the operational level, many pitfalls have appeared, and it is our duty to face them and to try to overcome them in order to ameliorate future interventions.

The main efforts that have been carried out in the academia have been centred on building a theoretical body related to the conceptual premises of the Peace Journalism, as can be noticed in the bibliography on “Peace and Media” (Shinar, 2007; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005). Hitherto very few scholars have devoted their researches to analyse the successful experiences in the field and the attempts to consolidate an institutional body of Peace Journalism practices. Many successful experiences of Peace Media are taking place (Howard et al, 2003), some powerful projects of Media Monitoring are highlighting urgent problems in contemporary societies (Kempf and Luostarinen, 2003). Deep changes are taking place in the conceptions and manners of covering war and violence in “conventional media” (Peleg, 2006; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005) and some very bold projects of networking and institution-creation are setting the bases for future cooperation of professionals of the “Peace-oriented journalism”⁶. However it seems that they remain “no-news” and they are not studied or critically revised.

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⁶ These experiences are developed by NGOs, University research teams and foundations, but to the date very few works have tried to compile all these efforts as a whole.
The main pitfalls that I have traced in the process of the academic reflection on topics within the Peace Journalism model are:

(1) The given paradoxical situation of profusion of philosophical discussion but poor debate on other aspects of a profoundly practical issue;
(2) The scarcity of research about the on-field experiences, and therefore, the lack of resources for institutions willing to intervene using this kind of strategies;
(3) The absence of critical approaches to the so-mentioned experiences (Peace Media, Peace Journalists networks, etc…); and,
(4) The oblivition of the journalist as a subject of study, marginalising thereby the reflection on journalists training and journalist’s education.

All these constraints happen to be on the top of a stubborn difficulty that we keep having due to our nature as “transdisciplinary” scholars: the strangeness and particularity of our area of study that draws on Media Studies and Peace Studies. Due to all of this, I can state that as young scholars we find many limitations that make difficult the development of solid and transcendental works related to this topic as the research agenda is very narrow, the interest on more “practical” issues is very poor and the literature is very small.

So, on the one hand, we have to face the so-mentioned paradox of the development of intense debates on merely theoretical issues about a very practical topic (journalism and media intervention!) with very few contributions to practical aspects such as analysis models, coverage models, training curricula, etc. On the other hand, there is very little bibliography on field experiences, and that which does exist has been developed by projects which have two very clear aims: fund-raising and improving the intervention-strategies. These have strongly influenced every attempt at theorizing on these issues. It is, thus, honestly hard to learn something beyond the biased materials produced for programmes run by Northern organisations, which is even more discouraging for first stage scholars or for those who are interested in a more complex approach to the topic.

Very closely connected with these statements, we find the third pitfall, which is the lack of critical analysis that helps us to understand the real dynamics of the media-based interventions in contexts of violence and armed conflict and, also, to see to what extent the proposed model of Peace Journalism has potentialities to deal with similar situations of “violence’s” in the so-called “pacified areas” that have to cope in daily life with great amounts of direct, cultural and structural vio-
PITFALLS OF THE ACADEMIC APPROACH TO PEACE JOURNALISM

We have to have, in this way, a critical stance towards the "liberal peace" agenda and we should consider other approaches to conflict resolution and peace building, such as Marxist schools, feminist theories and very specially, if studying African cases, the work developed on African Media and conflict resolution by African scholars and in African centres, universities and organizations (MISA, CODESRIA, etc.).

Finally, there is an urgent need to speak out about the oblivition of the journalist as a subject of study, marginalising thereby reflection on journalists’ training and journalists’ education. It is my opinion that it is important to reach a consensus in order to build a rich, complex and ample conception of the “Peace Journalist” with the aim of reflecting about the professionals that carry out the “Peace Journalism” projects and their limitations, potentialities, experiences, challenges, lives, etc. My early observations and preliminary studies about the place of journalism training and education in the Peace Journalism model (García-Mingo, 2008) reveal that the training-education is a transversal element in the PJ model, of underestimated importance yet necessary in order to develop effectively all the “promises” of Peace Journalism (Shinar, 2007).

It is thus my proposal that the scholars and experts should focus on these and other aspects of Peace Journalism, as I consider that the main challenge is the need to develop the core concepts and the philosophical premises of Peace Journalism and build on work already undertaken by pre-eminent scholarly projects such as the Toda Peace Institute Project on Peace Journalism (Shinar, 2007).

A burning topic: the Peace Media projects

In a parallel way, we can trace equivalent pitfalls in all the three levels of the Peace Journalism model, in many ways, as a result of the flaws that I have previously discussed. Here I will devote my attention to the case of Peace Media initiatives. These kinds of interventions are paradigmatical at the operational level of the Peace Journalism model and summarize the peace-oriented look and understanding of the Peace-oriented journalism, and therefore they enshrine the stated shortages. The Peace Media are projects that use the media —understood as a mechanism through which information and opinion is disseminated to a population (Howard et al., 2003: 15 et seq)— to try to promote peaceful conditions of life and resolution of conflict or to counter hate media (Gardner, 2001: 306). They have been successfully
developed since the 90s, but very little evaluation has been carried out on them to date.

Thus, I have observed that there is an imbalance between the different approaches to the projects of the Peace Media (Figure 2). When it comes to the empirical aspects of the projects, we find that the work undertaken by the institutions that will develop, are developing or have developed this kind of projects focus on the underlying principles of the projects, the strategies that articulate the project, the exhaustive analysis of the context and reflections about the international framework (context, donors’ agendas...). On the other hand we find very few works dedicated to examining the theoretical approaches to these projects that reflect on the operational frameworks, the evaluation methods and critical reviews and revision of the ongoing projects.

Fig. 2.  Broken balance of revision of Peace Media projects

This lack of study of methodological elements relating to project developments and the absence of critical approaches to on-going or
closed media projects is impeding both a good understanding and enhancement of current and future projects in what is to become a very transcendental area within peace-building architecture.

From my point of view there are three under-reported issues that have particular value in Peace Media development: the operational frameworks, the evaluation methods and the critical revision and compilation of projects.

First, we can affirm that the operational frameworks have been poorly developed. However, some very lucid and valid work has been carried out by the Canadian scholar and journalist Ross Howard. This has been developed in the collection of essays in *The Power of the Media* (Howard et al.: 2003), that is still the key reference work to consider if you are either studying or launching a Peace Media project. On the whole, however, there are few references to the operational frameworks of the different Peace Media initiatives, even though these continue to grow and we cannot consider them marginal or unique anymore, but settled, solid and promising. I consider this a pitfall because it is very important to have standard operation frameworks that help the actors that want to launch Peace Media projects to take account of the specificities of the project and the context in which it is going to be set.

The second weakness of Peace Journalism theory at the paradigmatic level is the absence of complex and coherent tools to evaluate and compile the experiences that have successfully gathered in many countries, such as *Radio Okapi* in Democratic Republic of Congo or *Medios para la Paz* in Colombia. Some of the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Foundations that are developing this kind of projects are now looking for expert teams that can do an external evaluation of these projects (such is the case of Fondation Hirondelle, the Swiss foundation responsible of launching, between others, *Agence Hirondelle, Radio Okapi* and *Radio Agatysya*, some of the most paradigmatic experiences of Peace Media), in order to legitimate them, to know the weak and strong points and to have some evidence to continue negotiating with the donors. Despite the need for these things there is very little academic material on this matter and the work published by the NGOs and Foundations that work in this area is very superficial and does not have the vocation of going beyond a specific project. Yet this academic material is necessary to reflect about and to generate broader tools that build on Peace Journalism premises to enable the different actors to evaluate what is being done in the arena of Peace Media.

And lastly, it is impossible to go on reflecting on Peace Media projects without noticing that there is a great chasm that has to be
urgently overcome: the lack of critical evaluations of the projects that have been developed and are being developed. Hitherto, this approach and the questions related to a more critical look have been a non-issue. However, due to the importance of having always a lens of sense critique, I wanted to point out in this article the need to pay attention to the shades of the Peace Media projects strategies and development. The darker corners of the Peace Media projects, where the scholars need to shed some light, are the motivation of the intervention; the funding and relationship between donors and recipients; the relationship/impact of the liberal peace agenda; the concept of “peace” and related issues; the training of journalists/media professionals; the conception and use of the media; the methodology used to understand the context and needs; the evaluation methods; the transparency; the impact/effects on the audience of the media; the added-value of the initiative; the intercultural competency of the project; the transcendence in the World Information Order; the level of improvement of the flows of information and the contribution to bridging the technological gap existing between the North-South, etc.

Conclusion

This article sheds some light on critical aspects of the Peace Journalism model that have appeared in my investigative path. I wanted to speak out and reflect about the difficulties that young—and not so young—researchers are finding in the theoretical approach to media interventions in the peace building processes and to point out some pitfalls that we have to avoid in order to improve the researches that we are undertaking.

The conclusions that can be drawn are the following:

1. The model of Peace Journalism is an ambitious and rich model that can be depicted as:
   - A normative model that recognizes the role of the media as peace-promoters and peace-builders
   - A model based on the idea of proactiveness, ethical challenge and social commitment
   - A three dimensional model that intervenes at: a paradigmatical level, an operational level and an institutional level with different initiatives that include media monitoring, advocacy, on-field projects, philosophical presumptions, etc.
2. It can be stated that the theoretical developments that have been proposed to date are dense and inspiring but they have left gaps that can become pitfalls if they are not filled. There are four flaws that we have to address:

- The profusion of philosophical discussion (paradigmatical level) while the operational and institutional level are marginalised in the studies
- The scarcity of research about the on-field experiences
- The absence of critical studies of PJ experiences
- The obliviation of the journalist as a subject of study and the need of considering the different aspects relates to it, namely the training and the education.

- In the same way, we can also trace pitfalls within the different levels of the model. I have focused on the operational level of Peace Media initiatives, and more precisely, ways of intervening. I have realised that there has been very little reflection about these projects and there are three weaknesses that we have to work on in order to strengthen them and be able to propose further and more complex experiences: the availability of material for, and reflection on, operational frameworks; the evaluation methods and the critical revision and compilation of lessons-learnt.

References


Introduction

In current dominant research, the analysis and interpretation of conflicts has become a somehow dangerously simplistic exercise. Looking mainly from a distance and from a western, developed and relatively comfortable socio-economic perspective, one's capacity to fully understand and explain conflict in the so-called Third World can be appallingly limited and perverse. In fact, it seems much easier to look at such conflicts as inevitable barbarian struggles between peoples who cannot coexist due to their ancestral and primordial ethnic, religious or cultural differences. Furthermore, such an interpretation can be a comfortable one also, since it gives us the idea that there is not much we can do to prevent or solve them, or at least that our capacity to get involved should be a very limited one. All actions from external actors seem to simply artificially contain tensions that, sooner or later, will give place to violence and conflict.

Our analysis, however, departs from a very different position and calls for a significantly different approach to conflict prevention and resolution especially in divided societies. In fact, even if a great number of contemporary conflicts are characterised by important ethnic, religious and cultural dimensions, it must also be acknowledged that they incorporate indubitable underlying political, economic and social causes. At the same time, such complex conflicts, especially internal ones, have always been an important source of poverty and underde-
velopment in the so-called low-income countries under stress, thus creating a vicious circle difficult to break and overcome.

The progressive perception of the threat to regional and international security and stability posed by these conflicts situated especially in many African countries, led the developed world to some awareness of how important it was to help prevent and solve internal violence abroad. In fact, since the end of the Cold-War, there was an important push towards various forms of international intervention in conflict scenarios, especially in the so-called third world, increasingly—or at least more visibly—characterised by violent and enduring internal conflict. This ‘new interventionism’ was basically characterised by a new and very simplistic and perverse representation of the periphery of the world system as a sort of failure of the modernity project. According to this view, the result has been the multiplication of the so-called failed states which create the conditions for the emergence of ‘new wars’, mainly internal and characterised by new actors and forms of violence. The external diagnosis of these new wars gave way to an also inevitably external therapy, aimed at containing instability and violence in that same periphery. This in turn led to an increasing consensus on the need for a wide and comprehensive range of conflict prevention strategies, namely at the level of most international and regional organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe or even the African Union. The definition and implementation of models and strategies for conflict prevention and peace building has thus been a feature ever since the 1990s but it has also undergone significant change and developments, according to the needs and priorities of the main external actors.

Despite recognising the importance of these developments in response to violent and long-lasting internal conflicts, this chapter presents a critical analysis and evaluation of such approaches to conflict and peace and which have often been characterised by rushing post-conflict societies towards market democracy and thus resulting in a very limited strategy for preventing a return to violence in countries that experienced protracted internal conflict (Dodson, 2006: 245). In fact, in the dominant literature and practice of conflict prevention and peace building, for example, the effective consideration of the role of cleavages and socio-economic inequalities and, consequently, of the fundamental character of economic and social rights in the overall peace process, is frequently undermined and it usually results in an almost exclusive emphasis on the democratisation approach or on counterproductive economic conditionality imposed by external actors.
Contrary to some approaches that question if the root causes of internal conflict truly matter in the efforts to prevent or resolve conflicts, we here underline the importance of such causes. By presenting these dominant prevention and peace building approaches as limited and insufficient both in identifying the deeper causes of conflict and underdevelopment in divided countries and in tackling the deeper needs of the population, this chapter departs from the assumption that to better and more effectively prevent conflicts and build sustainable peace in such contexts it is crucial to make a rigorous diagnosis of a conflict’s multiple and more complex causes. In such contexts, this includes, among other things, a thorough assessment of the economic and social rights situation of the population and in particular of specific groups.

More specifically, the aim of this chapter is twofold: first, it aims to clarify the underlying processes and dynamics of conflict in divided societies and especially the role of socio-economic inequalities of the population for the emergence or aggravation of such conflicts; secondly, to test whether the recognition and inclusion and effective fulfilment of economic and social rights in peace processes in such contexts, can emerge as potential factors for the consolidation of more equitable and peaceful social structures.

With this analysis we aim to develop a comprehensive understanding of the intersections between complex social, economic, political and cultural processes and dynamics of violent conflict in divided societies, as well as to acquire both comprehensive and critical knowledge of the theoretical approaches and debates regarding contemporary forms of violent conflict and conflict transformation, and skills to engage with their multiple causes and consequences at local, national and global levels.

Therefore, and having as its underlying thematic the relevant, if not crucial, role of economic, social and cultural rights in conflict prevention and post conflict reconstruction strategies, this analysis will thus attempt to answer the following question: considering the crucial role that the non-compliance with economic and social rights obligations play in the emergence of conflict, are the dominant prevention and peace building strategies, based on purely demo-liberal goals, sustainable and effective in preventing conflicts and creating peace?

We will apply our analysis to the long-lasting civil conflict in Sudan, which opposed the Muslim government of Khartoum and the Christian rebels in the South (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-SPLM/A) and in particular to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 and which was the result of a long and complex peace process. The analysis of the case-study will first attempt to contribute to a broader and deeper understanding of the multiple
origins of this country’s recurring civil wars, by focusing on the underlying variables and factors that are not usually addressed, such as socio-economic inequality and marginalisation among different groups, and which may undermine the achievement of a definitive and lasting peace in the country. Secondly, and more importantly, from a rigorous analysis of the dynamics of a long and complex peace process between the North and the South, we will also try to understand if and how economic and social rights have been effectively included and implemented as a part of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and if they were crucial for its success and effectiveness. Drawing from the case-study of Sudan, and more specifically from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the North and the South, we thus intend to demonstrate that dominant prevention and peace building strategies in contexts experiencing such variable and complex dynamics can only be effective and successful in achieving sustainable peace if they incorporate the respect and fulfilment of economic and social rights as fundamental and intrinsically linked to their civil and political counterparts.

Preventing conflicts and building peace in divided societies: a critical analysis

Understanding armed conflicts has never been an easy task mainly due to their inherent complexity. But it becomes particularly difficult in the case of internal conflicts in ethnically divided societies, where simplistic interpretations can easily render solutions and prevention an almost impossible mission. In such circumstances, undertaking a thorough assessment and understanding of why some different cultural, ethnic or religious groups sharing and living in the same national territory engage in conflict and violent confrontation whereas in others that does not happen should be one of the first steps in the study of contemporary conflicts.

The acknowledgement of a re-emergence of religious and ethnic traditions worldwide and the argument put forward that the political resurgence of religious communities often involves violent clashes in and between nations (Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2000: 641) has marked the beginning of a particularly interesting and rich debate in the field of International Relations and Political Science.¹ It has been

¹ Samuel HUNTINGTON’s claim (1996) about the cultural fragmentation of the world somehow initiated this debate. Huntington proposed a model to interpret the new reality of the world, based on the fact that the explanatory factors are not ideo-
suggested, for example, that the colonial period in Africa, although often establishing a territorial division without great correlation with ethnic frontiers, has encouraged an ethnic classification of the populations and used some ethnic groups to fulfil special roles in the prevailing colonial policy. In the post colonial period, the centralised control of the State by one social group has produced an ethnicisation of state power which in some countries has resulted in a suppression of ethnic movements through its marginalization or cooptation, but in others has represented a factor of increased tensions (Osaghae, 1994: 24).

Furthermore, since during independence most African states did not actually have a coherent and functional unity, there was a first phase in which the national construction imperative led many leaders to reject and ignore the multi-ethnic character of their societies, even facing ethnicity as an anachronism that should disappear with progress, modernisation and economic growth (Ferreira, 2005: 47). Since ethnic diversity was viewed as inherently conflictual, the origins and stability of a national State depended on the denial of partial identities and on incentives to create alternative forms of alliances, loyalties and consciences. The most common answer to diversity was the adoption of policies that aimed at the homogenisation and unity of heterogeneous populations through the limitation of expressions of groups’ differences (Ferreira, 2005: 48).

In this context, the conflicts in southern Sudan, in Darfur and the latent and increased violence in the eastern regions of Sudan, for example, seem to be all part of a same trend in which the ‘enemy’ is identified with a specific and limited Muslim-Arab elite, who have been controlling and dominating the political and economic life of the country ever since independence in 1956, thus continuously and increasingly marginalizing and repressing a significant part of the Sudanese population mostly on the basis of ethnicity and religion. But is it really so?

One of the main justifications for this research thus lies in the lack of systematic research on adequate strategies both for accurately explaining and dealing peacefully with conflicts which include not only religious and ethnic dimensions, but also and above all deep socio-economic fractures. The role of these dimensions in conflict is, at the same

logical but cultural. Following this argument, religions play a fundamental role in world politics. As Marta REYNAL-QUEROL points out «People belonging to different religions have different versions of many relations among individuals and authorities. Following Huntington, one of the most important causes of future conflict among civilisations is that their characteristics and differences are less mutable and, therefore, more difficult to reach agreements and solve than political and economic differences» (2002: 31).
time, often misunderstood, leading to largely ineffective responses based on distorted assumptions. In fact, although the literature on the underlying causes and factors of internal conflicts in ethnically and/or religiously divided societies is relatively well-developed, the majority of the analysis of current conflicts taking place in such contexts tends to focus mainly on the primordial role that existing ethnic or religious divisions play in the eruption and perpetuation of such conflicts. Since many groups of people fight together perceiving themselves as belonging to a common culture (ethnic or religious) there is a tendency to attribute wars to ‘primordial’ ethnic passions, which makes them seem intractable. However, this is a flawed view of such conflicts, attempting to divert attention from crucial underlying economic, social and political causes (Stewart, 2002: 342). Consequently, dominant prevention and reconstruction models and strategies tend to focus on responses that privilege the civil and political inclusion and participation of specific groups in society and government, and thus undermining the importance of structures for full economic and social participation.

The more inductive approach to conflict prevention, which focus on the explanation of the social, economic and political factors that contribute to or caused the conflict, is basically aimed at identifying appropriate ways for external action that may redress those causes, but it has been associated with some recognised shortcomings, since identifying root causes is a complex task and the international community is often not well-equipped to design appropriate strategies of such a nature (Zeeuw, 2001: 14-15).

Often, one of the characteristics of external assistance to war-torn societies is the bias towards a ‘quick-fix’, because most programmes and forms of involvement are usually temporary (although most of these actors acknowledge that peace building is a long-term process) and based on technical fixes in the form of disarmament, law and order programmes, elections and the return of refugees (Zeeuw, 2001: 26). This is particularly important since it basically defines whether involvement and intervention is truly committed to creating the sustainable structures for sustainable peace or not. However, if one envisages peace merely as the absence of armed conflict, without looking at the structural dimension of peace, then intervention will hardly be effective in the longer-term.

Preventing conflict and building peace is thus seen as a highly externally driven process and often results in an experiment of social engineering controlled by outsiders and often disengaged from the societies they are trying to rebuild. Others —like Roland Paris (2004) or Mark Duffield (2001)— have taken this argument even further and ar-
gue that peace building, within such models, basically serves the external actor’s own agendas by ‘transplanting western models of social, political and economic organisation into war-torn states in order to control civil conflict in the peripheries of the international system (Zeeuw, 2001: 27).

In fact, and even if one does not want to take such argument to an extreme, it cannot be ignored that traditional models of external involvement in such conflicting contexts tends to depend on some specific interests of external actors, be they individual states or regional or international organisations (which depend on the interests of the states that sustain them). As Reychler notes, lessons learned in conflict prevention and peace-building efforts have been inhibited by some important political impediments, such as a lack of perceived interests or competing definitions of peace (Reychler, 2007: 153). He summarises this as follows:

First, there is the problem of commitment to conflict prevention and peace building. The propensity to intervene is related with the perception of interests. When vital interests are at stake, donors will tend to make greater efforts than when interests at stake are perceived as marginal. Second, when there is no consensus on the peace one wants to achieve, it is difficult to build it. (Reychler, 2007: 153)

Although the UN has been developing a more inclusive and comprehensive approach in its work, namely when it comes to human rights considerations, the practical results of such a human rights component within the broader work of conflict prevention and post-conflict peace building are far from satisfying, thus demonstrating an important gap between theory and practice concerning human rights work and the still existing multiple “flaws” of the current prevention and post-conflict reconstruction models. There is often a perverse tendency to draw a rigid distinction between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights, thus ignoring and undermining the need for a global and joint action in the field and the fundamental place and role of all human rights in the whole process. Furthermore, such activities in the field of human rights tend to be concentrated on norms and procedures and seldom reach all the relevant areas of policy making. The neo-liberal economic policies, which are usually associated with the liberal peace ideology, have been barely contested assumptions underlying external economic reconstruction assistance and management in war-torn societies (Pugh, 2005: 1). And to certain extent these dominant models of international aid tend to reproduce and per-
petuate the flaws of the political and economic structures in such weak and divided societies.

This becomes particularly problematic when we consider that an estimated one-fifth or one-quarter of the world’s population lives in absolute poverty, without adequate food, shelter and health care. The marginalization of economic, social and cultural rights has thus served to marginalize further the poorest, most vulnerable groups of society. This is especially relevant and problematic in the context of deeply divided societies characterised both by ongoing internal conflict or even post-conflict peace building processes. In this scenario, economic and social rights are, in our perspective, basic and fundamental human rights that must be implemented and fulfilled in any circumstances, but are especially important in conflict and post-conflict scenarios. As long as there are sectors of the population who live below all standards of human decency in a state of extreme poverty, the conditions will be there for the situation to degenerate into a new conflict. In fact, the denial of fundamental human rights such as the right to life, housing, food or respect for cultural life, as well as discrimination and the systematic and large scale exclusion by the institutions and decision-making mechanisms in divided societies, based on ethnicity or religion, are frequently seen at the origin of many contemporary conflicts. These conflicts simultaneously demonstrate how important the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights is, since civil and political rights alone are seen as useless if not complemented and reinforced by the fulfilment of economic and social rights, crucial for the survival and well being of all people. The collapse of infrastructures, corruption of institutions, power abuses by certain groups put into question a wide range of civil and political rights, but also and above all, of economic, social and also cultural rights.

Some of the underlying causes that are often found in such conflicts are what John Burton (1990) called ‘unmet human needs’, which include socio-economic security, belonging, participation and economic well being. If groups of people believe that their needs have not been met and that they have been discriminated against for an extended period of time, the resentment that they carry with them can fuel the most intense and violent conflicts (Hauss, 2003). Given these extremely serious potential consequences of severe inequalities, development policy ought to include policies to monitor and correct them. Decent housing, jobs, education and health must be the fundamental objective of both government’s and external actor’s policies and this effort is one in which all sectors of the population, without exception, must be engaged (Tigerstrom 2001: 147). Yet, this is not [usually] part of the
current conflict prevention and peace building agendas, which tend to consider poverty and inequality only at the level of the individual, not as a group phenomenon (Stewart, 2002a: 3). As it has been mentioned before, current state building and peacebuilding models, clearly conforming to neo-liberal assumptions, tend to universalise a limited human rights approach being translated mainly into demands for compliance and respect for a catalogue of basic civil and political rights, like elections, democratic institutions and, above all, in a deliberate blurring of economic and social rights. In fact, dominant preventive and peace building models usually underline, almost exclusively, the importance of political stability and representation over the recognition of equal economic, social and cultural rights and guarantees of all groups. In fact, it can even be argued that the internationally recognised separation of human rights in two different international covenants helped perpetuate a belief that economic, social and cultural rights are different—and even secondary—from civil and political rights both in their nature and in the type of responsibility imposed on the governments.

More recently, Ho-Won Jeong has also examined and underlined how security, political, social and economic components must not be isolated and should always support each other in ‘reweaving a divided society’s fabric’. He presents a conceptual framework for the design of peace building and the coordination of different functions in the field and concludes that sustainable peace based simply on justice can be an illusive goal in the absence of longer-term structural perspectives and it may not be sufficient to end a protracted conflict based on ethnic and religious rivalries and opposing political and economic interests (Jeong, 2000: 18).

The acknowledgment and recognition of the existence of various types of underlying factors, of a more material and structural nature, which are as important to fully understand the emergence or perpetuation of conflicts in these societies, such as political and socio-economic inequalities, then become fundamental elements for the definition of alternative strategies to prevent or resolve conflicts of such complex nature.

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2 For this chapter we take as a fundamental reference the United Nations’ peace building model, whose principles and goals have been recognised, supported and adopted as a reference by other international organisations working in the field of conflict prevention and post-conflict peace building. The UN model consists of four fundamental dimensions: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, Political and Constitutional, Socio-Economic and Psychosocial all of which obeying to a specific set of neoliberal principles, processes and rules that must be respected in order to achieve peace.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement: a recipe for peace or a way back to conflict?

In some analysis of ethnicity and its management in Africa, it is argued that wars do not break out merely because there are different ethnic groups (Osaghae, 1994: 7-8). Sharing this view —and although aware of the importance of existing ethnic or religious cleavages within a given society— the transversal hypothesis throughout this chapter has been that accurate and rigorous analysis and understandings of conflicts in ethnically or religiously divided societies must take into due account the role and influence of socio-economic inequalities and the degree of denial of economic, social and cultural rights of specific groups. As mentioned by Klaus Schlichte, the deeper causes of contemporary wars may be existing socio-economic disparities which are associated with discriminatory behaviours: “so-called ethnic conflicts sometimes result from the marginalisation of one group by another, with political and economic, as well as cultural marginalisation taking place” (Ferreira, 2005: 69). It is often argued that when men fight across ethnic lines it is nearly always the case that they fight over some fundamental issues concerning the distribution and exercise of power, whether economic, political or both (Stewart, 2002a: 3); or, at a minimum, they are to guarantee the fulfilment of their basic needs.

In fact, in many multi-ethnic countries —like Sudan—, it is common that a dominant ethnic group concentrates power, and often wealth and resources, for its own benefit, at the same time attempting in keeping all other non-dominant groups in a subordinate and marginalized situation (Stavenhagen, 1990:36). In such scenarios, marginalized groups either conform to the status quo or try to challenge it either through political strategies or, as it often happens, by resorting to violence in contestation of the state’s discriminating policies.

In the case of Sudan, for example —the country leading the ranking of the 2006 and 2007 Failed States Index and characterised by some of the highest indicators of political, economic, social and military instability in a list of sixty other countries—, it seems that there has never been a full understanding of the root causes of the conflict and of the degree in which the denial of economic, social and cultural rights has contributed to perpetuate conflict and promote instability in the whole country.

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3 These indicators are, for example, the number of refugees and internally displaced persons, group grievance, human rights, uneven development, delegitimisation of the State, public services, military apparatus, factionalized elites, among others. For further information, see www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3420&page=1.
In fact, the long-lasting conflict opposing the northern Muslim government and southern Christian and Animist groups has been frequently interpreted simply according to the primordial thesis in which ethnic, religious and/or cultural factors and differences must be seen as the most important independent variables to explain violence within nations. This view tends, in our perspective, to limit the scope and nature of external involvement to achieve peace in such contexts. We therefore believe this is an extremely limited and distorted view of reality of most divided societies in general, and of Sudan in particular. In fact, in the context of Sudan, such a tendency has contributed to a perverse interpretation of its conflicts as struggles between different groups that cannot coexist due to their different ethnic or religious nature and therefore, as endemic and unavoidable. As a consequence, attempts to bring the conflict to an end have often failed to go behind such arguments and address the deeper socio-economic inequalities reinforcing ethnic or religious dividing lines.

We are not aiming to totally disregarding the importance of ethnic and/or religious identities and feelings, these should be seen as important variables, but mainly because they are either instrumentalised or constructed in order to be used to justify violence and/or for the perpetuation and maintenance of inequalities between different groups and thus hiding the deeper causes of these conflicts. The underlying assumption here is that the increasing politicisation of religious, ethnic or cultural traditions and the radicalisation of several aspects of group identity are especially linked to moments of economic degradation and social disintegration. In such contexts, marginalized or threatened groups tend to focus and concentrate on their specific traditions and specificities in search for an alternative political order that satisfies their well being, recognition and security needs. Frequently, the result tends to be an attempt to use this renewed interest for the specific differences by the main elites for their own benefit and profit. The competition for scarce resources between social groups, the need to fulfil needs that the State cannot guarantee, the conditions of poverty and social collapse and asymmetries of power all contribute to the reinforcement of the division between ethnic (and religious) groups (Ferreira, 2005: 69).

Moreover, Sudan has historically been based on a flawed political economy highly dependent on cheap and unfree labour, a reality that has been continually reproduced, not only by the government itself, but also by the international aid models and agencies. Sudan is also an example of both deep group inequalities (with southerners, easterners and various Darfurian tribes being heavily deprived of access to their...
rights and needs) and powerful private gains that perpetuate the struggle (Keen, 1994).

Within the Sudanese peace process in general and of the CPA in particular, the role and impact of the denial of economic, social and cultural rights has always been neglected and undermined and, consequently, poorly addressed. The proof of this is that, despite the inclusion and acceptance of a wealth sharing protocol, the peace agreement does not foresee the establishment of structures that may guarantee the actual equal distribution of resources and wealth, and that the traditional assumption of political power sharing prevails as a solution for the conflict. Three years since the signing of the CPA the socio-economic situation of most southern Sudan’s population remains the same, with no infrastructures or policies being actually and fully implemented to respond to the population’s basic human needs. The prospects for peace are, therefore, still to be confirmed and guaranteed, but in our perspective this specific case shows how the international community and its prevention strategies and instruments are still weak in their design and impact on sustainable and longer-term peace in post-violence contexts. The tendency to focus on the political arrangements between the belligerent parts and on its related civil and political rights dimension, as well as the consequent lack of involvement and commitment when it comes to actively engaging on and including economic and social rights guarantees and policies, has contributed to very fragile peace processes which tend to collapse during the implementation phase. Sudan seems to be just another example of this perverse scenario characterised by an international community willing to intervene, prevent and resolve conflicts, but at the same time too tied to a specific and limited model that lacks the more appropriate and effective strategies.

This analysis therefore calls for a broader and deeper understanding of the origins of this country’s multiple and recurring civil wars, by focusing on the underlying causes and factors that are not usually addressed, such as socio-economic inequality and marginalisation among different groups, and which may undermine the achievement of a definitive and lasting peace in the country.

Conclusion

One of the fundamental lessons to be drawn from this analysis and from the specific case study of Sudan is that the causes of conflicts are highly complex, with processes in which religious or ethnic fac-
tors, although present, tend to assume a more complementary role as sources of conflict (Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2000: 673). Contemporary armed conflicts have complex causes, ranging from social inequality, state failure, human rights violations, and resource competition, among others. We therefore believe that these complexities thus call for a deeper and committed international involvement in areas including sustainable socio-economic growth, equal distribution of resources, human rights respect and political stability. In order to reduce the likelihood of violent conflict in such divided societies, it becomes crucial to promote inclusive development, reduce inequalities between groups, tackle unemployment and, via national and international control over illicit trade, reduce private incentives to fight (Stewart, 2002: 342).

In sum, this chapter aims to go beyond simplifying and essentialist arguments, which attribute wars to ‘primordial’ ethnic passions, which make them seem intractable. This is a flawed view of such conflicts, attempting to divert attention from crucial underlying economic and political causes (Stewart, 2002: 342). We thus stress the need to take a closer look to the contexts in which these conflicts occur and to the historic and deeper root and structural causes behind them, and to focus on the existing socio-economic inequalities within and among groups which have traditionally been undermined both by the governments and the international community involved in a given peace process or peace building processes.

Renewed and serious prevention and peace building efforts in cases like Sudan will definitely have to take into account the different facets, actors, levels and needs in order to design its programmes and ultimately be effective. This means that both internal and external actors must reframe their policies and strategies regarding conflicting and post-conflict scenarios- and especially in divided societies (Zeeuw, 2001: 30) towards a rigorous analysis of conflicts and a transversal and indivisible conception of all human rights.

Making peace in Sudan, and in many other similar multi-ethnic or multi-religious contexts, definitely entails sharing power, resources and a common vision of the country, as well as assuring that all groups within the society are able to enjoy the rights to which they are entitled as human beings, without any kind of discrimination. These are all demands that may obviously be perceived as unacceptable to those used to exclusive views and benefits and which tend to make this an extremely difficult task (Rogier, 2004: 25). But despite this difficulty it does not mean it is impossible or that it should be discarded from the available options. Such a gigantic task obviously implies many challenges. But if the challenge of preventing future conflict and creating
sustainable peace is taken seriously —as it should always be—, then both internal and external actors directly and actively involved in conflict prevention and peace building must be clear on their strategy to support war-torn societies.

More effective conflict resolution processes and models thus need to include as fundamental a reinforcement of economic, social and cultural rights, while at the same time assuming and expressing the indivisibility of all human rights as a central element for their success, especially in deeply divided societies. The acknowledgment and recognition of the existence of various types of underlying factors, of a more material and structural nature, which are as important to fully understand the emergence or perpetuation of conflicts in these societies, such as political and socio-economic inequalities, then become fundamental elements for the definition of alternative strategies to prevent or resolve conflicts of such complex nature.

More importantly, external (as well as internal) peace efforts must focus on the creation of equitable and integrative socio-economic structures for the whole population while at the same time guaranteeing their civil and political counterparts. If everyone, regardless of their ethnic identity, is able to not only understand but to effectively enjoy their rights —economic, social and cultural, as well as civil and political—they will surely have less incentives to resort to violence and conflict.

References


Neither “the rhapsodist of the eternal” nor “the strategist of life and death”, the critical intellectual provides the intellectual tools—awarenesses of the strategic and tactical possibilities—those in the political trenches need to fight battles.

(Guttling, 2005: 24)

Introduction

In 2003 United States President George W. Bush launched the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) aimed at 15 priority countries, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa, home to half of today’s around 33 million infected persons. Apart from its humanitarian function, PEPFAR exercises a role in the overall U.S. global security doctrine as a sophisticated technology of international stabilization and terrorism minimization. Although established after the post September 11 context, PEPFAR’s legacy goes back to late Clinton Administration.

At the implementation level, PEPFAR engages an array of actors within its public-private, local-national-international partnership networks. Policy authors at the U.S. army structure and influential think-tanks (Center for International and Strategic Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, The Brookings Institution, American Enterprise Institute, etc.) have constructed a comprehensive HIV/AIDS\(^1\) — security nexus drawing on a complex set of causal relations between uncontrolled dissemination; orphanage and socio-economic breakdown; terrorism and social unrest.

Compared to the 14th century black plague, HIV/AIDS elicits global security measures in hotspot-countries which accomplish other ge-

\(^1\) HIV and AIDS stand for Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Virus, respectively.
opolitical concerns: Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa, home to terrorist havens and international wars; several countries in Central Africa, especially Nigeria, major regional power and oil producer, though with intra-national complications; and Southern Africa, in particular South Africa, the most developed and sole nuclear country in the continent, yet where HIV rates are the highest in the world. Yet, that scenario is rooted in very little evidence, as some of the proponents admit (Jefferson, 2006; Garrett, 2005) and some skeptics and critics underline (Barnett and Prins, 2006; Barnett and Whiteside, 2006; de Waal, 2006; Bray, 2003).

Authors in health history have argued about an intimate relation between the rise and solidification of liberal power and the inculcation of hygienist measures (Foucault, 1994; Bashford, 2006). This process started at the national level and proceeded internationally under the colonial systems in terms of gathering epidemiological records and establishing international disease containment (Bashford, 2006), and hence advancing what Foucault has named biopower, i.e. disciplining of bodies and societies (Foucault, 1984). As an ambivalent polity, biopolitics (as the author re-coined) is about enhancing life but also prevent it to the point of death. To what extent does that have an impact in project priorities rationalities?

The main target populations consist of Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC), youths and young couples, officially under the care of the local public and private institutions and faith-based organizations, the participation of the military sectors tends to revolve around prevention and treatment of military personnel. This presentation does not offer data on “local realities,” and, of course, assertive conclusions on how securitization and militarization of HIV/AIDS is happening. Yet, it definitely seeks to put forward a robust theoretical framework, built upon a Foucauldian “historical-political argument,” that offers an alternative lens to the mainstream epistemology on HIV/AIDS politics.

**HIV/AIDS as a security issue**

In January 10 2000 HIV/AIDS received its first recognition at the highest level as a security issue under the auspices of a session of the United Nations Security Council. It was also the first time that a health theme has received such credit. It is remarkable that the first major HIV/AIDS international initiative took place in the Security Council, and was moreover introduced by the Clinton Administration. Contrarily to what could somehow be expected, it was neither discussed in the General-
Assembly, nor brought to the fore by some hard-hit country in Southern Africa. This event is revealing for the complex chain of phenomena that it induced. In my view, this event expresses the Western contemplation of a disturbing “dark side” of globalization. United States ambassador to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke, expressed it finely, and hence should be cited at length

Watching kids sleep in the gutters in Lusaka, [Zambia], knowing that they will become either prostitutes or rape victims, either getting or spreading the disease, because there’s no shelter for them, and that the government is doing nothing about it, makes a powerful impression on you. (…)

I said: “Look at the facts; it’s not simply a humanitarian issue. If a country loses so many of its resources in fighting a disease which takes down a third of its population, it’s going to be destabilized, so it is a security issue.” (…)

Anyway, that was years ago. That issue is over. Everyone now accepts our definition of AIDS as a security issue: it’s self-evident. (Holbrooke, 2006)

HIV/AIDS has been mostly tackled at the global scale under the auspices of grand funding schemes: the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), and the United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), in articulation with other public and private initiatives. These programs were established to prevent and treat the most lethal diseases in the world, especially in Southern and Eastern Africa, but with an increasing focus in other world countries/regions: India, China and South-eastern Asia, the Caribbean, Russia and Eastern Europe. Those diseases are generally transmitted via sexual and reproductive relations, drug injection and needle sharing, lack of sanitation, and food and water. Often diseases such as tuberculosis appear and disseminate opportunistically in people already living with AIDS. These diseases account for the greatest cause of death in the world, and their effects are felt at the family and community levels.

The topic of HIV/AIDS has been inserted in the most recent Western strategic concepts in articulation with other issues that, reflecting a vision of national security centered in globalization-related threats, surpass the structuralist, state-centered, Cold War-like conceptions of International Relations.

[These] new flows of trade, investment, information, and technology are transforming national security. Globalization has exposed
us to new challenges and changed the way old challenges touch our interests and values, while also greatly enhancing our capacity to respond. Examples include: Public health challenges like pandemics (HIV/AIDS, avian influenza) that recognize no borders. The risks to social order are so great that traditional public health approaches may be inadequate, necessitating new strategies and responses. (The White House, 2006: 47, my emphasis)

It is important to clarify though that the virus only appears as menacing human beings when it, first, infiltrates human ecology and afterwards penetrates and develops itself within the human body that does not have access to proper therapies. Thus, this agent as such does not pose any threat. What is actually convertible to a threat status are peoples, societies and, in the last analysis, states. The securitized people are those “at risk”, those “vulnerable”, if not those making up “dangerous classes” (Hardt and Negri, 2004). Whereas in Southern and Eastern Africa they are, among the general population, “orphans and vulnerable children,” in China, India, Russia, and the West, they are drug injectors, migrants, homosexuals and the general mass of “marginalized ones.” Conversely, the securitizing agents tend to be most powerful groups in society (political and economic elites and the military), where power is more “‘sedimented’ (rhetorically and discursively, culturally, and institutionally) and structured in ways that make securitizations somewhat predictable and thus subject to probabilistic analysis” (Williams, 2003: 14).

The securitization narrative of diseases is not elaborated in an isolated fashion. It has been complexly mastered with five sorts of topics: “war on terror;” “failed states,” “new wars,” and “uncontrolled migrations;” globalization; current medical practices; and social and behavioral changes.

The response to the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, inaugurated an era of asymmetric, global and apparently endless war. The war on terror aims to identify and combat the means of dissemination of terror, namely biologic ones, as reports of mail being distributed with anthrax hit the headlines in the aftermath of September 11. In this way, the inscription of health security in the overall question of terrorism and counterinsurgency takes place in a conclusive mode, as part of subjection of the several areas of governance to the struggle against international terrorism. Yet, it should be underlined that the biological threat is not reducible to agents such as anthrax.

Andrew Price-Smith (2002) has produced an exhaustive work on the relation between health indicators and state capacity, which paved
an investigative avenue for research on epidemics’ impact on several societal fields. Authors writing on incidence in the population underline the mutual direct reinforcement of disease proliferation and disruption of the socio-economic tissue, collapse and war feeding (Elbe, 2003; Peterson, 2002). Other authors have established linkages between HIV-orphaned ‘vulnerable’ children and delinquency. The circumstance that many children and youths find themselves on their own might lead to the formation of pockets of delinquency that provoke instability, even politically, with probable extremist associations (Garrett, 2005). Lyman and Morrison (2006) have suggested that countries like Nigeria and South Africa offer safe havens for recruitment of children and youths for jihadist, anti-Western activities home and abroad. Yet it should be remarked that this attention paid to children is prior to September 11, as stressed above.

Simply put, a disturbing new formula may be emerging; AIDS creates economic devastation. Economic devastation creates an atmosphere where stable governments cannot function. When stable governments cannot effectively function, terrorism thrives by exploiting the underlying conditions that promote the despair and the destructive visions of political change. (…) AIDS has created a steady stream of orphans who can be exploited and used for terrorist activities. (Jefferson, 2006: 6-7)

Military forces —both national and foreign in peacekeeping missions— were inserted in the securitization framework, not just in the African context (Rupiya, 2006; Elbe, 2003; Lim, 2004), but also the Russian one (Eberstadt, 2002; Sjösted, 2008). Conversely, also migratory and refugee movements, gender issues (O’Manique, 2006) and even global warming (APP, 2008) were associated.

Expressing the moralist tension present particularly in the domain of sex-related diseases, Brower and Chalk (2003) found another set of causes in “the higher acceptance of multiple sexual partners and permissive homosexuality particularly in the Western countries [and] the Asian strong sex industries, and the growing prevalence of intravenous drug use” (Brower and Chalk, 2003: 26-28, my emphasis).

The domain of epidemics has indeed been a clear-cut example of camouflaging a topic as security issue as a strategy for attracting scarce resources to real human dramas (Altman, 2003). The WHO dedicated the World Health Report in 2007 to “security in health” (WHO, 2007) and UNAIDS’ executive-director Peter Piot has been using the AIDS-security nexus as a persuasion narrative (Elbe, 2008).
At the same time, a group of social scientists has been engaging in the assessment of the “true” social impact of AIDS. So far, the conclusion has been that the predicted impact of the AIDS-security nexus is eminently speculative (McInnes, 2006) and based more in intuition than in evidence (Barnett and Prins, 2006: 360). AIDS is a long-event wave, and it is necessary to analyze three generations in order to come to more peremptory conclusions about the real impact.

Put briefly, an infected person has children, these are orphaned and may grow up to be infected, but not before they have themselves had children: who are orphaned in turn. Hence a basic unit of social structure in most human societies, the three-generation bond linking grandparents, parents and children in a continuously reproduced pattern is rent asunder. (Barnett, 2006: 298)

In his turn, Alex de Waal (2006: 86) reminds us that, just like there are theses reinforcing the AIDS-economic disruption argument, others argue that AIDS will correct the excess of population issue in Africa. One can deduce that, from a security-centered perspective (and not, for example, a human rights-centered one), the desired outcome can hence be achieved.

In an important critical appreciation on future scenarios for the orphan children in South Africa, Rachel Bray reports about the ethnographic studies already carried in the region. Though limited, those studies highlight the role OVC play not as delinquents but as care-providers to relatives and members of the community. Thereby Bray denounces the Western prejudice about the child growing alone and “without family”:

Young people are considered vulnerable, but also rebellious and potentially delinquent. For these reasons, there is a perceived need to organise and control the young in order to prevent social disorder. Families are generally promoted as a way in which society can maintain such control over children, meaning that children who are outside ‘the family norm’ are even more dangerous. (Bray, 2003: 42)

Moreover Bray questions whether “AIDS orphan” is the new international category for those called “street children,” “trafficked children,” child soldiers or exploited children (Bray, 2003: 44).

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2 I am referring to laboratories located at the London School of Economics and Political Science (www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEAIDS/Default.htm), University of KwaZulu-Natal (www.heard.org.za/), Durban, and the Social Science and Research Council (programs.ssrc.org/HIV/), directed by Tony BARNETT, Alan WHITESIDE and Alex DE WAAL, respectively.
Therefore, are not we facing “old wine in new bottles”? This hypothesis is definitely to be explored. It seems to meet Mark Duffield’s discussion on the permanent reinvention of Western development aid models in the Third World. Accordingly, this reinvention aims at, in a global political perspective and especially in moments of violence and chaos (or “states of exception”), intervening in order to restore self-reliance.

As liberal alternative to extermination, development has always existed in relation to a state of exception or, rather, two interconnected states of exception. As self-reliance moves into crisis it calls forth a globalizing and intrusive humanitarian urge to protect. (Duffield, 2007: 219)

Securitization of HIV/AIDS: an historical-political approach as an alternative epistemology?

Securitization goes back to the rise of the liberal political regime in Europe since the 17th century. The global expansion and consolidation of this regime was accompanied by international public hygienist surveillance from the 1830s. Given this structure, it is relevant to review and discuss specific points in Foucault’s work on the analytics of power, and the work of subsequent writers who applied his ideas in the field of International Relations. The approach adopted here uses a methodological technique adopted by Foucault, i.e. genealogy, which has been described as a “history of the present” (Guttling, 2005: 50). This technique has been described as follows

First, the subject matter of the history is the origins of present rules, practices or institutions that claim an authority over us. Second, the primary intent is not to understand the past in its own terms or for its own sake, but to understand and evaluate the present, particularly with a view to discrediting unjustified claims of authority. (ibid)

Inverting the principle of General von Clausewitz that “war is the continuation of politics of other means,” Foucault maintains that modern societies in Europe, with the end of religious wars and rise of nation-states since the 17th century, started to be organised to prepare for war, even in times of formal peace. Hence, according to Foucault (2006), “politics is the continuation of war by other means.” As a result, there is a change in the idea of sovereignty, which is based less on juridical and territorial premises and more on political terms.
The nature of the power of the sovereign agent starts to be less located in the capacity of taking life. On the contrary, the sovereign is capable of either fostering life or impeding it. This is a power that relates to human beings at the aggregate level (populations) and has been designated “biopower,” an expression of the 18th century scientific effort to measure and regulate all dimensions of life including birth, schooling, employment, criminality, etc. This change has implied thinking of the human being as an “être biologique” (biological being), a natural species, yet with political life and power. Biopower is totalitarian, although with a tremendously ambivalent design, which allows it to manage surplus populations vis-à-vis the sovereign agent’s survival and expansionist objectives. Holding society under control, in the last analysis, biopower provides the prevalence of the superior race, in which the concentration camp is not just a symbol of the regime and an institutional practice under a state of exception, but also a locus of scientific efficiency. Two major examples are the Nazi genocides, and, at the time of writing, the unlawful imprisonments at Guantanamo Bay detention centre (Agamben, 2005). Contrarily to previous absolutist regimes, biopower has to be rationalized and justified. In this regard, medical practice was very important in terms of consolidating this regime of power at its knowledge level. Such recognition has to do with the realization since the 18th century of human finitude. Medical practice, namely autopsies, empower the human being as both its subject and object of its own knowledge (Foucault, 1994: 197). No more death is the realm of the “metaphysics of the evil” (Foucault, 1994: 196). According to Foucault, “[medical science] is closer than any of [the human sciences] to the anthropological structure that sustains them all” (Foucault, 1994: 198).

The concept of biopower is linked to the concept of biopolitics, that started to be used by Foucault later, and is basically the agent of the former. It is supplemented by the concept of governamentality (gouvernamentalité), that is, a discursive-material device (dispositif) of security embodying rationalities and technologies of government, comprising “discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions” (Foucault, 1980: 184).

Yet, those technologies do not necessarily use violence to force people to do what the sovereign wants (Lemke, 2001). In liberal societies that would be very complicated to manage for the sake of the system’s own sustainability. Frequently control is exerted through “ideological manipulation or rational argumentation, moral advice or eco-
nomic exploitation” (Lemke, 2000: 5). The target is, nevertheless, the anatomic body in its most comprehensive political sense and at very different scales: from the professional setting to the dietary/beauty regime (ibid.: 13).

Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero (2008) consider that biopolitics is a security device that expresses an “evolving economy of power relations,” whose most recent development can be assessed through the term “emergency.” Emergency—that illustrates public health-related interventions’ rationale in the post-September 11 and post-2003 SARS outbreaks—is a form of contingency that the biopolitical liberal governance does confront. Governance is performed via a set of governamentalising technologies, both prophylactic and regulatory, whose objective is to maximize the profits of those who govern. However, they add the idea of circulation within a territorial and biological (population-related) framework, which basically correspond to the idea of markets. In globalizing, neo-liberal times, there is a tendency for some discontents to denounce markets’ deregulation as technical wording for “wild capitalism.” Deregulation is to be comprehended as a sophisticated technology of control in which refinement in collection and analysis of statistical information on market agents’ behaviors is fundamental. Self-regulation of the markets corresponds to the idea of biopolitical self-governance. However, what should be highlighted for our discussion on infectious disease is that such self-governance is risky and poses serious dilemmas. Indeed, in the same way that liberal economic globalization requires large flexibility in consumption and investment facilitated by movements of people, goods, services and finances, this platform is also utilized for such illicit activities as criminality or terrorism. What does this mean? Risks emerge as a contingency of the system that can be commoditized, commercialized and managed as insurances, yet to specific limits. As François Ewald put it, there are two places where infectious diseases are located “toward the infinitely small-scale (biological, natural, or food-related risk), and toward the infinitely large-scale (major technological risks or technological catastrophes)” (Ewald, 1993: 222).

Impossible to be fully calculated and secured, these risks are nevertheless inscribed in the rationalities and technologies of governance under the categories of precaution and prevention. Yet, it should be stressed that risk management is carried out as a function of information, quantitative and qualitative, often leading to a problem of speculation. That can be undermining in terms of the sustainability of the rationality that masters the very mechanism of governance. In any case, an efficient management of risk management constitutes a
powerful means of power consolidation, reinforcing the individualism that liberal philosophy has defended ever since, in opposition, for example, to the notion of solidarity as an alternative or complementary logic.

Alison Bashford (2006) reports that one result of the establishment of border epidemiological check-ups and quarantine systems was the installation of surveillance mechanisms on a global scale, uniting metropolises and colonies. Thus, national surveillance and hygienist measures moved beyond the national sphere on to the rest of the world, cementing Western power territorially and biologically. This process was a response to a cholera epidemic affecting the European powers in the 1830s which paved the way for several international hygienist conferences during the 19th century. In this regard, the international sanitary institutions of the inter-war years were very decisive. In those years, health issues were essentially regarded as technical matters by the League of Nations' Health Office. Its mission was to collect information from the national administrations, in order to control diseases such as malaria, smallpox and sleeping sickness, in close collaboration with the Economics Office of the organization. General population-related dossiers tended to be studied in its migratory and trade dimensions, excluding issues such as birth control, and sexual and reproductive health. These latter matters were not considered to be part of the League’s mandate.

Today, however, sexually and maternally transmitted diseases have obtained such recognition, and they receive much political and funding support. Partly that has to do with the increasing pressure displayed by the health and activist sectors. But partly that has also to do with the securitization that Holbrooke expressed above, and the activist world has contributed to this through its early politicization (Vieira, 2007). The problem here is the already mentioned ambivalence that security at the human level reveals, an ambivalence identified in the concepts of biopower and biopolitics. Security: made by whom, targeted at whom and for what purpose?

From an ethical point of view, the essential problem with biopolitics as securitization of bodies and societies is that it works towards the establishment of normalizing political objectives, (subtly) discriminating against what is superfluous, unnecessary and impure. In his discussion of HIV/AIDS securitization, Elbe (2005) warns about the potential for public measures to reinforce an already very stigmatizing HIV status, regardless of prevention strategies.
Conclusion

The adoption of an “historical-political” lens allows us to come to what may be a surprising conclusions about the “true” nature of epidemiology and public health in the whole Western global security project. Its surveillance mechanisms, structural elements of epidemic control, preparedness and response, has helped cement a world system of dominance over the colonial world, ever since the 19th century. Hygienism has been, for instance, particularly instrumental with regard to the implementation of outrageous white-supremacist regimes in the former colonies (Youde, 2005: 5-6).

The analysis of PEPFAR’s political rationale and implementation strategies in the light of a biopolitical point of view revals them to be instruments of geo-biopolitical normalization. To understand this we need a transdisciplinary focus, especially with regard to the historical political content embedded in medical and social interventions. Yet, the way this securitization —and even militarization (thus implying attention to the role of the Department of Defense)— is proceeding necessitates closer attention to interrelated “trendy” issues (conflicts, trade, counter-terrorism, etc.) at the territorial level. This exercise should be pursued through multilevel analysis according to the country at stake, and with a focus on the OVC as target-group. Several issues require special attention: the relationship between the organizations and OVC; intra-organizational partnerships’ relations; relationships between the partnership framework and the “AIDS community”; and the relationship between the partnership and U.S. security and political representations.

References


The War of the Symbols: Performative Violence Within the ‘Black Bloc’ and ‘Kale Borroka’

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Introduction

The images of young activists dressed in black, with their faces hidden behind masks and ‘palestinos’, burning luxury cars and containers, destroying cash machines and the windows of banks and estate agencies, has become one of the stereotypical images of ‘urban violence’, to which the mass-media turn when looking for bigger audiences (Juris, 2003; Appadurai, 1996). This is what Philippe Bourgois (1997) would have called ‘Pornography of the Violence’. The ‘Kale Borroka’, the young descendants of the immigrants in the Parisian suburbs, as well as the activists of the global strategy named ‘Black Bloc’, are some of the social actors who had decided to use these violent methods and strategies, which Juris (2003) defined as ‘performative violence’. These types of violent rituals work thanks to some symbolic and hidden grammars and languages, which are based on the use of aggressive and spectacular tactics or actions. Some of these violent strategies, rites of passage and styles, that appear and work in the ‘local’ (Dirlik, 1997; Appadurai, 1996; Robertson, 1995; Gikandi, 2002; Mohanty, 2003), had been mutated, readapted and reinvented by the new global cultural flows, in the last decades (Ferrandiz and Feixa, 2005). In certain occasions and contexts, we could see a globalizing

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1 This is the name by which is known the typical regional scarf used in some Muslim cultures to protect the head and face. In the last decades it has been used in a symbolic way, by some youths in Europe (Spain, Italy…) belonging to some sub-cultures and alter-globalization groups.

2 The activists try to carry out some spectacular and symbolic actions, as they can appear in the news. The main aim is to be mentioned in the headlines of the diverse newspapers, radios, TV, etc.

3 ‘Rites of Passage’ were described for the first time by Arnold VAN GENNEP. These rites follow a three stage structure; ‘separation —liminality— re-grouping’, and thanks to them old roles are lost and new ones obtain, by the member taking part in it.
process in some cases of violence headed by youths, which had passed the ‘local’ sphere, to reach a global stage. This process is clearly manifested, in the massive demonstrations and incidents carried out by the Black Bloc during the G8 meetings.

Many of the conflicts we can find in the 21st century around the world, have old or deep rooted causes, which haven’t been fixed for many different reasons. One of the main problems could be the definition of what a conflict is: the ‘conflict’ in the Basque Country for instance, is not considered as such by some of the parts involved which will define it with a single word: terrorism. Many think the conflict will persist even on the day ETA disappears, because they consider it as a deep routed and not fixed social, cultural and political conflict started in the 19th Century (Las Carlistadas) and prolonged from 1936 to 1976, due to the dictatorship of the General Francisco Franco. However, there have been several efforts in the last decades to create and develop successful peace processes between the Spanish Government and ETA, that nevertheless might have failed in their efforts, just because they might have excluded several issues and actors from those processes. The non recognition of an armed, cultural or political conflict and the exclusion of any of the parts (political parties, social and cultural groups, armed groups etc.) from any peace process could result in a violent scenario.

By using this kind of ritualized behavior, the diverse social groups can create new ‘hybrid identities’ (Hall, 1989; Young, 1995), which allow these groups to reinvent and reconstruct themselves constantly. All these new imagined communities (Anderson, 1983), are created and enforced thanks to the multiple global social nets. Indimedia, a huge information global net within the alter-globalization movement, is a good example of this phenomenon. This huge ‘resistance net’ could be inserted into a globalized context, where the dualistic discourse/fight performed by themselves and some mass media representing various neo-liberal ideologies, take place.

**Discovering new global violences**

Globalization could be considered in the present as a key concept for the diverse researchers working in the Social Sciences. What is dif-

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4 Benedict ANDERSON (1983) analyzes nations as imagines communities. More than fixed natural social/cultural structures, they are imagined, symbolic and therefore artificial human constructions. As clear examples we could propose the cases of the diverse Diasporas and the Queer Nation for instance.
different today from precedent periods or times? Can we analyze a conflict in the same way we used to do some decades ago? These are some of the questions we have to deal with when researching violent and armed conflicts, which have been influenced by different global actors and factors.

We could talk about ‘New Wars’ referring to newest types/models/styles of violence that could be contextualized locally and globally. We need to describe and define these new conflicts (or new forms of old conflicts) if we want to consider them as such, and not as nonsensical daily violence. Unfortunately many researchers and organizations still have deep problems and weird arguments to negate the evidences about the existence or inexistence of a violent or an armed conflict. The ‘Uppsala Universitet’ (Sweden), one of the top universities in the world in conflict studies, negates the existence of an armed conflict if the deaths per year are less than 25. It does not consider the fact that conflicts could be set in a continuum, where violence can grow or low down gradually. As long as violence is used to reach some objectives, we could talk about violent conflicts (even though nobody has been killed).

‘Kale Borroka’ in a local context (Basque conflict) and the ‘Black Bloc’ in a global context (Alter-globalization movement) should be considered as using violent conflicts/strategies, where violent tactics and violent rituals are presented as the best way of communication for the diverse activists. Recovering the precedent argument about what a conflict is or is not, I would like to argue that usually some types of conflicts are hidden thanks to the dualist discourse, by which they are defined as terrorism or vandalism. The mentioned discourse brings us to the eternal fight between right vs. left, religion vs. laicism, order vs. terrorism and so on. The main problem resides in the way in which this opposition or contrast is created and by whom it is created. To name things is the best way to take control over them. Naming is controlling and in the present (as well as in the past), leaders know how to maintain and use this powerful cultural and symbolic weapon (more powerful than the biggest atomic bomb). Terrorism is one of the key words by which global and local fears can be fed and grown. Fear can be used to ‘performativize’ the diverse discourses and languages, which justified some deeply ‘anti-human-rights’ laws, such as those applied to the prisoners in Guantánamo (Cuba) for instance. Local appears in the Global, and Global can influence Local in a continuous feedback, which could be represented in the so called ‘Glocalization’ (Robertson, 1995; Dirlik, 1997), where both, local and global meet and create new contexts and socio-cultural ‘realities’. Fear might be used to establish
some incredible (in the worst sense of the word) laws, strategies, policies, which conclude in the exclusion of one/some of the parts, commonly related to the category of the ‘subaltern’.

The global mass media has been habitually the tool used to de-contextualize these new and unknown violences, usually related to youths and underground subcultures. The diverse mass medias search for sensationalist, polemic, visually impacting and politically socking images. The main concern is to get the biggest audiences. This kind of sensationalism could derive in a ‘pornography of violence’ (Bourgois, 1997).

**Action-Reaction Continuum**

Conflicts can be usually set in a changing *continuum*, where violence can escalate or de-escalate imitating the crazy actions of a rollercoaster. Even though an action-reaction schema could seem simplistic, in many cases, this is the way in which things work. *Kale Borroka* and *Black Bloc* represent or are represented as the phantasmagoric spectrums, which threaten the stability of some societies, cultures or governments. The young anarchists, communists, feminists taking part in the various anti-system fights or movements, are presented as radical and crazy terrorists, who deserve nothing else than some long holidays in prison.

Usually hegemonic governments find in this type of construction of reality, the best method to create and enforce strong dualistic discourses, which basically promote the ostracism and marginalization of the other group/community. Nobody cares about how to *destroy*, illegalize or marginalize the ‘other’, as long as the mass media agrees with it. The problem might be the fact, that the owners of the most important mass media are usually related to the hegemonic powers, governments, neo-liberal lobbies and so on. However, the ‘other’ has understood that communication, information and publicity could be the most appropriate symbolic weapon to resist their opponents’ attacks. *Indymedia* became in the end of the 1990s and during the new millennium, the utopian alternative to overcome and gain the absurd and malefic capitalistic ‘evil’, represented by the transnational companies such as, McDonald’s, Nike, etc.

As long as we do not understand the hidden grammars, which legitimize the diverse violent behaviors, we will not be able to fix them or at least try to deal with them. Citizenship in the Basque Country had been traditionally ‘bombarded’ by the diverse medias, trying to impose their own vision of the conflict. Everyone wants and needs to impose its own vision of the conflict to the rest of the society. Probably, the big-
gest problem in this nice land, is the lack of people prepared to present and study the conflict in an objective and honest way. Politicians and their performative and dualistic discourses are the only visible interpretations people can receive, whenever a violent incident happens. The unique answer and interpretation given, relates everything to terrorism and illogic violence presented in a synchronic context. The place for the history has been suddenly forgiven and forbidden by those who find in violence a way to survive and endure in time.

Fear and global fear are two of the concepts we should deal with, as they perfectly represent the functioning and ‘intra-structure’ of some of the social and communal behaviors in current societies. Marginalizing ideologies, which do not fit in the ‘standardized’ modern mentality, have become a favorite strategy of the most powerful world leaders. Everybody/everything is in the present susceptible to being ‘terroristed’ and banned by the laws created especially for the occasion. In the case of the Basque Country, political parties can be made illegal, whenever they threaten the stability of the hegemonic nationalism (Spanish nationalism). There is no place anymore for the ‘mirror game’ between nationalisms, described by Francisco Letamendia (Año). ‘Peripheric nationalisms’ do not apparently exist for the Spanish leaders, it is only a matter of terrorism. Anything opposed to the ‘Spanish Constitution’ or the ‘American Way of Life’ and so on, would be added to the ‘black list’ of the global leaders and therefore attacked until they are destroyed. No one will complain; and if they do, they would join their predecessors. Global alliances are followed by the creation of global enemies and the ‘game’ becomes a never-ending curl or loop. How can we then stop criminal strategies carried out by the most powerful countries in the world, that threaten the integrity of human rights, such as Guantánamo or the secret jails in Europe and so on?

In any type of conflict, individual versus individual, community versus community, country versus country, etc., there is a fixed structure or tendency; the creation of the ‘other’. The ‘other/others’ represent everything we dislike. The ‘other’ is the result of a cognitive and symbolic construction/idea, that helps enforce and consolidate the structure of our own community. We could say that creating the ‘other’ helps in creating ‘us’. But what does it really suppose for the ‘other’? Is it safe from ‘us’ and from our ‘usness’? When life is considered less important than our own identity, groups like the Nazis and ‘GAL’\(^5\) emerge.

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\(^5\) Spanish State Terrorism created in the 1980s by the Government, responsible for the murders of dozens of innocent people.
Dealing with the ‘other’

Who/What is the ‘other’? Is it ‘real’ or it is just an irrational perception of our context? In the Middle Ages, Europeans, considered the ‘others’ the non-Christians (Savages, Muslims etc.) and vice-versa. Concepts related to religion and other beliefs were the bases to underline the importance and purity of ‘our’ community and the impurity, dirtiness that represented the ‘others’. In the present, religion is being used for the same purpose in many occasions and it could be considered as one of the main reasons for the existence of deep-rooted and bloody conflicts (Serbia vs. Bosnia, inter-ethnic conflicts in Iraq). However, we could see within a diachronic approach to the phenomenon, that many of the reasons have changed in their appearance or mutated into new forms of the same conflict. We could see somehow, a qualitative and sometimes quantitative jump, from aspects or matters related to religion, to new ones related to nationalism, economy, etc. Nevertheless, we can find a continuous element, which is ‘identity’. Identity is the main concept we should use when we try to analyze the deep and hidden reason and ideologies, that justify the use of some violent and ‘performative’ strategies, actions, cosmologies and so on. As researchers, we should be able to discover the hidden meanings and grammars, by which the violent expressions are created and legitimated.

Globalization has created new types of identities different from the previous ones. Violence could be transferred from local contexts to globalized ones, thanks to the new global cultural flows. New identities, sub-cultures, ethnicities (Hall, 1989) are created and recreated by the new actors, usually youths. Violence could follow and imitate the same structures the cultural flow creates. Sometimes, culture, identity and violence could join the same journey to globalized violent scenarios. Our main task as researchers is to discover how and why this could happen. Hibridity (Young, 1995) can be a perfect example of this fact. Hibridity thus makes difference into sameness, and sameness into difference. Hibridity is a making one of two distinct things. It might be a good solution to deal with the ‘other’, the creation of new weaker identities (and weaker performative languages/discourses too), based in new ethnicities and hybrid identities.

Images and symbols of the Basque political violence

Basque Political violence cannot be properly understood as a rational type of behavior alone, but also as communicative and magi-
cal behavior, which we would define as ‘ritual’ behavior. The Basque nationalist resistance has even resorted to terrorist actions. It is only to be expected that premises of a magical kind and ritualized behavior should become constitutive of such performances. The investigation should not be directed toward the ‘criminal acts’ themselves, but rather toward the presuppositions on which they are premised. Ritual imposes a new order by reducing an ambiguous state of affairs to the clarity of an either/or. A confrontation of order and disorder is staged. The radical denials of Basque political activism, no matter how terrorist and unruly with respect to the established order, are in a ritual sense attempts to escape the maddening contradictions imposed on the Basques by Madrid’s politico-military domination. By transcending time and proclaiming a new political foundation, radical violence aims at ritually founding a new order (Zulaika, 1988;1996).

It is primarily from their basic culture that Basques learn how to perform efficiently. When periods of critical transformation force upon a society new acts of creation and violence, the return to the original roots gets partly expressed in tacitly assuming modes of performance long sanctioned by cultural tradition. A truly innovative process in creating a different political culture on the part of the Basques requires that they become cognizant of the extent to which their performances are subservient to these models so that they may be faced with the challenge of transforming them into new modes of thinking and acting. In a broad sense, ritualization denotes “the adaptive formalization and canalization of motivated human activities so as to secure more effective communicatory (signalling) function, reduction of intra-group damage, or better intra-group bonding” (Huxley, 1966: 258).

Re/presented ‘local’ and ‘global’ violent performances

Rituals related to the use of the performative violence, manifest themselves by ritualized behaviors and languages (stiles, sociolects…) in which linguistic performativity has a deeply important role. Both, the stereotyped formalism (songs, gesticulation, repetition…) or the importance of the forms (style…), that Maurice Bloch (1986) described, and the delegation (delegated authority) Pierre Bourdieu (1985) proposed, are some of the characteristics related to performative language, when this is manifested by the use of the performative violence. The diverse meta-languages and essentialisms that commonly arise during the armed and political conflicts show many of the elements assigned or related to the performative language. Austin (1962) argued the existence of some
languages and grammatical statements by which certain acts or actions
directly related to the idiosyncrasy of a community were expressed/re-
alized. To be correctly used, *performed* or articulated, they should ful-
fil some guidelines or bases: *they should be used in an accepted con-
ventional procedure, particular circumstances and people should be the
appropriate and it should be done in a correct/agreed way by all the
participants* (Austin, 1962: 56). This kind of *performativa* (realisative)
statements, could be followed by some different *performativa* elements,
such as the ‘representation’ and the ‘delegation of the power’.

An interdisciplinary research, where the diverse aspects related to
both, cultural and linguistic elements, could help us finding or inter-
preting the deep and hidden meanings that reasoned or justified this
kind of behaviour. Probably by developing a *deep description* (Geertz,
1988) from the perspective of the actors, we could create and man-
age new ways to gain any violent conflict. If we would develop our re-
searches from the perspective of the Ethnography, in an *Emic* way (an-
alyzing the structural and symbolic elements), we could probably reach
some conclusions that even being ‘politically incorrect’, could be help-
ful to create and establish new peace and reconciliation processes. De-
fining and considering the acts of ‘Performativa Violence’ as *nonsense*
violence or as terrorism, might be a huge mistake that many countries
have made in the last decades. By proposing this kind of definitions
and classifications, the various governments are probably omitting and
ignoring the cultural, political and symbolic component that every rite/
ritual performs or displays, is the most diverse and unsuspected ways.
Anton Bloc (2000) affirms that we should not consider violence as
something irrational, but as a changing way of social/cultural interac-
tion and communication.

**Violence versus terrorism: ‘un-finished violence’**

Last week (July 2008), one of the main commandos of ETA was
broken up by the Spanish military police (Guardia Civil). Like in previ-
ous occasions that the same fact has happened (arrested comman-
dos), Spanish politicians and mass media quickly congratulate them-

could last for quite longer. There is a continuous feedback between a big part of the Basque society and ETA, that permits its own resurrection every time a ‘break up’ happens. As we signalled before we should be aware of the symbolism, rituality and performativity of Basque violence in a wider geographical and diachronic context. More than focusing our efforts in ‘destroying’ ETA, we should be able to understand the deep grammars and cognitive constructions that legitimize the use of violence. The creation of doubtful and anti-constitutional laws (‘Ley de Partidos’, ‘Ley de Dispersion’…) by the Spanish government, allows and legitimates those who defend a national imagined community with the violence.

Another big problem could be found in the metonymic description of the Basque Violence and terrorism. The Kale Borroka had been defined by the formula ‘Pars pro Toto’ and therefore included in the wide sack of the Basque terrorism. Many activist of the Kale Borroka watching that they will have to go to jail for taking part in the ‘street fight’ (some people spent in jail more than 8 years just for burning a cash machine), decided to join ETA. Some policies help growing the flow from low symbolic violence, to higher levels of deathly violence and the spiral keeps on going.

There are some common elements within the Basque Conflict (Kale Borroka) and the violent and visual demonstrations organized by the Alter globalization movement that should be tackle honestly in an aim to reach and define the real causes of that conflict. In peace and conflict resolution processes we should try to take the situation from the ‘personal’ to the ‘substantive’ (Galtung, 1985). We should try to explore and analyze how the different parts create and assume the image of the other and how they act consequently. The symbolic definition (usually negative) of the other implies certain elements and symbols that must be fought or illegalised. The role of the medias is deeply important, as they are the ones who can present and construct a subject as an evil or as a hero for the rest of the society.

References


6 The heads of the Government and Police can manipulate the images, taking them out of context to be introduced later on in a new and totally different one, and presenting them as a clear example of terrorism and dangerous criminality (GITLIN, 1980).


Delegitimisation of Identity as a Political Strategy:
The Moroccan Official Discourse about the Polisario Front

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Introduction

The main focus of this chapter is on how the Moroccan official discourse addresses the identity of the Polisario and implications of that. The main argument is that the categorisation of Polisario’s members as (potential) terrorists that is prevalent in the Moroccan official discourse intends to disqualify and delegitimize this actor not only domestically but also in the realm of international politics. This subject of inquiry is important as it shows how discourses, often uncritically accepted and replicated by media, policy makers and academic institutions, have social and political implications that go beyond establishing an understanding. Indeed, in this chapter language is not considered neutral nor natural, but always as an exercise of power.

The chapter is structured in four sections. The first one outlines the foundations of the analysis of the Moroccan public discourses on Polisario. On the theoretical level, it is argued that language has a constitutive and powerful role on the construction of identity. Methodologically, it is based on a textual analysis embedded in a wider social and political context. This context is set in the second section with a description of the conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front over the sovereignty of Western Sahara. The third section analyses the Moroccan discourses related to Polisario, focusing on the linkages that these discourses attempt to establish between Polisario and terrorism. The fourth section addresses the issue of the wider implications of such labelling of the Polisario Front’s members as (potential) terrorists in the Moroccan domestic scene and at the international level. The concluding section provides a summary of the preceding sections and a discussion of the key conclusions that emerge from the research.
Theorising the Moroccan discourse with regard to Polisario

Reality can be perceived in different ways because it can be approached by different social and cultural representations and so, in a way, it is socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann, 1980). This construction is an inter-subjective task, realised through sharing, discussing, contesting, disputing the meanings by which we try to make sense of reality. These meanings are not merely descriptive; on the contrary, they always convey values, norms and beliefs which, at the same time, are a reflection of and reflect upon social and political structures, that is, relations of power. Thus, language is an instrument of power (Bourdieu, 2001).

One of the ways by which language conveys power is through labelling. When labelling, one sparks processes of ‘typification’ which in its radical form can produce social stigmatisation. This process of ‘typification’ happens when it succeeds in isolating and underlying a trait of identity affecting the way that such being views itself and its position in the world, the way it acts, and the way others will view it and act towards it (Berger and Luckmann, 1980). This process can stigmatise that being when the social designation produced implies depreciation of its identity by reference to the dominant norms (here in the sociological sense of the prevalent expectations towards the behaviour of a being) and by that way it distorts the interaction of the others with the stigmatised one (Goffman, 1988). All of this outlines a picture of identity as something deeply embedded in symbolic interaction, and thus a view of identity as much as a construction by the self and an attribution by the others (an hitherto construction) each one resulting in what Goffman defines as ‘real’ identity and ‘virtual’ identity (apud Ferreira et al, 1995: 307). In relation to the question of power, it can be argued that the relative weight of the self (real) identity and of the attributed (or virtual) identity in the overall identity of a being at stake in its interactions with others is much a result of the power that structures the relations of the being with these other ones.

Departing from this theoretical framework, this chapter analyses the Moroccan discourse about Polisario in its attempt to attribute a ‘virtual’ or supposed terrorist identity to this nationalist movement and by that way to delegitimise and disempower its performance both in the international and the domestic political realms for what concerns the resolution of the dispute over the sovereignty of Western Sahara. Given the impossibility to carry out field work, data has been uniquely collected through documentary review. Access to official documents has sometimes proved difficult. This reflects how delicate issues such as
terrorism and the dispute over Western Sahara are. Primary texts are reported as they were actually presented, without any correction or modification. The exception is the emboldened words in the quotes, which has been done to indicate the focus of analysis.

**Socio-political context**

The dispute over the sovereignty of Western Sahara has to do with two main principles that have been ordering international society since World War II: self-determination and the prohibition of aggressive territorial expansion. Notwithstanding, the dispute over Western Sahara has mainly been considered has a self-determination case and it is still in the agenda of the United Nations (UN) as a decolonisation case. This dispute gave rise to a violent conflict between Morocco and the nationalist movement known as the Polisario Front (Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el Hamra and the Rio de Oro), internationally recognised as the representative of the Saharawis. The UN recognised the right of self-determination for the people of the Spanish Sahara in the 1960s and demanded Spain to provide for it. At the same time, Morocco started to claim that it was entitled to that territory under the principle of territorial integrity.

On October 16, 1975, the International Court of Justice issued an Advisory Opinion on the case stating that the territory was inhabited by tribes that had their own social and political organisation, with some legal ties of allegiance with Morocco and Mauritania which, should, under any circumstances, hinder the right to self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

That same day, King Hassan II announced that he had a dream inspired by God: the Green March. On the November 6, about 350,000 Moroccans cross into Western Sahara inspired by the idea of the ‘Great Morocco’. The Spanish army did not resist the invasion and withdrew. The territory was invaded, two-thirds at North under Moroccan administration, and the rest under Mauritania’s. During the subsequent years, the invasion led thousands of Saharawis to flee to Tindouf in the

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1 In this section it will only be outlined a brief description of the case, resumed from BARATA, 2008: 97-101. A very good chronology can be found at POINTIER, 2004; and more detailed assessments at ARTS and LEITE, 2007; ICG, 2007; OHAEGBULAM, 2004; SHELLEY, 2004; SOLA-MARTIN, 2007; THEOFILOPOULOU, 2006.

Southwest of Algeria where some refugee camps remain until today (San Martin, 2005: 588).

Following the invasion, the Polisario Front initiated a ‘national liberation’ war and in 1976 declared the formation of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic that has been recognised by around a dozen of countries, mainly African and Latin American. In the late 1980s, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the UN started to mediate the conflict, and in 1991 the parties finally signed an agreement on a peace plan that envisaged a ceasefire and a referendum in which people would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. A peacekeeping mission (MINURSO-United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) was established to implement the plan.

The dispute ended and since then the conflict can be seen as “a long, drawn-out diplomatic war of attrition” (Mundy, 2007). A series of problems concerning the eligibility to vote on the referendum were the pretext and the starting point of a tortuous process of successive delays that hampered its realisation until today. This has been arguably facilitated by the ambivalence of the UN Security Council towards this case, which has to do with the support that Morocco has been receiving from the US and France.

The Peace Plan was more and more being perceived as a zero-sum game, and in 2000 the UN Secretary-General declared that it would be very difficult for the referendum to happen and that even if it would, there could be no way of imposing the result (UNSG, 2000). In this context, James Baker, Special Representative of the UNSG for Western Sahara, got involved in conversations with the parties to find a ‘third way’ of resolving the conflict that was orientated more to a political solution rather than to the application of the 1991 Peace Plan. However, the two Baker plans proposed were rejected firstly by Polisario and then by Morocco.

In 2007, the parties started direct negotiations for a political solution under the auspices of the UNSG but until now the issue has not evolved. The Moroccan position is to negotiate an agreement on autonomy to be subject to referendum. However, it does not consider in-

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3 It is not easy to rigorously estimate the number of people dislocated. Estimates point to about 40 to 50 per cent of the population resident in the territory of Spanish Sahara in 1975, and to a number of refugee people today in south of Algeria between 150,000 and 200,000.

4 There have been already four rounds of negotiations in Manhasset, New York, in 18-19 June 2007 (Manhasset I), 10-11 August 2007 (Manhasset II), 7-9 January 2008 (Manhasset III) and 16-18 March 2008 (Manhasset IV)-official documentation can be found at www.arso.org/UNnegociations160308.htm. For an analysis of the non-productivity of these negotiations see, for instance, THEOFILOPOULOU, 2008.
dependence an option that can be included in the *referendum*. On the contrary, the Polisario’s position is that the option of independence is non-negotiable and its intentions are to negotiate the terms of the relations between the two countries after a potential independence. The situation is presently on an impasse.

Despite the fact that the parts continue to respect the ceasefire, this situation can still be considered as a conflict on the basis of the irreducibility of both parties in their contradictory positions towards the possible ways to the resolution of the dispute; the existence on the side of the nationalist movement of tendencies that push forward to a resumption of armed struggle (ICG, 2007: 16; Mundy, 2006: 159; Solá-Martín, 2005); the high levels of militarisation, social control, coercion and intimidation, and censorship in both parties (Solá-Martín, 2005); the serious violations of human rights, mainly from the part of Morocco upon the Saharawi population in the territory under its control (illegal detentions, beatings, torture and disappearances); finally, the emergence, from 2005 until today, in the territories under Moroccan control and also in Moroccan cities, of a relatively non-violent resistance movement (the self-defined ‘Intifada Saharawi’) that is violently repressed (Mundy, 2006: 263; San Martín, 2005: 583; Shelley, 2004: 115; Stephan and Mundy, 2006).

**Analysing the Moroccan discourse with regard to Polisario**

The issue of Western Sahara has been dominant in the Moroccan discourse since at least four decades. Immediately after the end of the French protectorate, Hassan II started building its internal legitimacy and hegemony in great measure upon the project of a ‘Great Morocco’ (which claims Ceuta, Melilla, the Spanish Sahara, Mauritania, some parts of Algeria, Mali and Senegal) and makes the question of Western Sahara a factor of national unity internally, and an argument of political stability in the international realm (Lacoste, 1988: 81; Pointier, 2004: 52; Shelley, 2004: 53). Despite the fact that Moroccan governments, since the mid-1970s, tried to label the Polisario as a terrorist organisation, it is only recently that the Moroccan official discourse seems to address the issue of Western Sahara more specifically in the wider contexts of international terrorism, and related (counter-)terrorism discourses, seemingly trying to connect it with the main concerns of US international agenda.5

5 For an analysis of the implication of terrorism and counter-terrorism discourses see BARTOLUCCI, 2008.
In March 2007, the Moroccan Ministry of Justice at the time, Mohamed Bouzoubab, accused the Polisario Front of being in collusion with Al Qaeda with the aim of destabilising the Sahel region. He stated: “There are, now, cooperation and coordination between Al Qaida, specifically the Algerian GCPS and the Moroccan Salafia Jihadia, that engage in a common action with the Polisario Front” (Algerie.dz, 2007, emphasis added). Bouzoubab argued that this linkage is “corroborated by some reports of the international intelligence services”, in particular the American. And he added:

If we allow this situation to continue, the entire Sahel region will be in danger, because the separatists (the Front Polisario) help terrorist groups at every level for acts of sabotage that would threaten the Moroccan stability” Jihadia, that engage in a common action with the Polisario Front. (Algerie.dz, 2007, emphasis added)

This linkage between terrorism and the Polisario Front expressed by Bouzoubab is far from being an isolate or marginal position. On the contrary, this trend of assuming a connection between the two has recently grown up to the point of having the Polisario’s members labelled as ”terrorists”.

This discourse has been replicated by media. That has been seen as a source of concern for instance by Camacho, a Spanish journalist that in April 2008 wrote: “Until now, its role as the Sahrawi people’s liberation movement has never been disputed, but now they have been downgraded to no more than a vulgar terrorist group” (Camacho, 2008, emphasis added). This trend of linking Polisario and terrorism is clearly emerging from a review of Moroccan media articles and reports. ICG (International Crisis Group) reports that Morocco has often pointed out that the Polisario Front is following a radical Islamist ideology and that the linkages between the Polisario and jihadist networks are clear. However, Moroccan authorities never offer evidences (ICG, 2007a).

The Polisario Front, strongly reacted against Mohamed Bouzoubab’s allegations of a coordination between the Polisario’ s activities and Al Quaeda. The Swiss newspaper Rédaction de Liberté reported that: “Following the Moroccan attempts to assimilate it to a ‘terrorist movement’, the Polisario Front denounces a ‘manipulation grossière’” (Rédaction de Liberté, 2007, emphasis added). One of the main repercussions of this in Polisario’s position has to do with a putative resume of hostilities. The frustration with the impasse of the political process is growing in the refugee camps as well as in the occupied territories,
and this has been sparkling pressures among the nationalist movement to a return to political violence. However, the pro-international law faction (that considers the legal way as the main possibility to resolve the conflict), which since 1988 dominated the Polisario, is now subject to further concern with the potential of it being connected with international terrorism in case of a resume of hostilities, considering the ever more explicit support of the US to the Moroccan position.

**Implications of labelling Polisario as “terrorists” at the international level**

As clearly emerges from the previous analysis, the issue of Western Sahara has given rise to a politicised and controversial vocabulary. Thus, whereas the Polisario speaks of ‘Western Sahara’ and it considers it a territory ‘occupied by the Moroccans’, Morocco refers to a ‘Moroccan Sahara’. Similarly, whereas Polisario’s members call themselves ‘freedom fighters’, ‘heroes of liberation’, and alike, the Moroccan official discourse considers them ‘rebels’, ‘criminals’, and even ‘terrorists’. And again, if the issue of Western Sahara is a matter of ‘self-determination’ for the Polisario, it is, on the contrary, a ‘rebellion’, an ‘Algerian tool’ for Morocco. These differences of vocabulary reflect not only the inevitable verbal confrontation present in any conflict, but they are also a sign of the very different ways of portraying history and identity by the two parts: Morocco and the Polisario Front.⁶

Camacho argued that the Moroccan rulers have been trying to benefit from Western Sahara through several means. One of them consists in airing a certain connection between Polisario and Islamist terrorism — something filtered in the middle of the Casablanca bombings (Camacho, 2008). Nowadays, the stigma of terrorism has become a powerful way to discredit opponents, carrying serious political and legal consequences. Labelling the Polisario Front as such is one of the most desired objectives after sought by King Mohammed’s friends (Camacho, 2008). Morocco has often emphasised the risk of having a newly established unstable state in the region, and recently it reiterated that possibility in stressing the threat of Islamic jihadism. ICG reports

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⁶ Actually, history, not as objective facts but as collective memory, is very important in this case and both parts make real efforts to reconstruct the past in ways consistent with the legitimisation of their aims. About the historical roots that Moroccan and Sahrawi nationalisms built in reference to the territory of Western Sahara cf. LACOSTE, 1988, POINTIER, 2006 and SAN MARTÍN, 2005.
that: “Since the 11 September 2001 attacks and renewed US focus on this threat, Rabat has emphasised this aspect, underscoring the possibility that the region might be infiltrated by Al Quaeda or its followers” (ICG, 2007a).

Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the manipulative use of terrorism is not an exclusive prerogative of Morocco. Indeed, while Morocco accuses the Polisario Front of having links with Al Quaeda, Algeria argues that the Moroccan government finances its own Islamist movements. This labelling has repercussions that go beyond the Moroccan national borders. Thus, in pointing out a “coordination and cooperation” between Al Quaeda and the Polisario Front, some observers argue that Mohamed Bouzoubab aims to obtain the inscription of Polisario in the global terrorism lists managed by Washington, D.C. (Réduction de Liberté, 2007).

Morocco is taking advantage of his privileged relationship with the US. Morocco is the main ally of the US ‘war on terror’ in the region and it is considered the most valuable bulwark against terrorist violence. The geo-strategic value of Morocco has mainly to do with its location at the jugular of the Mediterranean Sea that provides access to the control of one of the most important maritime routes of the world. Moreover, Morocco is a privileged interlocutor for the US as well as for Israel, within the Arab world. In this context, the question of the stability of the Alaouite dynasty is considered of the utmost importance by the US. In this way, the Moroccan attempt to manipulate for its own interests the US’s concerns related to terrorism are double faced: Morocco frames the question of Western Sahara as a question of national unity; at the same time the Moroccan’s strategy of linking the issue of Western Sahara to internal stability and of labelling Polisario as a terrorist group stresses upon what mostly concerns the US.

However, the most important implication of that language manipulation against Polisario is the attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the Polisario Front, in Morocco and beyond. What Morocco has been achieving with this strategy is US support (direct support as well as through the UN Security Council) to a political negotiated solution of the dispute, instead of the application of peace plans that envisaged a referendum with the option of independence and, more recently, an explicit support to its own proposal of an autonomy plan for the region. Indeed, in 2007, some US diplomatic officers have considered “serious and credible” the Plan for the Autonomy proposed by the Moroccan government (Theofilopoulou, 2007), and this view was reproduced in the UNSC Resolution 1754 of the April 30, stating that it “welcomes (sic) serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move
the process forward towards resolution” (UNSC, 2007). Similarly, 180 members of the US Congress had expressed their support to the Moroccan proposal (Theofilopoulou, 2007). More recently, some US officials and the UNSC went further stating that the Moroccan proposal was the only ‘realistic’ base for a resolution of the dispute.

**Conclusion**

The issue of Western Sahara is of extreme importance for Morocco. As Shelley pointed out, “any outcome in the Western Sahara will have consequences for the nature of the Moroccan state” (2004: 4). In fact, in Morocco, it is often argued that an exit from Western Sahara would imperil the monarchy. Furthermore, Morocco is the main ally of the US-led ‘war on terrorism’ in the region and it is really keen in promoting and maintaining an image of moderation and stability, in particular in front of the West. Morocco often emphasised its unique role in providing a privileged channel of communication between the Muslim World and the West. In this context, the framing of the Western Sahara dispute is of great importance. As already pointed out, this issue can threaten not only the legitimacy of the King, but also the internal stability of the country. As international law does not favour its aims, Morocco has envisaged a double strategy: to retain the support of the Great Powers as well as preserving the military and civil occupations of the territory.

As a result of the construction of Polisario as a potential terrorist organisation, Polisario finds itself under tight and contradictory pressures. The UN Security Council and the US strongly pressure it to compromise with Morocco. At the same time, however, the rising of Saharawi nationalism during these latest years has been growing stronger and stronger (Mundy, 2007; Pointier, 2004; Shelley, 2004). The present situation is extremely complex. Pressures to resume violent hostilities are growing among the nationalist movement and by that way the Polisario position and legitimacy inside the movement is being questioned.

This chapter aims at opening a space of reflection on the performative role of language. Its aim is to stress the power within language and the implications of that. Particular attention has been devoted to the implication of labelling, too often considered an innocent act. However, this chapter is only the first step in the direction of a deeper understanding of the socio-political construction of Polisario members as (potential) terrorists and its conclusion are only tentative.
References


Introduction

The main factor that has contributed to the amount and diversity of international immigration flows to the European Union (EU) is globalization. Globalization is a result of growing economic, political and societal interdependence which has been catalysing the creation of new expectations especially by the underprivileged and, here in particular, by those living in Sub-Saharan Africa. Economic and societal integration has worked as a propelling force reducing the impact of space and time on social relations, encouraging many individuals to leave their homes to migrate in the direction to the “Old Continent”, namely Western Europe. It is particularly relevant to include also the Asian migratory waves when analysing migratory patterns, which embody the so-called Overseas Chinese, who have migrated in large numbers to Great Britain, France and The Netherlands in a first wave (1990s), and more recently to Southern Europe (Rocha-Trindade et al, 2006: 39). Part of the reason for this is, as Pierre Picquart refers, the fact that Europe offers fewer barriers to the Chinese community than the United States or Canada. Migration from Asia will tend to increase in coming years, although it is often seen in European societies as the “yellow danger” (Picquart, 2004: 151).

Furthermore, around half a million illegal immigrants enter the EU every year, many of them via sea borders, which are under the control of maritime authorities and therefore, the crossing of these “frontiers” represents a real odyssey. An increasingly restrictive European legislation
has caused the loss of many dreams of migrants, since they are forced to stop at the “front door” of the EU under inhumane conditions. The circumstances of these odysseys include the operations of human traffickers and smugglers, who frequently leave their victims abandoned to death somewhere in the desert on the way to the “glorified” borders of the EU. When migrants survive the journey, they often reach islands, such as Lampedusa and the Canary Islands. These touristy areas have become centres to “collect” immigrants, where they are kept in precarious conditions offered by the host country, and in addition subject to abuses of human rights, as was witnessed by Italian journalist Fabrizio Gatti in the so-called “processing centre” of Lampedusa. At the same time, the EU has been developing efforts in order to improve economic conditions in some African countries. The European Commission (EC), for example, undertook a project to help them with 0.56 % of their own Gross Domestic Product in 2010, increasing this support in subsequent years as a preventive measure to manage migration (Navarro et al, 2005: 28).

The situation of migrants has constantly worsened since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the bombings in Madrid in the year 2004, and the growing overall perception of Islam fundamentalism as a threat to liberal democracies. The incidents and its effects increased the pressure on internal immigrant communities and external flows in and to EU member-states. Since then, irregular immigration was not only a question of (il)legality anymore but especially one of security. The sentiment of threat created a general idea, very much encouraged by the media, that some foreign communities could be developing terrorist cells with immigrants. Immigrants were more and more seen as a threat to the state power of liberal Western democracies. In the aftermath of the attacks, a symptomatic “fever” in regard to security restrictions gained ground throughout the Western world.

The effects are also visible in the EU which further closed its borders to third country nationals. Also in Western Europe, the paradigm of security changed radically. The terms nowadays used by policy makers easily link up to terrorism, religion and/or nationality. A flagrant carelessness can be observed when looking at terminology used for the combat of irregular migration, which is frequently named as a “fight against illegal immigration”. This induces a clear criminal classification. The use of the word “irregular” would be far more neutral. It is important to point out in this context that the influx of people includes many different backgrounds and life stories. The flows are a mix of, for instance, refugees, trafficked and smuggled people. They are not just “illegal” and therefore criminals.
The central issue of this chapter is to analyse how EU and its member-states restrictive immigration policies trigger (potential) conflict(s) in the Mediterranean, the African neighbourhood of the Union, and in EU member-states hosting immigrant societies. We start by presenting the general framework and developments on the meanders of EU immigration legislation, which seem to reflect a clear confrontation between the protection of migrants and the security of host societies. Some statistical data will help to better understand the scope of the issue under review, and the example of Italian legislation and practice, with a focus on the case of Lampedusa, provides a more concrete idea of how the EU and its member-states are nowadays dealing with the issue of immigration. An evaluation from a human rights and refugee protection perspective in regard to EU and Italian immigration laws and policies constitutes the critical analytical framework.

**Human Rights and refugee protection in EU law and policy**

New communication and modern modes of travelling have facilitated the movement of millions of so called “economic” and other migrants in recent years. The overall motivation is to seek for a better life in more developed countries. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) points out that “[m]odern migratory patterns can be extremely complex and contain a mix of economic migrants, refugees and others” (2007: 9). Hence, the management of migrant flows represents a crucial task and challenge for state authorities. The European Commission put forward a proposal for a “Directive on the conditions of admission and stay of third country workers” in July 2001. However, since the member-states upheld diverging views on this issue, at this time there was no adoption of a common legislation (EC, 2007). The EC re-opened the debate on the need of common rules for the admission of economic migrants with a “Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration” again in 2005. This consultation led to the adoption of a “Policy Plan on Legal Migration” in December 2005. It lists the actions and legislative initiatives that the Commission intends to take, so as to pursue the consistent development of the EU legal migration policy. The Plan fosters the rights of highly skilled workers, seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees, and remunerated trainees (EU Website on Activities of the European Union, Summery of Legislation) (EC, 2007a). Even though the rights of legal migrants are also a pressing topic, the policy actions for these people are not the focus of this chapter, since human rights abuses occur foremost con-
cerning irregular migrants, refugees and trafficked people. The urgency therefore is with the protection of vulnerable migrants.

Economic migrants normally leave their country voluntarily. This means in return that if they choose to go back home they will continue to receive protection by their state. Refugees, on the contrary, flee because of persecution or the threat of persecution in their home country. Their own state is no longer able or willing to offer any protection, and sometimes it constitutes the actual threat to the individual. Refugees therefore cannot return safely unless there has been a durable shift in the situation, for instance, a change of government or the establishment of a peace agreement. This is why separating refugees from the various groups in the migration stream, and providing them with fair asylum procedures, is one of the biggest tasks of receiving countries. Under the categorisation of “others” as stated in the above given UNHCR’s citation, this chapter takes the example of victims of human trafficking and argues that trafficked people are a particularly vulnerable migratory group in need of special protection.

Migrant flows are composed of people with different backgrounds and motives for their movements. People are travelling with or without proper documentation, meaning that they enter the territory of a state either legally or illegally. The act of illegally entering a state makes the migrant, he or she, “illegal” or “irregular”. S/he committed a criminal offense against the receiving state. Depending on national law provisions, there might be a different interpretation of the terms “irregular” and “illegal”. Italy, for example, distinguishes both terms as is outlined in this chapter at a later stage. Furthermore, migrants might travel on their own or with the help of smugglers. They might be victims of human trafficking, a modern form of slave trade. To distinguish the different cases is the pressing task of state authorities in receiving countries.

“Irregular” or “illegal” migration is a problem, especially, law enforcers struggle with. Fighting or combating “illegal” or “irregular” migration is always in tension with the protection of migrants, namely their fundamental human rights as well as with the rights of refugees and trafficked people. Protection is normally provided to a citizen by its own state. It encompasses services and protection by the police, legislation and courts from crime and persecution. It also means that citizens have rights which are civil, political, economic and cultural in nature (UNHCR, 2007: 8). If the home state is not able or willing to provide this protection, asylum is meant to grant international protection instead.

However, the responsibility of states towards their own societies is to grant safe living conditions — namely the upholding of “the pub-
lic order (ordre public) or of public health or morals” (UN, 1990: Art. 13.3.b). Nevertheless, internal security of the migrants’ receiving state needs always to be balanced with the fundamental rights of migrants, whether they have entered the country legally or illegally. Thus, with regard to immigration and asylum policies, state practice can either follow a “human rights approach”, a “security approach”, or try to combine both. In the worst case, from a pro-migrants perspective, an exclusively security-led approach is chosen by authorities. However, dependent on the individual circumstances, refugees and migrants are entitled to legal protection from different international, European and national law sources. Moreover, the victims of human trafficking are to receive special assistance, as has been discussed in European circles over the last years, and finally codified with the Council of Europe “Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings”, in February 2008.

However, international and European law and directives need to be adopted in national legal systems in order to become enforceable. The importance of this issue is clear, for example, when one analyses the treatment of people coming from North Africa by various travelling routes and methods aiming at entering the EU at its coastline. They often strand in bastions of the EU, for instance at the island of Lampedusa belonging to Italy. The EU’s concern about the increasing movement of Sub-Saharan Africans to the Maghreb, and from there to EU territory, is especially pressing for the EU member-states Italy, Greece and Spain. This is why border control management is to make sure that those who somehow manage to penetrate the cordon surrounding the EU are awaited with a militarised response, mostly undertaken by navy forces. In addition to sea surveillance, detention camps are installed to deal with the arrivals.

*Migrant rights: UN Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and European legal initiatives*

“Migrants” and their rights are defined in the UN “Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families” (1990), which means that they enjoy special protection by an international legal body. Human Rights which define the relation between a state and its nationals or any person on its territory remain always applicable. It does make a difference however what status a person is granted when his/her case gets approved by a state. The matter is not with documented migrants who qualified for a visa and entered the
country through regular travelling channels. The problem is with undocumented travellers. To what protection rights are they entitled to?

The rights of regular and irregular migrants are provided in the UN “Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families”\(^1\), which entered into force on July 1, 2003. The Convention aims at guaranteeing equality of treatment and the same working conditions for migrants and nationals. In this respect, the UNESCO “International Migration Programme Tool Kit” on the Convention clarifies that “equality” implies preventing inhumane living and working conditions, physical and sexual abuse and degrading treatments (UN, 1990: Arts. 10-11, 25 and 54); guaranteeing migrants’ rights to freedom of thought, expression and religion (UN, 1990: Arts. 12-13); guaranteeing migrants’ access to information on their rights (UN, 1990: Arts. 33 and 37); ensuring their right to legal equality, which implies that migrant workers are subject to correct procedures, have access to interpreting services and are not sentenced to disproportionate penalties such as expulsion (UN, 1990: Arts. 16-20 and 22); guaranteeing migrants’ equal access to educational and social services (UN, 1990: Arts. 27-28, 30, 43-45 and 54); and ensuring that migrants have the right to participate in trade unions (UN, 1990: Arts. 26 and 40) (UNESCO, 2005: 7). Migrants should also have the right to remain connected to their country of origin, says the Convention. This encompasses their return to their country of origin (if they wish so), that they are allowed to go for occasional visits, and are encouraged to maintain cultural links (UN, 1990: Arts. 8, 31 and 38), that they can participate politically in the country of origin (UN, 1990: Arts. 41-42), and have the right to transfer their earnings to their home country (UN, 1990: Arts. 32 and 46-48).

With regard to undocumented migrants, the most important statement of the Convention is that whether regular or irregular, all migrants are entitled to a minimal degree of protection. The UN Convention contains a list of human rights of migrant workers, including those in an irregular situation. Of course, the Convention recognises that legal migrants have the legitimacy to claim more rights than undocumented migrants towards the host-state but it also stresses that the fundamental human rights of undocumented migrants must be respected. Concerning the problem of clandestine movements, the Convention proposes actions especially through the fight against mislead-

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\(^1\) For a list of the current ratification status as well as for declarations/reservations see portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID=3693&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html, accessed July 12, 2008.
ing information encouraging people to migrate irregularly and through sanctions and penalties against smugglers/traffickers and employers of undocumented migrants.

In the EU context, it is important to stress the striking fact that the UN Convention on Migrant Rights has not been signed by any EU member-state. The dedication to migrant rights is obviously very weak or even non-existent from the EU member-states’ side. Moreover, the EU legally binding instruments concerning irregular migration which have been adopted since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty does not offer strong human rights guarantees, and refugee rights are acknowledged only at a very basic level (Cholewinski, 2004: 169).

In terms of policy development, it is to say that after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, an ad hoc Immigration Group was established to deal with the topic of irregular migration. Moreover, arrangements at the EU level were made in the context of Schengen agreements, as is outlined below. The EC established a foundation for the development of a coherent policy on asylum and immigration issues in its 1994 Communication on asylum and immigration policies. The policy adopted was based on the implementation of measures on four different levels, namely (1) the prevention of entry of illegal migrants to the EU territory, (2) the identification of those illegally residing in an EU member-state, (3) the definition of minimum standards for the treatment of irregular migrants, and (4) the facilitation of their repatriation home (EC, 1994). Just by reading, one can understand that the term “prevention” is used here in opposition to the meaning of tackling root causes of (forced) migration in the countries of origin. As the four measures show, they are designed to prevent illegal migration in the sense that people are hindered to enter EU territory. Moreover, the measures emphasise the detection of illegal employment, facilitation of expulsion and readmission (Cholewinski, 2004: 167).


The EU “Charter of Fundamental Freedoms” of 2000 guarantees the right to asylum in its Article 18. The article clarifies that asylum procedures have to be in line with the “Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees” of 1951, the Protocol of 1967, and the Treaty establishing the EU (1992). The states that have ratified the Refugee Convention and its Protocol are obliged to carry out its provisions. Since EU asylum procedures are based on the Refugee Convention, it is impor-
tant to analyse what the Refugee Convention and the Protocol say about asylum and protection.

After World War II, the international refugee system was formally institutionalised with the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees of 1951 and with the 1967 Protocol to which the majority of the states are parties. The definition given in the Convention dominates the definitions of “refugee” and “asylum seeker” of Western countries. Or, as Malkki states, “the Convention Refugee definition produces the social, political and legal constructions we now recognize as ‘refugeeness’” (1995: 506) The 1951 Refugee Convention’s definition of a refugee makes a distinction between those who will receive state protection and those who will not:

A. For the purpose of the present Convention, the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person who:

(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling, to return to it.² (UN, 1951: Art. 1)

In the definition given in the Refugee Convention four different elements to define or not to define a person as being a refugee are to be found: 1: outside country of nationality/former habitual residence, 2: well-founded fear, 3: persecution, 4: ground. Four questions need to be answered, linked to the four elements, to better understand the dynamics under study:

—First: is the individual outside the country of nationality or former habitual residence? This is, did (s)he cross an international border?
—Second: can the individual prove a well-founded fear of being persecuted in the country of origin?

² The article further reads: «In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term “country of his nationality” shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based well-founded fear. He has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.»
—Third: has there been any persecution?
—Fourth: on which grounds did the persecution take place?

The Convention defines that the persecution needs to be a general one or it must be grounded on race, religion or nationality. It also might take place because of membership to a particular social group (i.e. a political party or the gay community). Being a woman can also be considered as belonging to a social group and is often stated in relation to domestic violence, or might be based on the political opinion of the refugee claimant. The four elements are part of the “inclusion clauses” of the Convention, defining the necessary criteria a person must meet in order to gain refugee protection. All elements need to be satisfied at the same time for that person to be granted “Convention refugee”-status.

The overall general rule is that a state must not refoule (French for “send back”) a person, who has a well-founded fear of persecution, to the country where one can soundly believe that s/he will be persecuted. This rule is called the principle of “non-refoulement” and anchored in the Refugee Convention in Article 33.1. The exclusion clauses of the Convention stipulate on contrary to the “inclusion clauses” that the Convention may not apply to persons who do not need or deserve protection. In addition and due to the fact that refugee law is about protection, although not only the protection of the refugee but also of the host society, national law includes provisions for the arrest, detention, and forced removal of failed refugee claimants. The Convention does not neglect the right of the state to do so.

The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. (UN, 1951: Art. 33.2)

However, the Convention asks for fair procedures and standards. Article 32 regulating expulsion reads

1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order.
2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to
appeal to and be represented for the purpose before competent au-
thority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent
authority.
3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable
period. (UN, 1951)

Besides these strict criteria for expulsion, the Convention grants
rights and freedoms to refugees, including freedom of religion and
movement, and the right to travel, work, education and accessibil-
not provide further rights but removes geographical and time limita-
tions, which were to be found in the 1951 Convention. The original
Convention was only applicable for events occurring before January
1, 1951 which involved for the most part only Europeans. The number
of people that could apply for refugee status was therefore very lim-
ited, which simply relates to the fact that the Convention was meant to
manage the refugees of World War II. Later experiences showed how-
ever that the following decades saw the migration of millions of people
due to emergencies and persecution. With the Protocol, the Conven-
tion was “turned into a truly universal instrument that could benefit
refugees everywhere” (UNHCR, 2007: 7).

In 2001, UNHCR already indicated that “[t]here are signs that sev-
eral refugee resettlement countries are disinclined to maintain their
programmes at the promised levels, particularly for certain ethnic
groups” (UNHCR, 2001: 6). Generally speaking, a few wealthy nations
select a limited number of refugees from overseas and resettle “tiny”
numbers every year. The overwhelming majority of refugees in West-
ern counties arrive, however, on their own initiative as asylum seekers,
for example at the coastline of Europe in Italy, Greece, Spain, or Tur-
key. The Global War on Terrorism influenced national and international
policy measures, also leading to more restrictive immigration and refu-
gee determination systems. Important is to understand the negative ef-
fects for asylum seekers emerging from lower thresholds for exclusion,
expulsion and extradition. Expulsion and exclusion represent different
processes. Persons who are excluded do not deserve international refu-
gee protection. Expulsion aims at protecting the destination country, at
that particular moment or in the future.

The threshold for returning refugees to their country of origin has
to be particularly stringent, since it is an exception to the principle of
non-refoulement. In comparison, exclusion from refugee status is mo-
tivated by the severity of crimes the asylum seeker has committed in
the past. It serves as protection for the asylum system of being abused
for the motive of fleeing prosecution. Furthermore, even though international refugee law does not preclude the extradition for prosecution purposes, it should never lead to persecution in the country of origin of the asylum seeker. When it is assessed that extradition leads to persecution, UNHCR recommends that prosecution in the country of asylum is the appropriate way (according to the principle “aut dedere aut iudicare”).

Detention as a solution contradicts the obligations under the Refugee Convention. The principle of non-refoulement which represents international customary law is also eroded by EU member-states’ practice, in our example, Italy. Generally speaking, any exclusion from refugeehood must be well-founded. The link between the individual and the alleged security threat must be proven in any circumstances.

**Human trafficking: UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings**

Irregular migration encompasses people fleeing economic hardship (economic migrants) or personal persecution (refugees) involving smuggling of persons and trafficking of people. Human smuggling and trafficking represent modes of movement which are both illegal. It is however important to distinguish trafficking in human beings from smuggling of persons. A smuggler facilitates the illegal entry into a country for a fee but on arrival at the destination country the smuggled individual is free. The UN Protocol Against Smuggling states that smuggling is: “[t]he procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state party of which the person is not a national or permanent resident” (Anti-Slavery International, 2006: 8).

In contrast, trafficking victims are kept involuntarily for purposes of exploitation, they are “enslaved”. Thus, trafficking is “smuggling plus coercion or deception at the beginning of the process and exploitation at the end” (Bales, 2005: 132). However, besides being an international crime involving wide networks of criminals, the fact of being smuggled and/or trafficked is dangerous for the people concerned, notably the “users” of the support of smugglers to cross an international border without proper documentation, on the one hand, and the victims of trafficking who are lured into false promises, often kidnapped and then sold to “employers”, on the other hand. Authorities are always responsible to protect people on their territories from human rights abuses. Smuggling and trafficking involve a whole set of human rights abuses;
and states are therefore obliged to protect people on their territory from suffering those abuses and inhumane treatment.

Human trafficking represents a form of forced migration for exploitation, might it be in sexual or labour terms. Forced labour does not always extend to slavery or slavery-like conditions, and human trafficking is not always linked to full ownership of one person over another and money transfer, but in any case, human rights’ abuses in various forms and scale take place. The term “trafficking” has often only been used in relation to prostitution.\(^3\) For instance, the 1949 United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Trafficking in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others “failed to confront the traffic in persons that was not linked to prostitution”. Therefore, seeing the trafficking phenomenon only as being for the purpose of prostitution, a view strongly promoted by feminist movements in the 20th century, is far too narrow. Often, trafficking victims are accused of being illegal migrants and are therefore arrested or sent back to their home countries without any closer identification of their case. This is why they usually do not receive any assistance for their physical harms, mental troubles and injuries (not to speak about justice in any legal or moral form).

Human trafficking and smuggling involve offenses against the state—abuse of immigration laws, corruption of government officials, document forgery, money laundering, tax evasion—and offenses directed against the victims, such as unlawful coercion or threat, extortion, aggravated (sexual) assault, rape or even murder. Besides the criminological aspects, human trafficking has an economic dimension, since it is dictated by mechanisms of demand and supply (Kligman and Limoncelli, 2005). In addition to the criminological and economic understanding of trafficking and smuggling, the phenomena also represent a development issue, since the root causes of forced migration are poverty and under-development. Children, men and women represent potential victims of trafficking and potential “users” of smugglers especially in times when the unemployment rate is high and the overall economic situation is difficult (Bales, 2005: 127). This is generally the case when a society enters a period of transition after a natural disaster or armed conflict (Bales, 2005: 127).

In conclusion, one can say that migration as a coping strategy is very frequent in times of economic hardship, social, political and armed conflicts.

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\(^3\) A one sided angle which is also reflected in most post-World War II international legal instruments, until the end of the 20th century.
conflict or instability and natural disasters. “Civil war, ethnic violence and invasion create millions of refugees whose precarious situations make them susceptible to being enslaved.” (Bales, 2005: 127) Therefore, it is very important to bear in mind that in a flow of irregular migrants, people who might qualify as being a refugee under the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 are to be found.

By the end of the last century, it became obvious that the crime of trafficking in human beings had to be clarified, *inter alia* for creating a better working basis for law enforcers, since trafficking activities have been constantly increasing and have reached a dramatic volume. According to the United States Agency for International Development, global trafficking is the third largest illicit trade after narcotics and weapons, generating between 5 and 7 billion US Dollars per year (Kureshi, 2007: 29). This is the reason why there was no other solution left than working on legal definitions for creating a better ground for action. The Anti-Trafficking Protocol of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime represents the legal instrument dealing with the phenomenon at the international level. It needs to be stressed that the UN Anti-Trafficking Protocol does not provide any individual rights to victims, but does recommend (the wording is however, for the most part, not very strong) several measures for victim protection and assistance to States Parties, which should be implemented in national law with a victim-focused approach. With regard to penalising trafficking of people and the employment of trafficked people, similar provisions, as in the UN Convention on Migrant Rights, are made in the Anti-Trafficking Protocol and also in the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.

Adopting a human-rights-based approach to human trafficking is an important step. The Convention goes into this direction, which is victim-centred, and does not only stress state security, as it is the case in UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Anti-Trafficking Protocol. The rights-based approach legitimises itself because trafficking encloses a whole row of human rights abuses up to the level of slavery, which is strictly forbidden by international law. A human-rights-based approach recognizes that human trafficking is not just a criminal activity but one that has profound human rights implications for victims. The same often counts for people that have been smuggled.

With the recent entry into force of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, the fight against human trafficking is nowadays in the focus of the EU. However, the protection of the victim is embedded in an approach of fighting or-
ganised crime. Humanitarian aspects are only slowly acknowledged by state actors in their treatment of undocumented migrants. Re-victimisation and criminalisation are still aspects of state action towards people crossing a border or staying in a country without proper documentation.

EU immigration legislation and policy

The establishment of policies on immigration in Western Europe emerged only at the beginning of the twentieth century. Until then, there was no control of travellers: people could freely cross countries and work without passports or permits, though they might be deported if they were poor, sick or had committed some type of crime. The unequal distribution of resources, the development of means of transport and the advent of World War I were among the factors which triggered migration flows and the consequent creation of measures to contain it. Soon, immigration rose from a temporary into a permanent phenomenon and led to a drastic reversal of policy trends, with greater concern for the control of flows and the management of the growth of immigrant communities (Bonifazi, 2000: 236). At the same time, it has become an important political factor, in which public opinion developed a direct and very strong role in intervening on immigration matters.

Harmonisation and integration of EU legislation on immigration

With the creation of the European Union in 1992, issues of immigration have become inseparable from the process of constructing a common European economic bloc. The great historical transformation was reached with the creation of the Single European Act⁴, comprising a space without internal frontiers where the principle of free movement of people is guaranteed, has brought a profound review of traditional conceptions and introduced the notion of supranationality in security matters (Balzacq and Carrera, 2005: 8). Between 1985 and 1990, the Schengen Treaty was signed, whose objectives aim at eliminating the control of borders between signatory countries, but also at

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⁴ The Single European Act of 1987 was the first major revision of the Treaty of Rome that formally established the Single European Market and the European Political Cooperation.
strengthening the common exterior borders. The Schengen Agreement functioned as a parallel structure to the EU until 1999, when they became incorporated into the *acquis communautaire*.

The establishment of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development and the so-called Budapest Process (1991), initiated by the German Government, were other important structures which served the purpose of “preventing” undocumented migration and regulating it in the wider European region (Alsher, 2005: 5). In 1992, with the *Maastricht Treaty* or otherwise named the Treaty on the European Union, another important step was achieved with the creation of the European citizenship, which includes the right to move “freely within the territory of the member-states” (EU, 1992: Art. 18). This status is, nevertheless, subject to the member-states’ right to drive out a non-national on grounds of public policy, public security or public health (EU, 1992: Art. 9). In a progressive sense, a strategy identified as a goal of social cohesion in which the issue of a labour market for immigrants and refugees represented an important element for the integration process, was launched in Lisbon, in March 2000. At that time, it seemed that the EU was above all interested in building a solid policy at the transnational level in response to the steadily growing human mobility (i.e. migration and asylum) to and within the EU territory. In fact, there was an evident lack of transparency, democratic and judicial responsibility as well as efficiency. In 2003, with the Hague Programme, the Council reconfirmed the need for greater coordination of national integration policies and EU initiatives in the field of immigration. However, definitions of “illegal” immigration still differ from country to country. Before a person can be an “illegal” immigrant s/he must find her/himself on the territory of a state that provides the legislation defining her/his presence as “illegal” (Balzacq and Carrera, 2005: 26).

Since the European Union is engaged in an ambitious process of enlargement, it is debating issues of safety due to the increase of illegal immigration. Among the issues discussed are the monitoring of borders, harmonisation of procedures for deportation and funding of operations in order to build a “security belt” (Alscher, 2005: 1) or “fortress”. Meanwhile, citizens of Mediterranean Border States and future EU members in the East will not be able to benefit from a visa-free entrance to the EU in the mid- to long-term. The main concerns are, however, with Southern countries, such as Morocco, Algeria and Libya, integrated into the safeguard system against undocumented migration, being asked to strengthen their border controls and readmit those migrants who entered illegally via their territories (*ibidem*).
In addition, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the member-states of the European Union (Frontex) was established by Council Regulation (EC 2007/2004) and started to be operational in 2005. It promotes a pan-European model of integrated border security, which consists not only of border controls, but also of other important elements, such as exchange of information, cooperation and repatriation. In fact, the EU has maintained a program of cooperation with countries of origin, transit and destination. The MEDA Programme, a financial instrument of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, is one of the programs that is being developed for the management of EU borders and aims to implement training for border guards. It was developed after the Barcelona Process, launched by the plenum of the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers in November 1995. MEDA forms an innovative alliance based on the principles of joint ownership, dialogue and cooperation. It brings together the 27 Members of the European Union and 12 Southern Mediterranean states. It aims to set up a common zone of peace and stability in the Mediterranean region, create an area of mutual prosperity through the progressive establishment of a free-trade area by 2010, and develops human resources, promotes inter-cultural dialogue and exchange with the civil societies.

**EU external relations with Africa regarding irregular immigration**

Besides the immigrants themselves, there are political actors involved in and affected by irregular immigration from Africa to Europe. The EU as a supranational policy-maker, the Southern EU member-states (Italy, Spain and Greece), African states (both Maghreb and Sub-Saharan home countries), the African Union as well as international institutions concerned with the issue (mainly UNHCR). This part of the chapter will focus on the implications of the EU policies as a point of conflict on the EU- African countries’ relations. The reflections of EU policies in the African countries deserves attention equally, since the EU policies influence the willingness of African policy-makers in the home or transit countries to continue cooperating within the structures largely determined by the EU.

The Cotonou Convention and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) set the framework of the EU relations with African countries. While the Cotonou Convention is directed at framing the EU-Africa relations, the ENP policies concerning the Mediterranean countries are particularly centred on relations with North African countries. With re-
gard to irregular immigration, the Convention underlines the necessity of political dialogue and the protection of the rights and dignity of irregular immigrants by the relevant parties in any procedure aiming to return them to their countries of origin (Peers and Ward, 2004: 232). The Convention states that there is an obligation to negotiate further agreements between the parties and offer adequate assistance to the partners by the EU for the implementation of the agreements (Peers and Ward, 2004: 232).

The ENP establishes four priority areas in its relations with its neighbours, one of which is the facilitation of mobility and management of migration. The projects to be implemented in the Mediterranean region will work through the Barcelona Process and Association Agreements signed with the non-EU Mediterranean countries (Cianciara, 2008). The agreements on immigration aim at the enhancement of cooperation in four realms: (1) the creation of compatible systems of migration and asylum management, (2) the support of voluntary return of immigrants to countries of origin, (3) the increased ability of the countries of origin in regard to the readmission procedures vis-à-vis the European Union and its member-states, and (4) the development of preventive measures as well as counter-action procedures against trafficking and irregular immigration (EC, 2007).

In terms of irregular immigration, the EU policy foresees a single action: deportation to the country of origin in cooperation with the neighbouring countries based on existing bilateral agreements. However, the EU regulations are widely criticized due to the minimal standards they set regarding the protection for refugees and asylum seekers. The European Council on Refugees and Exiles declared that the "absolute respect of the right to seek asylum", promised at Tampere has been totally undermined" (EurActiv, 2006). The nature of the cooperation is undermining the treatment of irregular immigrants, as in the case of Lampedusa, because both the EU and the third parties seem to disregard the necessity to incorporate a human rights perspective. The European Parliament resolution on the treatment of irregular immigrants in and out of Lampedusa is a self-criticism of what the EU and its neighbouring Mediterranean countries must avoid, and of what kind of improvements are necessary for an adequate treatment of immigrants without violating their basic human rights.

Consequently, there are two sides to the story. There is a general perception reflected at the EU decision-making level that irregular immigrants are a threat to the internal security of the EU and therefore, how they are deported to their countries of origin is not important as long as they are deported. On the other hand, the neighbouring coun-
tries, especially the North African governments, seem to be at ease with implementing the readmission requirements entailed in the bilateral agreements.

**Bilateral agreements between Southern EU member-states and African states**

Since 2000, Africa has been the top priority of the EU officials working on migration policy, due to the increasing numbers of African irregular immigrants. Nevertheless, there is a misconception that there are hundreds of thousands of Sub-Saharan Africans who illegally enter the EU each year. The numbers of Sub-Saharan Africans who enter the Maghreb are estimated to be between 65,000 to 120,000 annually, but only about 20-38% is estimated to migrate to the EU countries (IOM, 2008). The 2008 report, by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), place the number of immigrants from Africa to the EU as between 25 to 35 thousand, which is a small proportion of the total 2.6 million immigrants. Thus, according to the IOM, the immigration from Africa is not as in large numbers as usually reflected in the media.

The majority of these immigrants are reported to be coming from increasingly diverse countries, such as Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Mali, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, and the Horn of Africa, in general (Haas, 2006). These countries are predominantly home countries whereas the North African countries are both home countries and increasingly transit countries due to the growing flow of immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, the EU policies developed in a way that the North African countries are complying with the EU structures to prevent the immigrant flow to the “bordering” EU. In other words, the new “transit” countries serve as the “bastions” of “fortress EU” to prevent irregular immigrant flows through the bilateral agreements. The content and the implementation of these agreements would prove important in evaluating the “success” of EU immigration policies. However, the scope and time limit of this chapter does not allow a detailed analysis and needs to be left for further research.

The vitality of the issue for the EU has been a source of pressure for the Southern EU member-states. As a general principle, the EU urges the bilateral agreements between the EU countries and third countries on immigration, though the contents of these agreements are sometimes kept secret by the signatories, as for instance, the wording of the
agreement on the management of migration between Italy and Libya of 2004. Spanish and Italian governments have been cooperating on border controls with Morocco and Libya respectively, since 2003. The Spanish government has recently multiplied its immigration agreements with North and West African countries, such as Morocco and Mauritius (PIIE, 2008). These agreements foresee joint patrols and cooperation in training of liaison officers to prevent the migrant flow before it reaches EU territory. The Spanish government widened the scope of the agreements by signing a bilateral agreement with Senegal, in 2008. With this agreement, 2,700 Senegalese were to be given work permits in Spain during the year. These immigrants will receive Spanish-funded training in Senegal on fishing before they start working on Spanish boats. The rest of the immigrants will be employed in the agricultural sector. Thus, there is an attempt to reduce the irregular immigration flow by opening formal channels of legal, and generally temporary, immigration opportunities (afrol News, 2008).

As has been mentioned, Italy and Libya signed an agreement on the management of migration in 2004. The content of this agreement remains secret, but allegations imply the deportation of irregular immigrants by Libyan authorities and closure of its southern “frontiers” (Haas, 2006). Interestingly, the EU agreed to lift off the arms embargo on Libya two months after this agreement was signed. Italian officials are known to have lobbied strongly in favour of this decision on the grounds that if Libyan authorities use improved arms, border controls against immigration could be more effective (Haas, 2006). Another agreement on the management of migration was signed in 2007, which was consolidated by Italian President Berlusconi’s visit of President Qaddafi in June 2008 (API, 2008).

There are two clear impacts of illegal migration on African countries. On the one hand, the extent and depth of EU-designed cooperation on border control and readmission procedures are widened particularly with Morocco and Libya. This widening generated some criticism from civil society organisations and policy makers. The national immigration laws passed by Morocco and Tunisia, in 2003 and 2004, respectively, when extensive cooperation with Southern EU members started, was considered to be a sign of concession, even “bowing to pressure from the EU to play the role of Europe’s policemen” (Haas, 2006).

On the other hand, irregular immigrants are affected by the general atmosphere of rising hostilities against migrants not only in the EU countries but also in the “transit” North African countries. The number of the irregular immigrants, particularly in Libya and Morocco, has increased due to the fact that some of the immigrants who fail to reach
Europe decide to settle in these transit countries. In Libya, the resentment with migrants seems to have reached the level of xenophobia, expressing itself through verbal and physical attacks, extortion, harassment, arbitrary detentions and forced repatriation (Haas, 2006). Many Nigerians who sought to travel to Europe through Libya have been accused of prostitution and drug trafficking. They were deported after serving jail sentences in Libya (Africa News, 2008). In Morocco, following the October 2005 events when hundreds of Africans tried to enter Ceuta and Melilla, and some of them were allegedly killed by the Moroccan authorities, the government has ordered raids and arrests of immigrants throughout the country. It has led to the deportation of around 1,500 immigrants, who were abandoned in the Moroccan desert (Haas, 2006). Hence, the irregular immigration has implicitly contributed to the xenophobic tensions within the communities of the Maghreb countries.

The general lack of interest to prevent the abuses of basic human rights of irregular immigrants during the deportation and return processes by EU member-states, West- and North African third countries, has increasingly been a matter of concern. Such concern has been voiced lately by Raddho, an independent Senegalese Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO). Raddho criticized the EU for the criminalization of immigrants by the introduction of the “European Pact” on immigration and building a wall around itself (EU Business, 2008). It also called upon African governments to design their own immigration pact. A mid-way approach was adopted by the Senegalese Foreign Minister, stating that the African Union must come up with its own pact, which might be converged with the EU Pact into a single Euro-African migration pact (EU Business, 2008).

EU level agreements with African states

The EU perspective on the management of migration is concentrated on two cores: the migration-development relationship and illegal migration. This perspective is reflected in the words of Louis Michel, the EU Development Commissioner, who says: “I am thinking in particular of legal migration, strengthening the link between migration and development and the fight against illegal immigration” (afrol News, 2008).

All EU level initiatives follow this logic which is reflected in the statement. One concrete and recent result are the negotiations for a “pilot mobility partnership” with Senegal (June 2008). This initiative
was decided by the EU Foreign Ministers upon the acceptance that the EU should adopt country specific approaches. With the signing of the partnership, Senegal became the first Sub-Saharan country to sign a migration agreement with the EU. The adoption of a “country specific approach” and the urgency of the issue indicate that similar agreements with other countries might follow.

Among a number of bilateral agreements, the major instruments of EU-African cooperation on irregular immigration are the readmission agreements, which have been mentioned before. There are several informal agreements, such as memoranda of understanding, exchanges of letters, and police cooperation agreements with reference to readmission procedures, which are linked to particular readmission agreements with South and East Mediterranean as well as African countries, including the Maghreb (EUI, 2008). Such readmission agreements work as instruments to facilitate the expulsion of illegal immigrants (EurActiv, 2006). The procedure is intended at a third-country national who has no legal right to reside in the EU. It foresees the return of these nationals to their country of origin operated and funded by the EU.

To regulate the return process, the Commission adopted the Return Action Programme, in November 2002, which is comprised of minimum standards for forced repatriation on short-, medium- and long-term bases. The readmission agreements in force are signed with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ukraine, Hong Kong, Macedonia, Sri Lanka, Macao, Montenegro, Moldova, Russia, Serbia and Albania. Negotiations continue with Morocco, Pakistan, Algeria, and Turkey (EUI, 2008). The disregard for human rights in treating irregular immigrants is accompanied with returning them to their countries, predominantly done by North African countries, even though some of these immigrants might actually qualify to receive asylum.

The 2006 European Parliament resolution on Lampedusa emphasizes this problem. The lack of legal procedures and principles consistent with international law in both Italian and Libyan national legislation facilitates the possibility that immigrants who would have genuinely qualified as refugees were indeed expelled to Libya, to be returned to their country of origin (European Parliament Resolution P6_TA(2005)0138). An additional problem with the readmission process regarding the flow from Africa is that most of the Sub-Saharan African governments are unwilling to abide the requirements of readmission agreements and accept the immigrants (Haas, 2007: 16). Thus, if an irregular immigrant is caught within the EU, s/he is set free after a detention period and an expulsion order which is generally not implemented. The limited capacity to identify and return the irregular immigrants has
to a certain extent contributed to the prioritization of preventing the migrants from passing through the borders in the first place.

Overall, the problem of how to reconcile two parts of the story, which are perceived as mutually exclusive notions, remain: irregular immigration as a security concern versus respect for the basic rights of the “potential disrupters”, the irregular immigrants. The EU officials have been expressing their sensitivity about the human rights violations in the EU candidates as well as third countries. However, the EU and member-states’ policies are marked by negligence for the basic human rights of irregular immigrants as they try to enter the EU territory. A country which struggles a lot with new arrivals on a daily basis is Italy. In the next section, Italy is analysed as an example for restrictive immigration policies.

Italian law and policy on immigration

As in other Western countries, there are very active trade unions in Italy which fight for the rights of irregular immigrants. As Patrick Taran (2006) refers, the traditional consented ignorance of irregular migration has changed. This “ignorance” and sometimes even hostility towards irregular immigrants is being substituted by a kind of solidarity in receiving countries (Taran, 2006: 265). This means that there is the conscience that irregular immigrants need to have a legal status in order to be protected. Furthermore, the national trade union confederations of Italy and of Ireland “are at the core of new national campaigns for ratification of the ILO5 [International Labour Organisation] and UN Conventions on migrant workers” (Taran, 2006: 266) It seems that, with the declining industrialization in Western countries, the necessity of legislating in order to protect migrants, and particularly irregular migrants, at a regional level became a priority. But is it also a priority to Italian authorities? How does Italian law and authorities deal with irregular immigration? And where do irregular immigrants come from and by which routes? These are the questions to be dealt with in the following sub-sections.

5 «Two ILO Conventions set specific norms for treatment of migrant workers. The Migration for Employment Convention, 1949 (No. 97) provides the foundations of equal treatment between nationals and regular migrants in areas such as recruitment, living and working conditions, access to justice, and against unjustified termination of employment or expulsion. The Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No 143) expands norms to regulate migration flows, eliminate clandestine migration and combat trafficking and smuggling activities; and to facilitate integration of migrants in host societies» (TARAN, 2006: 267).
Migration routes towards Italy

As its European Mediterranean neighbours, Italy is facing a mass migration movement. However, the traditional migration flows from the Balkans seem to have lost some of its importance to new ones. Nowadays, there are six main migration routes towards Italy. First, and maybe the most important, is the route coming from North Africa to Sicily and, especially, to the small islands of Lampedusa and Pantelleria in the Mediterranean Sea; second, the route from Sri Lanka to Sicily and Calabria by the Suez Channel; third, the route from Turkey to Calabria; fourth, the route from Albania to Puglia; fifth, the route from Greece to the Adriatic coast; and sixth, the route which links Central and Eastern Europe and Asia to the Italian-Slovene frontier.6

The Southern Italian coastline became the main destination to migrants crossing the sea from North Africa, with the regions of Puglia, Sicily (in which Lampedusa is included), Calabria and Sardinia receiving the larger part of them. As Paola Monzini refers, “the shortest way to cross the Sicily Channel from North Africa to the coast of Italy is from Tunisia, between Cap Bon and Sfax, to the islands of Lampedusa and Pantelleri” (2007: 177) The duration of the trip is “only” 10 hours by fishing boat (so-called “carrette del mare”). Irregular immigration from Libya takes two or three days. According to Gemma Marotta, the cost range for illegal immigrants is between US$2,000 and US$3,000 (2004: 43). And if, during the 1990s, the flows had a regional provenance (with the majority of the immigrants coming from North Africa, especially, Tunisia and Morocco), the situation has changed after 2000. The Sub-Saharans and the Asians became an important part of the phenomenon. It increased the number of the traffickers and intensified the departures from Libyan territory (Monzini, 2007: 177). This illegal immigration obviously constitutes a problem for Italian authorities and, in a lato sensu, for the European Union itself. The Schengen area, known for the abolition of border controls, allows the spread of illegal immigrants all over Schengen countries.7 As Hugo Brady says, “[a]fter the expansion of the Schengen area, a non-EU citizen can move from Trondheim to Warsaw without a passport check” (2008: 26). As a consequence, the securitisation of migration became an important issue

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6 This border is now dissolute, since Slovenia became a SCHENGEN member during the expansion of this area on December 21, 2007.
7 Schengen area does not include the United Kingdom, Ireland, Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus. However, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, three non-EU members are included in this area.
within European states, particularly those, like Italy, in which coasts irregular immigrants arrive each day.

Irregular immigration in Italy and immigration legislation

Naturally, if immigration is associated to terrorism, criminality and all kinds of smuggling, the policies related to immigration are consequent. There is, however, a difference between “immigration policy” and “immigrant policy” (Dell’Olio, 2004: 107-108). “Immigration policy”, on the one hand, is related to specific policies taken in order to decide who is allowed to immigrate, and in what numbers. On the other hand, “immigrant policies” deal with those who are already living in the receiving countries.

It is also important to identify who are the immigrants against which the repression is made. According to the website of the Italian Department of the Interior, immigration can be “clandestine” or “irregular”. In the first case, immigrants are seen as clandestine when they enter Italian territory without regular visas of entry. In the second case, irregular immigrants are those who lost the necessary conditions to remain in Italy, as for example, a null residence permit (“permesso di soggiorno”). Consequently, the Italian immigration policy has three main objectives: (1) programming migration flows, (2) conditions for the attribution of the right of entry and the status of the legal immigrant, and (3) the objective of distinguishing irregular immigration from clandestine immigration (Ministero Dell’Interno, 2007: 30). Curiously, Italian immigration policy integrates immigrant policy, or at least, part of it.

There are two important laws that regulate and deal with immigration in Italy: the Turco-Napolitano Law (1998), also known as the “Single text of the dispositions concerning the discipline of the immigration and the norms about the condition of the foreigner” (“Testo unico delle disposizioni concernenti la disciplina dell’immigrazione e norme sulla condizione dello straniero”), and the Bossi-Fini Law (2002). The latter constitutes a response to the concern with the permeability of borders allowed by the earlier Turco-Napolitano Law. Consequently, the Bossi-Fini Law can be seen as the legal approval of rhetoric of border closure.

However, the points of view towards immigration within the Italian Far Right are different. The Lega Nord of Umberto Bossi appears to be less tolerable than the Alleanza Nazionale of Gianfranco Fini, even if they collaborated on a new Italian regime for immigration. Thus, if the Lega Nord is concerned with cultural homogeneity through the de-
fence of the physical borders of the traditional nation-state as a ma-
chine “that produce[s] a pure, homogeneous interior and a racialized,
othered exterior, beyond its borders” (Spruce, 2007: 119), the politics
of the Alleanza Nazionale are “politics of heterogeneity and deterri-
torialization, in which there is a breakdown in the distinction between
national and international politics” (ibidem), and goes further with the
proposal to give some voting rights to immigrants (idem: 100).

In Italy, there are three normative instruments used by police au-
thorities to deal with irregular immigration: (1) rejection; (2) expul-
sion; and (3) repatriation. Through the first instrument, the immigrants
are not authorized to cross the frontier. Nevertheless, this instrument
is not used if the foreigner requests political asylum or if it is neces-
sary to adopt measures in order to protect her/him for humanitarian
reasons. The second measure, namely expulsion, is a repressive instru-
ment by which the judicial and administrative authorities are allowed
to deal with irregular immigration. When the immigrant is sent back
to the frontier, expulsion and rejection are simultaneously used. Finally,
the Italian Government also uses repatriation. And, in this case, we can
refer to two kinds of repatriation. On the one hand, there is the “rim-
patri assistiti” (“assisted repatriations”); on the other hand, the “rim-
patri volontari assistiti” (“voluntary assisted repatriations”). If both of
them consist of sending back the irregular immigrants to their home-
land, they don’t present exactly the same features.

Moreover, repatriation is only permitted by the establishment of bi-
lateral agreements between Italy and immigrant home countries. Com-
ing back to the “rimpatri assistiti” and the “rimpatri volontari assistiti”,
it is the latter’s voluntary and spontaneous aspect that makes the dif-
ference. Thus, the “rimpatri volontari assistiti” provides assistance to
immigrants that express the wish to go back to their homelands. This
assistance is namely present in the support given by Italy for the (re)es-
tablishment of the immigrant in his/her home country and in the analy-
sis of the viability of his/her return.

Italian immigrant policies have also established three different kinds
of processing centres to receive and to assist irregular immigrants: Cen-
tri di accoglienza (CDA)\(^8\), Centri di accoglienza richiedenti asilo (CARA)\(^9\)
and Centri di identificazione ed espulsione (CIE)\(^10\). CDAs are structures
created in order to guarantee first aid to irregular immigrants who ar-

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\(^8\) *Centri di accoglienza*, or Centre of Reception.

\(^9\) *Centri di accoglienza richiedenti asilo*, or Centre of Reception for Asylum Applicants.

\(^10\) *Centri di identificazione e espulsione*, or Centre of Identification and Expulsion.
rive to Italy. However, the reception in these centres is limited until the identity and the legitimacy of permanence in national territory is recognized. Only Agrigento and Lampedusa have already 804 CDAs. In the case of CARAs, and due to their specific function, the treatment given to the irregular immigrants is quite different. The asylum seekers are sent to CARAs, where they remain for 20 to 35 days. Finally, the CIEs, ex-“Centri di permanenza temporanea ed assistenza”\textsuperscript{11} are centres destined to keep irregular immigrants that are destined to be expelled from Italian territory, and to prevent their flow into the country.

\textit{Human Rights violations in the Detention Camps in Lampedusa and Libya}

The larger public got concerned with detention in Lampedusa and deportation on military airplanes from the island to Libya, in the Fall of 2004, when more than one thousand “irregular” migrants were expelled (Andrijasevic, 2005: 1). At that time, the German Minister of Interior, Otto Schily, made the proposal together with his Italian colleague, Guiseppe Pisanu, to set up refugee processing centres in North Africa. The British government was in favour of the idea whereas France and Spain argued against it (Andrijasevic, 2005: 1). The content of the idea was that asylum-seekers and refugees would submit their asylum claims and wait in centres outside the EU borders. In the so called “processing-centres”, the claimants should wait until the application for asylum is processed in the EU. The “processing centres” were rejected by France, Sweden and Spain at the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, but nevertheless, in October 2004, the EU informal Justice and Home Affairs Council considered five projects proposed by the European Commission in Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. These projects aim at upgrading the existing facilities for processing claims and the development of asylum law in the five countries (Andrijasevic, 2005: 2).

Italy moreover started its own cooperation project with Libya after having lobbied for the lift of the EU’s arms’ embargo. Libya purchased technological surveillance equipment and speedboats from Italy. In addition, Libyan police was trained by Italian policemen and three detention camps were constructed with Italian funding. The deportations

\textsuperscript{11} Centri di permanenza temporanea ed assistenza, or Centre of Temporary Permanence and Assistance.
from Italy to Libya were, and still are, based on an agreement between the two countries on combating illegal migration into the EU, signed in August 2004 (Andrijasevic, 2005: 2). Furthermore, deportations of “irregular” migrants from Libya to Sub-Saharan Africa were financed by the Italian government (Andrijasevic, 2005: 2).

After the deportations had started, it was reported frequently by NGOs and the media that people came to death in the desert of Libya and in the sea during the crossover to Italy. NGOs started to speak out against the practice of the Italian and Libyan authorities. For instance, Amnesty International put pressure on the European Commission to stop the deportations and investigate the detention centres in Lampedusa and Libya. Several visits and reports proved the inhumane treatment of migrants and degrading conditions in the camps. The Frontex-led\textsuperscript{12}, seven-days’ mission (May 18 to June 5, 2007) to Libya which was requested by the European Commission, is the most recent one. It shows that the EU is supporting the fight of Libya against illegal immigration in granting technical assistance. Libya, which still does not have a functioning asylum system, is seen by the European agency as a pioneer country within the region. “[T]he Frontex-delegation made the point that operational cooperation could prove mutually beneficial and, as the first North African country Frontex had approached formally, Libya had the opportunity to lead the way within the region.” (Frontex, 2007: 4) The visit was a reaction to the request of the European Commisions’ Vice-President Frattini who asked Frontex to consult Libyan authorities in order to find out how the EU could assist the country with “the improved management of its southern borders” (Frontex, 2007: 6). The Frontex mission cooperated with embassy officials from Italy, Malta, Spain and Germany as well as the IOM (Frontex, 2007: 6). IOM is co-running the camps in Libya and therefore, a main actor on the ground. It is important to note that IOM is since some years under attack of several NGOs, i.e Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, for the management of detention camps, running return programmes for irregular migrants/asylum seekers, and implementing EU-border regimes (Andrijasevic, 2005: 2).

In Italy, people can be detained pending expulsion for 60 days, after this period of time the person needs to be released (Welch and Schuster, 2005: 342). Detention centres in Italy (Centri di Permanenza Temporanea e Assistenzi-CPTA) are based on the Turco-Napolitano

\textsuperscript{12} The «European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union» (Frontex), which is based in WARSAW, became operational on October 3, 2005.
Law (40/1998) of 1998 and where created to hold those whose expulsions cannot be directly executed (Welch and Schuster, 2005: 342). The Bossi-Fini Law of 2002 (189/2002) additionally created centres all over Italy for the purpose of arresting asylum seekers for the time during which their identification is cleared, or in cases in which it is assumed that the claim has been made to avoid migration control (Welch and Schuster, 2005: 343).

The centres are often managed by NGOs (Red Cross, Caritas, or others). Carabinieries uphold the “public order” in the camps. Very pressing is the fact that Italy prohibited UNHCR to visit the camps. In its afore mentioned “Resolution on Lampedusa” of April 2005, the European Parliament called upon Italy to grant access to UNHCR and also to stop mass detention and collective expulsion. From UNHCR references, it is yet not visible whether or not UNHCR is allowed to visit detainees on a regular basis. Transparency about what is going on in detention camps and on deportation procedures is still not established by Italy.

However, some insights are available. The lack of rights-based treatment of immigrants in Lampedusa is inter alia reported by Fabrizio Gatti, an Italian journalist. He stayed for one week in a “reception centre” in Lampedusa pretending to be a Kurdish immigrant. In the aftermath of this experience, he summarized: “There are no doors, no electricity, no intimacy. It’s all in front of everyone. There isn’t even toilet paper: they clean themselves with their hands” (Gatti, 2005: 25). He testified that, in addition to the deplorable conditions of infrastructure, including the lack of water and electricity, the treatment of immigrants by the Carabinieri (Italian policemen) was cruel and inhumane. The migrants are, for instance, obligated to rest in the sun for several hours and are beaten. In addition to physical abuse, fundamental freedoms such as religious freedom were not granted to the immigrants. State practice in the detention camp installed in Lampedusa shows that people in need of protection (e.g. refugees, trafficked and smuggled individuals) often do not receive the assistance they deserve. The example of (not only) Lampedusa reflects that protection towards immigrants is not provided by EU member-states, especially when they are referred to as being “illegal”. The rights of the “boatpeople” arriving at Lampedusa or of those who have been brought by Italian policemen to Lampedusa for the time period of the clearance of their status, or as an interim station in the expulsion-process, are violated on a large scale by the authorities operating in the camps.
Conclusion

The perception of immigration being solely a security concern builds up the tension between the EU citizens and the immigrant communities within the EU. Essentially after 9/11, the dichotomy between “us” and “them” constitutes more and more a way to securitise migration. The definition of the migrant as a potential terrorist, criminal or other, creates not only fear and “a perception of threat to ontological security far exceeding actual developments”, it also produces “the very clash of civilisations from which they [the politicians] verbally abstain” (Faist, 2006). The EU and its member-states are increasingly closing its doors to people in need of protection and immigrants. It is developing the characteristics of a “fortress” with Lampedusa and other islands in the Mediterranean as well as detention camps in North African states as “bastions”.

The EU immigration policy appears as a fertile ground for potential conflicts at different levels. The way the EU is handling immigration can be summarized as prevention of the immigration waves to reach EU territory. For this purpose, the EU has established institutions and programs to combat irregular immigration from Africa. At the heart of these mechanisms lies cooperation with the transit (North African) countries to increase border controls and return of the irregular immigrants. The EU level policies and the implementation of EU member-state policies (particularly Italy and Spain) with regard to irregular immigrants seem to display total neglect for the basic human rights of the immigrants. There is no attempt of the EU policy-makers to admit the maltreatments because irregular immigrants are considered to be a direct threat to internal security.

The Italian case, as it was analysed in this chapter, represents an example of human and refugee rights abuses. Several immigrants, who have experienced similar treatment and are currently living within Europe, are suspects of being potentially dangerous foreigners, especially after the 9/11 and then the London and Madrid terrorist attacks. Such alienation and suspicion add up to the tensions between communities, sometimes transforming them into violent conflicts, such as the 2005 and 2007 riots in France. In other words, there is a rising anxiety accompanying the xenophobic tensions fed by the post-9/11 environment about whether immigrant influxes will disrupt the EU citizens’ security. This perception is reflected as “deportation only” for irregular immigrants, which led, on the part of the EU members, to an intensification of police-measures to prevent migrants from reaching the EU shores. Accordingly, Spain and Italy have sharpened their border controls as the immigrant flow has proved to be on the rise.
It is striking that none of the measures which were taken by the EU since its creation through the Treaty of Maastricht focused on the protection of the rights of irregular migrants. Cholewinski clearly concludes that “the absence of a human rights agenda” is a “missing element” in developing a “comprehensive” common EU policy on irregular migration (Cholewinski, 2004: 182). New measures to develop such a comprehensive common policy should be rooted firmly in the framework of respect for the human rights of all migrants regardless of their legal status. Should the EU Constitutional Treaty, which would give binding status to the Charter on Fundamental Rights and mandate the EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights come into force, this framework would get a clearer shape.

This EU policy perspective needs to be revised as a coherent strategy in the medium- and long-term. Integrating the treatment of immigrants respectful of their basic human rights as the central principle is of utmost importance, but not the only dimension. We have to look at the irregular immigration issue from a broader perspective; inquiring its root causes and developing ways to tackle them. Currently, building the conditions in the countries of origin in order to prevent the movement of people to other places—might it be forced or voluntarily—is not on the agenda of the EU’s immigration policy. To argue that the root causes of immigration from Africa can never be eradicated would strengthen the hands of the EU policy-makers who support existing policies and reducing immigration to a security concern only. Thus, examining the root causes of migration is a crucial step in order to balance economic inequalities and help prevent conflicts which are rather triggered by restrictive immigration policies by the EU and its members.

Through the establishment of tighter relations with home and transit countries of immigrants, the cooperation schemes are based on restrictive policies as decided by the EU unilaterally. The nature of the cooperation has different implications; from deaths of irregular immigrants being expelled from transit countries to rising xenophobia. Critics of these policies and secret agreements between Southern EU member-states and North African states, and the European Parliament, go unheard at the policy implementation level. Such criticisms are increasing, with calls for a uniquely African approach to managing migration with the EU. Thus, convergence of approaches by the African and EU officials is required for the better handling of the issue. Otherwise, immigration is likely to emerge as a locus of conflict. Only a significant shift in EU policy towards multilateralism, which includes the establishment of an admission system contrary to only a “readmission system”, and the equal treatment of migrants without regards to their
origin and status, would constitute a coherent and successful external migration policy of the EU. The creation of barriers between societies never helped the peaceful transformation of tensions and may be more a threat than a protection.

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War gave rise to a growing optimism concerning a new world order. It was believed that the political project of modernity (democracy, rights and freedom, individuality and rationality) would become true, at last. However, the violent conflicts, which had been veiled by the bipolar dynamic of the Cold War, soon started to question [or undermine] this optimism. Fragile states, informal economies, actors beyond the State (paramilitary forces, militias, interest groups, religious and ethnic leaders), violence mainly directed towards civilians and the rhetoric of ethnic and religious identity are some of the features which characterize this conflictuality. This pattern ended up shattering the optimism above identified.

Refusing the possible failure of this modernity project, the international system presented this phenomenon as a deviant behaviour, likely and having to be corrected. Therefore, a strategy was needed to deal with these anomalies. The political project of post-armed conflict reconstruction emerged, among others, as one of the instruments used to normalize societies, within a specific framework, considered ideal. This political project as an instrument of global governance is twofold in nature. On the one hand, it is ideological, as it is based on democratic principles, namely liberty and rights; on the other hand, it is functional, since it manages differences within a society through democratic representation. The ideological component gives rise to the principle of empowerment, which fuels the functional element of the project.

However, the empowerment component is clearly contradicted in its implementation, which on its turn tends to transform in order to normalize societies. This is our departure point. In this chapter, we describe this modernity project and its principles and objectives and how it became a post-armed conflict reconstruction response towards the
dominant conflictuality of the nineties. Next, we concentrate ourselves on the theoretical framework, which inspired that response, as well as on the political and institutional model created specifically for those deviant scenarios. Finally, we question the project in two different ways: firstly, concerning its practice and consequences in terms of global governance; and secondly, on the intellectual extent of this normalization.

The 1990s: prospects for a new global order?

Demanding democracy, achieving modernity, creating peace

The end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the bipolar world were seen as a window of opportunity for a peaceful international system. The changes on the Soviet side (Gorbachev policies, fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR) allowed some to think of a new era that was about to come. Indeed, it appeared that communism had succumbed to the values of the West and societies were pushing the political sphere closer to the models of democracy.

A growing sense of victory matured among some scholars and politicians in the West: the fall of the Berlin Wall was, foremost, the collapse of the communist political ideal. This collapse represented a victory of liberal democracy, not only in the bipolar ideological confrontation, but also as the most suitable political contract between the state and the individual. A democratic moralism nurtured in the hearts of those who engaged in the definition of a new world order.

In his speech during the attack on Iraq in 1991, George Bush, then President of the United States of America, proclaimed the ‘forge’ of a new world order that should foster “a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations”\(^1\). Notwithstanding the uncertainty of the actors and spaces of this new world order\(^2\), democracy became its political project and the necessary consensus to push it forward. In fact, the values that were to guide international re-

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\(^1\) These are excerpts of the television speech President Bush gave shortly after the attack commenced in January 16, 1991. The speech is available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=IFrnQHaQWoA.

\(^2\) Far away from the certainty and logics of the bipolar order, where the governing actors in the international system where identified as well as the geopolitical sites of interest, this new order would have to deal with a multiplicity of sites and actors, including a more active United Nations and with a geopolitical reconfiguration in terms of problematic areas and issues of security. The predictability in international relations was strongly undermined due to this plurality.
lations in the years to come were presented as being morally superior. The promotion of democracy, at national and international levels, was perceived as the only path to international peace (Holm & Sørensen, 1995: 9) and the right trail for modernity.

Modernity, with its Enlightenment heritage, seems to have in its conceptualization a clear sense of rupture. Its two central values, individualism and rationality, came to define a complex and interlinked set of rights/values, such as equality, freedom and self-determination that challenged the dominant structures of power wherever its project was put on march. That is not to say that modernity, from the beginning, had a uniform project. For the purpose of this chapter, however, we must consider the liberal project of modernity in its different standings, for they are connected in an almost perfect harmony. Economically, capitalism and industrialism are chosen to fulfil the needs of individuals through a functioning market. Socially, individual self-determination is the goal in socially organized communities. And finally, in political terms, the establishment of the state, with its complex bureaucratic and surveillance functions, framed within the rule of law and separation of powers, through which order is achieved. The economy needs the state to regulate the market and live up to the individual. The state derives its sovereignty from the individuals and depends on a working economy to guarantee its survival. Individuals, on their turn, based on their capacity of self-determination, depend on the rights assured by the state and the well-being provided by the market.

At the centre of this complex triangle, democracy as the governing framework of this project, assures the necessary equilibrium among the vertices of this modernity. Even though the creation of modern states precludes it, it is liberal democracy, with the principle of representation, which overcomes the dichotomy between power/security and individual liberty (Held, 1995: 9). For this understanding it is fundamental to note the development and broadening of the concept of citizenship and its connection with the principle of autonomy. Undeniably, one of the great concerns of liberalism, since the writings of Locke, has been

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3 Individualism and rationality are values not directly converted into rights. They are more guiding principles from which derive other values, such as the ones mentioned above, that came to be rights in certain political communities. This does not mean they are independent. On the contrary, when we think of equality, for example, it is impossible not to establish a relational web, with the value of the individual and with its rationality, but also with other values/rights.

4 As we are aware, different schools of political thought emerged and proposed different ways to achieve the promises and values of modernity.
the existence of an unlimited power of the state towards its individuals and political community (idem: 149).

Democracy offers, through the status of citizenship, within a clear frame of rights, the possibility of achieving autonomy from this coercive power. The right of representation, fulfilled through the election of a government, limits and also legitimizes state power, establishing a political contract based on rational choices and the preservation of liberty. Individuals entrust the state with the necessary power to guarantee order and security and choose those who will apply that power, liberating themselves from a restrictive form of social integration while achieving a higher form of social organization (Arnason, 1990: 39). Held states that this dynamics “involves the ability to deliberate, judge, choose and act” (1995: 146). It is also this autonomy principle, in respect to the individual and its reason, which assures the maintenance of the market’s role. Democracy also applies autonomy to the agents of the market, ensuring economic liberalism, while regulating its actions. Autonomy is then the key aspect of a peaceful sociability within democracy, since it establishes the principles and limits of collective association (ibidem).

The equilibrium it establishes between collective and individual security and personal liberty is fundamental to avoid the resource to violence out of the state’s monopoly and also to limit this same power. Rationality and individualism are respected as modernity assumptions and the necessary system of governance is created, assuring, through democratic rules and institutions, an organized and peaceful society.

Of course democracy as we understand it today is a result of a process of development, congruent with the historical narrative of modernity, linear, sequential and modelled by the interaction with economic and social components of the liberal project. The discourse of evolution, achieved through the reflexive reason of modernity, i.e., by constantly analysing and mediating practices regarding past demarcation and distancing and projecting a future (Giddens, 1990: 38), is consistent with the course of democracy, from its creation to the present day. Also, theories of modernization assert the sequencing of development and evolution in societies, surrounding a dichotomy between traditional and modern ones (Blaney and Inayatullah, 2002: 104-109), where democracy is now an element of differentiation. In this sense, not only democracy has evolved as a regime but it also became a symptom of evolution and modernity in societies. This notion, together with the dichotomist representation of democracy versus communism as winner versus looser presented a single proposal of modernity, where democracy is seen not as one possible project but as the only rationally accepted and desired project. The new world order, then, could not
have possibly followed another model than the liberal democratic one (Paris, 2004: 21). Notwithstanding an intense debate around the future of the international system\(^5\), optimism developed as a wide feeling towards a prospect of a new world order in the beginning of the nineties. Theoretically, and although there was an intense debate, two strands of liberal thought came to testify and to proclaim this broad assumption internationally.

In 1989, and more precisely in 1992, Fukuyama drew the picture of the last man as a democratic political individual. Defining an understanding of History as a coherent evolutionary trail of human societies towards an ending point, where mankind would have achieved a form of society that satisfied its needs and requests, Fukuyama presented democracy as the final stage of political evolution (1992). Opting for Hegel’s vision of history, where recognition is the fundamental driver of historical process, the author presented communism as a defeated interpretation of history, not able to give individuals the material needs necessary to accomplish self-consciousness (Shani, 2003: 47-48). By doing so, liberal democracy is displayed as the final solution to give a satisfying answer to human struggle for recognition, by its relation with liberal economics and the establishment of the principle of equality (\textit{idem}), and, we would add, by granting an individual autonomy based on rationality. The last man is a man who unravelled its struggle for recognition by giving up an irrational desire “to be recognized as greater than others with a rational desire to be recognized as equal” (\textit{idem}). And the End of History came when liberal democracy presented itself as the solution for the historical human quest for recognition, freeing itself from fundamental internal contradictions and ceasing the search for new government arrangements.

In the 1990s, theories of Democratic Peace found the needed revival and update of the Kantian proposals in order to achieve a status beyond the theoretical realm. Even though democratic peace had been proposed before\(^6\), the specific circumstances offered a possibility to transform a theoretical proposal into a political agenda. This program

\(^5\) Different analyses and conclusions were offered by scholars and politicians who tried to predict how the world order would look like. In fact, a wide range of proposals emerged, coming from the most pessimistic, who saw anarchy as an element of chaos, to those, mostly liberals, who were optimistic towards what the rule of law could do to the international system.

\(^6\) BABST (1972), for example, stated that democracies were an unstoppable force of peace promotion and Michael Doyle’s article in 1986, «Liberalism and World Politics», became also a reference to the thesis of democratic peace.
is sustained on two levels of analysis. The monadic level asserts an inherent pacifism of democracies due to their management of autonomy and the security dilemma (Doyle, 1986: 49). The establishment of a social contract and institutions responsible for managing it, creates a normative culture of peaceful settlement of conflicts that will be certainly transposed from the domestic to the international level, where the citizenry, familiarized with pacifism, will persuade possible aggressive behaviours (Russett, 1993: 31-32) and democratic states will exhaust all means available to peacefully manage conflicts (Dixon, 1993 and Raymond, 1994 apud Ray, 1998: 40)\(^7\).

The dyadic level of analysis goes beyond the pacifist nature of democracies and analyses how they relate among themselves, although it shares the fundamental notions of the monadic considerations. Focusing in democratic dyads, the democratic peace offers an empirical law to international relations: democracies do not go to war with each other. The notion of sharing democratic values and peaceful expectations creates, in some sense, a transnational community of shared values and rights that generates a moral impediment to go to war with democratic states (Russett, 1993: 32; Doyle, 1986: 55). On the institutional side, the accountability question (Levy, 2001: 13) and the complex institutional framing of modern democratic states (Rato, 1998: 104) imply a consensus building to legitimate going to war. In between, democracies will have to work with peaceful mechanisms, reducing the probabilities of war (Russett, 1993: 38). This dyadic relation is founded on mutual trust established among democratic regimes and the nurturing of a signalling model, which assures the transparency and legitimacy in actions on a dyad (Levy, 2001: 14). A dyadic framing of democratic pacifism supposes a separate peace from which non-democracies are excluded (Doyle, 1986: 55-57). The two levels share, however, a clear sense of peaceful exclusivity, based on causal relations between political regimes and international peace. And, in this sense, advocates that the solution for the international order resides in promoting democracies worldwide, by intervening on the internal level of states (Archibugi, 2004: 441).

Indeed, the prospects of a new world order got caught on an optimistic democratic feeling, narrowing the scope of modernity to a singular project. From this time on, and as the theories above mentioned testify, an agenda was created regarding the promotion of a peace-

\(^7\) DIXON and RAYMOND affirm that democratic states, once involved in disputes, will easily apply peaceful mechanisms of conflict resolution. The odds of a successful use of these mechanisms increase with the presence of democratic states (apud RAY, 1998: 40).
ful international order. Democracy came to be identified as the missing political element to achieve peace internationally and guarantee modernity to underdeveloped sites of the world.

Opening Pandora’s box: the disruptive violence of the “New Wars”

As noted before, there was a plan to be followed when the curtain of the Cold War fell. Democracy was the trail and peace the final end. With a strategy defined and a determination founded on reason and evolution, those who approached the upsurge of violent conflict in the beginning of the decade could not avoid a sense of surprise. Despite not being a new phenomenon, the violent conflicts, later labelled by Mary Kaldor as New Wars (1999), simply did not fit the time of liberal modernity. The wars in Yugoslavia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Congo or Rwanda were some of the several violent conflicts which, throughout the decade, became visible to the eyes of the international community and concerned those who were more attached to the optimistic view of a new pacific era.

Indeed, when the simplistic logic of the Cold War became flawed, and while scholars and politicians were trying to forge new analytical frameworks, a Pandora’s box was opened and the diagnosis of the disease showed a reality distant from what had been imagined. Violence and conflicts veiled during the Cold War were revealed. New violent conflicts were targeted and identified as such. And yet, all of this seemed unconceivable to those observing and dealing with such a reality.

The features and causes of this new conflictuality have been a growing field of theoretical projection and analysis on such a way that new concepts appeared in order to better understand such disruptive violence. The concept of failed or collapsed states was chosen to define the places more likely to testify violent conflicts: the absence of an effective central power, the breakdown of the social contract, the proliferation of sub-state entities, the lack of security or the profound socio-economic differences are some of the conditions that might provoke disturbing social patterns. This phenomenon came to be progressively perceived as a threat to the modernity proposal of political order assured by the state on a systemic level (Milliken and Krause, 2002: 762-764) and a clear obstacle to democracy and peace. Effectively, the New Wars were targeted mainly on contexts of state disintegration (Kaldor, 1999: 5) which sustained this failure idea as the elected cause for these new wars.
Essentially, and according to Kaldor, these new wars can be distin-
guished by their objectives, war methods and their financing mecha-
nisms (*idem*: 7). These new wars’ goals can probably be easily con-
nected to power related issues that converge with identity politics
(*idem*: 110). Identity politics, ethnically or religiously presented, man-
age to construct a sense of otherness, based on perceptions of injust-
tice, power conquest or an eventual loss of privileges (Gurr, 2001: 167-
169).

Another aspect of these new wars is the privatization of violence,
which together with the proliferation of sub-state groups, challenges
the very existence of a state and foresees the development of new
methods and tactics of warfare apart from international law limita-
tions. Founding a general culture of violence, capable to injure social
relations through the victimization of civil targets generates a sense of
terror, fundamental to control resources and populations. Economies
of war emerge out of this control and also from the fragmentation and
informal nature of conflicts (Kaldor, 1999: 104). These economies deal
mostly with the commerce of valuable primary goods that guarantee its
agents a satisfying and assured profit through the integration with in-
ternational flows of illegal trade (Nitzschke and Studdard, 2005: 222).
Undeniably, these New Wars must be understood based on its global
implications and connections (causes of globalization in societies, links
to international networks, information diffusion, etc), but also on its
global scale, for the spaces where they appear are potentially global
(Kaldor, 1999: 74).

Even though one can question the real novelty of this conflictual-
ity, our aim is not to acquiesce or defy Mary Kaldor’s propositions, but
to accept it as a manifestation of the main characteristics identified
by the international community of the violence witnessed. In fact, the
term ‘New Wars’ abridges the main questions surrounding the conflict-
uality of post-Cold War times and came to reflect the perplexity when
studying this violence. The different elements mentioned above, con-
sidered individually or together, were part, as causes or consequences,
of a frame labelled as ‘new’ and implicitly at odds with all that had
been seen in warfare or international relations before. The novelty than
can be accepted if we consider the evolving environment in which it
came to be developed. Considering all what was discussed here pre-
viously, the term ‘new’ mainly implies a profound divergence with the
optimism of liberal modernity. The violence of the ‘new wars’ went up
against the linear historical evolution predicted for the international
system. It implied that something had been done to escape the narra-
tive of evolution and modernity’s most precious values.
Modern warfare was conceptualized according to Clausewitzian assumption of war as politics by other means, violent means to be specific. This violence was framed around the existence of legitimate actors involved, nation-states, with regular armies submitted to international conventions, which constrained the parts’ behaviour during a conflict. The rationality of this war is its fundamental trace of modernity and is what makes it legitimate. In fact, several of the elements that came to be identified as the outrageous features of the ‘new wars’ were already present in modern conflicts but they remained hidden by the legitimacy and the rational logic. On the other hand, it supposed that the parts, rationally, would make all the efforts to bring it to an end.

This rationality opposes the way violence is perceived in New Wars. Their framing presents violence from a functional point, where the pattern of social relations is based on a necessary elimination of otherness and maintenance of a scenario that fuels the parallel and profitable economy (Kaldor, 1999: 110). Irrationality in this violence comes, not from its purposes in terms of achievement, but precisely from the functional role it plays. New Wars imagined places where violence as daily structures of life challenges its status of exception in modernity. It is the type of social and political relations established that is considered to be irrational. And it is also this irrationality that gave room for perceiving these places as standing outside modernity, where violence is limited and circumscribed.

This perception of irrationality has, then, deepened the feeling of shock in the international system. The nineties brought a dilemma to the international community: how to proceed with the liberal modernity project if a challenge of irrationally was globally uprising?

**Back on track: rescuing the evolution process**

*Announcing the modern crusade*

The conflictuality that had shaken the international community was seen as an obstacle to a long lasting peace and stability at the international level. Its patterns of behaviour, labelled as irrational, disregarded the linear historical evolution planned by liberal modernity. These spaces of conflict were perceived as deviant behaviours: somewhere the plan of modernity was misapplied or misled, giving an incorrect direction to

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8 The violence used against civilians or the use of parallel economies to finance war, for example, have been used from the beginning of times as rational strategies to achieve a purpose.
the political, social and economical evolution. It was not modernity that failed, but its application. The notion of ‘deviant’ emphasizes the feeling of ‘standing outside modernity’, on a parallel dimension, waiting to be brought into the right path, liberal modernity. Consequentially, a generalized perception of moral responsibility to act and intervene emerged within the international community as a result of a shared sense of responsibility. A responsibility engaged in bringing to justice the perpetrators of these deviant behaviours and barbarian violence and also to assist societies returning towards the modernity path.

By refusing the failure of the modernity project, the international community came to internalize the causes of the conflicts: if the model proved to be right elsewhere then something had to be done internally to change the processes and consequentially the results. The description of failed states or the explanatory adoption of greed and grievance evidently presented conflictuality solely as the product of domestic predatory and criminal elites, pursuing their interests (Chandler, 2005: 312). This process of internalization is what Bickerton has called the ‘domestication of anarchy’, a process where the locus of disorder has descended from the international system to the domestic stage (2007: 94).

Connoting the ‘new’ armed conflicts with the label of ‘deviant’ also meant that liberal modernity kept the status of the desirable and single alternative towards a peaceful world order and a likely process of ‘conflict resolution’ at the domestic level. If the evolutionary discourse kept its central values untouched (merits to the narrative construction of these conflicts as product of irrationality), the viability of liberal modernity, and democracy on the political realm, as the process of ‘conflict resolution’ was assured. Indeed, liberal modernity proposes an understanding of violent conflicts to an extent that one is entrusted with power over them (Fetherston, 2000: 197). Practically it offers a re-arrangement of practices, institutions and social meanings in accordance with modernity (ibidem). The opposition between domestic disorder and modernity’s proposal of ‘conflict resolution’ enabled the international community (spaces of modernity) to offer a solution to war-torn societies (Bickerton, 2007: 94). The answer presented was obviously based on the modernity peaceful assumption and projected the construction of democratic societies as the means to achieve peace.

Undeniably, liberal modernity did not lose its international legitimacy. Albeit the shock caused by the New Wars’ violence, the modern international system, through the processes of internalizing the causes and externalizing the answers given, reaffirmed the liberal modernity project as the desirable ideal of peaceful societies and the correct way to achieve a new world order. This assertion of modernity as
the answer to conflicts came with Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* (1992). More than a systematic framing of concepts and actions, the document is a political statement, where the project of modern democracy is consensually presented as the intervention strategy to gain a lasting peace in conflictual scenarios. In 1996, *An Agenda for Democratization* came to consolidate the strategies and to canonize the role that democracy had to play within war-torn societies and as a promoter of development: “peace, development and democracy are inextricably linked” (Boutros-Ghali, 1996). This statement came to be a part of Kofi Annan’s political legacy, while Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), when he stated in 2000 that the promotion of democracy was a “highly effective means of preventing conflict” (*apud* Paris, 2004: 42). This also entailed the task of rebuilding the state institutions which would nurture and sustain the democratic system.

Bringing the places ‘standing outside’ into a liberal modernity path, with its democratic assumption, meant, and still means, a new agenda of intervention, where modernity values and theory are unveiled in scenarios of violent conflict. The modern crusade was then reintroduced in the 1990s, bringing societies to the evolutionary path through liberal modernity came to be identified as the moral duty of an engaged international community on quest for a new peaceful world order. Peacebuilding became the mission code and democracy its political instrument.

The concept of good governance became the guiding principle of this modern crusade. Understood as a transparent process responsible for the definition of adequate policies in order to achieve development (World Bank, 2000; Boutros-Ghali, 1994), the criteria for and promotion of good governance became the new conditionality of political modernity (Boutros-Ghali, 1996). Its inherent logic of control was assumed due to the necessity to contain and reverse the deviant behaviours through the principles of accountability and transparency in two complementary manners: first, international community’s supervision of the restructuring processes and the necessary associated reporting of national governments; and second, at the national level, through the vigilance of a society to be guided by democratic principles.

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9 *BOUTROS-GHALI* wrote on *An Agenda for Democratization*, «Democracy today is receiving widespread acknowledgement for its capacity to foster good governance, which is perhaps the single most important variable within the control of individual state» (1996).

10 Social contract prepositions assert the need for governors to be responsible in their actions, regarding the principle of popular sovereignty. Logically, the principle of good governance should be intrinsic to governance.
The UN became the consensual actor leading this modernity force ahead. By the end of the 1980s, the UN has been called to play a different role in international affairs: first, with the Namibia mission (1989), the UN’s scope of action was clearly enlarged from its traditional peacekeeping mandates to what would be considered the first peacebuilding mission (Paris, 2004: 13); second, the dismissal of conflicts by delegation in areas perceived as no longer worth of geopolitical interest created a gap of assistance, where the UN felt it should intervene; and finally, the first war against Iraq in 1991 assigned a different role to the Security Council, entrenching an idea of action according to international law, with the UN approval11.

Its ambitious post-conflict reconstruction model emerged from the idea of reengineering society as a whole. Albeit the aforementioned Namibian mission was presented as the prototype of this rehabilitation project, it was An Agenda for Peace that firstly institutionalized peacebuilding procedures. Defined as the “action to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace in order to avoid the relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992), peacebuilding implied a comprehensive project regarding its goals. This enormous project aims to address three fundamental deficits present in war-torn societies: the political and constitutional fragility or failure, the weak socio-economic conditions and the psycho-social trauma which translated, accordingly, into a strategic action plan organized in four main areas: military and security, reconciliation, socio-economic and political-constitutional (Ramsbotham, 2000: 172-173). Although the extent of this project, one must understand its dimension according to the modernity project as a whole. Answering to the symptoms of New Wars, especially the question of failed states, meant a profound reengineering in order to achieve the peace proposed by liberal modernity. This idea guided strategies and came to reinforce the political dimension centrality to foster the necessary premises to modernity.

**Adjusting theory to intervention: the political reconstruction model**

Concerning the political sphere of rehabilitation, international intervention presents itself as an attempt to find mechanisms to be im-

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11 At this point, it is worth noting some criticisms made to the way the UN Charter was revived, precisely the fact that the UN had somehow empowered a coalition, dismissing the possibility of applying Chapter VII.
plemented in order to manage, in the first place, the problems of civil unrest in a “Clausewitz in reverse” logic (Ramsbotham, 2000: 172), allowing for rationality, individuality and politics to be imposed, and, in the second place, the degenerative state failing in a governance reform perspective. The idea underlying this political project of reconstruction has been in fact no other than to enable post-war societies to normalize their political structures and to establish good governance mechanisms, correcting the deviant political and social contours which formally permitted violence to erupt.

The articulation between the modernity project and peacebuilding intervention was achieved through the creation of a comprehensive technical-political pack, which, wrapped with the good governance label, merged the functional and the ideological features of the modern theory with a problem-solving rationale aimed at solving and preventing violence. In fact, essentially, and by intending to correct disabled political structures, the post-conflict rehabilitation model seeks to stabilize the existing (dis)order and subsequently to restructure it according to the ‘modernity-liberal’ peace framework. For that purpose, it bases its operational formula on the institutional and rational assumptions that a strong democratic state, tackling the root causes of violence through political competition, representation, welfare, transparency, protection of citizens and respect for human rights, is the way to foster lasting peace between conflicting parties and divided societies.

Good governance mechanisms such as “monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) are some of the different peacebuilding measures formally identified in An Agenda for Peace, and which can be systematized in three main ‘modern’ areas of intervention: governance reform focused on the state and on democracy, the protection of human rights and the support of civil society.

In a top-down sequence, state reconstruction is the utmost emblem of this political process as it is regarded as the rehabilitation antidote to the ‘governance disease’ (Zartman, 1995) affecting ‘new wars’ scenarios. The peacebuilding model, as recorded in UN Operations in Somalia, Guatemala and East-Timor, among many others, has been focusing its activities in improving institutional capacity, basing government institutions on the rule of law and separation of powers, constructing governmental buildings and developing conciliatory and effective administrative procedures (Zeeuw, 2001: 20) in order to provide war-torn
societies with the effectiveness and the coherence of the polity, making them also fit the normative international landscape and stressing the fact that the engineering nature of peacebuilding crosscuts domestic and international realms, projecting the modernity order to the world scale. However, despite its macro importance, state reconstruction is in itself insufficient. In relating state with good governance, democracy emerges as the key linkage in the peacebuilding language and consequently state reconstruction is required to be supported by a democratic political regime.

According to Kirshna Kumar (1997: 4), in the absence of a legitimate and representative political authority, violent conflict cannot be solved or prevented nor economic and social rehabilitation are able to occur, highlighting the cohesion of the modernity project as a whole. In fact, notwithstanding the multiple conceptions of democracy, there is a clear consensus at the policy level on the content of democracy as a procedural and functional peace system. Democratization processes have remained, therefore, the key aspect of the political intervention process within the realm of the state and are mostly regarded as the harmonizing elements of this political project. This harmonization process can be identified in different layers, ranging from the systemic to the individual level.

With reference to the international arena, assistance to the process of democratization is considered to be a major investment in international security as it is believed that democracy enhances political international stability and results in a widening of market access (Reychler 1999: 39). Regarding domestic societies, democracy enables the management of divergences between conflicting parties in a political and constructive platform, which beforehand were disputed through violent conflict (Kumar, 1997: 7). Nevertheless, the balancing components of democracy under the scope of rehabilitation go beyond horizontal linkages between parties and also include important vertical political dynamics, such as the legitimization of political power through representation and democratic choice, the promotion of a new political framework for social relations, loyalties and representation, and the assurance to each citizen of political and civil rights, highlighting individuals rationality and scrutiny skills.

12 As JEONG (2005: 83) remarks, going along the institutional discourse, recreating political and administrative institutions based on the Weberian concept of state, on the idea of a legal rational authority, on national identity unity and on enforcement capacity is a way of assuring effective and equitable management of politics, social dynamics and economic issues—which were absent in conflict time—refraining violence from going off.
International ‘democratizing assistance’ has been mainly translated into technical and financial international assistance. Support to emergent legal frameworks (e.g. constitutional engineering and legal reforms), preparation of involved actors (set up of election commissions, training of national election supervisors, support to political parties, implementation of civic education measures) and organization and monitoring of elections are the three pillars of this political intervention, emphasizing quite clearly the technical and the functional nature of the intervention.

The protection of human rights and the support of civil society are the other key element of the good governance framework which peacebuilding missions seek to implement. From an institutional point of view, international intervention in the human rights arena in post-war scenarios aims, in the first place, to improve the human rights situation in order to enable the punishment of human rights violations taken place during war; second, to assure human rights protection in peace time; and third, in a wider perspective, to foster democracy practices and principles. The implementation of this reconstruction policy is usually developed by means of deploying observation missions, supporting legal reforms particularly sensitive towards the topic, setting up national human rights protection commissions and funding local organizations which develop their work in this area (Pureza et al., 2005: 92). Concerning civil society, intervention policies have been mainly directed towards the support of independent media and human rights organizations (ibidem). The idea is to create and develop a civil society that can function as an important catalyst for grassroots change towards democratization, “represent their local constituencies in decision-making processes and serve as a watchdog for government action” (Zeeuw, 2001: 24). The protection of human rights and civil society can be regarded as empowerment tools but also as controlling mechanisms, reinforcing democracy and the state.

Rescuing the Hegelian interdependence of state and society, the peacebuilding political project presents itself as a coherent, rational and inclusive rehabilitation project, merging the ideological and the functional elements of its proposition. Standing for capacity-building and empowerment, two updated and extended ideas of the modernity project, political peacebuilding promises emerge not only as a mechanism to bring back the deviant political scenarios to the liberal modernity path, but mostly to pull them through the evolution line making the golden end look closer.
A broken promise?

The rational and the normative aspects of this political governance reform highlight the modern recipe of this intervention and the belief on the conditionality of modernity principles in building order and peace. However, it is precisely within this linkage that the inconsistency of the project lies: the promise of modernity principles as ideological and functional tools for empowerment, on the one hand, and the building of order (and peace), on the other.

A strict analysis of peacebuilding missions, whether from a conceptualization or an operational point of view, highlight that peacebuilding missions have been continuously obeying to a technical standard operational procedure, neglecting the specificities and the political articulations of the societies to which rehabilitation projects are directed to (Clapham, 1998), and adopting a perspective of a quick fix agenda enabling just the construction of a formal and low intensity peace (Purreza et al., 2005: 149).

The most apparent reason for this rests upon the dry, technical, problem-solving and functionalist approach this peacebuilding model entailes, which can be summed up in Roland Paris’ idea of ‘institutionalization before liberalization’ (Paris, 2004)\textsuperscript{13} and is thoroughly related to the prescriptive nature of this intervention policy and the attempt to bring a certain kind of normality to domestic spheres and to world order.

Despite the fact that the rhetoric of good governance underlying peacebuilding interventions has been linked to modernity values as a whole ideological program, the implementation of good governance mechanisms developed by international organizations has emerged as a selective process which has been merely leading to the imposition of legal and rational structures designed to ‘cure’ in a technical and administrative way societies affected by ‘political pathologies’ (i.e. bad governance, corruption, irrationality and violence, to name but a few of the institutionally mentioned), leaving aside the application of capacity-building and empowerment.

The options for a Schumpeterian bias for procedural democracy (Odukoya, 2007: 149) or for long external transitional authorities (Chandler, 2005: 308) have been two of the clearest evidences of this

\textsuperscript{13} Roland PARIS in \textit{At war’s end} (2004) presents the idea that to focus on institutional capacity-building, i.e., civil service, police, judiciary (\textit{Institutionalization}) is considered to be à \textit{sine qua non} condition in order to achieve self-government (\textit{Liberalization}).
policy. By giving elections\textsuperscript{14} the main role of the democratic play and giving second roles to all other democratic practices, opting for a minimalist conception of democracy, and by also excluding all local inputs in the making and implementation of policy at state level (\textit{ibidem}), the political project of peacebuilding has built a slippery gap between the proposed discourse of peace and the real conditions in which it has been implemented.

This kind of intervention has resulted in the de-politicization of the local political sphere:\textsuperscript{15} the state entity becomes an empty shell where the lack of concrete political articulations and social relations expresses its artificial nature. In this intervention context, as political institutions can only bring coherence to society when emerging out of existing social forces (Huntington, 1968 \textit{apud} Chandler, 2005: 309), the political rehabilitation project turns out to be a more discursive product than a concrete reality, stressing the unbalance of the ideological proposition and the wider functional nature of these interventionist international policies.

Political peacebuilding intervention ends up to be regarded as a cyclical process departing from the abnormal de-politicization of the local, in a bad governance perspective, and drawn to a close in the de-politicization of the local, but this time by means of good governance mechanisms designed by outside experts. Chandler’s logical and contradictory sequence, going from ‘state without politics’ as a generator element of war to ‘peace without politics’ as a prescription to war, clearly expresses peacebuilding political contradiction: ‘politics as a barrier to peace’ (Chandler, 2005). As such, the modernity promise, within the peacebuilding political rehabilitation project, has not been fulfilled and instead of ranging from the systemic to the individual level, political good governance mechanisms has mostly ranged from the systemic towards the systemic level.

\textsuperscript{14} UNTAG in Namibia, UNAVEM in Angola, UNCTAD in Cambodia and MONUC in DRC are clear examples of the central importance of electoral assistance in this externally driven peacebuilding project to promote liberal democracy. The justification for the concentration on the electoral process lies in the conviction established since Namibia UN mission that elections are the key generator for political reform.

\textsuperscript{15} David CHANDLER is very clear concerning this point, for example when referring to the international administrative authority in Bosnia-Herzegovina, “there is a tendency to see state-building as a technical or administrative process [not requiring to build] a popular consensus for policy-making” (2005: 308), separating surprisingly state-building from politics.
Conclusion: gaining settings and minds

The political project of peacebuilding has evidently co-opted the modernity political model in its most rational and empowering ideas. However, if the rationality of institutions and law became a reality in post-conflict societies, the empowerment and capacity-building components have, conversely, been mostly disregarded. The cooptation of the modernity model resulted not necessarily in the accomplishment of the modernity promise but rather in the normalization of societies through technical and administrative therapeutic interventions in order to control them domestically and make it to be reflected in the international sphere.

The idea of normalization may not necessarily be regarded, at a first glance, as a negative concept, but more as a limitation, which does not allow us to look at differences in a non-assimilative way, and as a regulatory mechanism, in a cosmopolitan project of world order. The first idea is best portrayed in Tzvetan Todov’s *The Conquest of America* (1984 *apud* Blaney and Inayatullah, 2002: 106), where describing Columbus arrival to America, he states that Columbus encounters with Amerindians produced an interpretation shifting between seeing the Indians as human beings, having the same rights as himself, and seeing them not only as equals but also as identical, leading to ‘assimilationism’, i.e. the projection of his own values onto others. This double interpretation still characterizes the modernity encounter with difference (Blaney and Inayatullah, 2002: 106), as peacebuilding political project conveys. The second idea is intimately related to the creation of a sustainable legal and normative framework for the management of world order in a cosmopolitan logic.

However, the problem brought to surface when analyzing the normalization process in peacebuilding interventions —which can be translated into the idea of ‘becoming one of us’— is the hierarchical element introduced in a power dynamic revealing the way the modernity pack became an instrument of governance driven by western powers and international organizations. *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) and *An Agenda for Democratization* (1996) turned out to be, by means of policy implementation, an ‘agenda for hierarchical governance’, even if not formally acknowledged. The technical peacebuilding option of intervention and the maintenance of external experts in local scenarios are, in fact, the loudest symptom of the hierarchical governance nature.

The institutional, constitutional and civil peace the peacebuilding project aims to implement (corresponding to the cohesion of the modernity political proposition) in post-war scenarios is translated, through
the features of its implementation, into a hegemonic peace (Richmond, 2005). In reality, rather than dealing with the root causes of violence, peacebuilding interventions aim mostly to assure a liberal and controlled peace framework in the developing world (Pureza et al, 2005: 4-5). Peace became a governance framework, not to bring order and stability to all societies in a similar and modern way, but rather to bring a certain kind of order, stabilize certain societies and guarantee the maintenance of prosperity of the already modernly established.

Highlighting the articulation of the modernity project as a whole at a world scale, peacebuilding aims at controlling and disciplining non-western governments and populations in order to protect the functioning of the global capital (Pugh, 2004) and to prevent the disorder and instability in underdeveloped regions from spilling over to industrialized countries (Duffield, 2001). However, this last purpose is not necessarily accomplished through rescuing deviant scenarios by means of a cure mechanism but rather through a dynamic of “becoming one of us, but never reaching us”, revealing that the rhetoric of “other-regarding” (Chandler, 2006) or “self-effacing” ethics (Duffield: 2007), which inspired peacebuilding intervention in discursive politics and policies, is nothing but the reflection of an informal empire, even if exporting a specific kind of ideas and values connected to local empowerment and capacity-building.

Conversely to historical formal empires, which denied the right to self-government16 and were based on hierarchy rather than equality and on force rather than consent, the informal empire which fuels peacebuilding denies, in its turn, any form of direct political control and reinforces, surprisingly, the formal legal status of sovereignty (Chandler, 2006: 13-15). The empire is then, as David Chandler (ibidem) remarks, in denial, but yet in growing expansion. From Namibia to Angola, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Liberia, Guatemala, El Salvador, East-Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq, the political project of peacebuilding has been extending its targets, gaining settings to trace the modernity path but in a specific functional and segmented way: to guarantee and support the modernity of the front-line of the evolution process.

This has mainly been reached through the building of an epistemic and a political consensus on the objectives of the intervention and approaches to ending violence that are deployed in non-modern scenarios (Richmond, 2005: 85) and on the conditionality of this political and social system to attain peace. In reality, if the instrumental appropria-

16 Analogous to the denial of formal, civil and democratic rights in the domestic sphere.
tion of the modernity project by western powers has been one of the limitations and the critiques of this project, the intellectual consensus on the theoretical proposition of modernity is the other limitation that can be acknowledged.

Modernity has become the reference of political thought not only because of the rational and normative aspects of its program but also because of its cumulative discourses. As such, it has been giving a hermeneutical framework for intellectuals and politicians to interpret reality and to react upon it. However, the hegemony of this proposition and the power of the ideational structures on shaping actors and agents’ behaviours make researchers and politicians to be stuck into a hermeneutical mechanism which limits the analysis of the problems to a dynamic of being modern or not being modern and to prescribe the cure of the non-modern through modernity mechanisms. As such, even if acknowledging the deficiencies this model might entail, one finds himself unable to propose alternatives.

Through gaining settings and minds, the political peacebuilding project has been emerging as a hegemonic and self-sustaining process which, despite its insufficiencies, is confronted with no alternative except for the abnormal ‘un-modernity’.

References


Reconstructing the Security Sector in Afghanistan

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“The true and patriotic police officer is the friend of the people. People always approach them to get rid of oppression. If police officers do not have these qualities people would rather prefer to live under oppression and injustice rather than going to the police since they know that applying to the police will bring them additional problems.”

President Karzai speaking on Radio Afghanistan
November 21, 2002

Introduction

Post-conflict reconstruction is one of the most crucial issues that the international community had to face during the last decade due to the increasing visibility of ethnic, religious and other types of violent conflicts all around the world. The task has often been described as the process starting when an internal or an international violent conflict comes to an end and leaves behind destroyed state institutions and infrastructure. However, the term “post-conflict” should not be taken to mean that underlying conflicts have been resolved entirely. Rather, it is used to describe the end or de-escalation of active violent hostilities (negative peace) rather than the establishment of a positive peace (Çelik, 2007: 13). Therefore, scholars describe the post-conflict reconstruction as the stage where the peacebuilding process takes place and thus it is more than just building new infrastructure including new roads, bridges, hospitals or schools, but rather building capacity and also identifying and implementing the ‘right’ set of policy and institutional reforms.
The term “peacebuilding” became popular when Boutros Boutros-Ghali used it in *An Agenda for Peace* (1992). This document defined peacebuilding as disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming and strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation (Article 55), “address[ing] the serious problem of land mines” (Article 58), and “prevent[ing] the recurrence of conflicts” (Article 57). So, instead of a broader use of the term, Boutros-Ghali referred to the activities in the post-violent conflict phase.

Needless to say that Boutros-Ghali’s definition is not the only way of describing these concepts. For example, Galtung (1998) argues that there is a need for 3 R’s to occur to deal with violent conflicts. The first one is ‘reconstruction’ and this phase includes rehabilitation/healing, rebuilding/development, restructuration/democratization and the development of a culture of peace after violence. The following stage is ‘reconciliation’ (closure and healing) of the parties and the last stage is ‘resolution’ (dealing with the root causes) of the underlying conflict.

The main objective of the extensive reform process in the post-violent conflict period is basically establishing a secure environment where free markets can develop, civil society can function independently and commercial activities can be enhanced in an efficient way. Accordingly, the whole process of post-violent conflict reconstruction has four main pillars such as security, justice/reconciliation, social/economic well-being and governance/participation.

The security pillar includes the establishment of collective and individual security which is at the same time the precondition for the success of the remaining pillars. In a Hobbesian state-of-nature, where there is no central authority securing lives of civilians from direct and large-scale violence, the chaos and anarchy prevail. So security is the basic human need and the *sine qua non* requirement of a free and prosperous society and that is why ensuring the internal security appears as the most urgent target of the post-violent conflict reconstruction process. The primary objective of the procedure is to address all aspects of public safety and in particular to establish a safe and secure environment and, finally, to develop legitimate and stable security in-
stitutions by consolidating at the same time the indigenous capacities. According to the peacebuilding toolkit of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP, 2007), this pillar includes the following missions:

—Prevent renewal of fighting (e.g., enforce ceasefire; secure weapons/stockpiles; disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former fighters)
—Protect civilians (e.g., counter organized crime, de-mine)
—Ensure freedom of movement (e.g., for civilians, relief workers, peace monitors)
—Protect key historical, cultural, and religious sites, as well as important buildings, property, and infrastructure
—Protect witnesses and evidence of atrocities
—Protect international borders/airspace/ports of entry
—Build effective security forces, under civilian control

The above-mentioned four pillars are all interrelated and depend on each other, but to ensure a secure environment is the most important basic need to fulfil and the basis for all the other pillars. This is the reason why this chapter focuses on the reconstruction of the security sector in post-violent conflict in Afghanistan. The main issues addressed are who and how it was established, the changes methods and actors underwent and preliminary conclusions on how effective the international community handled the case, allowing for some recommendations for the future.

The actors of reconstruction

After the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the following United States of America/United Kingdom (US/UK) led intervention in Afghanistan, the international community faced one of the most interesting cases of ‘reconstruction’ in history (Cramer and Goodhand, 2002; Dorronso, 2003; Castillo, 2003). There have been two military operations in Afghanistan in order to establish control over the country. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was a combat operation with the participation of coalition partners led by the United States against Al Qaeda forces. OEF was not a North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) operation, but rather a joint US and Afghan operation, with some involvement from other countries. This operation was separate from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was an operation of NATO nations. The initial attack removed the Taliban from power, but Taliban forces have since regained some strength. Since 2006, Taliban-led insurgent activity
has regained momentum due to growing illegal drug production and a fragile government with limited control outside of Kabul.

United Nations (UN) brokered talks held in Bonn (Germany) ended in the “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions” (Bonn Agreement). The agreement’s role was to rebuild the domestic justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions. Based on this agreement, the Judicial Reform Commission was set up according to a Presidential Decree of November 2, 2002.¹

This agreement also gave great importance to the reconstruction of the new Afghan security and armed forces. This was practically the only way to deal with Taliban forces that were very powerful in the areas outside Kabul. Clearly the police was not the only actor in the security field, and the establishment of a new army was also crucial; but the kind of security that most Afghans were demanding from a strong central government was through the deployment of a professional, well equipped, well managed police force.²

In the case of Afghanistan, one has to take into consideration that the country had been devastated by over 23 years of armed conflict (Grono, 2008). Civil society was, and is still, fragile and the lives of all Afghan people have been affected by many years of war. The only way to break from the past is to (re)establish the rule of law. The institutions essential to implement the rule of law were actually destroyed (when talking about the Taliban as the government of the Afghan state) or weakened at the beginning of the reconstruction process after the Bonn Agreement.

The security pillar as described above was again divided shortly after the occupation into five pillars. The US took responsibility for the army; Italy was, and is still, in charge of the justice sector; the UK assumed responsibility for combating drugs; and Japan took care of disarmament, demilitarization and reintegration (DDR). The rebuilding of the police became the task for the Germans, in 2002, even though the US was still by far the one contributing the most money for building up the police force.

In 2005, the US military began taking a larger role in police training, because the German training plan, although of high quality, lasted too long. Therefore, the US trained the staff under their plan with rudimentary instruction, only to fulfil the basic needs. To avoid these com-

applications, the international community tried to combine the two strategies, having well trained personnel in a longer-term training process, on the one hand and just basic trained personnel within a shorter time, on the other hand. With this intent, the international community established the EUPOL Afghanistan in 2006.

The comprehensive approach: EUPOL Afghanistan

In mid-June 2007, the European Union (EU) took over the responsibility for building up the police sector from the Germans (Dempsey, 2007). The EUPOL-Afghanistan3 was part of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESPD) and therefore part of an overall commitment and a coordinated EU approach to Afghanistan. It was built based on the goals of the former-German Police Project Office (GPPO), which had not been used by all donors. Before the EU took over, donors were uncoordinated. Even after mid-June 2007, Italy who is still in charge of the judicial system is still not working effectively, because they do not sufficiently liaise and coordinate their actions with other donors.

The EU Commission’s Delegation is located in Kabul and consists of 230 personnel, mainly police, law enforcement and justice experts (EUPOL, 2007).4 The team consists of partners from twenty countries (including other non-EU members, such as Canada, Norway and Croatia) and more than forty international civilian experts (EUPOL, 2008). In May 2008, the EU Council expressed its will to further increase its efforts through EUPOL. The personnel work as monitors, mentors or advisers at different levels of the Afghan governmental hierarchy, starting with the Ministry of Interior through the central Afghan administration all the way to the regions and provinces. So far, the mission has been established for a period of at least three years.

It is difficult to determine the exact number of policemen on duty, because so far there is no accounting system in place (USDS and USDD, 2006: 11). Until 2008, Germany had trained 4,250 police officers of intermediate and higher service ranks and provided advanced training to more than 14,000 police officers (idem). The US Military, which also uses private companies for their training, trained 75,000, from

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4 Mr. Jürgen SCHOLZ was appointed Head of EUPOL Afghanistan on October 16, 2007 (EUPOL, 2007).
which 65,000 of those are trained at a minimal level and only 2,000 meet new standards (*idem*). As EUPOL Afghanistan does not have any project funds of its own, the German project organization is also being continued.

The strategy encompasses different yearly steps towards rebuilding the ANP (Afghan National Police):

— 2006: “for the Afghans”
— 2007: “for and with the Afghans”
— 2008: “with the Afghans”
— 2009: “with and by the Afghans”

To achieve these goals, the allies established different programmes of training. Entry level courses are offered through two different ways depending on geographical location and the entry rank of the applicants. The National Police Academy (NPA) in Kabul offers a three-year professional training programme for police officers and a 12-week non-commissioned officer programme (*idem*). The first 251 police officers graduated in August 2005, and by 2008 more than 4,850 cadets have already graduated from the Academy and another 1,350 were enrolled (*idem*). This Intensive (USDS and USDD, 2006: 19) includes:

— 3 Basic Courses
— Border police courses
— Firearms handling
— Building and vehicle search
— High risk vehicle stops

The second much larger programme to train entry level ANP personnel is offered through courses given by other training camps. It can only realistically provide a basic platform for continued learning that must be reinforced with rigorous in-service training programmes and supplemented by local field trainers (FTO) in the districts.

**The problems and obstacles**

Even after 6 years of rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan, the security sector is still not totally reconciled. This process allows for the identifi-

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5 At Kabul CTC, and seven RTCs located in Kandahar, Herat GARDEZ, Mazar-e-SHARIF, KUNDUZ, JALABAD and BAMIYAN.
cation of a few difficulties that the international community (still) faces or, in some cases, did not realise until recently (Wiseman, 2007). For instance, in the Bonn II Agreement, there was a call for a multi-ethnic police force. Even if one could argue that none of the Afghan groups has so far complained, it is still an obligation that should be fulfilled in order to prevent future problems.

One of the most obvious and acute concerns is the little loyalty basic trained personnel have to the new central government. The untrained remain loyal to local militia, since they do not see any positive changes for them. In addition, newly trained policemen find it difficult to apply the principles they learned. Reports state that cases arouse where new trained policemen were forced to give equipment to more senior untrained police officers and were forced to extort money from truck drivers and travellers. One of reasons for these dynamics can be found in the fact that the Ministry of Interior has still limited awareness over police operations outside Kabul. There is still a lack of communication and internal discipline. The Ministry still lacks, in some circumstances, the political will to tackle a culture of impunity, and to end political interference in appointments and operations.

The low salaries and the shortages of equipment are still major problems. An Afghan policeman earns an average of 30 to 50 USD per month, which is inconsistently paid. As for the shortage of equipment, in some parts of Afghanistan, for example, the police still cannot perform routine patrols because they lack adequate numbers of vehicles and fuel to operate, so they have to rely on civilian-complainants for transportation.

During the intervention, 80% of police infrastructure was destroyed. But even if one could solve these problems, there is still to take into consideration that the entire infrastructure in Afghanistan is poor

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6 In Kandahar, only 120 out of 3,000 officers have received any training, all of them more than 10 years ago. In Bamiyan, of a 700-strong force, 350 graduated from the police academy previously or were trained abroad, and 350 are former Mujahideen. In Karukh district, Herat province, there are 120 police, of which only six have received training from a police training academy prior to Taliban rule. For further information see USDS and USDD, 2006.

7 Afghanistan is divided into 32 provinces that are sub-divided into smaller administrative districts. Each district has a police commander who should report to the provincial police commander. Large cities are also divided into districts, for example, Kandahar city is split into six districts. Provincial police commanders are then supposed to report directly to the Ministry of Interior. The communication system is still not fully developed and functioning.

8 There are also reports about cases where criminal suspects are detained in private residences, because most police stations lack secure conditions to hold them.
and has to be rebuilt. Not only the untrained officers constitute a problem, but also the international community has limited ability to evaluate afterguard the new trained ones, which is important for a strong, long lasting and modern police force.

**Conclusion**

In order to establish a sustainable security sector, more military trainers should be provided and civilian mentors should be established. Creating national level and provincial community liaison boards to advise and inform the police could be a good idea as well as long-term mandates should be created instead of short missions. The creation and support of a justice sector strategy for addressing the absence of the rule of law is essential in Afghanistan. In addition, help raising police prestige and morale by visiting the families of those killed in the line of duty and publicly recognizing acts of bravery could also be useful (ICG, 2007).

Without a strong and self sustaining police force, Afghanistan creates a new haven for criminals and terrorists, which would again pose a serious threat to global security. Even if there are still problems, and sometimes success seems little or even taking steps back, the international community should keep on going. The training shortage is critical because much of NATO’s strategy rests on rebuilding Afghan’s army and police to play a leading role in defeating insurgents and establishing security. Long-term improvement of institutions is vital for both state building and counter-insurgency. The caveats and short-term mandates imposed by many Western capitals on their troops hinder real planning and raise doubts about the depth of commitment. If the international community does not stay the course in Afghanistan, the price could be inordinately high, including: a return to civil war, with factions divided along regional and ethnic lines; and a state with institutions controlled by multiple organized (criminal) gangs.

The risk of widespread popular frustration with lawlessness and government weaknesses, its implications for stability and the political process on the region as a whole, remains present in Afghanistan (ICG, 2008). A functioning and reliable Afghan police force that can maintain security is absolutely vital for reconstruction to convince people —inside and outside Afghanistan— to maintain confidence in the country and its government, which is one of the key issues to build up a long lasting and ensured peace.
References


New Tigers, Black Eagles and the Dynamics of Violence in Sri Lanka and Colombia: Emergent Actors, Transformed Conflicts, Sustained Violence

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Introduction

In March 2004, a man known as Colonel Karuna Amman\(^1\) announced his decision to distance himself from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an armed group for which he had fought for over two decades, seeking the formation of an independent Tamil state in North-Eastern Sri Lanka (Eelam\(^2\)). Six months later, Karuna launched a new political party (Tamil People’s Liberation Tigers-TMVP) with a new set of goals, entering politics while still engaged in a military confrontation, now mainly against his former partners of the LTTE. Soon, this breakaway faction also had to deal with internal schisms, which ended up in an internal armed confrontation.

Meanwhile, that same year (2004), in Colombia, the paramilitary United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) started a process of demobilisation and disarmament after negotiations with the Uribe government. This demobilisation process gave birth to an amalgam of new armed actors in regions formerly under paramilitary control. The Uribe government’s intent is to treat these groups as drug-related criminal gangs (\textit{Bandas Criminales}-BACRIM) and thus as a matter of law enforcement. However, there are links and similarities with the former AUC, and some of these new groups try to seek legitimacy and a po-

\(^1\) Vinayagamoorthi MURALITHARAN, a Hindu Tamil from the Eastern province of Sri Lanka.

\(^2\) LTTE was founded in 1976 as an armed reaction to the discriminatory policies of the Sinhala majority population (79% of the population) against the Tamil community (12%). The LTTE’s aim is to found an independent Tamil state, based on their claimed homeland known as Eelam. Several attempts of a negotiated settlement with the LTTE have failed.
political platform. One of the more visible of these groups is the so called Black Eagles (Águilas Negras).

Sri Lanka and Colombia have thus recently experienced a peace process which in both cases produced the emergence of new armed actors, transforming the conflicts’ dynamics. They equally —albeit in their own way— portray complex interactions between politics and violence, in which simultaneously continuities of violence and the paradoxical presence of post-armed conflict processes are present. Moreover, some general features of the two countries and their conflicts reveal the possibilities and relevance of comparing these phenomena happening on opposite sides of the globe. For example, they are two of the longest ongoing armed conflicts in the world; they are (and were at the time the violence started) formal democracies; and they have both sustained relative economic development. It is the combination of these shared features, with the radically different contexts of armed conflict, what makes looking at the emergence of these new armed actors in a comparative perspective relevant.

The core objective of this chapter is to give a systematic account of the emergence of these new actors in their particular contexts. The fact that BACRIM and TMVP are recent phenomena and that very little and scattered information is available justifies this main goal. Nevertheless, this analysis also explores, in a comparative perspective, the implications of these processes for understanding the linkage between conflict transformations and violence continuities. This is not merely a descriptive effort in tracking the emergence and comparing the processes of these new armed actors, crucial challenges to the established perceptions of conflict dynamics are also identified, forcing a re-evaluation of some current and common labels, assumptions and dichotomies.

Several years have passed since these new groups first appeared, yet, in spite of enormous media coverage, very little has been written about them in a systematic way. Their activity blended into the political landscape and the everyday news in such a way that the processes they underwent and generated have passed somewhat uncritically through the public eye. Perhaps in Sri Lanka as in Colombia, both the routine of conflict and the speed of new events have reduced the space for deeper analysis, or maybe it is simply too soon to account for the implications of these processes and people have opted to wait and see how it unfolds.

The visible consequence is that processes which defy the standard perceptions of political and ethnic conflict, ‘conflict resolution’, transitional processes and political participation have settled in the public debate as nothing out of the ordinary. These processes end up being considered as merely the natural result of each country’s internal wars. Yet,
placing the emergence of TMVP and BACRIM in a comparative perspective restores the importance of their particularities for the political future of both Sri Lanka and Colombia, respectively, while simultaneously offering the exploratory basis for some theoretical suggestions on the dynamics of violence.

For obvious reasons, one needs to set aside the far reaching histories of both conflicts and to refer those unfamiliar with these cases to previous literature for a better understanding of the backdrop against which these transformations take place. The starting point in this chapter is the peace processes that took place between 2004 and 2006 in Colombia and between 2002 and 2008 in Sri Lanka, both briefly introduced in the following paragraphs.

**New armed actors’ emergence: the peace processes**

*Sri Lanka*

After the United National Party (UNP)\(^3\) won the elections and the LTTE announced a unilateral ceasefire on December 27, 2001, Ranil Wickremasinghe (Prime-Minister) officially requested Norway to assume the role of facilitator between the parties to the armed conflict. In February 2002, a ceasefire was signed (CFA) as the core feature of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), together with the establishment of a monitoring mission (SLMM). Later that year the first round of talks were held, regarding mainly humanitarian issues. Two more rounds took place in which the possibilities of a federal model for a solution within a united Sri Lanka were explored. However, after several sessions in which none or very little progress was made, the LTTE unilaterally suspended the peace talks (April 21, 2003), claiming, nevertheless, that it remained committed to the cease fire and the peace process. In November 2003, Norway suspended its role as facilitator. In the following year (2004), three crucial events took place: first, Karuna announced his defection, less than a month later the UNP lost the general elections to the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), and, in December, the South Asian tsunamis killed more than 35,000 people. The situation afterwards only escalated and finally in January 2008 the ceasefire officially came to an end.

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\(^3\) A centre-right political party formed in 1946, currently the main opposition party in Sri Lanka.
It is important to note that issues regarding development aid were pivotal to the failure of the process. On the one hand, as the LTTE claims, the direct justification for withdrawing from the negotiation table was their exclusion from the Washington donors’ conference. On the other hand, the inability to render operational the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) —related to the administration and distribution of resources for the reconstruction of the Northeast region— closed the last remaining window for a revival of the talks, after key elements of the P-TOMS were dismissed by the Supreme Court and declared as unconstitutional, in 2005. The relevance of these events is that in between them, the split of the Karuna faction took place in which issues regarding development aid implementation were also used as a justification for their defection. In all these cases, the potential of development aid to overcome violence resulted instead in further deepening the tensions, outwards and inwards.

At another level, internal political crises emerged as critical elements in the failure of the peace process. Norway based its decision of stepping aside on the internal disagreements between the Sri Lanka Prime-Minister and the President Kumaratunge. The President dissolved Parliament and called for elections in April 2004. Meanwhile, on the other front, overall LTTE leader Prabhakaran and his most important military commanders also struggled. Norway’s withdrawal announcement was made in November 2003; Karuna’s defection announcement was made in March 2004; and the general elections took place a month later.

Finally, the peace process became unsustainable because of the endless violations to the CFA, i.e. the constant use of violence from both sides. Ironically, although Karuna argued that one of his reasons to defect LTTE was the fact that Prabhakaran, LTTE’s leader, was not interested in peace, many of the ceasefire violations took place in the Eastern region, where Karuna operated.

Colombia

Colombia has recently completed an uncommon peace process resulting in the formal abstraction of one warring party from its civil war:

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4 The LTTE representatives were not allowed participate in the Washington donors’ conference because of the US ban.
5 She was excluded from the peace process, and later took over three ministries, reducing the Prime-Minister’s capability of manoeuvre, arguing that he was endangering national security because of a too lax approach to the LTTE.
the paramilitary United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC). Since the demobilisation of more than 30,000 paramilitaries, between 2003 and 2006, the country has been undergoing processes that would normally indicate an end to war: the uncovering of the truth regarding countless human rights abuses, the excavation of mass graves, and the identification and, to a certain extent, the prosecution of perpetrators, and a beginning of victims’ reparations. However, these processes are taking place in the context of a still ongoing armed conflict. Two guerrilla groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional-ELN), are still active. Furthermore, there is an amalgam of new armed groups now emerging in the territories formerly controlled by the AUC paramilitary.

The Uribe government was the first in Colombian history to enter into peace talks with the paramilitary forces. The AUC has its origins in the beginning of the 1980s, when local landowners and cattle ranchers in several regions, controlled by guerrilla forces (FARC, ELN), started to organise private armies for defence against guerrilla tactics of kidnapping and extortion. The state and the army were initially implied in the organisation and training of these forces. During the 1980s, however, these groups became increasingly operationally autonomous and increasingly involved in the drug trade. However, political relations with state actors remained intact, although never formally acknowledged by the state. At the beginning of the 1990s, the paramilitary forces controlled large areas of territory and started to organise at the national level, resulting in the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), in 1997.

When Uribe was elected in 2002, he announced his intention to negotiate with the AUC. Consequently, the High Commissioner for Peace (Alto Comisionado para la Paz) initiated negotiations with the central AUC command on behalf of the government. In December 2002, the AUC unilaterally declared a ceasefire, followed by the sign-

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6 Earlier negotiation attempts have been directed at the leftist insurgents such as FARC, ELN and others. Such peace talks (some failures, some successful) took place between 1982 and 1985 with President Belisario Betancur, between 1986 and 1990 with President Virgilio Barco Vargas, between 1990 and 1992 with President César Gaviria Trujillo, and between 1998 and 2002 with President Andrés Pastrana Arango.

7 Members of drug trafficking organisations were involved in the initial stages of the paramilitary organisation, such as members of the Medellin cartel in the organisation of self defence forces of the Magdelena Medio region. Drug money increasingly played a role in the financing and expansion of the paramilitary organisation during the 1980s and facilitated their operational professionalisation and autonomy.
ing of the Santafé de Ralito I Agreement (July 2003) stating the intention to demobilise. In January 2004, a monitoring mission was installed by the Organization of American States (OAS) to oversee the demobilisation process: the Peace Support Mission in Colombia (MAPP/OEA). With the signing of the Santafé de Ralito II Agreement (May 2004), a demilitarised zone was established in Tierralta, Córdoba, from where paramilitary leaders negotiated the final terms of demobilisation, resulting in the so-called Justice and Peace Law. In November 2004, the first demobilisation ceremonies started.

The Justice and Peace Law was only approved by the Constitutional Court in May 2006, when demobilisations were already well underway. Unexpectedly, the Court made some explicit alterations toughening the Law before approving it, alterations that caused a crisis in the demobilisation process. Some of the most relevant aspects of the new Justice and Peace Law are that all demobilised paramilitary have to fully confess their crimes, hand in any possessions obtained by illegal means and cooperate with the justice system in order to find truth and reparations for the victims and their relatives. Those demobilised paramilitary that are not under investigation for human rights abuses will enter a reinsertion program with government benefits aiding their reintegration into civilian life. Those who are accused of human rights abuses (mostly higher ranking commanders) can, if fully cooperative with the justice system, apply for a so-called alternative sentence, with a minimum of five and a maximum of eight years in prison (Diario Oficial, 2005).

Within the Justice and Peace Law framework, a total of 31,671 (Iván Arias, 2008) paramilitary combatants and commanders demobilised between 2004 and 2006. Obviously this was not without obstacles. First, regarding those paramilitary that were reinserted into civilian life, many of them are still at risk from former enemies and/or coerced recruitment by new armed groups. Second, regarding those commanders who were sentenced to prison, those who were unsatisfied with some of the Justice and Peace Law proceedings, started uncovering sensitive information about their ties to the Uribe government,

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8 Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia (MAPP)/Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA).
9 On May 18, the altered Justice and Peace Law was approved by the Court. On August 14, Uribe ordered that the AUC high command be placed in temporary seclusion at La Ceja (Antioquia) after they threatened several times to leave the process because of the alterations made by the Court. Several high commanders refused, left the process and went into hiding, among which Vicente Castaño, Jorge 40, Éver Veloza (alias H.H.) and Los Mellizos.
in 2006. This caused a political scandal of national proportions known as ‘parapolitics’, set off by information found on the computer of one of the paramilitary leaders (Semana, 2006). Within a year, 30% of Colombian Congress members were under investigation for alleged ties with the former AUC. Some of them are currently in prison (Semana, 2008d). Furthermore, imprisoned paramilitary commanders continued their criminal activities from jail.

What’s wrong with these transitions?

Both in Colombia as in Sri Lanka a ceasefire was in place and several rounds of talks were held, but no concrete peace agreement was ever reached; not between the Colombian government and the AUC, nor between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, or between the latter and the breakaway Karuna group (TMVP). Only procedural elements were agreed upon, yet never fully complied with. This is commonly the case every time a process starts but fails. One can find these characteristics of failure together with typically post-armed conflict situations, such as the process of truth, justice and reparations in Colombia, or the consolidation of an armed group as a political party (Karuna group as TMVP) taking part in elections. In addition, no clear political platforms were in place to negotiate upon. In fact, the demobilisation on its own right (in the case of the AUC), and the armed resistance towards the LTTE (by the TMVP) gave them the political status they aspired to and thus an ex-post legitimation.

Linked to the previous anomaly is the fact that in spite of the ceasefire agreements, both processes took place in the midst of a context of war. Not only did the parties continue their use of violence against each other, but perhaps even more significantly, third armed actors were not considered in the negotiations — from the beginning, as in Colombia, or once they appeared along the way, as in Sri Lanka. Which brings us to one of the most critical points of the transitions: in both countries, a bilateral model of ‘conflict resolution’ was installed and/or kept in place, meant to operate in and manage multiparty conflicts.

Colombia’s civil war is in fact a war-triangle (if not an undetermined polygon) with shifting relations. It is an internal conflict of the state against insurgencies (FARC, ELN), with AUC as a paramilitary reaction late in the conflict’s evolution. Thus, it is also partly a non-state conflict between FARC and AUC, although with a state accused and often proven to have several connections with the latter. In such a scenario, by negotiating bilaterally, only one side of the triangle is taken
out, while the armed conflict continues to put both demobilised combatants and civilian population in areas formerly controlled by these actors at risk.

The case of Sri Lanka is similar, with the emergence of a new armed group in the East that demanded a separate treatment and participation in the peace process, but remained excluded. But in a much broader sense, the bilateral approach excluded from the start the Muslim community of the negotiations. As quoted in an International Crisis Group report “it’s like a football match. One side is the LTTE, the other is the government. We Muslims are the football” (ICG, 2006: 18). They were left out of negotiations in spite of being constantly and simultaneously victimised by the parties and conveniently used in the political game.

Furthermore, in both cases, there are some salient ambiguities regarding demobilisation and disarmament. In Colombia, 31,671 ex-AUC combatants have demobilised, yet all the estimations of the number of combatants in 2004 before the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process were far lower. Notwithstanding, there are now hundreds of un-demobilised AUC members still in arms under different armed organisations. So, in a double paradox then, there are more demobilised than prior combatants, even though many real combatants never participated in demobilisations. This is partially explained by the fact that the AUC themselves were responsible for the lists of both combatants and arms handed in during the demobilisation process. Many common criminals (drug lords) used the demobilisation process to legitimize themselves, whitewash their illegal resources and clear their criminal record. Furthermore, part of the structures was conscious not demobilized, such as with the demobilisation of the Heroes of Tolová Bloc in Tierralta, Córdoba, where 60-80 men kept operating to control the coca production and trade (Semana, 2006a). In terms of arms, in most demobilisation ceremonies of the AUC the relation between the number of men and the arms handed over was one weapon for every two to three men. There are cases, for example the demobilization of the Autodefensas Campesinas de Tolima, where one weapon was handed in for every 4 men (idem). What happened to the other weapons?

In Sri Lanka, the formal peace process never even got to the point of starting a procedure of demobilisation. Nevertheless, it would have been expected that with the defection of the Karuna group and his transition towards a political party, a demobilisation strategy would have been planned. However, no such thing happened. Only some child-soldiers were sent home in a gesture of good will towards the
government and in hope of winning points in the international arena. In fact, both the LTTE and the Karuna group kept recruiting during the ceasefire and the peace process. After four years, the leader of the TMVP was appointed Chief-Minister for the Eastern Province by the President of Sri Lanka, but no official project of disarmament has even been mentioned.

This absence leads us to some brief comments on the legal frameworks and the underlying political alliances in these transitions. In both cases, the AUC and the TMVP, the transitions are of two, more or less, ‘state friendly’ armed actors, who often operated as illegal allies of the government forces, with multiple ties to local political actors. In Colombia, 30% of Congress members are under investigation for ties with the former AUC. In Sri Lanka, common operations between the Sri Lankan Army and the TMVP are known to take place, for there is no better intelligence and tactical knowledge about the LTTE than the one Karuna can provide. This condition might have facilitated the vague or nonexistent legal frameworks in both cases. In Colombia, an initially very loose set of rules was finally consolidated in a still flexible Justice and Peace Law, that once approved was no longer acceptable to any of the factions of the AUC. And in Sri Lanka, no legal framework or transitional justice mechanisms whatsoever were set up in the case of TMVP, to enable full use of their knowledge and methods. Ironically, in Colombia, this led to the prosecution of AUC commanders, many currently behind bars in Colombia and the United States of America (USA), whereas in Sri Lanka, it led to an electoral victory by the TMVP.

Finally, in both transitions the illegal economic practices and structures, as well as the underground political nexus remained largely untouched. The drug trade, the control of routes, the contacts with criminal networks and the (in)direct pressure and influence on local and regional politics that the AUC had built over the years, are almost intact and are still operated even from behind bars. This has been the main argument of the government to suspend the benefits of the Justice and Peace Law for many of the AUC leaders and extradite them to the USA to be sentenced for other (drug-related) crimes. Although arguably it may as well be the result of unsatisfied AUC members starting to talk about concrete ties of the government with them. This caused major damage to the transition process: (1) truth and reparations obligations of these commanders are now suspended; (2) future prospects for peace negotiations with a government that does not keep its end of the deal have worsened; and (3) the extradition of the paramilitary leaders broke the fragile equilibrium that existed in some regions between criminal bands and other armed actors that emerged after de-
mobilisation. Medium-level command officers (not demobilised or re-mobilised paramilitary) and drug cartels are now disputing the control over territory and drug routes.

Meanwhile, in Sri Lanka, the TMVP holds several key political positions in the Eastern province and yet it is still directly involved in extortion, kidnapping and intimidation. For the government to retain this alliance and tolerate those practices as a “pacifying strategy of the east” constitutes a risk of backfiring, sending negative signals to the international community, the population of East Sri Lanka, and eventually fertilising the ground for more and renewed forms of violence and vendettas.

Conflicts transformation: new armed groups

_Sri Lanka: from LTTE to the Karuna Group_

> Two tigers cannot hunt in the same mountain.

(Chinese proverb)

Before tracing back the emergence of this new armed actor, it is critical to review three basic features, which are slowly becoming common knowledge, but are still often neglected in the literature on the Sri Lankan conflict. First, one must insist on an apparently obvious distinction between the LTTE and the Tamil community. As unnecessary as it may sound, in many occasions the media, the direct actors involved and the scholars, willingly or not, end up talking about them indiscriminately. Furthermore, the LTTE has auto-proclaimed itself as the sole representative of the Tamils and has reduced dissident opinion since its inception.

A second evident, yet necessary, aspect to consider is that the Tamil community is not homogeneous. Its diversity is hard to grasp, but at least one should acknowledge the heterogeneity between the Tamils of the North, the Eastern Tamils and the so-called estate Tamils, residing mainly in the central province of Sri Lanka. For now, it should be mentioned that the formulation of the differences between the Northern and the Eastern Tamils are commonly expressed along the lines of castes. The monopoly of representation and lack of recognition of Tamil’s diversity by the LTTE and outsiders can be considered as crucial in the emergence of the new armed actor. Finally, it is important to insist on the fact that —partly as a result of the previous points— armed actors are not internally homogeneous either.
Having underlined these three levels of diversity, the article printed in one of the English written newspapers of Sri Lanka (May 2002), later presented as a premonition, reflects some of the concerns already identified regarding the main character in our plot (Karuna).

Most of the Batticaloa cadres are returning to the east on the pretext of going on leave. One could question the real motive of Karuna at this juncture. What is he doing at a time when he is expected to lay down his arms, building a separate and dreadful force in Batticaloa? Karuna is getting ready to take over the east. He knows that Prabhakaran trusts him even though there is a difference between the Batticaloa and Jaffa Tamils. No one knows if Karuna has an ulterior motive or if he is following the orders of his leader. Like his leader, Karuna is also not very comfortable at times of peace. He is a warlord of the LTTE. (…) Karuna may even tell Prabhakaran one day “I will look after the east and you look after the north”. (Island, 2002)

It must be said, however, that rather than anticipating Karuna’s split, what this article was warning the public about, was the possibility of Karuna either taking over or sharing power with LTTE’s number one. It is nevertheless a clear sign of Karuna’s split having a longer history, suggesting that there was more to it than just a decision of the moment and that it did not go completely unnoticed.

Born in 1966 (Kiran, Batticaloa), Karuna Amman joined the LTTE in 1983, the year considered the most important turning point in Sri Lanka’s armed struggle. Soon, he became the bodyguard of Prabhakran (Head of LTTE) and was later behind many of the most renowned military operations of the LTTE. His fame however was not just based on those achievements, but on his alleged involvement in some of the cruelest actions ever undertaken by the Tamil rebels, such as the execution of several hundreds of policemen who had surrendered, and the massacre of Muslims in Erovar and Kattankundy. In 2003, he was elevated to the rank of special commander for the Eastern provinces and ended up sitting at the negotiating table during the peace talks. Yet, taking many by surprise, he announced his intention to defect LTTE on March 3, 2004, making public a letter he sent to his Commander Prabhakran. What motivated a well established commander to break away from the

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10 The year was marked by the so-called Black July, during which soldiers were ambushed by LTTE in Jaffna and, allegedly as a reaction, mobs started riots in Colombo and then all over Sri Lanka killing thousands of Tamils, burning businesses and displacing entire communities.
LTTE after 21 years, just then in the middle of an ongoing peace process? What follows are some extracts of the aforementioned letter.

I write this letter to clarify the position regarding the present crisis. Nobody can reject or hide the fact that our Batticaloa and Ampara sections have done a great service during the history of our struggle. They faced killings and destruction. During struggles up to now 4550 militants have been killed on the front and 2248 of them died as they obeyed your orders to come to Jaffna and Wanni (…)

You have appointed more than 30 heads of divisions in Tamil Eelam. Among them there is nobody from either Batticaloa or Ampara. During the height of the struggle nobody paid attention to this matter but due to the peaceful environment everybody are (sic) making inquiries (…)

When all these divisional heads are travelling in luxury vehicles in Kilinochchi, members of the Jayandan battalion resident in Ampara are performing duties at the guard post at Pallai. How can you justify this? All militants wish to stay in their homes with their relations during these peaceful times (…).

(…) On behalf of North Eelam people I have performed priceless duties risking my life. During times of these opportunities I am willing to serve the people the South Tamil Eelam (…). I do not like anybody else standing in my way. I am willing to serve directly under you without divisional heads of Tamil Eelam. Hence I stopped the Intelligence unit.

We will not desert you and we need you still more. We treat you as our god (…) (Daily Mirror, 2004a)

From this text one can identify some of the motivations Karuna argued were behind his split. First, he suggests a disproportional sacrifice by Eastern Tamils for the cause. Second, he implies an unfair distribution of positions of power within LTTE structures for members originating from Batticaloa and Ampara districts. Third, he makes a case portraying the privileges favouring those of the North, particularly in a context of peace, at the expense of the fighters from the South(east).

Just some days later, he would add some additional triggers. He blamed Pottu Amman (Leader of the Intelligence wing of LTTE) for all the problems of the movement; then insinuated unequal development programmes for the North and East; and finally claimed that the request from Vanni leadership of 1,000 additional troops in times of peace was what sparked his final decision to split, for it showed, according to Karuna, that Prabhakaran “was getting ready for war” (Daily Mirror, 2004).
It is worth while noticing —looking back to Karuna’s letter— that no claims on caste are made, but rather on regional differences, or better said, on differential treatment based on geographical origin. Furthermore, it is interesting to see how ‘peacetimes’ are perceived as playing a fundamental role in the consolidation of tensions, for it gave people time to think, to observe discrimination and express their grievances.

But as is common in these cases, this legitimising attempt was immediately followed by a counter discourse of de-legitimisation, in this case from the LTTE political-wing, in particular from Tamilchelvan, Karikalan and Balasingham, major LTTE leaders. In a first instance, they discredited Karuna’s claims, and later on presented alternative motives to explain his decision. Regarding the absence of Eastern Tamils in leading positions within the LTTE, Tamilchelvan responded underlining the fact that the most important office within LTTE structure is the Head Office, which was led by a Batticaloa Tamil. Besides, he reminded everyone that Karuna used to be a central committee member, functioning next to Prabhakaran (Tamilchelvan, 2004). On the same question, some days later, Balasingham added that his leader is admired precisely for “having built a unified national liberation movement transcending divisions of class, caste, creed and regions that permeated the traditional Tamil society for centuries” (Balasingham, 2004).

In addition, the LTTE’s ideologue, Karikalan, commented that the movement’s organisation structure did not have the thirty major units expressed by Karuna, but a military and a political structure. Under those two are Finance, Law and Order, Intelligence and Education, for which the heads, he claims, are appointed on the basis of seniority (idem). Furthermore, the LTTE denied having asked for fighters, argued that development was non-existent both in the East as in the North, and claimed that there were external forces behind Karuna’s “confused state of mind” (Tamilchelvan, 2004; Karikalan, 2004). LTTE’s leadership in Kilinochchi started then to formulate the “real reasons behind the split” as selfish motives exploited by external actors during the peace talks. They included illicit sexual liaisons and embezzlement of the movement’s funds, witnesses of which were killed by Karuna. So on the one side, it was alleged that the interest of the eastern Tamils were ignored and, on the other, there were accusations of corruption and violation of LTTE’s code of conduct.

These are the motives provided from within, on both sides of the split. There were however some additional ones provided by outsiders, some claiming that either the US or Indian’s Intelligence wing were behind it; some claiming that Karuna felt sidelined after the ceasefire be-
cause of the shift of focus from the military victories (his own) to the political play (of Tamilselvan, Balasnigham and others). According to those, the discourse of discrimination was implemented to express that resentment (Island, 2004a). Regardless of Karuna’s reasons to rebel, his claims of discriminatory treatment found echo on ample sectors of the Eastern province’s population, although by far not all (UTHR, 2004a), and challenged Prabhakaran’s hegemony (Mahindapala, 2004) in ‘Then Eelam’ (Southern Eelam), reinforced by symbolic actions such as thousands of people burning an effigy of Prabhakaran in the first ever open defiance.

Karuna is not the first dissident in LTTE’s history. Prior to Karuna, the case of Mahatiya represented the biggest internal crisis of the LTTE. He and his supporters were completely crushed during the 1990s. This time that did not happen (even though many of Karuna’s men have been killed) because of a series of factors. On the one hand, Karuna immediately brought his revolt to the public domain (something Mahatiya did not do). One the other hand, Karuna’s case erupted in the midst of a peace process, not during times of war, meaning not only that there were serious restrictions to violence given the enforcement of the ceasefire agreement, but also that the international community was watching and, more importantly, that Karuna was known to them for having participated in the peace talks. This did not stop the efforts, but certainly limited the possibilities and methods. In addition, Karuna only wanted to be the “king of the east” with no intention of challenging Prabhakaran on his own turf, who knew that destroying Karuna completely would turn Karuna into a martyr of the East while deepening the North-east divide. Last, but certainly not least, Karuna, unlike Mahatiya, had an army and a territory under his control (Jeyaraj, 2004a).

How many fighters he had at the time of the breakaway and how many are still armed is a matter of controversy. Some authors suggest that by 2004 the total number of fighters of the LTTE was 18,000, out of which 7,500 came from the East, but not all of them were stationed there when Karuna defected (Jeyaraj, 2004a). The highest number referenced is that of 8,000 (Noyahr, 2004). The University Teachers for Human Rights (UTHR) Report estimated 4,000 (2004a) and Sri Lanka army sources stated that around 6,000 were under Karuna’s command (Shamindra, 2004). The most detailed version suggests 5,700 (Jeyaraj, 2004a), which is similar to the number Karuna months later claimed to have sent home (5,600) (Hariharan, 2004). However, approximately 200 cadres immediately left the East and crossed over to Vanni; around a thousand proclaimed neutrality in the internal power struggle; and about 500 were sent off by Karuna himself. Additionally, a huge pro-
portion of those fighters had been recently recruited, very young and with no battle experience, reducing Karuna’s military power to about 2,500. Of these, 1,000 up to 1,500, Karuna could be sure of their loyalty with 500 of them willing to die as suicide Black Tigers (*idem*). Ironically, when Balasingham answered to a question regarding the number of fighters of the breakaway group, he mentioned as well the weakness of Karuna’s force given that a vast number were recently recruited during the ceasefire; hereby admitting a violation of the Memorandum of Understanding (Balasingham, 2004). On the other hand, Karuna also used this opportunity to present child-soldiers sent home as a gesture of goodwill towards the government and the international community, as if willing to distance himself from child recruitment.

So, on the one side, some alliances were expected to have taken place between Karuna and some smaller paramilitary groups operating in the East (PLOTE, EPRLF, TELO factions)\(^{11}\), in addition to the well established, albeit clandestine, alliances with sections of the security forces. On the other side, Prabhakaran’s only option was to try to mobilise the 1,800 Easterners in the North against their own to prove their loyalty and avoid accusations of the North attacking the East.

Karuna had then the military capacity, the strategic knowledge and the legitimising discourse for the group’s use of violence. But to confront the LTTE and sustain the monopoly of violence in the East one needed armament supplies and the resources to finance the rebellion. It has been reported that the LTTE generated, prior to the split, about 4.6 million rupees a day ($43,000), more or less 16 million dollars a year in Batticaloa and Ampara districts. Those revenues came from taxes on businesses, professionals and transporters, and from ventures run by the LTTE in agriculture, fisheries and stone quarrying (Jeyaraj, 2004a). Karuna took over a part of those sources of income as exemplified by the seafood trade in Vaharai-Kalkuda area taken over by his brother (Hariharan, 2008). But, since Karuna did not have the international backing either of the Tamil Diaspora\(^{12}\) or the international community, he became dependent on a third force (sections of the Sri Lankan state) willing to sustain him militarily and financially (Mahindapala, 2004). He also tapped into some local criminal activities (mainly extortion). He received some support from Eastern traders and the edu-

\(^{11}\) *People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam*-PLOTE; *Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front*-EPRLF; and *Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization*-TELO.

\(^{12}\) The elite from Jaffna continued to hold the key jobs of the LTTE apparatus abroad. For instance, networks of global shops and drug peddling are run by agents of Prabhakaran as chief purchasers and suppliers of illegal arms.
icated classes, particularly a significant section of the Eastern University. But there was not much more political support, because he was associated with child abduction, physical and economic harassment and violence against Muslims (UTHR, 2004).

He nevertheless managed to mobilise the aforementioned grievances and co-opted some of the victims of the LTTE as former members of that organisation and their families, presenting himself as a better option for the Tamil people of the East. He then asked for at least one member of a family to take part, otherwise, they would be punished or child abduction would take place. Furthermore, he used newspapers, particularly Thamil Alai (Tamil waves) to propagate his point of view and filtered critiques coming from other sides (Jeyaraj, 2004a). At the end, the same grievances presented by the LTTE towards the Sinhala dominated state (exploitation, discrimination, exclusion, inequality) were now being redirected to the Tiger elite of the North, with similar tactics being implemented (child abduction, extortion, taxes, control over trade, political intimidation), within more or less the same financial system. And yet, the dynamics of the conflict changed dramatically.

Only 40 days after Karuna’s announcement, things seemed to portray that it had been a failed attempt. On March 25, LTTE formally declared war on Karuna. The military campaign that followed was preceded by selective killings, until on April 9, 2004 (Good Friday), LTTE launched its attack on Karuna cadres stationed just South of the Verugal River (Jeyaraj, 2004). Allegedly, at least 500 of Karuna’s cadres surrendered, among which 269 child-soldiers who were returned to United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (idem). It has been said that between 60 and 150 died between the April 9 and 11 on Karuna’s side (UTHR, 2004), but apparently several of those that surrendered were later massacred. Soon after, Karuna decided to withdraw and fled to Colombo. Supposedly, however, he sent a fax to the LTTE in Kilinochchi and struck a deal. Karuna would

1. cease fighting permanently;
2. disband and disperse his forces and send them home;
3. hand over arms and ammo to the LTTE;
4. release hostages of the LTTE;
5. vacate north-eastern province;
6. refrain from military or political activity in future;
7. maintain silence about LTTE’s internal issues; and

In return, the LTTE would let him leave the Eastern province, not kill him, nor ask him to return money and other valuables to LTTE, refrain
from killing his cadres, absorb those willing to rejoin the LTTE, and abstain from taking revenge on the Tamils from the East (Jeyaraj, 2004).

According to Jeyaraj (2004), after the deal, Karuna dismantled and dispersed around 3,500 to 4,000 cadres asking them to go home and lead a normal life. But as if not enough, unexpected twists were already in the making. Karuna, allegedly, broke the agreement and killed one of the LTTE members in his custody, after which the leadership in Kilinochichi considered the agreement invalid (Jeyaraj, 2004). The transition entered a new phase, different factions within the Karuna group started to emerge and confront each other, and, at the same time, Karuna’s group became a political party called Tamil People’s Liberation Tigers (TMVP).

Colombia: from AUC to BACRIM

The first signs of ‘post demobilisation’ armed groups in Colombia appeared in 2005, when the demobilisations were still in progress. In August 2005, the Fundación Ideas para la Paz published an article warning about a ‘third generation of paramilitary’. Since then, human rights organizations and other civil society players have warned about new armed actors taking over territories formerly controlled by the paramilitary, especially those key for the drug trade, such as corridors to the Pacific and Caribbean coasts and to the Venezuelan border (ICG, 2007). These warnings specifically refer to the similarities and links that these groups have with the former paramilitary AUC. The Uribe government however prefers to deal with these emergent groups as mere ‘criminal gangs’ (BACRIM) that have no political legitimacy or heritage.

So what are these BACRIM? Are they a continuation or re-emergence of old style paramilitary groups or are they simply criminal gangs related to the drug trade and, thus, a matter of law enforcement? And what does this mean for the use of violence? Answering the question about continuities and differences is not easy, not in the least because

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13 The International Crisis Group identifies 4 main regions: the North (including La Guajira, César and Norte de Santander departments, bordering with Venezuela); 2. the Eastern lowlands (including Meta, Vichada, Casanare and Arauca departments, also bordering Venezuela; 3. the South-West, with many corridors to the Pacific (including Nariño, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Putumayo, Caquetá, Caldas and Chocó departments); and 4. the Caribbean coastal zone (including Antioquia, Córdoba, Bolívar, Sucre and Magdalena) (ICG, 2007).
even the paramilitaries prior to demobilisation, were not one single actor, much less the current BACRIM.

BACRIM is a generic term for a diffuse and multiform phenomenon. Auto-denominations of these groups change constantly as do their rivalries, alliances and leadership. These BACRIM operate in a dynamic and fast changing context during an ongoing readjustment of power relations regarding territory and drugs. The Tenth MAPP/OAS Report (May 2007) identifies three general types of new armed groups: 1. regroupings of demobilised paramilitary into (criminal) gangs that control specific communities and illegal economic activities; 2. holdouts of paramilitary that did not participate in the demobilisation process and continue their activities; 3. new criminal armed players and/or the strengthening of those that already existed in areas abandoned by demobilised groups. Almost all groups have similarities with the former AUC, be it through their tactics, networks or combatants.

There are groups like the New Generation Organization (Organización Nueva Generación-ONG) in Nariño that have started counter-insurgency operations, much like the old-AUC bloc in the region, and show efforts to militarily control territory and people (all in service of the drug trade) (ICG, 2007). Others, like the Rastrojos, also in the Nariño department, seem less autonomous and both work for and compete with established criminal networks as private armies. Then there are ambiguous actors such as the Black Eagles (Águilas Negras), originally from Norte de Santander department, but currently appearing in several other regions, that seem to be more of a network of different groups operating under the same name. Black Eagles is a term the media has caught on to and is thus the group with the most public recognition.

Taking the BACRIM as a phenomenon, we will analyse the continuities and differences in their use of violence. In terms of goals or platform, the new groups have largely refrained from any political or ideological cause, such as the counter-insurgency origins of the AUC. However, given the complexity of the conflict, where political and criminal elements are interwoven, counter-insurgency operations do exist when there is a conflict over coca plantations and drug trafficking

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14 Demobilised are approximately 15% of BACRIM. According to the National Police (2007) between 2006 and 2007, 1,765 members of these new criminal bands were arrested, of which 258 were former demobilised. However, it seems that demobilised are not the real problem, a Report of the Comisión Nacional de Reconciliación y Reparación suggests that of all demobilised, only 2% have been remobilised into these new groups (an acceptable number in a demobilisation context).
routes. Furthermore, the counter-insurgency discourse is sometimes used to legitimise certain actions and present a political dimension to their activities. This message is still plausible since the FARC (the original cause for the emergence of the former AUC) still exists. Also this ambiguous practice between counter-insurgency aims and a drug trafficking reality was not alien to the AUC itself. In the late days of the AUC, the anti-guerrilla model of original AUC leader Carlos Catasño was superseded by drug trafficking, a transition that caused some serious ideological conflicts within the AUC.

BACRIM are a very diffuse and local phenomenon; there is no coordinated articulation at the national level, such as with the AUC. So far, no central command structure is known, and groups are often involved in conflict with each other. The current leadership of many of these groups is in the hands of mostly medium range commanders of the AUC, who did not demobilise or remobilise. There are allegations that higher AUC commanders would be behind some of these groups, such as Vicente Castaño, known as Macaco, in the case of the Black Eagles. However, most of the higher AUC commanders are currently either extradited or dead. Yet, there are signs of more far-reaching ambitions. Some groups have individually undertaken actions at higher level, such as threats directed at Congress members or embassies (Semana 2008a; 2008e; 2008f). The emergence of a national structure seems unlikely but possible. The AUC started more or less the same way in the beginning of the 1980s, before it organized nationally in 1997. And even then, some parts, such as the Cacique Nutibara Bloc, functioned as a network of various components including youth gangs, drug traffickers and oficinas de cobro¹⁵, all involved in multiple criminal activities.

The BACRIM are obviously smaller in number than the AUC. The number of people involved in these groups is disputed, but even the lowest count, from the police and the MAPP/OAS mission, point to some 3,000 people. Civil society groups estimate up to three times that figure. Pressure is on demobilised paramilitary to integrate one of these groups, since they are trained combatants with valuable connections. Force, threat and, allegedly, also kidnappings are used for recruitment (Semana, 2008b). Most new actors pay their soldiers well, as did the AUC. The monthly government allowance for the demobilised is 358,000 pesos a month, some of the new forces, like the Black Eagles, offer 800,000 to 1 million pesos a month for a trained combatant (Semana, 2008c).

¹⁵ Offices, the euphemistic denomination for mafia administration centres.
In terms of resources, like the AUC, the common denominator of resources for the BACRIM is the drug trade. Different from the AUC however, the means seem to have become the goal. Whereas the AUC originated as a counter-insurgency, self-defence force, and later developed into a powerful player in drug trafficking, these BACRIM lack ideological justification and aim at only controlling the trade. Whereas expansion of the AUC led to conflict and combat with the FARC and/or ELN, paradoxically, these new groups have found a strong ally in the FARC in some regions (Revista Cambio, 2008). In some cases, such as Norte de Santander, the FARC and ELN control coca production and the first stages of processing, while new groups (Black Eagles mostly) control trafficking routes and commercialise the cocaine elsewhere. Other resources are oil (tapping pipes and selling, or smuggling from Venezuela), gas and the emerald trade as well as extortion of/tax waging on local entrepreneurs, redirecting local administration funds.

BACRIM are generally less focused on militarily controlling territory and populations. They generally do not patrol using military uniforms, making their presence publicly known as did the AUC in most areas. The new groups have opted for a more clandestine presence, in Medellín, for example, new groups still control the streets of the comunas, marginalised neighbourhoods, but they no longer patrol with visible rifles and uniforms (El Espectador, 2007). The new groups do use some of the same tactics as the AUC to ensure some level of control, perverse security and impose their morals and values on populations in their areas of influence. They develop strategies of social cleaning (small criminals, youth gangs, street dwellers, drug addicts, etc.) to gain social support and eliminate sources of public protest (NGOs, human rights activists, union leaders, church leaders, etc.) (Semana, 2008; 2008a). The BACRIM are also known to attack victims and organisations involved in truth seeking and reparations, which indicates a clear link with the former paramilitaries.

BACRIM political influence and presence are less pervasive, there is no known influence at the national political level, on the contrary to the AUC, whose pervasive national political influence is still being uncovered in the parapolitics scandal. At the regional/local level, the influence is not as far reaching as the AUC, but it is definitely there. During the years of AUC expansion, a political process of decentralisation took place. This process enhanced local budgets and strengthened decision-making authority and, thus, the potential gains of small-scale political infiltration. This situation remains unchanged, and the BACRIM have inherited some of the AUC’s political connections and, in those areas,
where they do aim at more social and political control, the *modus operandi* and use of violence are largely the same.

Collaboration of security forces with the BACRIM is less than with the former AUC. However, press and NGO reports suggest that in some regions there are indications that security forces either tolerate the new armed groups or even actively work with them (ICG, 2007). Civilians and demobilised fighters are thus still weary of security forces due to perceptions of collaboration or infiltration of these armed groups and also because of threats made by them (like with the AUC).

In terms of civilian support, the AUC enjoyed a quasi-legitimate status in some parts of the country, particularly in their strongholds of Antioquia, Córdoba and parts of the Caribbean coast. The new groups do not have this benign perception by civilians and are generally seen as a mafia (ICG, 2007).

### Violence in a transformed context

**Sri Lanka: TMVP armed group versus TMVP political party**

On October 12, 2004, Karuna announced the formation of a new political party in an open letter to “the Tamil people”. His statement included four critical elements. First, he made an extensive critique of Prabhakaran, describing him as the “number one enemy of the Tamils”, “mentally deranged” and a “beastly person” (even if just a few months earlier he had referred to him as “Suriya thvam” (Sun God)). The second feature was an apology: “All those slaughtering (sic) that were committed in the past were done on orders of Prabhakaran and as I have been a member of the outfit for the past 21 years, for whatever that has happened, I tender my humble apologies to the Tamil People” (Hariharan, 2004).16

Third, an explanation of his withdrawal from Batticaloa, in April, was presented, portrayed by others as a military victory of the LTTE, although, according to Karuna, it was in fact a decision made to safeguard the lives of thousands of Tamil youths (*idem*). And fourth, he announced the creation of his movement, which, originally was to be called TEMVP (Thamil Eelam Viduthalai PULikal), but became TMVP. Taking the word ‘Eelam’ out (Jeyaraj, 2007) constituted a small but very

16 Notice however how his apology is directed to the Tamil people, but not to Muslims or Sinhalese.
strategic semantic move from emphasising the homeland as the LTTE name suggests, to emphasising the Tamil people. It is also worth mentioning that the acronym of the LTTE is in English, whereas that of the TMVP is in Tamil. Curiously, however, the letter is signed as Karuna, President of TMVP, Batticaloa, Tamil Eelam, not Sri Lanka. And finally, the movement kept the Tiger as a symbol, arguing that the association with this animal relates to the Tamil people going back centuries, and not with the rebel movement, which simply co-opted the symbol (Colombo, 2007).

What were the particular policies of his party, Karuna never mentioned, nor did he clarify whether or not he was going to give up arms. In a statement made in November 2006, however, while rejecting a struggle for an independent Eelam, Karuna explained that they were compelled to carry out an armed struggle in spite of joining mainstream politics, for

We are struggling to liberate the people of all nationalities who are entangled in Prabhakaran’s repressive and murderous culture. (…) the weapons that we carry today are only temporary. We are always prepared to give them up (…) if a life is assured for the people and if there are no obstacles to our political journey. (TMVP, 2006)

The first question is if four years (and counting) can be considered temporary; the second problem is that those weapons were not only used as they claimed, to defend themselves from LTTE. They have been used for criminal activities; they are being used against Muslim communities, and they are used against themselves. On another dimension, in 2004, a newspaper wrote “when it is clear that there is no single player, it follows that there can be more, it does not stop at two” (Island, 2004).

And so history repeats itself. The different factions within the TMVP, about a dozen (UTHR, 2008), began to line up either on Karuna’s side, or Pillayan’s side, his military supreme commander and deputy of the organisation. And once again, one of the main claims behind the division was regarding the embezzlement of funds after Pillayan facilitated safe residence for Karuna’s family in the United Kingdom (UK), and handed over the reins of the organization to Karuna in 2006 (Defencewire, 2007).

It is claimed that by the end of 2007 Pillayan controlled 900 men whereas Karuna controlled 400 (Defencewire, 2007). Allegedly, the armed clashes between them started on May 4, 2007, when the father of a Pillayan supporter was abducted and gunned down (UTHR,
There are however versions of third parties convincing Karuna to demand explanations from Pillayan, regarding his use of the funds (Jeyaraj, 2007). From mid 2007, Pillayan and his supporters moved to Trincomalee where they were helped by Patriotic National Movement (PNM) elements (UTHR, 2008).

It is suggested by Jeyaraj (2007) that the security forces sought to create the Karuna/Pillayan divide, to weaken them and make them easier to submit to their authority. Personal rivalry was then transformed in different alliance formations and eventually was expressed in a geographical manner. The Pillayan group operated and controlled Trincomalee, while Karuna controlled Ampara, and both shared Batticaloa. The Karuna/Pillayan split manifests two very remarkable alliances. The PNM (supporting Pillayan) augmented its role as an extremist political front affiliated to the President, assisting the takeover of the East. On the other hand, Karuna holds close ties with the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU, National Heritage Party), a nationalist Buddhist party, who openly supports the TMVP remaining armed-wing, until the LTTE is destroyed (UTHR, 2008). Both alliances were almost unthinkable, based on their backgrounds and discourses. But temporary common interests have apparently been strong enough to bring them together, even though they remain fragile associations with all participants being suspicious of each other.

Apparently, however, the clash between TMVP No.1 and No.2 was patched up and new arrangements were negotiated. Karuna joined his family in the UK, but it turned out that he entered the country with a forged (diplomatic) passport and visa, describing himself as a wildlife official on business. Consequently, he was arrested on November 2, 2007. It seems that the passport was apparently arranged by JHU Minister Champika Ranawaka. (UTHR, 2008), while rumours blamed Pillayan for giving up Karuna’s whereabouts. The arrest functioned almost as a cue for the government to adopt Pillayan as their ally in the East (UTHR 2008), now operating as the de facto number one of the TMVP. The alliance was made official on January 25, 2008, when the TMVP joined the government’s United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) and decided to contest elections together, first in March for the Batticaloa district local Council election (winning all the 9 councils), and then in May for the Eastern Provincial Council (EPC). Pillayan had the highest preferential vote for Batticaloa district and was afterwards appointed Chief-Minister for the EPC by President Mahinda Rajapakse. It is worth remembering at this point that he is still supreme commander of a paramilitary force, and it is therefore not surprising that several claims were made of unfair elections and political intimidation, in particu-
lar from opposition parties United National Party (UNP), the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA); and of course from Human Rights organisations.

In terms of their use of violence, both Pillayan and Karuna have taken part in conscription, extortion, murder, robbery, kidnapping; all practices they were familiar with since their time with LTTE. They both legitimised themselves, claiming the liberation of the East from Prabhakaran’s tyranny, and distinguish themselves from the other based on their (mis)use of the movement’s funds and criminal activity. Furthermore, it seems more and more that the Intelligence services and the different alliances are playing one against the other and simultaneously turning them both against the Muslim community. Violence appears to be their only clear policy to sustain and guarantee their continuity; old enemies have to be reinvented as a new threat. It would come as no surprise if the next transition entailed organised armed violence between the TMVP and emergent Muslim armed actors17.

In the East of Sri Lanka, the variation in the dynamics of violence is dependent on four main elements: the demographic distribution among the different communities, the active political and military alliances, the subsequent levels of military control, and the target population. In that sense, the intensity and concentration levels of violence are constantly shifting, focused heavily in Batticaloa (Tamil majority) in the early stages, moving to Trincomalee (balanced demographics among Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims) in a second phase, and it seems that it is slowly concentrating more and more in Ampara, where there is a Muslim Majority.

To make it even more complicated, in the East there are other paramilitary forces operating, sometimes passively, sometimes actively, as military-wings of other Tamil political parties, daring to challenge LTTE hegemony. All of this notwithstanding, TMVP has participated in local elections having Pillayan appointed as EPC Chief-Minister and Padmini elected as the Batticaloa Mayor. It would seem that in the so often discussed process of decentralisation and devolution of power as a solution to the armed conflict, the only clear decentralised element is the use of violence.

17 See Jeyaraj (2008), where he reported the killing of TMVP leader in Kaathankudi, for already some violent clashes between muslim and tamil groups.
Colombia: Black Eagles versus ONG

BACRIM emerged in the vacuum after demobilisation of the AUC in an explosion of small armed actors. To give an idea of the level of atomisation: in the formerly heavy paramilitary region of Magdalena Medio, currently 48 new armed groups have been identified (Revista Cambio, 2008). The diversity within the BACRIM makes them hard to analyse, let alone combat. Consequently, this section will focus on two of the more known groups that have been mentioned before: the Black Eagles, in Norte de Santander department, and the New Generation Organisation (Organización Nueva Generación, ONG), in the Nariño department. The aim is to analyse how they relate to the former AUC and which continuities and differences exist in their use of violence.

In Norte de Santander, a department in the North of Colombia, on the border with Venezuela, the temporary relief from violence after the demobilisation of the local AUC Catabumbo Bloc (December 10, 2004) was short-lived. Former paramilitaries, either remobilised or never demobilised, started organising protection for landowners and drug traffickers against the FARC and ELN that were trying to reclaim territory. New groups, known as Red, Black and Golden Eagles, emerged and were later brought together under the common denominator of Black Eagles. Leadership of this network passed into the hands of ‘Omega’, a former member of the AUC Northern Bloc, who organised the diverse Eagle groups.

At the same time, the FARC and ELN guerrillas re-appeared and were able to regain parts of the territory formally under their control. After several confrontations with the Black Eagles, a temporary equilibrium was reached wherein the guerrilla dealt with coca cultivation, as they controlled most rural territory, and the Black Eagles controlled the trafficking routes and protected drug trafficking organisations. However, at the beginning of 2007, there was another re-adjustment. The success of the Black Eagles had attracted bigger players. Allegedly, the former commander of the AUC Central Bolivar Bloc, known as ‘Macaco’ (at the time in prison under the Justice and Peace Law, since early 2005), ordered the assassination of the Black Eagles’ leadership
from prison and took over. From that time, the Black Eagles appeared in most areas formerly controlled by the Central Bolivar Bloc (Semana, 2007). Norte de Santander remains the epicentre of the Black Eagles, but they have made themselves known even in Bogotá (El Espectador, 2008).

However, ‘Macaco’ had difficulties to maintain control over these groups from prison, while they were independently moving millions. When ‘Macaco’ became the first of the high AUC commanders to be extradited to the U.S. on May 7, 2008, control became impossible. Currently, the leadership and structure of the Black Eagles is unclear. There are several smaller groups that use the name of Black Eagles in different parts of the country (Magdalena, Nariño, Putumayo and some sectors of the coffee axis). It is however unclear if and how these groups relate to a supposed central command. In Norte de Santander there are rumours of expansion and recruitment to defy the guerrilla control over coca cultivating territory in order to gain control over the complete chain of cocaine production and trafficking. This would be a repetition of the days when the AUC Catatumbo Bloc took over the coca cultivation from the FARC and the ELN in 1999.

Practically on the other side of the country, the Nariño department in the South West, was the terrain of the AUC Southern Liberator Bloc. This Bloc was set up in 2000 as a ‘franchise’ of the Central Bolivar Bloc led by ‘Macaco’. The AUC (as in Norte de Santander) disputed this territory with the FARC and ELN, who had been well established in the region until paramilitary incursion in 2000. The Southern Liberator Bloc was led by Guillermo Pérez Alzate (a.k.a. Pablo Sevillano) who was a drug trafficker for the Norte del Valle cartel (one of the successors of the famous Cali cartel). ‘Sevillano’ had bought the Southern Liberator Bloc paramilitary ‘franchise’ to be able to demobilise within the Justice and Peace Law and prevent capture and extradition. On July 30, 2005, 689 Southern Liberator Bloc members demobilised, handing over 596 weapons (Garzón, 2005). Local sources say, however, that the Bloc kept their networks and a reduced numbers of combatants intact.

Reports on the appearance of the New Generation Organization (Organización Nueva Generación, ONG) started to emerge early 2006. Witnesses report that in early 2007 members were sighted in mountain municipalities wearing uniforms and armbands. Most ONG violence is associated with the drug trade. Nevertheless, the ONG is apparently establishing structures and a modus operandi similar to those of their AUC predecessors. MAPP/OAS affirms that ONG is recruiting ex-combatants of the Southern Liberator Bloc (2007). Use of violence
included large counter-insurgency operations; however, this does not rule out that the FARC and the ONG occasionally cooperate on drugs.

Another group active in the region, Los Rastrojos, work together with ONG. Los Rastrojos are the armed-wing of a fraction of the former Norte del Valle Cartel (the partial heirs of the Cali Cartel), led by Wilber Varela (alias Jabón). This group moved into the Nariño territory from the Valle Department after the demobilisation of the Southern Liberators Bloc to expand their base. Deeply embedded in civilian population, they use networks established by Southern Liberators Bloc, dress in plain clothes and melt into communities.

Black Eagles seem to want to stress the relations with the former AUC to claim their counter-insurgency heritage and even the name (presenting themselves sometimes as the Black Eagles Bloc of the AUC). Although the ONG does not make this public effort, they do resemble the AUC operations and structure more, and their name (New Generation) also seems to suggest a continuity. Black Eagles are considered more criminal, less militarily organised and usually dress in civilian clothes. They have expansionist ambitions, but their presence is disperse and their structure and links among groups in different regions is unclear. Black Eagles are sometimes used by bigger players as drug armies. ONG, on the other hand, is military organisation, wears military uniforms and is aimed at local territorial control, fairly autonomous and organised. The ONG is generally considered an example of paramilitary continuity. The ONG follow the AUC model, controlling territory, population, local elites, drug routes, departure points and urban centres. Black Eagles follow the cartel model: primarily clandestine, seeking to fit in with urban middle classes and handling legitimate businesses, while subcontracting violence, transportation and distribution (ICG, 2007).

When comparing the BACRIM to their AUC predecessor, or comparing different BACRIM, the similarities are about as abundant as the differences. These are not simply un-demobilised or remobilised paramilitary by another name (90% of demobilised in Norte de Santander remain demobilised) (Semana, 2007), nor are they simple criminal bands. These are an amalgam of small groups that rose in the vacuum that the paramilitary demobilisation left. They have certain traits of and links to the former paramilitaries and have become increasingly organised. Better trained, with political aspirations, but without a counter-insurgency message, since they work together with FARC, when needed, and they kept the social cleansing factors as a means of imposing their morality.

The real differences lie elsewhere. Some context factors have not changed: the conflict with FARC and ELN continues and the drug trade
has not been controlled. However, some parameters are different: no complicity of state institutions. Government is no longer friends with paramilitary and paramilitary are no longer friends with government. BARCIM will be fighting the state and the FARC, but for lack of ideology, alliances are changeable, where they can strike deals with the state or guerrilla, they will.

The reaction of the state has been different: it has no intention of giving criminal bands any political legitimacy. Aware that the emergence of new groups can undermine AUC demobilisation and the Justice and Peace Process, President Uribe has assigned high priority to fighting them. The government has, however, used tactics more akin to the battle against the drug cartels than the counter-insurgency operations used against the guerrillas and, to a lesser degree, against the paramilitary. New police stations were built and forces expanded in municipalities identified as risk-areas.

While government forces have dealt several blows to the new groups and criminal organisations in Nariño, an International Crisis Group Report (2007) suggest that, in some areas, the illegal groups had the support or complicity of members of the security forces. Simultaneously, there has been a military response, with the army deploying new units to regions with a heavy presence of new groups and criminal organisations. Although traditional military operations do not work, because of invisibility, atomisation and infiltration, other areas of operations, such as intelligence may be more successful.

**Conclusion**

Clearly there is a need to further explore the processes here presented with an exhaustive fieldwork to consolidate the empirical data available. What is more, the cases seem to pose serious challenges to established views on conflict, the analysis of which may potentially contribute to new theoretical breakthroughs or to the refinement of current perspectives on collective action and political practices. Let us here merely suggest some of those potentialities.

The first crucial factor that comes to light (as already suggested in the introduction) is the consolidation of institutionalised peace processes as fertile grounds for the emergence of new actors and the reinvention of violence. Such a situation poses an enormous dilemma to practitioners of conflict resolution, while placing established peace processes as a nodal point in the continuation of violence, simultaneously setting the conditions of its transformation.
In addition, both phenomena directly expose the weakness or simplicity of the division between conflict and post-conflict scenarios, making a clear case for the fluidity between the two and the inadequacy of structuring interventions within such a dichotomy. Furthermore, other dichotomies such as that of greed versus grievances, or labels such as ethnic and political conflict, in the hope of grasping the ‘nature’ of the struggle, only contribute to neglecting the complexity of those violent processes. The Black Eagles in Colombia, with their invested interest in drug trafficking but nevertheless engaged in social control, imposing behaviour and seeking public recognition; cannot be classified as merely criminal, nor political. In that same line of thought, the emergence of TMVP in Sri Lanka seriously questions the classical perception of the conflict through ethnic lines with the Sinhala majority on the one side and the Tamil minority on the other. It is similarly unsustainable to claim either collective grievances or private interests of some as the sole or even main driving force behind the dynamics of conflict.

These ruptures with traditional notions of conflict analysis, brings us to an important conceptual distinction that has been implicit all along this comparative attempt. The only way in which we can even consider making a comparison between emergent armed actors in Sri Lanka and Colombia is by transcending those dichotomies through the analytical disarticulation of civil war violence from civil war itself (Kalyvas, 2006). This should not be understood, however, as the denial of contextual differences, but as the recognition of certain logics in the uses of violence based on key dynamic elements such as levels of control, collaboration, alliances, interests, leadership and mobilisation strategies.

Both the Black Eagles and the TMVP express continuity in the use of violence, by using similar methods regarding their legitimisation, recruitment, funding and military strategies; but they also express a transformation in the conflict, by redirecting their methods towards a renewed target and by establishing new, previously unlikely, alliances. The already questionable clarity of the dynamics of conflict, become in both cases even less visible and more unpredictable, creating an even more volatile environment in a constantly shifting enemy-friend divide.

Having said that, it is important to signal the fact that whereas in Sri Lanka one can at least try to establish some communication with leading figures that retain some level of control over the movement’s cadres, in Colombia, there are no visible leaders whatsoever, making it potentially less feasible to control and less likely for them to collectively re-enter civilian life.
References


KARIKALAN (2004): «Karuna’s accusations are cover up for Guilt and betrayal», TamilNet, March 7.


During ten days in July 2008, around fifty students and a dozen professors from twelve different European universities met at the University of Coimbra for the Fifth Intensive Seminar of the European Doctorate Enhancement Programme on Peace and Conflict (EDEN) and discussed the new dimensions of peace and security studies. Their contributions reflect the research agendas of a new generation, who continue to address enduring themes in peace and conflict studies, but whose formative influences are those of a complex post Cold War world.