Wolfgang Bosswick, Charles Husband

Comparative European Research in Migration, Diversity and Identities

Humanitarian Net
Thematic Network on Humanitarian Development Studies
Comparative European Research in Migration, Diversity and Identities
Comparative European Research in Migration, Diversity and Identities

2005
University of Deusto
Bilbao
Contents

Preface
Wolfgang Bosswick .......................................................... 9

I. Diasporic Identities
Towards a Post-Ethnic Europe
Marco Martiniello, University of Liège ........................................ 13

Diaspora: An Overview of a Concept at the Crossroad of Nation-State and
Transnationalism
William Berthomiere, University of Poitiers ................................. 25

Diaspora, Spatiality, Identities
Emmanuel Ma Mung, University of Poitier ................................. 33

Transnational Social Spaces
Gaby Straßburger, University of Applied Sciences, Berlin ............ 49

II. Migration and Policy
Problems of Cohesion? Multiculturalism and Migrants’ Claims-Making for
Group Demands in Britain and the Netherlands
Paul Statham, University of Leeds
Ruud Koopmans, Free University of Amsterdam .......................... 69

National Modes of Immigrant Integration
Friedrich Heckmann, University of Bamberg ............................... 99

Religion and Migration
Enzo Pace, University of Padova ............................................. 113
Doing Good By Stealth, Whilst Flirting With Racism. Some Contradictory Dynamics of British Multiculturalism
Charles Husband, University of Bradford .......................... 125

III. Methods
On Methods
Matti Similä, University of Helsinki .................................. 153

Official data on migration
Wolfgang Boswick, University of Bamberg .......................... 167
Preface

Wolfgang Bosswick

This volume presents a selection of lectures held at a series of European Summer School on Migration, Diversity and Identities. The selection out of 55 lectures given at the four annual European Summer Schools was made by focusing on three major aspects for comparative research on a European level: Firstly, some theoretical and conceptual discussion on migration, diversity and identities, themes which gave the programme its very name. Secondly, on the relation between migration processes, their consequences, and the sphere of politics and policy making. Finally, — since the programme also intended to support young researchers for their PhD project — two papers on methodological problems which emerge when doing comparative research on migration at a European level.

The European Summer School on Migration, Diversity and Identities programme has been developed as part of a doctoral programme by the group Migration, Multiculturality and Ethnic Conflict within the Thematic Network Humanitarian Development Studies, HumanitarianNet. The group was formed in 1996 in London and carried out amongst its first activities a survey on existing courses and units on migration and integration among 48 universities participating in the network. Based on the data generated, the group developed modules for European Summer Schools for PhD students doing their PhD research in the field of migration or integration of migrants. The participation in two sequenced Summer Schools of the programme is an obligatory part of a European Doctoral Programme on Migration, Diversity and Identities which aims to encourage a European exposure of PhD students and to support networking among the young researchers on the European level. The European Doctoral Programme was developed by the same migration group within HumanitarianNet in the context of the Bologna process and the TUNING project of the EU Commission according to the recommendations of the European Conference of University Rectors.
During the first cycle of European Summer Schools (Bilbao/E 2001, Bradford/UK 2002, Bamberg/D 2003, Helsinki/FI 2004), a total of 84 PhD students from 15 European countries attended to the programme, resulting in 128 participations for the ten days’ Intensive Programmes of the Summer Schools. The next cycle will start in September 2005 at the University of Padova, Italy.

When looking back to the experiences from the four years of Summer Schools, a clear development became visible: It seems that as a result of the cooperation of the institutions participating in the programme, which has been ongoing since 1997, each cohort of young researchers was more able to anticipate and understand the differences among academic styles and discourses across Europe, enabling them to communicate effectively on a professional level. Interpersonal conflicts and fundamental communication problems which had been a well known symptom of the early phase of “European exposure” in academia, were minimal although the programme and its tasks were designed to be quite demanding. The Summer Schools aimed to introduce young researchers to the challenges of collaborating in an interdisciplinary and multinational team in order to develop a common research agenda. Very concrete tasks were set up that required intensive cooperation in developing a research proposal within a prescribed format. As a result, the young participants developed very positive group dynamics. The research cohort-building ambitions of the programme were substantially realised. As one result from the programme, a group of 50 former Summer School participants took the initiative to found an international association HERMES with the goal of maintaining and strengthening the networking among young researchers on migration after finishing the PhD and to develop own projects and activities.

We want to thank the EU Commission on Education and Culture, the EU Research Commission and several national funders, notably the Finnish Ministry of Higher Education, for making this programme possible. We are convinced that our activities were able to contribute to the building of Europe also as a sphere of shared discourses, mutual recognition of traditions and peculiarities, and intense professional cooperation across the old boundaries visible within academia. The questions of migration, integration of migrants and social cohesion are highly relevant for today’s European societies. Tackling them requires transcending not only national, but also intellectual boundaries, and serious research in this field is not only an urgent need for an informed policy, but also a contribution to building Europe as an open and integrated social reality.
I

Diasporic Identities
Europe, no matter how it is defined —either as the European Union or as another, broader Europe— embraces a wide variety of ethnocultural and national affiliations and identities. This diversity, furthermore, is not going to disappear under the pressures of globalization. We have embarked on a process of “the diversification of diversity”, to use David Hollinger’s expression (Hollinger, 1995).

In the EU, the diversification of diversity has three main aspects. First, the process of European enlargement will increase the diversity of national identities within the EU. Second, in several member states, subnational political mobilizations promote ethno-regional identities as groups demand recognition as national minorities or as ethnic groups, or even sometimes full independence: we could mention the Basque and Catalan cases in Spain (Conversi, 1997), the Corsican and Breton cases in France (Simon, 1999), the historical ethno-linguistic divide in Belgium (Martiniello, 1997 p.287-302), or the rise of the Northern League in Italy (D’Amato and Schieder, p.273-86). Third, Europe is and will remain a continent of immigration (Thränhardt, 1996). Migrants come from all over the world, following new patterns of migration. Some of them settle and culturally adapt to their new environment, whilst simultaneously enriching the local culture and the variety of ethno-cultural identities. Therefore Europe is, like any human society, de facto multicultural, a culturally diversified society in which many collective identities co-exist. The myth of monoculture is daily contradicted by the sociological evolution of European societies.

Europe also faces a fundamental problem, at least for those who suffer because of it, namely, the growing social, economic and political inequality between states, between regions and cities within states, and between individuals and groups. Economic, social and political deprivation is on the increase in many European cities together with a
rise in unemployment, homelessness, petty urban crime, the return of some diseases that had disappeared and so on. Two processes seem to be simultaneously at work. First, exclusion/inclusion processes account for the appearance of a distinct society outside the mainstream: conservative moralists stress the distinctive features (cultural, psychological etc.) of this “permanent European underclass”, and progressive thinkers prefer to stress the macro-economic and social forces that lead to the formation of this category of excluded pseudo-citizens. Second, there is an observable recomposition of inequality patterns within the mainstream society. Global capitalism has been reshaping the class structure through flexibility, precarious and badly paid jobs and so on. Not all citizens are equally “in”: the difference between Bill Gates and the part-time worker at McDonald's is more than evident, even though both are part of the “included” as opposed to the “excluded”.

It is not satisfactory to conceive of these two statements —Europe is de facto, and will remain, a multicultural continent; and European society is de facto socially, economically and politically unequal— as distinct. The process of the diversification of European diversity, in terms of cultures and identities, and the process of the reconstruction of social, economic and political inequality are closely connected in several ways. First, there is a simultaneous awareness that the two myths on which most European societies have been built —the myth of monoculture and homogeneity on the one hand, and the myth of an egalitarian society on the other— are precisely that: myths, and not realistic descriptions of social dynamics. Second, economic, social and political inequality and ethno-cultural diversification overlap in complex ways. Not all ethno-cultural and religious identities are equally recognized socially and politically; some are considered to be legitimate while others are not. For example, in the Belgian federal state, the Flemish and Walloon identities are fully legitimate and recognized by the constitution while immigrant ethnic identities are not; Catholicism is funded by the state while Islam, though officially recognized in Belgium, is not equally funded. Third, ethnicization and racism are central to any explanation of an individual's economic position; bearers of “illegitimate” identities are more easily excluded from the labour market, an exclusion that can in turn reinforce their specific identity.

Therefore, the question arises: how does Europe, in this case the European Union, deal with its de facto multicultural, multireligious, multi-ethnic character while simultaneously reasserting its democratic obligations and attending to growing social and economic inequality and exclusion? In other words, how does it address the question of multicultural European citizenship? In this article I look specifically at
one dimension of the problem, namely, what type of ethnic and post-ethnic identities are being created, reproduced and asserted in the EU, and how they are linked to ideas about citizenship and belonging in a new type of political society that could be called, after Antje Wiener, a “non-state” (Wiener, 1998). European identity-building and European citizenship-building are closely connected, and we have to look at both processes simultaneously to make sense of current developments.

Even though I do not deal extensively with EU citizenship *stricto sensu*, my point of departure is a critical view of the dominant conceptions of European culture and identity on the one hand, and of EU citizenship on the other. More precisely, dominant ideas about what European culture and European identity are and should be are rooted in a somewhat mystified version of the European past, resulting in the potential exclusion from full European belonging of many non-EU citizens, as well as many EU citizens with an ethnic or racial minority background. Furthermore, EU citizenship as it is legally defined in the Amsterdam Treaty, in which these common ideas of European culture and identity are embraced, has a similar exclusionary effect. Institutional visions of European multiculturalism that inform and are simultaneously informed by ideas of European culture, identity and citizenship can actually be seen as evidence of widespread concern over the optimal degree of cultural and identificational diversity that not only is acceptable in an EU context, but that defines the core of a European model based on the membership of states.

However, there is an important gap between institutional visions of European multiculturalism and the *de facto* multiculturalism, identity construction and cultural construction that can often be observed in urban Europe. Individuals and groups that consider themselves deeply European (although they may embrace other identities as well), that locate their social activity in Europe, are not recognised as “real” European citizens because of their alleged cultural non-conformity with a European essence mainly defined with reference to the past. Simply stated, whereas Europe is *de facto* increasingly multicultural and multi-identificational, institutional visions of multiculturalism, identity and culture in Europe remain restricted to a past that supposedly forged the

---

national identities and cultures of the member states. European institutional multiculturalism rests on an essentialist notion of culture and identity that defines, to a significant degree, the opportunities for incorporation within European citizenship. No satisfactory answer is given at the European level to the question of how to combine a quest for social and political unity, on the one hand, with *de facto* cultural and identificational diversity on the other.

The problem is not typically European of course. The United States, for example, has long faced a similar, fundamental problem. In the extensive American literature on the subject, the normative work by historian David Hollinger on a “post-ethnic America” deserves special consideration. Can his vision help us to envision a “post-ethnic Europe” that could address more satisfactorily the problems presented above?

**European culture, identity and citizenship: a critical view**

Debates about EU citizenship have taken on greater political urgency as old debates on European identity and culture have been re-emerging. One could say that the introduction of the notion of EU citizenship has occurred at the same time as attempts to build a European culture, and to promote a European identity based on it, have intensified.

Two major options can be distinguished in this process of European “culturalization”: the traditionalist option and the modernist option (Ferry, 1990 p.80-91). According to the traditionalist, or fundamentalist, option, “European culture” is a given, a *fait accompli* on the basis of which a European “community of destiny” should develop. The idea of an intangible, ancestral “European culture”, based on a common Judeo-Christian and humanist experience, being the bedrock of a “European spirit” has been current for a long time. In his call for perpetual peace written at the turn of the seventeenth century, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre stated that, as opposed to Asia or Africa, Europe was “a real society with its religion, its manners, its customs and its laws, from which its peoples cannot deviate without causing difficulties”.2 In 1924 Paul Valéry wrote that “all races and all lands that have successively been romanized, Christianized and submitted, as far as the spirit is concerned, to the

---

2 “… une société réelle qui a sa religion, ses moeurs, ses coutumes et ses lois, dont aucun des peuples qui la composent ne peut s’écarter sans causer aussitôt des troubles” (Hésiode *et al.*, *Écrits sur l’Europe* (Paris: Seghers 1963), 107).
discipline of the Greeks, are absolutely European”.$^3$ In Valéry’s mind, *homo europaeus* could be characterized by a European spirit that had evolved over the ages from Roman, Greek and Christian heritages. Even today, several European apologists attempt to mobilize a return to this heritage for the foundation of a “European culture”, a European identity and consequently a European “community for destiny”. For Pierre-Yves Monette, for example, the fundamental core of the European civilization:

… the European specificity, is made up of all that we have in common: our cultural Judeo-Christian foundation, our marked taste for liberty, justice and democracy … our conception of the role of the woman that stands in complete opposition to that of a number of other civilizations, our spirit of openness and tolerance that is not the extreme fundamentalism cultivated by some other peoples …$^4$

This passage exemplifies a purely essentialist approach to European culture and identity. It asserts that it is possible to identify a nucleus of typical European cultural elements that characterizes the “European cultural civilization” on which tomorrow’s Europe should be built, and which should define the frontiers of “Europeanity”, the frontiers of European identity.$^5$

According to the modernist, or constructivist, option, a major objective of politics and policies is the creation of a common European cultural and identificational space. From this point of view, the cultural construction of Europe should follow the same pattern as the economic construction, and should be seen as the result of conscious political action in various fields, including multilingualism, schooling and higher education, media, publishing and so on (Domenach, 1990). Long neglected, the Europe of schools and universities has developed considerably since the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty; exchange programmes for students, researchers and academics —the Erasmus, Socrates, Human Capital and Mobility, and Marie Curie Fellowships, for example— have been increasingly successful, even

---

$^3$ Ibid., 99:“… toute race et toute terre qui a été successivement romanisée, christianisée et soumise, quant à l’esprit, à la discipline des Grecs, est absolument européenne”.

$^4$ “… la spécificité européenne s’explique par tout ce qu’il nous est commun: nos fondements culturels judéo-chrétiens, notre goût prononcé pour la liberté, la justice et la démocratie … notre concepton du role de la femme qui est en opposition complète avec celle de nombreuses autres civilisations, notre esprit d’ouverture et de tolérance qui n’est pas l’intégrisme cultivé par certains peoples …” (P-Y Monette, *Les États-Unis d’Europe* (Beauvechain: Nauwelaerts/Brussels: Bruylant 1991), 2w85)

$^5$ Other versions of the traditionalist approach to European culture can be found in the work of Hélène Ahrweiler (1993 p.30-45) or John Hale (1993 p.46-63).
though they face numerous financial, administrative and other problems. The harmonization of European university curricula, which is gradually being achieved, will have an impact on the European culture of higher education and perhaps, in the long term, on European identity itself.

These two options for the “culturalization” of Europe are not mutually exclusive. They complement each other in one significant outcome: the exclusion from “Europeanity” of those citizens living in Europe who supposedly come from non-Judeo-Christian civilizations, such as the immigrant-origin populations that come from countries where Islam is the principal religion. To the extent that EU citizenship is theoretically granted on the basis of belonging to one of the EU member states, and on the basis of belonging to the European culture and identity that is being constructed, it is possible to foresee the exclusion not only of numerous immigrants from the South and the East of the world already living in Europe, but also of those future migrants who will arrive in Europe as asylum-seekers or under the provisions of family reunification. Furthermore, the idea that one must be a EU citizen and primarily “culturally” European to participate in Europe’s relative economic well-being seems to be gathering steam; this could lead to an assertion of a sort of ethno-racial conception of European society that would account for all the exclusionary practices aimed at non-members of that society, especially those from poorer countries.

However, the EU and most of its member states are de facto increasingly multi-ethnic, multicultural and multiracial. The various minorities living in the member states —whose presence is a consequence of colonialism, labour migrations and other patterns of human mobility— are a living challenge to the mythic vision of an ethnically, racially and culturally relatively homogeneous Europe, a vision of Europe’s future that, to be fair, is not the only one on offer. In urban Europe, ethnic segregation and discrimination are a reality in the labour market, in the educational system, in housing and so on, even though the situation generally compares favourably to that in the United States.

But this is counterbalanced by multicultural practices. European urban youth often celebrate what I call a “soft” multiculturalism in their modes of consumption (Martiniello, 1997 p.66). They can be open to the world, to diversity, to mélange, and attracted by cosmopolitan identities. To them, old national identities can seem obsolete alongside the possibility of multidimensional identities and multiple affiliations. Sometimes, however, European youth assert very strict and exclusive ethno-national identities, not only in social life but also in politics: Haider, Le Pen and the Vlaams Blok are supported by young
people as well as their elders. It is outside the scope of this discussion to attempt a full explanation of this apparent paradox and, indeed, it would be overly simplistic to divide European youth into two groups, a cosmopolitan one and a nationalistic or racist one. It is nevertheless clear that access to good educational, cultural, economic and social resources is often favourable to the assertion of a cosmopolitan identity, whereas social dislocation, a poor education and economic marginality, combined with the collapse of overarching ideologies, like the decline of Communism, explain to some degree and in some cases the emergence of restrictive ethno-national identities among groups of urban youth. But, in any case, the problem of combining social and political unity with cultural and identificational diversity remains unsolved at the European level. Does the post-ethnic project have any relevance for Europe?

The post-ethnic United States

In a book published in 1995, expanding on the insights of an article published earlier, the American historian David Hollinger develops a normative approach—the post-ethnic perspective—based on a comprehensive analysis of the current state of ethnic and race relations in the United States in the 1990’s. He advocates the emergence of a “post-ethnic America” that would be based on the positive aspects of multiculturalism and rid itself of the negative dimensions.

Hollinger states that the ideology of the American nation is historically non-ethnic. The US Constitution is clearly universalistic, and this universalism pervades much of contemporary political discourse. In theory, citizenship rights are granted to those individuals who sign a contract with the United States, regardless of their skin colour and ethnic origin. However, it is well known that ethnicity and race have played a central role in American history, and that each individual, each US citizen, is quasi-automatically classified as belonging to one of the ethnic and racial groups that have shaped American society. This process of ethno-racial classification reflects the state of the power relations between the various groups. For example, the individual who can trace both Irish and African ancestry will probably be classified as African American since Irish Americans are powerful enough to control the borders of their group and to deny access to a non-white person.

6 Hollinger, Postethnic America; for the earlier article, see D.A. Hollinger, “Postethnic America”, Contention, vol. 2, no. 1, 1992 79-96
It is the history of ethnicity and race that explains the current configuration of American society, described by Hollinger as an ethno-racial pentagon. In his view, the United States is composed of five ethno-racial blocs that live side by side, ignoring each other and neglecting the poor in their midst: the European-American bloc, the Asian-American bloc, the African-American bloc, the Hispanic bloc and the Native-American bloc. The frontiers between these blocs are very rigid. Unlike radical opponents of any form of multiculturalism, such as Arthur Schlesinger (Schlesinger, 1992), Hollinger does not argue that the fragmentation of the United States is the result of multiculturalism, even though a multicultural ideology based on toleration does not in his view really help in building bridges between ethno-racial blocs. The fragmentation is the result of a specific historical development as well as other economic and social causes.

According to Hollinger, the United States should re-assert its universalist aspirations while simultaneously rejecting an ethnic conception of history according to which each individual is identified with an ethnic or racial group. This means reaching beyond conventional liberal multiculturalism, which is often based on pluralism. The idea that the social world is divided into distinct cultures between which clear frontiers exist is taken for granted, even by an author like Will Kymlicka, whose contribution to the international debate on citizenship and multiculturalism has been extremely positive (Kymlica, 1995). Similarly, the idea that each individual needs one—and only one—culture and identity to give his or her life meaning is rarely questioned. Hollinger draws inspiration from a more cosmopolitan stream of multiculturalism, at the core of which is the idea of freely chosen identities, a multiplicity of identities and a flexibility of cultural frontiers.

In other words, there is a growing tension between pluralist multiculturalism and cosmopolitan multiculturalism (Waldron, 1992 p. 751-93). The former respects only inherited frontiers and the principle according to which each individual must be located in one and only one ethno-racial group. These groups, accordingly, must be protected and preserved as such. The latter is wary of traditional identities. It favours freely chosen and multiple affiliations, and stresses the dynamism of group—and identity—formation.

Hollinger’s post-ethnic perspective rests on these principles. It rejects ethnic and racial ascriptions in favour of free choice. It promotes solidarity between individuals with different backgrounds. And, finally, it leaves the door open for the inclusion of new collective identities within the nation. A post-ethnic United States would be a society in which a black writer could claim both an African and an Irish heritage without provoking
general hilarity. It would also be a society in which the convention according to which a white woman can give birth to a black child but a black woman cannot give birth to a white child would be inconceivable.

As opposed to the famous pluralist Horace Kallen (Kallen, 1915), who considered that ethno-racial identities were fixed forever since one cannot choose one’s ancestors, Hollinger writes: “Let individuals affiliate or disaffiliate with others of shared descent or differing descent as they choose (Hollinger, 1995 p.84).” In other words, a post-ethnic society would be one in which the opportunity to express one’s ethnic options would be equally distributed among all individuals (Waters, 1990), something that is definitely not the case today.

Hollinger’s perspective, Hollinger’s dream —which I have only sketched here— is very exciting vis-à-vis the American context, despite the fact that, in a recent article, the author regrets that the “postethnic vocabulary” remains marginal (Hollinger, 1998 p. 85-99). But is it useful for imagining the future of a democratic and multicultural Europe? Or is it specific to the United States?

How About a Post-Ethnic Europe?

By encouraging freely chosen identities and rejecting ascribed and imposed identities, the post-ethnic perspective clearly privileges individual autonomy and rejects imposed community strictures. In today’s Europe, the freedom of individuals to choose freely their identities is far from being recognized, despite the fact that this runs counter to the alleged European ideal. Citizens of member states of the European Union have no choice: they are automatically granted citizenship of the EU precisely because they are citizens of one of those states. Some individuals see this process as an attempt to assign to them a European identity, sometimes against their will. Others embrace a European identity but have no direct access to it because they do not belong to one of the member states and because they are considered to be culturally unsuited. Trying to force individuals to become Europeans is a good way to reinforce restrictive national identities. Refusing access to European citizenship is a good way to push people into other restrictive identities. This is exactly what can be observed throughout Europe: a strengthening of restrictive national identities in the case of some majority groups, and the assertion of restrictive cultural identities in the case of some minority groups. In both cases, the dark side of ethnicity and national identity is being promoted, and this is a problem for a democratic Europe. We cannot compare the
divisions between the five ethno-racial blocs in the United States with the divisions between the fifteen present member states of the EU: furthermore, in the European context, quasi-ghettoized ethno-national identities also must be taken into account. In this context, the post-ethnic perspective may offer an interesting way out of the logic of separation and fragmentation sometimes at work in Europe.

The post-ethnic perspective also argues for a balance between old identities and new ones, between old communities and new ones. In Europe this would translate into a balance between old national identities and new supranational ones. A flexible and open European identity does not mean the end of older national identities. Any project for creating a new European identity that did not respect the individual’s right to choose to keep her or his national identity would be bound to face widespread hostility.

As for solidarity between individuals with different ethnic and racial backgrounds —at the core of the post-ethnic perspective— this would also be essential in the Europe context. The European space embraces people with various ethnic, racial, economic, cultural and religious backgrounds. While the idea of solidarity and co-operation between nations is at the core of the European project, solidarity between individuals at a European supranational level has been neglected. Within member states of the EU the idea of solidarity between individuals has historically been at the heart of the various welfare-state regimes. The idea that society at large should compensate for an individual’s permanent or temporary inability to satisfy her or his needs —due to loss of job, health problems, accident, physical or mental handicap and so on— has been generally accepted. Furthermore, the idea that social and economic inequality should be controlled through a process of wealth redistribution managed by the state has also been taken for granted. Today, the various national welfare-state regimes are either being gradually dismantled, according to some observers, or simply being modernized, according to others. In any case, very little has so far been done to construct a European welfare state based on European solidarity between all individuals living in Europe whatever their national or ethnic background. The question then arises: without this solidarity that could lay the foundation for European social citizenship, are not the ideas of a European public sphere and an active European citizenship condemned to remain pure fiction?

Despite the immense and well-known differences between European societies and the United States, one problem is evident on both sides of the Atlantic: how to combine social and political unity, on the one hand, and ethno-cultural and identificational diversity, on the other. It
is not my intention here to look for an ad hoc solution to a European problem in the American literature. But the post-ethnic perspective is arguably a rich and normative approach that might help us to envision a future democratic, multicultural and open Europe. I am convinced that, in order to avoid other Kosovos and Bosnias in tomorrow’s enlarged European Union, this kind of reflection is not at all simply an intellectual exercise but a step towards a long-term, positive solution to the problems of democracy in Europe.

This paper provided by the author is based on an earlier publication. The original version has been published as:
“Towards a post-ethnic Europe”

References

D’AMATO, Gianni and SCHIEDER, Siegfried “Italy’s Northern League: between ethnic citizenship and a federal state”, in WICKER (ed.), 273-86.
KALLEN, H. “Democracy versus the melting-pot”. The Nation, 18-19 February 1915


The term diaspora finds its roots in the Greek language and is based on a translation of the Hebrew word, Galut. Based on speiro (to sow) and the preposition dia (over), in the Ancient Greece, the word referred to migration and colonisation. In Hebrew, “the term initially referred to the setting of colonies of Jews outside Palestine after the Babylonian exile and has assumed a more general connotation of people settled away from their ancestral homelands” (Shuval, 2003).

In social sciences, the term diasporas is recent. Before the 80’s, there are only few quotations of this concept. It was due to the fact, as Judith Shuval (2002) underlined, that “before the 1960’s, immigrant groups were generally expected to shed their ethnic identity and assimilate to local norms. Groups that were thought unable to do this, weren’t admitted, eg. Chinese to Canada, non-Whites to Australia”.

During the 70’s, when assimilation theory and other theories based on the same meaning of integration models demonstrated their fallibility, the notion of diaspora occurred progressively to describe migrants groups: migrants maintaining their ethnic tradition, a strong feeling of collectiveness (Bruneau, 1995; Dorai et al., 1998; Shuval, 2003). So, it is only during the 80’s that the concept of diaspora has known a period of expansion. But, quickly, some authors as such Alain Medam (1993) or James Clifford (1994) expressed their disinterest in the concept because in more and more researches the concept was quoted just for to describe phenomena characterized only by the dispersion of a population originated from one nation-state in several “host countries”. And these authors called for more theorization.

The key question for the Academics was to explore the notion of diaspora to find those specific elements that explained the need to refer to this notion rather than any other concepts of social sciences. To summarize this period, the question was: does there exist a “di[a]s-
position”, such a specific spatial and social organisation that characterizes and differentiates the migrant groups, described under this denomination of diaspora, from the other social and spatial “disposition”, produced by the other migrants groups and studied before.

A need to theorisation

The first theory of diaspora appeared, according to Gabriel Sheffer, with the work of Amstrong in his paper: “Mobilized and proletarian diasporas” published in the American Political Sciences Review in 1976 (Dorai et al., 1998). Gabriel Sheffer, himself, in his book “Modern Diasporas in International Politics” (published in 1986) wrote that it is a mistake to maintain the concept of diaspora only for the Jewish people because many others have existed before (such as Nabatheans, Phenicians or Assyrians). And, also, because during the second half of the XIXth Century some groups with many similarities with the Jewish diaspora appear in Europe, such as the Greek diaspora or the Chinese. In his point of view, three criteria could be proposed for a definition:

1. the maintenance and the development of a own collective identity in the “diasporised people”;
2. the existence of an internal organisation distinct from those existing in the country of origin or in the host country;
3. Significative contacts with the Homeland: real contacts (ie. Travel remittances) or symbolic contacts as in the sentence: “the next year at Jerusalem” at the end of the prayer for Pessah (Easter).

More recently, Robin Cohen (1997a) in his book Global diasporas: an introduction continued to underline the lack of theorization in the publication about diasporas and suggest that the “Jewish archetypal” could be a base for reflection even if it couldn’t be a transposable model. William Safran, one of the first authors to be published in the review Diaspora edited by Kachig Tololyan, suggests that in his view the term diaspora could be consider as a “metaphoric designation” and could apply to various populations (expatriates, political refugees...). In his essays (1991 & 1999), Safran defines the diasporas as follows: expatriate minority communities:

1. that are dispersed from a original “center” to at least two “peripheral” places;
2. that maintain a “memory”, vision or myth about their original homeland;
3. that “believe they are not —and perhaps cannot be— fully accepted by their host country”;
4. that see the ancestral home as a place of eventual return when the time is right;
5. that are committed to the maintenance or restoration of this homeland, and;
6. of which the group’s consciousness and solidarity are “importantly defined” by this continuing relationships with the homeland.

So, during the 90’s, many typologies were proposed to understand and to describe the diasporas. For example, Alain Medam (1993) proposed a typology based on the degree of cohesiveness and the dynamism of the diasporic organization. In this perspective, Medam differentiates “crystallised diasporas” and “fluid diasporas”. In the former type, he presents some dynamic diasporas characterised by the efficiency of their transnational networks; as, for example, the Chinese diaspora. For another specialist of this question, Michel Bruneau (1995), the typology must be based on the diasporic organisation. He defined three major types of diasporas:

1. the entrepreuneurial diasporas (ie. Chinese or Libanese)
2. the religious diasporas (ie. Jews or Greeks)
3. and the politic diasporas (ie. Palestinians, Tibetans).

By mentioning Palestinians and Tibetans, authors as Gabriel Sheffer have introduced clearly the political dimension which was under-represented in the diaspora literature. Seven years after the publication of his book, Gabriel Sheffer (1993) proposed to operate a distinction between diasporas: those without State of origin, called stateless diasporas (ex. Palestinians) and those with a State of origin, defined as state-based diaspora. This typology allows the description of the fluidity of the forms of organization in ethnic groups along their history: as for the Jews who were state-based, stateless and, since 1948, state-based. Robin Cohen (1997a), in “response” at this territorial point of view proposed a typology set up on some empirical observations with five types:

1. Victim diasporas (ie. Africans and Armenians);
2. Labour diasporas (ie. Indians);
3. Imperial diasporas (ie. British);
4. The trade diasporas (ie. Chinese, Lebanese);
5. And the Cultural diasporas; with the Caribbean case.
This last type of diaspora—the cultural diaspora—with the Caribbean case became one of the most stimulating and productive type. It comes from the fact that most of the actors of this group, most of the leaders were (and still tend to be) intellectuals, writers, very active in the public sphere. The diaspora discourse, in its cultural dimension, offered a large place to the notion of hybridity, used by post-modernist authors to denote the evolution of new social dynamics as mixed cultures. The French Caribbean is a good example of the emergence of the question of hybridity (Chivallon, 1997). Books written by Edouard Glissant present clear reference to rhizome identity (concept developed by Gilles Deleuze, notably in his book *Mille plateaux* co-edited with Felix Guattari, 1980). In this field, conceptual researches are developed also with reference to “travelling cultures” theorised by James Clifford (1994) and found a substantial added value in the debate about the Black diaspora and in the work of Paul Gilroy. Cohen (1997a) summarised this current by quoting that in this perspective: “diasporas are positioned somewhere between “nations-states” and “travelling cultures” in that they involve dwelling in a nation-state in a physical sense, but travelling in an astral or spiritual sense that falls outside the nation-state’s space/time zone.

So, on one hand, we face with this kind of intellectual position a very different space of thoughts in comparison with the problematic described previously. The nation-state, as Paul Gilroy (1994) described, is the institutional means to terminate diaspora dispersal: on one side, through the assimilation and, on the other side, through return. On the other hand, we are also at a converging point because all these researches lead to the same questions about the connection between nation-states and diasporas.

Globally, all this activity and effort of conceptualisation were productive even if the outcome suggest that nothing was clearly delimited and that one of the characteristics of the concept of diaspora is a strong propensity to overlap the proposed and mobilised notions: perhaps due to the development of the theoretical discourse on globalisation.

**Merging the concept of diaspora in the globalisation and transnationalism discourses**

The research carried out during the 90’s, viewed the emergence of the notions of transnational space, transnational communities, nations unbound notably with the work produced by Basch, Glick-Schiller and Szanton Blanc (1994). These three authors summarized the convergence
of all these problematics when they quoted that the contemporary diasporas are “nation unbound” who “reinscribe” space in a new way. They maintain that in contrast with the past when nation-states were defined in terms of a People sharing a common culture within a bounded territory. This new conception of nation-states includes as citizens “those who live physically dispersed within the boundaries of many others states but who remain socially, politically, culturally and often economically part of the nation-state of their ancestors” (see Basch et al., 1994). At this stage of analysis, the risk of confusion becomes more and more present. It is probably due to the fact, as underlined by James Clifford (1994) that, “an unruly crowd of descriptive/interpretative terms now jostle and converse in an effort to characterise the contact zones of nations, cultures and regions”.

In the group of diaspora “specialists”, the difficulty of managing all these terms is confirmed. In the concluding chapter of two reference books on diasporas —the book of Robin Cohen (1997a), Global Diasporas: An introduction, or in the Nicholas Van Hear book (1998) —New diasporas—, both are devoted to diasporas in the age of globalization and transnationalism. In a recent paper about “Transnationalism, Globalization and Diaspora”, Paul Kennedy and Victor Roudometof (2001) confessed that despite the important contributions of the last ten years, the theorisation of the transnational experience (and its ties to globalisation) remains incomplete. Even if all these elements constitute a strong basis for work, there remain some difficulties of conceptualisation because the diasporas keep an image of a particular social form needing a proper space of theorisation and, in the same time, progressively, the notion became just a particularity of the worldwide social form described under the denomination, transnational communities. This statement confirms the difficulty of differentiating diaspora and transnational communities. One hypothesis should be that, in fact, there are no differences between the realities covered by the two concepts? And, in fact, this statement was clearly expressed by Kachig Tololyan mentioning that “Diasporas are the exemplary communities of the transnational moment” (Shuval, 2003) and deciding, in 1991, to name his review Diaspora... A journal of transnational studies.

More recently, for to clarify this question, some elements were provided by Nicholas van Hear (1998) when he suggests defining diasporas on three minimal criteria:

1. “the population is dispersed from a Homeland to two or more other territories (here is an agreement with the proposition of William Safran mentioned previously);
2. the presence abroad is enduring, although exile is not necessarily permanent but may include movement between Homeland and new host countries;
3. there is some kind of exchange —social, economical, political or cultural— between or among the spatially separated populations comprising the diaspora”.

And Nicholas van Hear suggests that for the transnational community definition that this “is a more inclusive notion, which embraces diasporas, but also populations that are contiguous rather than scattered and may straddle just one border”. But, after this proposition, Van Hear raises up, perhaps the most important question, “is the formation of transnational communities and diaspora now inevitable concomitant of migration?”. And, in finally, this proposal underlines the idea that the two terms are tools permitting the analyse of the questions of identity and belonging that are hardly interrogated. The recent book —*Global sociology*— by Robin Cohen and Paul Kenendy (2000) confirmed this sentiment. In their book, they have presented a chapter on identity and belonging in which one sub-chapter is devoted to transnationalism described via three examples: *The cosmopolitan city, diasporas, diasporas and a global business*. All this contributes to underline that the researchers have to pay attention to these multiple inclusions of the notion of diaspora. These elements add to confusion but ask questions on the permanence of the term of diaspora in the “age of globalisation” seems validate (Cohen, 1997b) and on the capacity of the new forms of migration to evolve “automatically” in a space transcending the national frontiers.

In terms of analyse, all these factors contribute to relegate the notion of diaspora to “historical migrants” and to privilege the question of time as Marientras (1989) and Medam (1993) proposed and to prefer the term of transnational communities to the newest migrant groups, presenting a multipolarised organisation. Nevertheless, this statement is an unsatisfactory answer as is, also weak, the idea that diaspora “refers specifically to the movement —forced or voluntary— of people from one or more nation-states to another” and that transnationalism “speaks to larger, more impersonal forces —specifically those of globalization and global capitalism” (Braziel, 2003). Once again, this ineffectiveness seems due to the fact that it is simply impossible to cover by one notion, with a large part of affect, a plurality of human reality. As James Clifford (1997) underlined, the different attempts to list some working definitions are productive but present some difficulties to fit with an “ideal type” of diaspora. In fact, a large part of the problem is also due to the production of various
analyses from very different scientific positions: some researchers can put the label “diaspora” to a group of people by referring to their history (exile, existence of a collective trauma) or by considering the religion and a memory of the homeland, some others can make this choice in regards of the density of the social relationships in a dispersed group. Globally, various elements who are presenting a real efficiency but also some important obstacles for comparison. Some researchers are dealing with the identity question and some others are speaking from a structural point of view. The Turkish migrants are a good example of this confusion. Many researchers refer to a diasporic structure but hesitate to speak of them as a Turkish diaspora. In this “time of confusion”, two methodological points of conclusion could be proposed to explore the variety of the social and spatial dispositions of these migrant groups. First, all the researches on diasporas should be based on a strong theoretical infrastructure (characteristics of diaspora group, of homeland, of host) as proposed by Judith Shuval (2003). Secondly, following the Van Hear proposal, it could be useful for those who want to explore the notion of diaspora to pay attention to one question: how can we explain and characterize the passage from migrants to diaspora? For that, I will suggest to refer to the recent work of Gabriel Sheffer (2003) who dealt with this question.

Note: This introduction on the notion of diaspora was followed by a case study on Diaspora and Homeland based on two publications: William Berthomiere, “Integration and the social dynamic of ethnic migration: The Jews from the Former Soviet Union in Israel” in Rainer Münz, Rainer Ohliger, 2003, Diasporas and Ethnic Migrants: Germany, Israel and Russia in Comparative Perspective, London: Frank Cass and William Berthomiere, “L’immigration des Juifs soviétiques et éthiopiens en Israël”, Hommes et Migrations (1235).

Bibliography


CLIFFORD James, 1994, “Diasporas”, Cultural Anthropology (9-3).
What is a Diaspora? Different Definitions

The term of diaspora has a Greek origin and means dispersal. Originally it only described the dispersal of the Jewish people after the destruction of the Realm of Israel by the Assyrians in 722 B.C. This dispersion went on in 586 B.C. with the seizure of Jerusalem by the Empire of Babylon. The term was then written with a capital letter (Diaspora). Since then, diaspora, this time written without any capital letter, describes some forms of dispersal. The term of “diaspora” has yet recently been used in the field of social sciences. Before 1980 few works mentioned this notion, the connection between diaspora and Jewish people being too obvious for researchers to apply it to other groups.

After 1980 the concept of diaspora has been more and more used by researchers and has appeared also in every day’s language. This concept, mostly used in a context of movement of people, has become a topic. On the one hand some researchers remain close to a “classical” definition of the term and on the other hand others suggest a new definition of the concept, taking into account the global context favourable to the mobility of populations. These movement mechanisms follow the economic constraints of the capitalist system and highlight the link between economic globalization and the development of diasporas.

One can wonder whether this term is appropriate to define contemporary forms of international migrations. Can this term be

---

1 This speech has been prepared and based on various previous works: (Dorai, Hily, and Ma Mung 1998; Ma Mung 1992, 1996, 2000, 2001).
interchangeable with migrations—in this case it is of little use— or does it describe the current morphology of some migrations?

Whatever the answer to these questions one needs to underline beforehand that this term is not neutral and is fraught with meanings, part of which extends to this population when the term is used to describe a migration. And it refers to a greater or lesser degree to the diaspora archetype set by the Jewish diaspora. However, the ever greater use of this term to describe very diverse migrations progressively weakens the force of the reference to the archetype of the Jewish diaspora.

Though its roots are buried in a distant past, the development of diasporas corresponds to the intensification of migratory movements during this century. Diasporas represent a form of adaptation to the new means of transportation and communication and are particularly well integrated into the current globalization of economy as well as migrations or cultural phenomena. Owing to their own features they contributed to improving bilingualism or multilingualism in the world (Gottman 1996) and to laying greater interest on foreign cultures in the host countries.

I will now give my own definition of a diaspora and we will then study various authors’ definitions.

**Multipolarization of the Migration and Interpolarity of Relations**

One can admit (Ma Mung, 1992) that a minimum of two objective morphological features define a diaspora:

— The *multipolarization of the migration* of a same national, ethnic or religious group between various countries corresponding to the classical definition of the diaspora in the original meaning of dispersal,

— *The interpolarity of relations*, i.e. migratory, economic, information or affective links maintained by the members of the various poles of the migratory space in a particular group; not only the migrations between each migratory pole and the country of origin as in the case of classical migrations but also those relations existing between the various migratory poles.

In terms of geographic networks the classical migration would correspond to an elementary network—relations between a central pole (the country of origin) and secondary poles (the various setline places of the migration)— while a diaspora would rather be established as a complex network—existing links between the whole poles.
One can then say that a classical migration is established as a diaspora when it ranges from the organization in elementary networks to that of a complex network. Therefore, a growing number of migrating groups tend towards this form of organization: North-Africans, Africans and other groups. However, in a continuum that would stretch from the most elementary network to the most complex, the various groups are found at different levels. Diaspora is visibly a migratory form with a marked reticulary dimension.

Beyond the similarity of external physical forms defining a diaspora in our opinion (multipolarity of the migration and interpolarity of relations) and allowing to gather within the same term migrations of a different nature, are there any internal features common to the diaspora? It seems to me that at least two can be distinguished: one social identity of ethnic nature and a discontinuous territory.

**A Social Identity of Ethnic Nature**

During the migration an identity develops and is based on the feeling of sharing a common origin, be it real or supposed. This feeling of belonging to a same group with a common origin makes-up a collective identity of ethnic nature in the sense given by Max Weber. What makes the difference between the ethnic identity of other forms of social identity (professional, religious, political …) is the shared belief in the same origin. Therefore, this identity is past-oriented, towards the preservation of a memory of origins and the building-up of a history of these origins.

**A Discontinuous Territory**

If there is a spatial form common to the diasporas, beyond the similarity of external forms we have mentioned before, its main characteristic is a territorial discontinuity.

On a local scale the diaspora presence can be marked by a strong local imprint in the form, yet again archetypal, of the ghetto and of the concentration of a population in a given area, “Arab quarters”, “African quarters”, “Chinese quarters” in Paris for instance, or Chinatowns, Greektowns, Koreantowns of North-American cities …). This presence is often marked —this needs to be underlined— by a commercial characteristic (various shops, restaurants, services …) thus indicating through its concentrations the presence of such or such a population.
One a global scale the territory of the diaspora is discontinuous and made up of as many disconnected spaces as there are local presences. There is no homogeneous territory. These micro-territories are however interconnected by a movement of goods, people, information ... that are real and on the other hand through a conscience of the diaspora, in other words, the fact of knowing that there are fellow men in these other places. And finally by the construction of a collective memory/history as I have already mentioned. This memory/history justifies for each individual their belonging to the diaspora.

A discontinuous territory, therefore, made up of disconnected spaces but linked together by exchanges, the unity of which is given by the memory attached to places: each collective memory and the particular history that it offers to a group.

These characteristics well apply to Chinese migration. On this subject one can then talk about a Chinese diaspora. In addition to that, the very fact of talking of diaspora about the Chinese migration strengthens the characteristic of diaspora insofar as the term is more and more used within community media, thus strengthening the self-representation of the group as a diaspora.

Various Senses of the Diaspora Concept

The definition of the diaspora concept is very variable according to authors and defines far different populations. One can, however, note two trends of thoughts providing sometimes very different contents. Christine Chivallon (1997) basing her study on the West Indian case, highlights the “Anglo-Saxon” approach and the “French” approach. Although the French scientific sector considers West Indians as a migrating population, the British consider it as a diaspora.

The Anglo-Saxon conception is generally far more globalizing, the French researchers’ one often more restrictive. But primacy can be given to Anglo-Saxon research for the theorization of the diaspora concept. We will first retain a rather general definition (Sheffer 1986, 1993, 1996; Cohen, 1997), and then study the various aspects of this definition as they were developed in the French and Anglo-Saxon literature. Gabriel Sheffer (1986) co-ordinated a reference book on the subject: *Modern Diasporas in International Politics* in which the authors indulge in a survey of the question from theoretical studies on the concept itself and a series of studies on precise cases (Jews, Palestinians ...). In his article Sheffer, though he dates the origin of
the concept with Armstrong’s 1976 article called “Mobilized and proletarian diasporas”, thinks it would be wrong to consider that the term can only apply to the dispersal of the Jews after the destruction of the first temple of Jerusalem. Other diasporas existed, at the same time of the Jewish or Greek diasporas, or even happened before. The emergence of diasporas is contemporary with the crystallization of the homeland concept in the collective conscience of ethnic groups and of its function in the organization of these socio-political entities. Dispersals, that can be called diaspora, have existed since the establishment of such political entities in the Middle East, in Asia, or elsewhere. Robin Cohen (1997) noticed also that diasporas (Greek for instance) existed before the Jewish diaspora and that they had no specific traumatic connotations for the peoples concerned. Some, as the Jewish diaspora, could really stand the test of time, while the major part has now disappeared, as the Nabatean, Phoenician or Assyrian diaspora.

For some authors the creation process of a diaspora includes several criteria, such as the existence of an ethnic community, the attachment to a territory, the conscience of a shared identity feeling and a situation of exile. This is the case for the Jews who left Mesopotamia to settle in Eretz Israël under the leadership of Abraham and progressively built a strong link with their new homeland. They then dispersed with the first destruction of the temple. During the second destruction of the temple and up until the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the Jews will form a stateless diaspora, as the Palestinians do today or as the Amenians did at some time.

Gabriel Sheffer notes that since the second half of the nineteenth century diasporas that are very similar to the Jewish diaspora have developed, particularly in Europe. He notably mentions the Greeks, the Chinese and the Turks.

“Diaspora is a minority group of migrant origin which maintains sentimental or material links with its land of origin.” (Sheffer 1986, 333-336)

From this viewpoint one must then exclude in the first place the migrants who left their country and became the prevailing elements in their country of destination, (the English in Australia or New Zealand). Then groups like the Afrikaners who cut the sentimental and economic links with their country of origin should not be included in the diasporas as well. Also the ethnic groups that are a minority in a State, not for migration reasons but owing to a border division (i.e. Druzes in Lebanon), are excluded from this definition.
Three main criteria are put forward by Gabriel Sheffer (1993) to define a diaspora:

1. The preservation and the development of an identity proper to the “diasporized” people. This identity build-up stems from a voluntary process of the individual members of the diaspora who find their bearings in it.

2. An internal organization of the diaspora distinct from the one in the State of origin or in the host State. This social organization is essentially based on communalism. This enables the diaspora to distinguish itself from the host State without being separatist and exerting lobbying to defend its interests.

3. Significant contacts with the country of origin, in a real form (journey, money transfers …) or mythical form as in the Jewish phrase “next year in Jerusalem” repeated at the end of the prayer of Pessah.

After placing the emphasis on the lack of theorization in the research on diasporas, Robin Cohen (1997) quotes James Clifford (1994) to underline that the Jewish archetype can be taken as a basis for reflection without making up a normative model, that can adapt to the new global conditions. Without questioning the Jewish “archetype”, he gives two main arguments for further thinking. The Jewish diaspora history can not amount to a traumatic event, other migrations, voluntary ones, have driven the Jewish people. The other reason is the ever wider use of the term of diaspora in very different context. (Safran 1991) notes that diaspora, considered as a “metaphoric designation” concerns very different populations such as the “Expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities.” The list of populations in a diaspora situation provided by Safran, as Cohen (1997) gives it, is criticized by the latter who thinks it is too encompassing or weak.

The French thought further insists on the preservation of unity in the diaspora group and its mode of functioning. The development of modern communication means lets contemporary migrants as well as diasporas consider “alternative returns” to their country of origin (Simon 1995, p. 216-222). Isabelle Rigoni (1997) sums up the main

---

2 “We should be able to recognize the strong entailment of Jewish history on the language of diaspora without making that history a definitive model. Jewish (and Greek and Armenian) diasporas can be taken as non-normative starting points for a discourse that is travelling in new global conditions.” (James Clifford (1994, p. 303) quoted by Robin Cohen (1997, p. 2)).
features of the diasporas by borrowing some criteria to the Anglo-Saxon definitions.

— *The reason of exile*: Armstrong (1976) makes the difference between mobilized diasporas, founded from an exile and proletarian diasporas composed of economic migrants.

— *The duration of exile*: the exile must be long for a diaspora is formed during the passing on of culture between generations, in the resistance and the development of institutions and ethnic networks.

— *The space of exile*: it is a multipolar space. “The space of the diaspora is a transnational space structured by a plurality of networks that see the movement of ideas, individuals as well as capitals.” (Rigoni, 1997, p. 47)

— *The degree of community cohesion*: a diaspora is often the result of a migratory chain where the first migrant made their close relations come, what results in the construction of a community within the exile.

— *The existence of links, real or imaginary with the territory or the country of reference*: real contacts are established most often by means of *alternative returns* to quote Gildas Simon (1995).

**Typologies of Diasporas**

Considered as transnational social construction diasporas can be characterized in various ways. Typologies produced by researchers may vary significantly and vary according to the criteria retained by the authors.

Gabriel Sheffer (1993) makes a simple distinction between diasporas with no State of origin, or stateless diasporas and state-based diasporas. In the first case one can find Palestinians and Tibetans. So to state-based diasporas Gabriel Sheffer divides them up into four categories:

1. Classical diasporas as the Jews or Chinese. They are very old and structured.
2. Veteran type diasporas as the Greeks or Italians that are more recent but fairly strongly structured.
3. Newly born diasporas as the Koreans.
4. And finally, sleeping diasporas as Americans in Europe or Asia. Networks of this last type of diaspora are no longer active, the community link is ten weak.
What makes the difference between diasporas is related to the mode of community organization that defines their cohesion. Three types of networks prevail in this organization. They are the political, economic and cultural networks. These three elements lay the very basis of the diaspora. The ancientness of the diaspora is an element that substantially influences the degree of organization of the community, it is thus a key element.

Robin Cohen (1997) suggests a typology of existing diasporas, as a basis for reflection on the concept of diaspora. His typology relies on the main characters(s) of the diasporas. They usually combine various criteria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Diaspora</th>
<th>Examples Given</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim/Refugee</td>
<td>Jews, Africans, Armenians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others: Irish, Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial/Colonial</td>
<td>Ancient Greeks, British, Russions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others: Spanish, Portuguese, Germans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce/Service</td>
<td>Indians, Chinese and Japanese, Sikhs, Turks, Italians under contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce/Business/Professional</td>
<td>Venetians, Lebanese, Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural/Hybrid/Post-Modern</td>
<td>Caribbean peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others: today Chinese and Indians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extract from Cohen (1997: 178)

These typologies are just an indication and are more frameworks for reflection than a representation of an observed reality. In fact each diaspora is unique and considerably develops with time. The progressive settle of “diasporized” communities in their host State modifies the relations with the host and origin States without questioning though the liveliness and dynamics of the diasporas.

**Different issues**

**Diasporas, Networks and Relation with the Territory**

The functioning in transnational networks is not sufficient to define a diaspora although one can notice “structural similarities” between
both types of organizations. Martine Hovanessian (1998, p. 22) then analyzes the construction of diasporas in terms of identity.

“Diasporas are no longer measured only in terms of spatial scattering and migratory mobilities but in terms of identity project.”

Robert Fossaert (1989) explains that the peculiarity of diaspora identities is to be altered while maintaining the unity of the diaspora without diluting in other peoples. Martine Hovanessian underlines that the sociological analysis of diasporas goes along with a reflection on other types of conceptualization produced in the field of interethnic relations:

“The problem of diasporas is an integral part of the sociology of interethnic relations in France which, from the critical debate on the republican model of integration, makes visible, language, relationship, cultural and professional abilities within populations with a foreign origin, acquired in several migratory spaced.” (ibid)

Finally, other authors see diasporas as the consequence of a political history. Peoples at a certain point in their history find themselves refused the right to a State and form themselves in a diaspora. (Ter Minassian 1989; Yacoub 1994)

“This perception of diasporas associated with a geopolitical destiny raises the massive constraint of the exclusion from a territory, of a departure or a forced movement thus creating a “minority conscience” during the exile. All the question remains in this passage from the minority conscience to the evocation of a diaspora organization.” (Hovanessian 1998: 19)

Finally, following his researches on the Armenians, the author suggests that:

“The existence in diaspora is mostly measured by the absence of connections between identities and national identifications, between the forms of identity interiorization and the ways to be perceived by the others despite confirmed citizenships.” (ibid: 25)

_Diaspora and Relations with the Country of Origin and the Host Country_

The relations of diasporas with their host State and their State of origin are one of the determining elements for the mobility of migrating groups they are composed of. The degree of attachment to
the State of origin influences the volume of migratory movements between the poles of the diaspora and the original centre.

The relations between the diasporas and their host State concern the various strategies of integration and behaviour that were adopted and the activities that were deployed in the social space. According to Gabriel Sheffer (1993), the total assimilation of ethnic minorities is no longer conceivable and a greater tolerance to some forms of pluralism is observed. Assimilation is referred to as individual decisions but is not related to a community strategy at the level of diaspora institutions. According to him, state-bound diasporas can choose isolationist strategies in their host States. This lets them use lobbying as a communication and pressure means on their host government. On the contrary, stateless diasporas as Palestinians or part of the Yishouv (Jews from Palestine) before 1948, can choose secessionism to create their own State.

The homeland of origin tends to consider its diaspora as an instrument to promote its particular interests. In the case of stateless diasporas, the room for manoeuvre of diaspora organizations can be greater than the one of internal organizations. Diaspora then becomes the major political instrument in the fight for national liberation. This debate animated the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, some thinking that the Yishouv was the main actor for the emergence of the State, while the diaspora, with the development of the Zionist movement claims paternity. This was the case with the Palestinian diaspora from 1967, the time of its real emergence, to 1987, the time when the Palestinian intifada refocused the conflict within the territory of historical Palestine.

The question of double allegiance raises the problem as much for the country of origin as for the host country (Sheffer, 1996). But, it also raises problems for the diaspora itself. The management of communities in diaspora situations during tensions between both countries then becomes a problem. Which attitude should diaspora adopt? This question is all the more important in the case of stateless diasporas. Which attitude Palestinians from Lebanon had to adopt during the crisis that burst between the PLO and the Lebanese State during the civil war? Siding with the PLO and risking a new exodus towards an unknown destination or siding with the Lebanese State and losing any means to defend oneself? Diaspora then often becomes a political instrument as much for the State of origin as for the host State.

Transnational networks are set up between the various communities of the diaspora and their homeland. Information, movement of
individuals, money pass through these networks. In numerous cases it is fairly difficult to evaluate the financial flows. For the Jewish diaspora these figures are known with some accuracy. Since the 1980’s the yearly amount of transfers of the Jewish community from the United States to Israel has been of 300 million dollars, the yearly transfers of other communities have been of 200 million dollars, and investments have amounted to 600 million dollars for that period. In comparison, Gabriel Sheffer (1996) estimates that the PLO during the same period has only received 5 % of this amount. Studies carried out by the World Bank and the IMF show that these sums have been transferred by individuals but have passed or have been paid directly by diaspora organizations. (Sheffer 1996)

Another example: Since 1979, the Chinese Diaspora has had growing economic relations with Continental China, which have contributed in a very decisive way to the spectacular development of this country over the last fifteen years. Numerous authors agree that 70 to 80 per cent of foreign investments (US $10 billion in 1995) were made by Chinese Diaspora. They also played a role in the creation of business and in this way they contributed to more than 100,000 joint ventures in 1994, totalling US $17 billion. (Ma Mung, 2001)

Diaspora and Migratory Movement

Exodus is a key feature to understand the diaspora phenomena but is not sufficient to explain them. The networks that link the various scattered communities are the framework.

Consequently, is the concept of migratory movement within an economic space not better placed “here/elsewhere” and rather describes a spatial fluidity between migratory poles (or the notion of spatial mobility that does not freeze movement in the concept of migration that could seem far too rigid or not adapted to some situations). How is mobility integrated within the framework of the diaspora organization? These questions in the case of diaspora migrations lead us to reconsider the types of migration from the angle of a new migratory complexity and a greater ease in spatial mobility. Migration is no longer perceived as a break or a disgression but as an integral part of a social organization.

The migratory problem has carved out a major place in the analysis of diasporas. The formation of a diaspora implies the creation of diaspora poles made up by the various communities (or diaspora establishments) scattered by the initial exodus. Networks (social, economic, information …) are then established between these poles,
most often in parallel with the migratory channels deriving the diaspora. For example, economic networks created by the migrants’ transfers illustrate the major place of migration in the links established between the various communities.

The “migratory systems” of mobile diasporas show great flexibility as much in their spatial extension (formation of poles) as in their functioning. This system is endlessly redefined and generates migratory movements. A certain number of individuals continually move from one pole of the diaspora to the other, searching for a more favourable legal status, a job, or carry out a family reunion.

According to Robin Cohen (1997) the diaspora experience at the end of the modern age rests on the ratio between the mobility of material or immaterial goods and of people. He emphasizes three factors contributing to growing migratory movement between the various poles of the diasporas:

— A world economy with denser and quicker transactions between regions and sub-regions thanks to improved communication means, cheaper transport and the effects of liberal commerce and of the policy of free capital flows.

— Forms of international migrations increasing contractual relations, part-time positions, stays abroad rather than final settlement and exclusive adoption of the citizenship of the destination country.

— A cosmopolitan and hybrid culture created and supported by satellite broadcasting, video, tourism, advertising and media as well as industries of mass entertainment.

This strong interconnection between diaspora, networks and migratory movement raises the problem of the demarcation of the diaspora construction. The functioning under networks as well as the practice of migratory movements are not exclusive attributes of the diasporas.

*Diaspora or Structured Networks?*

It seems difficult to determine, despite or because of the multiplicity of definitions, whether a migrating population does or does not make up a diaspora. Isabelle Rigoni (1997) clearly illustrates this difficulty in studying the case of the Turkish migration Turkish migrants develop “*multiple forms of networks*” (migratory, religious, political). These networks host numerous types of “*interconnected organizations*”. She questions herself as follows:
Is it enough for migrants to develop and then maintain transnational associative networks to classify them as diasporas?

Turkey has on its territory a vast number of various ethnic groups and religious denominations. Belonging to a community or another can influence the grounds for emigration and also the type of transnational networks that the community will set up (a Kurd will flee from political persecution, a Sunni will seek to get rich …). The majority of authors talk about a Turkish diaspora, except Stéphane de Tapia who has some reservations on the grounds of the great diversity and high mobility of Turkish migrants. The Turkish migration is multipolar:

Its geographical extension “looks structured by complex relations, set up between the country or origin and the host country (migratory movement)”. (de Tapia 1996: 34)

The first Turkish migratory waves establish scattered communities that will make up the main framework of sophisticated socio-economic networks.

For I. Rigoni, from 1950 to 1980, the date of the military coup, the Turkish migratory process was rather traditional. From 1980 on different Turkish, Kurdish and Assyro-Chaldean transnational networks are formed with the arrival of new migrants.

“The dichotomy developed by Armstrong is effective here, in the case of the Turks and Kurds, the mobilized migrants (if not the diasporas) have energized the proletarian migrants (if not the diasporas)”. (ibid: 54)

Turkish migrants yet seem to show certain morphological traits of a diaspora (community cohesion, significance of the homeland, numerous transnational networks …), but the migration does, however, not seem old enough to categorically determine their formation as a diaspora. However, the Kurds and Assyro-Chaldeans (particularly in the United States for the latter) seem to make up diasporas. One can then talk about Turkish diaspora(s) in the plural rather than in the singular.

The same question can be considered in the case of the Moroccan or Tunisian migration. Though there is a multipolarization of the Moroccan migration (Lazaar, 1996) and of the Tunisian migration (Bel Haj Zekri, 1996) and an increase in the migratory movements of these migrating populations, mainly due to the gradual closure of European countries to immigration in 1973-74), can we still talk about “North-African diasporas” as Gildas Simon (1995) does?
Generally speaking, some authors wonder about the use of the term of diasporas:

"Does the West-Indian universe brought back into the notion of diaspora and its various meanings speak about a social reality or of the one that builds the forms of intelligibility?" (Chivallon, 1997: 149)

Some diasporas are partly based upon political claims following persecutions they were subjected to as minorities in their country of residence (as the Jews in Europe, the Armenians in Turkey, the Tibetans or the Palestinians). In general terms the diaspora can also be interpreted as a result of the dominating/dominated relations. Consequently, there is no need to conceal this relation of domination but, on the contrary, to integrate it is the analysis of the making-up modes of the diasporas. Similarly, far from neglecting the importance of politics in studying diasporas, numerous authors (Yves Lacoste, for example, on the French side, or Gabriel Sheffer for the Anglo-Saxons) have based their analysis on the character and political role of the diasporas as much in the sphere of nation-States as in the sphere of international relations.

Current scientific debates on the diaspora have the common point of lying within the scope of the economic context of market globalization. The situation of interdependence of economies allowed substantial population movements and a diversity of cultures. In that respect the diaspora is an eminently modern phenomenon.

Debates on the definition of diasporas do not only concern the strict scientific point of view. They also refer to the political dimension and to the legitimacy of a group’s claims. The processes of de-territorialization, the making-up of transnational networks then lead us to re-question the concept of diaspora and to appreciate a new dynamics of social organization applying to large groups that organize and structure the forms of their economic, social, religious, cultural and family life according to the transnational networks.

References


Introduction

In the course of the past years, social scientists have increasingly noted that many migrants live their lives across borders and maintain their ties to home, even if there is a great distance to their country of origin. They take actions, make decisions, and feel concerns within a field of social relations that links together their country of origin and their country of settlement. Thus, their lives cut across national boundaries and bring two societies into a single social field (see Glick Schiller 1992). To describe these border-crossing phenomena, we may use the term “transnational social space”.

What are Transnational Social Spaces?

Transnational social spaces are relatively permanent flows of people, goods, ideas, symbols, and services across international borders that tie migrants and non-migrants and their corresponding networks within a migration system. The concept of transnational social space suggests networks that cross national boundaries for a considerable amount of time —lets say for at least one immigrant cohort (see Faist 2003:309).

What types of transnational social spaces may be distinguished?

Following Thomas Faist (2000) there are three types of transnational social spaces that may be distinguished in an ideal-typical way:
**Types of Transnational Social Spaces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary resources</th>
<th>Main characteristic</th>
<th>Typical example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Transnational kinship groups</td>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>Upholding the social norm of equivalence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Transnational circuits</td>
<td>Exchange</td>
<td>Exploitation of insider advantages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Transnational communities</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>Mobilization of collective representations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transnational *kinship groups* are primarily based on reciprocity: what one party receives from the other requires some return. Their main characteristic is upholding the social norm of equivalence. Transnational reciprocity in small groups like, for example, kinship groups and multilocal families regularly arises through specific reciprocity, such as remittances of those abroad in exchange for child-rearing and housekeeping. It also exists when members of village communities offer migrating members a first stop abroad and help them to find jobs and housing.

A widespread phenomenon are multilocal families, with parent and children distributed in households across national boundaries. For example, parents may live abroad with some of the children while other offspring reside in the country of origin in households headed by relatives. Multilocal families may also arise when older migrants return to the country of origin while their adult children and grandchildren stay in the immigration country. (See Faist 2002:204).

We can capture these phenomena by speaking of a shadow group. Shadow groups include all persons whose principal commitments and obligations are to a particular household but who are not presently co-residing in that household. (See Faist 2000:206).

*Transnational circuits* mainly entail networks that depend on the exchange of information and mutual obligations along generalized tit-for-tat lines. Therefore, they are mostly operative in trading networks, and typically go beyond the kinship group. The benefits derived from transnational circuits crucially depend on the exploitation of insider advantages such as knowledge of habits and customs in the emigration and immigration countries.

*Transnational communities* arise out of social and symbolic ties of groups and organizations, ranging from local villages to nations. They are based on solidarity and express shared ideas, beliefs, and symbols.
in some sort of collective identity. The backbone of transnational communities is formed by strong symbolic ties and a mobilization of collective representations with historically oriented narratives. (See Faist 2000:311f).

For example, diasporas like Jews, Armenians, or Palestinians are specific types of transnational communities. In diasporas, a group has suffered some kind of traumatic event which leads to the dispersal of its members, and there is a vision of a lost homeland to be restored or an imagined homeland still to be established. (See Faist 2000:208)

Are Transnational Social Spaces a new phenomenon?

Lest there be a misunderstanding, let us make one point very clear from the outset: transnational life among immigrants is not a “new” phenomenon, at least when seen in the perspective over the past one hundred years.

As Thomas Faist argues:

—Multilocal families with members scattered across borders have been a feature of most international migration.
—And putting away money to buy land or build houses in the country of origin is another characteristic habit, at least among labour migrants.
—The same holds for return rates that indicate continuing ties to the country of origin. They have been substantial even at the turn of the last century among European immigrants to the USA.
—Political life has always remained tied to the politics of the old country in many ways, not least through the immigrant press.
—Moreover, long-distance commuting of recurrent migrants who worked summers in the immigration country and spend the long winters in the countries of origin, is not a new feature.

What is novel is the magnitude and the nature of transnational opportunities available to migrants. One noteworthy macro-structural trend has accelerated the emergence of transnational social spaces: the technological breakthrough in long-distance communication and travel occurred in the nineteenth century with transoceanic steamship passages and telegraph communication considerably decreased costs for bridging long geographical distances. This trend sharply accelerated after World War Two, and especially since the 1970’s
transnational commuting is now possible to a higher extent. (See Faist 2000:211f).

Until now, we have —in a first step— been talking about how transnational phenomena can be described and categorized, and how their increase is to be explained. A further question is whether these phenomena are limited to the first generation of migrants. This will be the subject of my following outlines.

I will present some empirical findings that derive from my studies about second generation Turks in Germany. By analysing their marriage behaviour I found many phenomena that are strongly connected to the concept of transnational social spaces and might provide interesting insights into transnational kinship groups.

**Transnational Ties of the Second Generation**

In general, transnational ties to the country of origin are assumed to loose importance in the second generation, since most second generation youngsters have entirely grown up in the immigration country and visited the country of origin just for rather restricted periods of time.

Compared to the first generation, social ties of the second will probably to a much greater share be located within the immigration country while transnational ties with family, kin and friends in the country of origin might easily narrow down to only a few contacts. Social networks of the second generation are likely to be located for the main part in the immigration country with only some extension to the country of origin besides.

This assumption seems to hold for many second generation Turks in Germany as well. Various factors like, for example, the long distance to Turkey, having been largely grown up in Germany, and a dense social network of family, friends, colleagues and others, who live in Germany, contribute to a declining importance of transnational ties.

But nevertheless, we may also find phenomena that indicate the existence of rather strong transnational ties in the second generation. One of these indicators is transnational marriages with partners who had been living in Turkey before the marriage. So, analysing the marriage behaviour of the second generation might probably help to answer the question whether transnational social spaces exist and operate beyond the first generation. As we will see, the interrelation of marriages and transnational social spaces is manifold.
Transnational marriages do not only strengthen existing transnational ties or establish new ties by bridging the networks of the partner in the country of origin with the network of the partner in the immigration country. Transnational marriages have in general also to be seen as a result of transnational social ties that have been in existence prior to the marriage, since such networks provide the space where potential spouses may meet. Consequently, transnational marriages represent both the cause and the result of transnational social ties. Moreover, they reaffirm these relationships and contribute to the self-perpetuating character of migration and the maintaining of a transnational social space.

Therefore, it seems quite profitable to know more about the causes of transnational marriages. So, our central question is: What are the underlying causes of the relatively high percentage of transnational marriages in the second generation? I will compare my empirical findings with white mainstream discourses about the causes of transnational marriages and ask whether transnational marriages are indeed induced by demands of potential migrants in Turkey who aim to get a permit to stay in Germany via marriage, as often assumed in public debates.

This leads us to ask whether the transnational ties of the second generation are generally of a strong or a weak quality. In other words: are second generation Turks personally embedded in a transnational system of reciprocity that gets them to accept transnational marriages even if they mainly function as a means of support for potential migrants?

Or, on the contrary, are second generation Turks simply using transnational ties to get additional opportunities to meet potential spouses? In the first case this would require quite strong ties, while in the second case transnational ties would be assumed to be rather weak.

Discussing these questions, I present first a statistical analysis of Turkish marriages in Germany. The main part of the paper, however, is focussed on the reasons why most second generation Turks opt for transnational marriages. Beginning with a description of the mainstream discourse on transnational marriages, I will claim that the majority of transnational marriages are influenced by factors which are quite different from what is often assumed.

The findings result from a statistical analysis of demographic data and from detailed qualitative case studies that aim to explore the entire logic of decision-taking in the process of partner choice and to show the variety of marriages.
Marriage Options of the Second Generation

Second generation Turks in Germany may choose among three main categories of marriage options:

i. they could get married either to a partner who is a resident of Turkey (that is transnational marriages), or

ii. they could choose a spouse among the Turkish population in Germany, especially of the second generation (that is marriages within the Turkish migrant population), or

iii. they could marry someone outside their group of origin (that is interethnic marriages).

Distribution of Marriage Patterns

In the following I attempt to show to what extent second generation Turks make use of these different marriage options. Turning to the official marriage statistics, it is difficult to determine the quantitative importance of the marriage options considered here since we lack sufficient statistical data.

Among others, the most important reason why the statistical information available is full of gaps is that the transnational dimension of migrants’ marriage behaviour is not covered by national statistics.

Civil weddings may be contracted in German registry offices, Turkish registry offices, and in Turkish consulates. Since most of the civil weddings of Turkish migrants are contracted either outside of Germany or in a Turkish consulate, only a small percentage is registered in German marriage statistics.

Most marriages are registered in Turkish statistics, but if the weddings have been contracted in Turkish registry offices it is, of course, not possible to distinguish especially the marriages involving permanent residents of Germany from other marriages.

Therefore, one has to seek other ways to be able to estimate how many civil weddings are contracted, how many of them are interethnic or transnational, and how many are established within the Turkish population in Germany. I tried to solve this problem by summing up:

1) civil weddings of Turkish nationals in German registry offices,
2) civil weddings of Turkish nationals in Turkish consulates in Germany, and
3) visas of German consulates in Turkey, which are granted to residents of Turkey for the purpose of joining their non-German spouse in Germany.
In sum, I have found around 29,000 marriages of Turkish nationals residing in Germany for the year 1996. The data refers to 1996 because this was the first year in which the number of visas was reported that have been granted for the purpose of joining one’s spouse. Besides, 1996 is a year in which the number of naturalizations of former Turkish nationals was still quite low whilst it increased in the following years and made the estimate even more problematic.

Another point that has to be mentioned is the fact that the data listed here refers to all Turkish nationals residing in Germany regardless of whether they belong to the first, second, or third generation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marriages of Turkish Nationals in Germany 1996</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German-Turkish marriages in German registry offices</td>
<td>4,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriages of Turkish and third-country nationals in German registry offices</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish-Turkish marriages in German registry offices</td>
<td>917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish-Turkish marriages in Turkish consulates in Germany</td>
<td>4,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visas of German consulates in Turkey to residents of Turkey for joining their non-German spouse</td>
<td>17,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28,903</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Federal Statistical Office, Turkish Consulates General, Foreign Ministry

From top to bottom, you see that approximately 16 per cent of the total are German-Turkish marriages and another 2.6 per cent are mixed marriages with third-country nationals. They are followed by Turkish-Turkish marriages. Around 3 per cent Turkish-Turkish marriages took place in German registry offices. In addition, there are 17 per cent Turkish-Turkish marriages which were registered in Turkish consulates in Germany. The last item listed are family-unification visas granted for the purpose of joining one’s spouse. These visas represent slightly more than 61 per cent of the total.

If one assumes that most of these marriages concern the second generation, the statistical data indicates that obviously over half of the second generation continue to choose their partners from among the
residents of Turkey. So, transnational marriages bridging the country of origin with that of residence clearly represent the most popular marriage option, followed by marriages within the Turkish population in Germany. German-Turkish marriages come third.

This distribution implies that family related migration has not yet come to an end but is still of an amount that might guarantee continued interaction between Turkey and Germany by constantly integrating new family members that have grown up in the country of origin. Yet, the inner structure of this continued immigration and the quality of the transnational ties have still to be discussed.

Therefore, we have to look for the underlying causes of transnational marriage behaviour. This includes the question whether individuals who opt for a transnational marriage have certain characteristics that differ from individuals who prefer marriage within the migrant population. The starting point for our discussion will be gender.

By separating the data along gender lines, two differences are striking. German-Turkish marriages account for eighteen per cent in the male population but only for seven per cent in the female group. However, marriages within the Turkish migrant population—registered in German registry offices or in Turkish consulates in Germany—represent less than thirty per cent in the male, but around forty per cent in the female population.

**Marriages of Male Turkish Nationals in Germany 1996**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>10,387 Visas for Turkish women joining non-German husbands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>4,920 Turkish-Turkish marriages in Turkish consulates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>917 Turkish-Turkish marriages in German registry offices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>391 Third-country-Turkish marriages in German registry offices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>3,720 German-Turkish marriages in German registry offices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Federal Statistical Office, Turkish Consulates General, Foreign Ministry.*
These differences are probably first of all an outcome of the unbalanced sex ratio in the Turkish population of Germany. According to official statistics, the group of unmarried women aged fifteen years or more is just half as large as the group of men with the same characteristics. One hundred unmarried Turkish men are matched by only forty eight unmarried women. While women may easily find marriage partners within the migrant population, men are faced with a skewed ethnic marriage market in Germany. Corresponding to this shortage of potential spouses, one expects more men than women getting married to German partners.

However, the unbalanced sex ratio does not seem to overwhelmingly encourage male intermarriage with Germans. If so, the number of interethnic marriages would be much higher but the vast majority of men appear to prefer transnational marriages with women from Turkey, rather than consider intermarriage. The demographic factor sex ratio may largely explain the higher percentage of German-Turkish marriages on the male side just as the higher percentage of transnational marriages may be partly caused by the skewed ethnic marriage market. But, since we still need an explanation for transnational marriages of Turkish women, we apparently have to regard other factors as well.
Lacking statistical data for Germany, it seems profitable to have a look at the situation in Belgium explored by John Lievens (1999). His analysis of the 1991 census shows the distribution of married couples for which at least one partner had Turkish nationality, was eighteen or older, and had either migrated at least two years prior to marriage or was born in Belgium. Considering that such individuals were in a position to marry a partner from the country of origin, Lievens calls them “potential importers” and speaks about “imported partners” when he refers to transnational marriages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin of Partner</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western European</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish group in Belgium</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>1,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imported partner</td>
<td>5,510</td>
<td>3,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7,378</td>
<td>4,934</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lievens (1998:14)

Similar to the Turkish group in Germany, their counterparts in Belgium also show a large preference for transnational marriages, followed by marriages within the Turkish Migrant Population, while interethnic marriages to Western Europeans cover a rather small percentage. In order to gain insight into the underlying causes of transnational marriages, Lievens analysed the effects of socio-cultural characteristics like “age at marriage” and “educational attainment” on the probability of being married to a partner from Turkey.

He observed clear differences between men and women. For Turkish men he found the lowest probability of a transnational marriage for those men married at a higher age and holding a higher education diploma. In sharp contrast, Turkish women having the same characteristics showed a higher probability of a transnational marriage than women who married at a lower age or had a lower education.

These important findings contradict white mainstream discourses on the causes of transnational marriages. Such discourses differ according to gender: while second generation women are generally
assumed to be pressured into transnational marriages to help someone to settle in Germany via family unification, second generation men are assumed to prefer transnational marriages because they want to avoid marrying an emancipated woman grown up in Germany.

Supposed these discourses would reflect the causes of transnational marriages correctly, Lievens would have had to find the probability of transnational marriages to be higher for women who had married at a lower age and who had lower education. But since this was not the case we have to look for a better explanation.

Methodology

In order to reach a scientific insight into the reasons and motives for transnational marriages, I have carried out a qualitative analysis that focuses on reasons why so many of the second generation opt for transnational marriages. These reasons include structural and demographic factors, social and cultural resources, and individual preferences.

The qualitative analysis was aimed at outlining the diversity of influences that lead to transnational marriages. To be able to examine—despite a rather limited number of interviews—a certain variety of marriages, I decided not to use the snowball-sampling-method to find potential interviewees, since this method would have probably led to a rather restricted range of cases. Instead, I based the sampling on the examination of data about each Turkish citizen in a middle-sized town in Franconia (Bavaria, Germany) with 70,000 inhabitants, including 1,400 Turkish nationals.

Finally, I had fourteen in-depth interviews with nine married women and five married men of different age and educational level, with different religious (Sunni and Alevi) and ethnic (Turkish and Kurdish) backgrounds, who had been living in Germany for a different period of time. All of them belonged to the second generation which—for the purpose of this study—had been defined as individuals who have either been born in Germany or have immigrated at an age below thirteen.

Some of their marriages had been arranged, others had been completely self-organized, but most of them were based on a mixture of both modes of partner choice. Three men and five women had transnational marriages, two women were married to partners of non-Turkish origin while the others had chosen a partner among the Turkish population in Germany.
This range of cases with different modes of partner choice and marriage options provided a good database for a comparative analysis, although its results are obviously not representative at all. The aim of this exploratory analysis, however, is not to make general statements. Its goal is much more modest. The study aims to show a variety of examples and to give a thick description of their complexity.

I have used a biography oriented approach and tried to single out the relevant influences and to reconstruct the interconnectedness of the underlying causes. Then I have analysed similarities and differences of the cases and set up some profound hypotheses about various marriage options.

In the following I will contrast the outcome of this analysis to the mainstream discourses on the underlying causes of transnational marriage behaviour. I will show that the transnational marriages, that have been analysed in this study, can be attributed to factors which are quite different from what is often assumed, and that there are similarities and differences between the cases, which are influenced by factors like gender, socio-economic background, life-cycle or biographical background, as well as individual experiences and expectations.

Individual Preferences

By examining the subject from the perspective of the second generation and by investigating their decision-taking it became quite evident that —apart from exceptional cases of suppression that certainly exist but do not represent the typical case— women decide mainly on their own account to marry someone from their country of origin. Among other things, one major factor in opting for a transnational marriage can be experiences with second generation men that have not been very satisfactory.

This was apparently the case for Berrin (twenty one years, born in Germany). She states:

“Men from here aren’t O.K. That’s the reason why I’ve decided not to look for a partner from here!”

As her statement indicates, she clearly preferred a transnational marriage instead of a marriage with one of the young men in her immediate surroundings. I have my doubts that this decision has always been as clear as she described it in the retrospective interview.
situation, but I am sure that she had been well aware of the advantages and disadvantages of her transnational marriage.

The decision to marry had been the result of a teenager’s romantic love affair with Bülent who was one year older than herself and had been living in Germany from childhood. He had afterwards returned to the small town in the European part of Turkey where Berrin’s parents come from. The couple got to know each other when Berrin was twelve. First it had been a mere holiday flirt among adolescents. But, within some years, things were changing into a serious relationship which was kept secret from Berrin’s parents until Bülent’s family asked them for Berrin’s hand when she reached the age of seventeen.

Bülent would have preferred Berrin to take up residence in Turkey but she did not agree. So, he came over to Germany and moved in with her parents for one year. When they expected a child the new couple took up residence in an apartment next door and Berrin gave up her working permit in favour of Bülent who could then start a regular job in a factory.

This case obviously contradicts some of the assumptions cited above: the marriage had not been arranged and Berrin’s husband did not show an intention to leave Turkey but gave in to Berrin’s plans and accepted to live with his in-laws. Regarding these issues Berrin’s case is not exceptional, since all of the five transnational marriages of second generation women which I have analysed have been more or less self-organised and not arranged.

Besides, I have already found two other groups who first tried to persuade the fiancée to join them in Turkey. One of them succeeded. His wife agreed and returned to Turkey, but after two years she finally came back to Germany together with her husband.

These examples show that obviously many men in Turkey are well aware of the economic problem they might face in Germany. In addition, social problems might occur, because contrary to women—who when joining their husband after marriage correspond to the tradition—men joining their wives (and in-laws) contradict gender roles. Instead of being bread-winners they, at least in the beginning, risk being dependent on their wife’s or in-laws’ income. This is another reason why at least some men try to avoid joining their wife in Germany.

Contrary to the common mainstream expectation that women do not actively decide to enter a transnational marriage, men who are married to a partner from Turkey are usually assumed to have preferred explicitly this option. This assumption contradicts the statements of three male interviewees like Faruk (twenty eight years old, twenty years
in Germany) who emphasised that he preferred a partner from among the second generation:

“If I had me the right one, I would probably have married here because she would have already known the German language and would have been used to the surroundings here. Such a marriage would have been much easier.”

Statements like this indicate that transnational marriages cannot be simply equated with a rejection of a marriage among the second generation. Rather, at least a part of these marriages is caused by the fact that the search for an appropriate partner within the migrant population remained without success. In this respect, transnational marriages are not always the first but sometimes just the second choice.

**Demographic Factors**

As already mentioned before, the unbalanced sex ratio of the Turkish population in Germany encourages men to extend the search for a partner from the marriage market in Germany to Turkey. Since finding a marriage partner among the Turkish population in Germany is much more difficult for men than for women, second generation men's individual preferences of getting married either within the second generation or with someone living in the country of origin seem to be much less important than often expected.

**Social Networks**

Until now, we have concentrated on individual preferences and demographic factors to examine underlying causes of transnational marriages. In the following, however, we will focus on the role of social ties and see that preferences and demography are not the only crucial points of the second generation’s marriage behaviour. Networks are very important as well since they provide the connecting link between socio-structural conditions and individual preferences.

Transnational networks of family, kin or friends provide many opportunities for second generation Turks to meet potential spouses in Turkey. So it is not astonishing that among the transnational marriages which I have analysed all except one are based on personal ties to friends, neighbours, and kin in Turkey. Only one relationship started
with a flirt at the beach during summer vacation. All other couples have met each other at weddings, in a group of friends or cousins, or they were introduced to each other at family visits, which were sometimes especially arranged for this purpose.

Whether second generation Turks make use of such opportunities to look for marriage partners in Turkey depends, among other factors, on the ideas they have about transnational marriages and how they qualify them compared to marriages within the second generation.

Therefore, an analysis has to take into account questions like: Do they expect to realize their plans for the future more easily with someone grown up in Germany or in Turkey? How do they judge the effect of socialization in these socio-cultural contexts on the future prospects of the marriage? Do they regard the life-style of potential marriage partners to be compatible with their own?

Since ideas about such issues are not shaped in a vacuum but are affected by experiences being made in a social context, it is required to examine the personal networks of second generation Turks. Regarding social ties, that might be relevant for a transnational marriage decision, it is important to study the socio-economic background of the Turkey-based networks.

Here, the crucial point will be the socialization of individuals who might eventually become partners in a transnational marriage. If they were raised in big cities like Istanbul, Ankara, or Izmir, their life-style might, in the eyes of the second generation, easily be qualified as adaptable to Germany. The contrary might be the case if they grew up in an Anatolian village.

The attitude of second generation youngsters towards transnational marriages will probably be influenced into a positive direction if their personal transnational network provides contact to individuals who have qualities that they regard being necessary and favourable for a good marriage.

These qualities include the individual cultural capital that a potential spouse could transfer to Germany. Reflecting often problematic experiences with transnational marriages of elder siblings and friends, a growing number of second generation Turks is well aware that it is essential for partners from Turkey to have cultural resources like education, language proficiency and occupational skills.

That such cultural capital is indeed a decisive factor in opting for transnational marriages becomes apparent when we regard the Belgian case, where it seems that second generation women show a clear preference for educated marriage partners from Turkey. George Reniers found that "Migrant bridegrooms are generally better educated than
their reference population in Turkey, and thus show a positive instead of a negative or neutral selection.” (Reniers 1997:19)

Another aspect which second generation Turks often regard to be important is the transferability of the cultural capital available. Most cultural resources, however, cannot be easily transferred to another country. (See Faist 1997). Holding cultural capital that might be transferred is above all valued highly for men since they are usually expected to be the bread-winners of the future household. This became apparent in the interview situation when women showing a positive attitude towards a marriage with a partner from Turkey noticeably implied that he should have an urban background and a high level of education including professional experience.

To the contrary, women who refused a transnational marriage justified their refusal by referring to problems that might occur when a partner from Turkey has to be integrated into the German labour market but does either not have the qualifications required or can not make use of them because he lacks language skills.

The Quality of the Second Generation’s Transnational Ties

Here I want to return to our starting point and the three types of transnational social spaces. We have stated that transnational kinship groups are based on reciprocity and on upholding the social norm of equivalence. We have further been asking whether transnational social spaces are limited to the first generation of migrants or whether they will maintain in the second or third generation as well. I have argued that the continuity of transnational kinship groups based upon reciprocity is first of all guaranteed by the existence of transnational ties that are strong. This has led us to ask whether transnational ties of the second generation are of a strong or a weak quality.

Following the white mainstream discourse about transnational marriages of second generation women, they are usually assumed to be embedded in strong ties of reciprocity with their parents’ community of origin. So, it would be mainly the demand of prospective migrants in Turkey which makes transnational marriages of second generation women become rather frequent.

This aspect has also been mentioned quite a few times in the interviews. Several women said that they have been asked again and again to marry a special person in order to take him to Germany. Nevertheless, none of them agreed because they did not see any reason why they should accept a marriage under these conditions.
On the other hand, one has to take into account the results of an ethnographic fieldwork undertaken at the end of the eighties in the Netherlands by Anita Böcker (1995). They indicate that it was quite common in certain parts of the Turkish migrant population to arrange transnational marriages, mainly with the intention to bring someone over to the Netherlands. The imported partners were mostly male members of the specific community of origin, especially kin. In these cases the marriage functioned as a means of support and was embedded in a system of reciprocity.

Yet, the marriages described by Böcker involved not second generation but a generation between the first and the second. These women had spent their childhood and mostly also considerable parts of their youth in Turkey and had migrated relatively late to the Netherlands. Therefore, most of them had still been personally embedded in the system of reciprocity.

However, this is not the case for second generation women who are born in Germany or who settled in Germany when they were quite young. Having largely grown up in Germany they are hardly part of a system of exchange relationships characterized by reciprocity. Thus they should not be expected to feel personally responsible for the faith of their kin or the community of origin, when they are willing to come to Germany. Under such circumstances the crucial point is obviously not the mere existence of transnational ties but their quality. All in all, we observe a decline of importance of transnational reciprocity.

Besides, we can state a certain diversification of the transnational social ties. Transnational ties of the second generation are no more restricted to kin or to the specific community of origin —ties which had already been existing prior to immigration— but are increasingly supplemented by “new” transnational ties of friendship that had started during summer vacation or other occasions and have been established after the migration to Germany.

We are now faced with an apparently increasing share of transnational marriages which are not based on kinship ties or on other pre-migratory ties to the specific group of origin. These new kind of transnational marriages seems to be an outcome of the diversified transnational network.

Moreover, marriages with someone belonging to a post-migratory transnational network, contribute to further strengthen post-migratory transnational ties by transforming them from friendship into family and kinship ties. Thus it might be assumed that “new” transnational ties will probably gain importance in being an alternative to the “old” ones.
This diversification of intimate transnational ties is paralleled by a decreasing significance of the community of origin. The quality of these “old” pre-migratory ties has gradually altered from a relationship characterized by another kind of emotional solidarity which is practiced much more voluntarily than before and is obviously not strong enough to directly influence such serious decisions like partner choice of the second generation.

Summarising the line of argumentation above, we may state that while “old” transnational ties are gradually losing importance on the one hand, “new” transnational ties are established on the other. Thus we are not faced with a transnational social space that is vanishing but with one that is changing its inner structure and its quality.

Sources


II
Migration and Policy
Problems of Cohesion? Multiculturalism and Migrants’ Claims-Making for Group Demands in Britain and the Netherlands

Paul Statham
Centre for European Political Communication (EurPolCom), University of Leeds

Ruud Koopmans
Free University of Amsterdam

Introduction

A few years ago, it appeared to some authors that Western liberal democracies that would push decisively for policies that deliberately and explicitly recognised and protected migrants as distinct ethnic groups (e.g., Kymlicka 1995, Parekh 2000). However, in the new millennium, after the 9/11 atrocity and a fractious Gulf War, the mantra “we are all multiculturalists now” (Glazer 1997) has less salience both as normative rhetoric and as a policy option. Such shifts away from multiculturalism were arguably already in place. The most overt European experiment in multicultural policies, the Dutch had already switched from special policies for migrant groups to policies for individual migrants within society (Entzinger 2003). Similar changes were also discernible in Sweden (Soininen 1999), and in Britain, where republican-style citizenship rituals and the principle of “community...
cohesion” have been introduced into recent policies (Statham 2003). Instead of celebrating diversity, assimilative cultural demands —language skills, knowledge of national culture, citizenship rituals— are the requirements for migrants in the new policy thinking.

In the sizeable theoretical literature on the subject, there has been a strong preoccupation with the position of ethnic minorities and the —beneficial or harmful— effects of “multiculturalism”, the extension of cultural group recognition and rights to ethnic minorities (e.g., Taylor 1992, Habermas 1994). At stake in these discussions is the nation-state’s capacity for maintaining social cohesion as well as the liberal conception of individual rights on which it rests. Problems are seen to arise from the increasing demands that are put forward by migrant minorities for special group rights, recognition, exemption from duties, and support from the state for their cultural identities. These group demands challenge the concept of a unified, undifferentiated citizenship, a development that is viewed by supporters of multiculturalism (e.g., Parekh 1996, Young 1998) as a healthy antidote against the prevalent “white” cultural hegemony, and by opponents (e.g., Schlesinger 1992, Huntington 1996) as a serious assault on the shared communal values and solidarity necessary for social cohesion and integration.

In contrast to the many normative contributions (e.g., Bauböck 1994, Spinner 1994, Philips 1995, Kymlicka and Norman 2000), in this article we address the challenge of migrants’ group demands to social cohesion empirically, by examining original data on the claims-making of minorities of migrant origin2 in Britain and the Netherlands. Britain and the Netherlands are suited for comparison as different European variants of multiculturalism, with roughly similar proportions —between 7.5 % and 10 %— of migrants and their descendants in their populations, from similar waves of migration. Although their migrant stocks come partly from similar and partly from different regions of origin —Britain: the Caribbean and Indian subcontinent; Netherlands: Indonesia, the Caribbean, Morocco and Turkey— they have significant

---

2 Our empirical enquiry is limited to minorities of immigrant origin. It thus excludes other ethnocultural minorities, and specifically national ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples and the descendants of forced migrants, such as black African Americans in the USA, whose cases are also much discussed in the literature, but which produce different types of claims and political responses than those by resident minorities of migrant origin. Regarding terminology, throughout the text we shall use “migrants” to cover all minorities of immigrant origin, regardless of the length of their residence, citizenship status, or national or ethnic origin.
Muslim communities, making up about 3.5%-5%, who are central to debates about group demands. Our original data set on claims-making is drawn from a sample covering 1992-1998. This allows us to compare the impact of Dutch multicultural policies, before they became less facilitating for group demands, with those in Britain which have always maintained a more restrictive cultural pluralism. Thus we can examine the challenge of group rights in relation to the policies which facilitated them, when assessing whether they contribute to cohesion.

First we discuss the challenge of group demands, before giving details on the policy approaches of Britain and the Netherlands. After briefly outlining our method, we then make an overview of claims-making for group demands in the two countries, before undertaking a qualitative analysis of those by Muslims.

The Challenge of Migrants’ Group Demands

Others have used the terms “multiculturalism” or “differentiated citizenship” to refer to migrants’ particularist group demands. Because we use the term “multiculturalism” for a policy approach, we refer to “group demands”. “Group demands” is an umbrella term for the political field of claims by migrants for group specific rights, recognition, and exemptions from duties, with respect to the cultural requirements of citizenship in their societies of settlement. Although this category is heterogeneous, all group demands share two features: firstly, they are demands that go beyond the set of common civil and political rights of individual citizenship which are protected in all liberal democracies; and secondly, they are demands that if realised, constitute the recognition and accommodation by the state of the distinctive identities and needs of migrant groups.

Regarding the challenge of group demands, a first point to make is that the idea of a unitary citizenship based on equal individual rights, on which liberalism rests, is an ideology and not an accurate depiction of reality for the typical liberal nation-state. Most nation-states attribute some group rights in the form of corporatist or federal arrangements, and most nation-states give preferential treatment to specific religions over others. Thus in Britain, the historical accommodation of church and state has left the Monarch both Head of State and Head of the Church of England. Religious institutions receive no direct state support, but the state privileges its own religion within its understanding of politics, for example, with Church of England Bishops
sitting in the second chamber, the House of Lords, which is not the case for other denominations.

Another important point is that although controversies over group demands are often played out in the public domain through symbols, such as headscarves and minarets, they are about the distribution of material resources. For example, in Germany, a “Church tax” is levied on the individual employee and channelled to Christian or Jewish religious institutions recognised by the state. If Turkish migrants were allowed to contribute to their own faith denomination, which they are not, this would bring not only symbolic recognition, but significant tax revenues to Islamic organisations (Laurence 2001). This example demonstrates that many cultural group demands are not just about value conflicts, but about material stakes in society. Cultural demands that are made by migrants in policy fields such as public education or welfare, where the state has responsibilities for providing and distributing services, present challenges to a pre-existing institutionalised context of procedure in which the native “white” population also has defined stakes.

Although some group demands by migrants are for “parity” of treatment with other religious and ethnic groups, others go further requesting special or “exceptional” treatment for the group relative to other members of society. Some exceptional demands are easily accommodated by liberal states. Indeed for the case of reparations for Nazi crimes in the Holocaust, the German state has itself promoted preferential treatment for the associational activities of Jews and Roma. However, some other migrants’ exceptional demands are less easy to accommodate, because they actually challenge the very essence of liberal values. For example, Muslim migrants wishing to practice polygamy, female circumcision, or *sharia* divorce, would be committing acts that contradict most liberal states’ legal and moral understandings of equality, between individuals, and men and women. How common or representative of group demands such cases are, is an empirical question. We suspect that many migrants’ to Europe are likely to adhere to more secular or modern understandings of Islamic practice, or that such practices would diminish overtime, which would make such cases atypical rather than the norm.

A last point, concerns the native publics of the host society. Native publics and their liberal intellectuals often come to see themselves as the defenders and upholders of the “myth” of a unitary national citizenship. However sincere such allegiances to liberal principles may be, it is also the case that their proponents may be wedded to a version of those concepts that in the post-immigration
era is an historical anachronism, or alternatively, based on nostalgia for the nation’s past. In cases such as Rushdie in Britain, or the headscarf affairs in France, public discourse dynamics tend to take over and the actual problems become distorted under a barrage of rhetoric about national values and identity. Thus the importance of the challenge of group demands may be distorted in the public imagination.

After outlining the challenge of group demands, we now turn to the policy traditions for accommodating cultural and religious difference which have emerged in Britain and the Netherlands.

Britain and the Netherlands: Two Variants of Multiculturalism

In recent years, a number of scholars have conceptualised the citizenship configurations of different nation-states as policy approaches that are the explanatory variable for migrant incorporation (e.g., Joppke 1996, 1999, Safran 1997, Favell 1998, Guiraudon 1998, Ireland 2000, Koopmans and Statham 2000, 2003). Typically, these authors distinguish between two important dimensions of citizenship that determine the degree and form of inclusiveness/exclusiveness of a national approach: firstly, the criteria for formal access to citizenship; and secondly, the cultural obligations that this access to citizenship entails.

Regarding the first dimension of citizenship, Britain and the Netherlands have a civic territorial basis for citizenship acquisition. This has made it relatively easy for migrants to gain access to formal civic rights, through *ius soli* at birth and naturalisation, when compared to countries such as Germany and Switzerland, where access to the political community has been based on preconditions that the candidate assimilate to the cultural requirements of the host country. However, Britain and the Netherlands also differ from those countries such as France, where the state grants relatively easy access to formal citizenship, but in doing so, is highly resistant to recognizing the existence of ethno-cultural groups and enforces a strict separation of state and church. In contrast to France’s imposition of a unitary mode of conduct for citizens in the public sphere, the multicultural approaches of Britain and the Netherlands do not make such access conditional upon assimilation, and new citizens are allowed to retain aspects of their cultural identities, and express them, and their interests, in the public sphere, including core institutions, such as schools, the military, and the media.
We now look briefly at some aspects of these country’s respective approaches. In addition to comparing integration policies, we also consider church/state relations and the resultant political space for migrant religions. This is an important factor defining a state’s approach for politically accommodating the cultural difference of migrants, which has previously tended to be overlooked in the literature, or subsumed under migrant policies.

In Britain, migrant organisation and political participation is facilitated by the state for ethnic or racial minorities. A state-sponsored “race relations” industry has emerged backed by anti-discrimination legislation and the authority of the Commission for Racial Equality and local bodies to report on practices for ensuring equal treatment, especially in the labour market. It is worth emphasizing that British political élites adopted “race” as a category when attempting to address the disadvantage of minority populations caused by discrimination. This “racialization” of policies in part reflected the fear of political élites that British “race riots” might escalate to the crisis point of those experienced in the United States in the 1960s. An outcome of this approach is that policies were more tailored to the integration of Afro-Caribbeans under the generic umbrella term “black“, than the relatively later inflows of migrants from the Indian sub-continent (Hiro 1991). Race Relations politics has been extended to Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis under the generic term “Asian”, which implies that groups with a self-identification that is non-racial, the prime example being Muslims, have been served relatively less well by the institutional apparatus (Modood 1988, Statham 1999). Another point worth making is that the constituency-based electoral system has provided the large concentrations of migrant communities in specific regions with a considerable resource-base of voting power for influencing their Members of Parliament. This has in turn led political parties to take up issues relating to ethnic minorities. At the local level of politics, migrants have made a considerable impact (Solomos and Back 1995, Garbaye 2000).

Religious institutions receive no direct state support, and the role of religion in public institutions is relegated to a matter of private individual conscience, but the British state does privilege its own Anglican religion within its understanding of politics. More than twenty Anglican bishops sit in the second chamber, the House of

---

3 More substantive overviews can be found in Hiro (1991) and Blackstone, Parekh and Saunders (1998) for Britain; and Rath et al. (1999) and Duyvené de Wit and Koopmans (2001), for the Netherlands.
Lords, and the Church of England, headed by the Monarch, stands as the official national religion. The limit which British law sets in extending rights to migrant religions was most clearly demonstrated by the ruling in the Rushdie Affair that blasphemy did not extend to Islam.\(^4\) A key feature of the Race Relations legislation is that it basically attributes rights to secular and not religious groups of minorities. Although Britain has special laws with regard to racial discrimination, there are no parallel laws that make religious discrimination a crime.\(^5\) Furthermore, several ruling interpretations of the 1976 Race Relations Act have steadfastly refused to extend group rights against discrimination to Muslims, although two ethno-religious groups, Sikhs and Jews, have been legally considered “ethnic” groups since 1983.\(^6\) Thus even when the Commission for Racial Equality brought a case against an engineering firm which refused to employ Muslims because it saw them as “extremists” in 1991, the employer was found guilty only of “indirect discrimination” against the racial category “Asians” and his anti-Muslim sentiments went legally unpunished (Vertovec 1996: 177, Lewis 2002: 250). In some ways reminiscent of France, British multiracialism has been far from reticent in opposing the extension of group rights to Muslims. The state has only recently allowed state funding for a few Islamic “faith schools”, which Anglican, Catholic and Jewish denominations have enjoyed for many years. In response there has been a concerted campaign by British Muslims and Race Relations campaigners to coin the phrase “Islamophobia” as a specific form of “racism”.\(^7\)

---

\(^4\) A case of blasphemy against Christianity had been successfully prosecuted as recently as 1979, against a poem asserting that Christ was a homosexual. The failure of the blasphemy cases against Rushdie were therefore not due to the secularisation rendering “blasphemy law” archaic.

\(^5\) Such laws with respect to religious discrimination are in force only in Northern Ireland in an attempt to combat the local conflicts along confessional lines between Protestants and Catholics. In 2001, the crime of “incitement to religious hatred” was bolted onto the statute book parallel to the already existing crime of “incitement to racial hatred”. This shows that the state is slowly acknowledging some degree of recognition for religion within Race Relations, but not yet in the direct way it does for race/ethnicity.

\(^6\) In Mandla v. Dowell-Lee 1983 a head teacher’s refusal to allow a Sikh boy to wear a turban in school was successfully challenged under the Race Relations Act and it was established that Sikhs and by extension Jews were “ethnic” groups.

\(^7\) This framing is interesting because it tries to include Islam as a category within the Race Relations framework, by conflating the secular status of racial minority with that of a religious faith group. See, for example, the reports by the Runnymede Trust on “Islamophobia” (1997) and the Parekh report on “The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain” (2000).
The Netherlands recognized relatively early that many “guestworker” migrants would remain, and reacted through the inclusive Minderhedennota (minorities policy) of 1983, which stated that, “Achieving a society in which all members of minority groups in the Netherlands, individually and also as groups, are in a situation of equality and have full opportunities for their development”, or in short a policy objective of “integration with retention of own culture” (Entzinger 2003: 63). Importantly, for our discussion of group rights, Dutch policies perceived migrants in terms of their group membership and not primarily as individuals. Following the Dutch tradition of institutionalised pluralism “pillarization” (verzuiling) (Lijphart 1975), the government’s policies provided for a large degree of autonomy for “ethnic minorities” in the cultural sphere, and incorporated minority elites into politics by subsidizing representative organizations and their inclusion in the policy deliberation and implementation processes. In the Netherlands, the state even went as far as opening up civil service positions and local voting rights to foreign residents. Thus in contrast to Britain, Dutch cultural pluralism did not provide a “racialised” straightjacket for minority identities. Instead the Dutch elites considered that integration is most likely to be accomplished through confident subcultures, which makes the preservation of minority cultures an essential part of their incorporation. In the 1990s, Dutch minority policy moved away from this idealist undiluted multiculturalism and toward a more British-style focus on socio-economic parity, when the realism set in that maintaining group diversity could also mean structuring disadvantage for those groups. Nonetheless, the Dutch approach still retains important distinctive characteristics with the result that it offers a wider and deeper range of cultural opportunities for minority groups than Britain, which is important, because it encouraged the preservation of a wide range of homeland, national and ethnic identities. The “pillarised” system of consociational politics has the tradition for delegating state prerogatives to religious communities. As a result, religious group rights extend much further than those granted in Britain, so that, for example, religious groups have the legal right to government funding for their schools. The policy traces of Dutch-style multiculturalism avant la lettre remain. Thus we find a state funded Islamic broadcasting network (Moslim-omroep), an Islamic school board, an Islamic pedagogic centre, and more than forty Islamic schools, which are fully government funded with a regular Dutch curriculum. Just as the “old” Christian and Protestant pillars had their own state-sponsored semi-autonomous institutions in education, health, welfare
and the public media, such rights could not be denied to the new cultural and religious minorities. Even though the Dutch state retreated from this “pure” multiculturalism, in comparison to Britain, it still serves as the case for a more facilitating approach to accommodating group demands, especially as our data covers the period 1992-8, when the more radical multicultural policy was still in place.

Data collection

To investigate the political claims-making of migrants in Britain and the Netherlands, we use data drawn from content analyses of daily newspapers in the two countries. In contrast to many media content analyses, we are not primarily interested in the way in which the media frame events. On the contrary, our focus is on the news coverage of mobilisation, public statements and other forms of claims-making by non-media actors. Taking a cue from “protest event analysis” in the study of social movements (Tarrow 1989, Olzak 1989, Rucht, Koopmans, and Neidhardt 1998), the units of analysis are not articles, but individual instances of claims-making (Koopmans and Statham 1999). Instances of claims-making have been included irrespective of their form, and range from violent attacks on other groups, public demonstrations and legal action, to public statements.

Acts were included in the data if they involved demands, criticisms, or proposals related to the regulation or evaluation of immigration, minority integration, or xenophobia. Because of our special interest in migrant claims-making, we included acts by resident minorities of migrant origin, even if they were not related to these issues, provided, of course, that they involved some political claim. Regarding territorial criteria we included all acts in Britain and the Netherlands, respectively. There are obviously limitations to our data. The data-set excludes claims-making outside the public sphere (e.g., insider lobbying), as well as claims-making in partial public spheres (e.g., claims directed at school boards by parents, or purely local issues). However, it should be pointed out that once such claims become controversial, they too tend eventually to be reported in the nationwide press, and would then be picked up by our sources.

For the comparative analysis here, we use data drawn from every second issue (Monday, Wednesday, Friday) of The Guardian for Britain,
and the NRC/Handelsblad for the Netherlands. These papers were chosen because they are of a comparable, moderately left-liberal political affiliation, and because, compared to other national quality newspapers, they have the most encompassing coverage of the specific issues of interest. The data cover the same periods in the four countries: 1992-1998. When using newspapers as a source one has to deal with the problem of selection—not all events that occur receive coverage—and description bias—events may get covered in a distorted way (McCarthy et al. 1996). We have tried to minimize the problem of description bias by explicitly basing the coding only on the factual coverage of statements and events in newspaper articles, and leaving out any comments and evaluations made by reporters or editors. In any case, quality newspapers have to protect their reputation and cannot afford to quote claims patently incorrectly. Since our interest here lies with public claims-making, the problem of selection bias is less aggravating here than in some other contexts, because acts of claims-making become relevant—and potentially controversial—only when they reach the public sphere.

The Overall Picture of Claims-making for Group Demands

A first empirical question to address is the extent of migrants’ claims-making for group demands. Table 1 shows cases where the substantive focus of migrant claims-making is for group demands relating to cultural or religious difference.

---

8 Data were coded from microfilm and CD-ROM versions of the newspapers by trained coding assistants on the basis of a standardized codebook. All articles in the home news section of the newspapers were checked for relevant acts, i.e. the search was not limited to articles containing certain key words. For the main variables in the analysis (actors, addressees, aims, etc.) open category lists were used, which allow us to retain the detail of the original reports in the analysis. In addition, hard copies of the original articles were kept to allow us to go back to the original reports if information was needed that had not been captured by the variables and categories included in the codebook (codebooks are available from the authors on request). The use of very detailed open category systems including hundreds of different actors and claims entails that conventional measures of inter-coder reliability are not applicable to these variables. Anyway, the categorizations used in the present analyses are not based on coder decisions, but are the result of aggregations of raw codes by the authors (for a similar two-stage procedure of content analysis, see Shapiro and Markoff 1998, pp. 73ff., 199ff).
First we see that, quantitatively, migrants’ group demands constitute a very small proportion of all claims made on immigration and ethnic relations politics, accounting for 2.0% in the Netherlands and 3.4% in Britain. Such an empirical finding is difficult to tally with the impression given by much of the literature about multiculturalism, that migrants’ claims-making for group demands presents a fundamental challenge to the integrative capacity of the liberal nation-state. Even when we include the claims by non-migrant collective actors about group demands, the proportion of this type of claims-making remains very modest: Netherlands 5.5% and Britain 7.7%.

Surprisingly, we also find from Table 1, a slightly higher level of group demands in Britain, the weaker variant of multicultural policies, when compared to the Netherlands. This goes against our expectation that the stronger variant of multiculturalism in the Netherlands would have encouraged more group demands, and shows that there are some limits to policy approaches’ ability to shape migrants’ behaviour.

In Table 2, we examine the collective identities which migrants used for making group demands. Migrants may use at least four types of collective identities, drawn from identification with: the status categories of integration policies, e.g., as “ethnic minorities”; with a “racial” group, e.g., as “black”; their religion, e.g., as Hindu; or lastly with their ethnicity, or nationality of their country of origin, as Roma or
Table 2
Collective Identities used by Migrants in Claims-making for Group Demands
The Netherlands and Britain, 1992-8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Type</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy-status identities</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities/allochthonen</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial identities</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious identities</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rastafarian</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-religious identities</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic and national identities</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinti and Roma</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mollucan</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyphenated identification with country of residence</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sum total                             | 111.1       | 109.1   |

N =                                      45          | 44
“Asians” (the categorisation from British Race Relations policies for Indian Subcontinent migrants), “Muslims”, or as “ethnic minorities”, and as “British Asians” or “British Muslims”. The actual collective identities which migrant groups use for entering the public domain is a strategic dimension of their claims-making.

Table 2 shows the type of collective identities expressed by migrants when making group demands in the Netherlands and Britain. The most striking feature is that more than six tenths of these migrant group demands were made using religious forms of identification in the Netherlands (60.0%), and two thirds in Britain (65.9%). This is what we would expect in the Netherlands which facilitates religious group identities within its minority politics, but runs counter to our expectations for Britain where such identities are excluded from the Race Relations framework (with the exceptions of the ethno-religions Judaism and Sikhism).

In addition, we see that the vast majority of these group demands were made by migrants identifying themselves as “Muslim” (Netherlands 46.7%, Britain 61.4%). Again this especially surprising for Britain, which excludes Islam and sponsors the “Asian” identity for Indian Subcontinent minorities, and once more points to the limitation of state policies in shaping migrants’ behaviour.

Another finding is the low number of group demands made by other migrant faith groups, when compared to Muslims. Although both countries have significant migrant populations of Hindu faith, who face exactly the same multicultural and state/religion policies as Muslims, there is little evidence for Hindus making group demands using religious identities (Netherlands 6.7%; Britain 2.3%). Likewise, the ethno-religious group, Jews, actually mobilise less in the group demands field than they do overall. Jews make 2.2% of group demands in the Netherlands and 6.8% in Britain, whilst they account for 8.1% of all claims-making by Dutch migrants and 5.5% by British migrants, respectively. This low presence of group demands in the claims-making repertoires of Jews stands in sharp contrast to Muslims, for whom between four tenths and two thirds of all claims-making was for group demands (Netherlands 50.0%, Britain 67.5%).

---

9 We measure collective identities by the way in which migrant collective actors are described in our newspaper sources. Names of organisations are important vehicles for the self-presentation of groups toward both their constituency, and the wider society, and therefore may be considered good indicators of the group’s collective identity. In addition, we allow for the possibility for composite identities, by coding multiple identities. Thus the Turks-Islamitische Culturele Federatie receives two identity codes “Turkish” and “Muslim”. This double-counting explains why the figures are greater than 100% in the sum total row.
With respect to the difference between Jews and Muslims, one can point to the much longer history of political accommodation of Jews within Western European societies. In addition, the vast majority of Jews practise their faith, if at all, to the same limited extent as the vast majority of nominal Christians. Such factors may explain why Jews make few group demands relative to Muslims. However, such differences do not hold for Hindus, who came in the same waves of migration, from the same regions, and who have received similar levels of political and religious accommodation as Muslims. Although Hinduism in some of its manifestations can promote values that are equally as incommensurable to liberal democratic values as Islam, Hindu group demands are largely invisible in the public domain.

We consider that the relatively low level of Hindu group demands compared to Muslims is a result of the different infrastructures of the two religions in their societies of settlement. Islam is a more collective and public religion centred on the Mosque, whereas there are many different types of Hinduism, traceable in part to regional or caste differences, and the home is often the principal location for worship in a religion which demands few public celebrations (Hiro 1991, Rex and Tomlinson 1983, Poulter 1998). As a non-proselytising de-centralised religion that is practised privately, Hinduism has fitted more easily as a new minority religion within the political space granted to religions. In addition, Hindu Temples have not taken on the same functions for the migrant community of service provision and negotiating at the interface with the host political authorities that the Mosque has for Muslims.

In sum, our findings here indicate important group-specific differences between religious minorities, and toward an especially high propensity of group demands by Muslims. The key finding is that regardless of the differences in national contexts for attributing group rights, it is principally only Muslims who make group demands. We argue that this finding provides strong suggestive evidence that there is something about the relationship between liberal states and their Muslim migrants, which leads to group demands. On one side, it could be that there is something specific about the political position of Muslims in their societies of settlement, which leads to claims-making for group demands, independently of national context. Here, we hypothesise that it is the public nature of the Islamic religion and the demands that it makes on the way that followers conduct their public lives, which makes Islam an especially resistant type of identity, and which results in claims-making for group demands. On the other, it could be that there is something specific in the way that liberal
democratic states attempt to accommodate their Muslims, which leads to group demands. Here, we hypothesise that there are specific deficits in liberal states’ cultural provision for migrant and religious group needs which impact disproportionately on groups who are practising Muslims. In order to investigate these questions, empirically and cross-nationally, we now undertake a detailed qualitative analysis of Muslims’ group demands.

**Qualitative Analysis of Muslims’ Group Demands for Rights**

Following from the earlier discussion, we distinguish between two types of group demand for rights: “exceptional” and “parity”. By “exceptional”, we refer to those group demands for rights that are not already granted to other native cultural, minority or religious groups. Claims for exceptional group rights demand something substantively “new”, or a special exemption for the migrant or religious group, which if realised, sets the group apart from all other groups. It is particularly challenging to the form of cultural pluralism sponsored by a country’s policies, because it demands group rights, and exemptions from duties, that go beyond those granted to other national minority and religious groups. For example, those claims relating to conflicts over Muslim women wearing the headscarf in French state institutions where religious symbolism is prohibited are examples of exceptional group rights demands. In contrast, “parity” demands for group rights request the same privileges, and exemptions from duties, that are already extended to other religious and minority groups. Here the group demand is for equality with other groups who are already granted special treatment. Such demands for parity are generally less challenging and easier to accommodate than “exceptional” ones, because they do not directly challenge the logic of the category system used by a country’s migrant or church/state policies. On the contrary, they only demand that the privileges already granted to some minorities, are extended to another migrant group. For example, if Turkish Muslims in Germany request state subsidies for religious and cultural organisations of the kind already granted to Jews, then this is a parity demand.

Not all group demands are for rights, there are group demands which are weaker and which simply mobilise the group’s collective identity in the public domain rather than engaging in the context of rights on offer from a country’s multicultural policies. An example of this would be the Islamic federation in Berlin denying that it had links
with the extremist group Milli Görüs, stating “we want to transmit the Islamic religion, not politics”. This is not a demand for group rights made on the host state and society, but an assertion of group identity that is made in it. Our analysis will focus principally on cases of exceptional and parity group rights demands, which are more explicitly formulated.

In addition, we consider the nature of the relationship between the state and native public, on one side, and the Muslim group, on the other, which produces a group demand. We refer to this as the motivational impetus of a group demand. A “proactive” group demand is mobilised autonomously by the Muslim group, independently from actions by the state and host society actors, and is a more assertive form of claims-making. Conversely, a “reactive” group demand is when it is mobilised in response to an intervention by state or native public actors, for example, when the state officially bans a form of religious expression in public places.

Lastly, we look at the type of action form used to mobilise a group demand. Here we use the standard social movements’ categorisations for protest action repertoires which range from conventional and demonstrative, to confrontational, and then violent forms.

The strategic orientation of group demands may be either acculturative or dissociative in their relationship to a state’s cultural pluralism. Acculturative claims-making fits within the state’s framework and policies for categorising minority or religious groups, whereas dissociative claims-making challenges the state’s approach to minority and religious difference, by making demands which go further than, or ignore, current formulations. In general, one would expect exceptional rights demands to be dissociative because they are the most demanding on the dominant host culture. They are subsequently also likely to lead to reactions by state institutions and native public discourses, which may result in conflicts. Parity rights demands also have a potential to become highly controversial, and provoke strong host society and state reactions. However, “parity” group demands are more likely to be acculturative than exceptional demands, because they try to fit into an existing framework of political accommodation.

The Netherlands: Islam Pushing for a New “Pillar”

The examples of Muslim group demands in our Dutch sample cover issues that are common to the literature on multiculturalism. Six cases refer to issues about Islamic schools, six are about attempts to set up a
Dutch Imam school, and the remainder cover requirements and exemptions for halal meat, provision of religious and cultural centres, Imams for Muslim prisoners, broadcasting rights for Muslims, and divorce by *sharia* law.

Of the group demands by Muslims in the Netherlands, sixteen of the twenty-one cases in our sample are demands for “parity” group rights with other groups, four of the cases are claims for “exceptional” group rights, and only one case stands outside the context of rights demands.

Concerning the action forms used to mobilise demands, there is only a single case of protest. In this instance, the Aya Sofia Association and the Mosque Neighbourhood Association Milli Görüş in Amsterdam West organised a 6000 strong demonstration against the refusal of the borough government to permit a large cultural centre. In all other cases, Muslims used conventional action forms for claims-making, including public speeches and statements. This predominant use of conventional action forms gives a first indication of the receptiveness of Dutch multicultural politics to group demands.

At first glance, our findings fit the cosy image that Dutch group-based multicultural policies produce a pacified and acculturative form of group demands by Muslims. As we have seen, the Dutch state grants minority group rights almost automatically in a way that encourages migrants to see themselves as new groups with new group demands. Indeed the Dutch political space is so receptive to group claims, that even for Muslims, a group which other countries find difficult to accommodate, it is hard to make “exceptional” group rights demands. This is because the Dutch state appears ever willing to acknowledge another cultural religious “pillar” within its national political community, using the principle that what is already granted to some groups must therefore be extended to all groups.

Another finding that points to the confidence of Muslims in the Netherlands for making group demands, is that seventeen of the twenty-one cases of Muslim’s group demands were pro-active, compared to only three that were reactive, and one that was neither. Again this seems to point to the beneficial outcomes of the Dutch style group-based multiculturalism which creates incentives for Muslims to make this type of demand. Before getting too carried away with the benefits of Dutch multiculturalism, however, it is first worth looking more closely at specific examples of these claims and the nature of the controversies which they represent.

Turning to the “exceptional” group rights demands, a first example is where a separate Islamic Butchers’ Association is set up with the
claim that Muslims are unable to follow the regular training and education of butchers because their faith prohibits them dealing with pork. Another exceptional group demand occurs when the Union of Moroccan Muslim Organisations in the Netherlands (Ummon) advocates educating Imams in the Netherlands, and providing education in the language and knowledge of Dutch society for foreign Imams. These are good examples of Muslims in the Netherlands having the confidence to proactively demand new exceptions as a group in the belief that this will be straightforwardly accommodated by the state. Although they are examples of exceptional group rights demands, the strong group-based enforcement within Dutch multicultural policies means that overall these claims are acculturative rather than dissociative in nature, and unlikely to provoke reactions from the host society.

In contrast, it is the strength of the enforcement of the group rights principle by Dutch politics that actually causes another of our examples of exceptional group rights demands. In this case, Muslims actually challenge the consequences for them of the over-liberal tendencies within Dutch multiculturalism. The Dutch Muslim Council and the Moroccan Women’s Society come out publicly against the bill proposed by the Secretary of Justice to allow for one-sided marriage dissolution according to Islamic law. Here the dissociative basis of the Muslim demand is against the proposed policies of the Dutch state, which appears willingly to promote exceptional group rights for Muslims that at least some important groups do not even want. It also indicates that the state promotion of groupness *ad infinitum* is prepared in some instances to subordinate Dutch law about gender rights to what is sees as the internal law of the Muslim community. In this example, the rosy image of the consequences of cultural pluralism Dutch-style begins to slip. This case of extreme multiculturalism seems content to view Muslims as a society apart from the Dutch, and fit to be run by their own internal community rules, a position which the Muslim groups themselves challenge. Such a policy stance would be unthinkable in Britain. Indeed the biggest threat or challenge to the integrative capacity of the nation-state in this instance is from the over-willingness of Dutch policy-makers to grant exceptional group rights rather than from the Muslims’ group demands.

Looking now at some Dutch examples of Muslim demands for parity rights, it is clear that many of these would constitute demands for exceptional group rights in Britain. Thus the Islamic Broadcasting Foundation claims that its right to broadcast on the public channel is a good way of advancing the integration of Muslims into Dutch society. The
Halal Food Foundation announces that it hopes to end the “unreliable” supply of ritually slaughtered meat for the Islamic consumer after being granted the right to introduce their own hallmark, a concession giving them a parity of rights with Jews. The Islamic Council of the Netherlands and researchers associated with the Islamic Chair of the University of Amsterdam, make a demand that there should be between 25 and 30 Imams employed in prisons. According to their research, this would bring Islam proportionally in line with other faith denominations. These examples demonstrate, firstly, the far-reaching sponsorship of group rights by the Dutch authorities, and secondly, that this creates a political space and set of incentives for group demands by Muslims. This legitimation of group demands by Dutch multicultural policies, has the effect of making those Muslim group demands seem officially benign, which in Britain would most likely provoke reactions from states and native publics.

In the cases relating to training Imams, we find the following group demands: The Centre for Islamic Studies advocates state sponsorship for the education of Imams, on a par with that provided for Christian vicars and priests, on the condition that the government does not interfere in the substance of the education. In a case already referred to, the Union of Moroccan Muslim Organisations in the Netherlands (Ummon) makes a request for additional Dutch language training and knowledge of Dutch society as part of the education for Imams. The holder of an Islamic Professorial Chair at a University comes out in favour of a Dutch Imam education, as does a resident Imam. Against this the President of the Turkish-Islamic Cultural Federation strongly criticises the proposals of the Dutch liberal MP Dijkstal to found a Dutch Imam school. Here we find a range of different positions being expressed by leading organisations from different factions within the Muslim community, all in response to an agenda of group rights set by the state. These examples of claims-making about Imam education are illustrative of another feature of the controversies about Islam in Dutch society. Instead of controversies occurring between the native population and Muslims, Dutch state policies tend to promote controversies and competition over resources within different factions of the Muslim communities.

Such factionalism and competition within Muslim communities, may lead to the proliferation of ever smaller denominations of groups, who demand their own group rights from the state. Further evidence for this comes from our claims on Islamic schools. In one case, the Foundation of Islamic Primary Education (IQRA) demands that different denominations from within Islam have the right to separate
In another, the Headmaster of the Yunus Emre Islamic primary school in The Hague advocates that a new school should be founded for a more orthodox Islamic education. On the same matter, the Islamic School Board Association (ISBO), an umbrella organisation for 29 Islamic schools in the Netherlands, publicly rules that the distinction between whether a school follows liberal or orthodox Islamic teaching is unimportant. Once more, this issue demonstrates that Dutch multiculturalism encourages Muslims to set up ever smaller denominational groups, through establishing new organisations which they expect will receive state recognition and subsidies. Also the orthodox Islam that these smaller factions will teach are likely to reproduce the separatist tendencies that will lead to internally cohesive Muslim communities, but ones which are inward-looking, and which hardly fit into Dutch society. Here we witness once more that Dutch liberal multiculturalism lets community group rights take precedence over the national community. Such an approach takes Dutch society in a direction that may reproduce parallel and divided rather than cohesive societies.

**Britain: Islam as a Challenge to Race Relations**

In our group claims by Muslims in Britain, five cases relate to the issuing of a fatwa against Salman Rushdie for publishing the Satanic Verses. Another five relate to the perceived stigmatisation and lack of respect by the native population and within the public sphere for Islamic symbols and people. Of the remainder, a significant proportion are about the relationship between the state and the Muslim community, including claims about state subsidies and recognition for Islamic schools, religious education in state schools, anti-discrimination measures for Muslims, treatment of Muslims in state prisons, the suitability of social amenities provided by authorities for Muslims, and finally, the political representation of Muslims.

Of the twenty seven group demands, nine are for exceptional group rights, nine are for parity group rights, and nine do not make

---

10 In the Dutch case, this is not an exceptional group rights demand because it is a right that is already extended, for example, to the Reformed and Calvinist denominations of Dutch Protestants.

11 This is the case even though our sample only starts in 1992, a few years after the fatwa was issued against Rushdie (1989), which underlines the resonance of this case for Britain.
rights demands. This differs from the Dutch case where most demands are for parity rather than exceptional rights. In general, this indicates that Muslims in Britain have more difficulty fitting their demands within the framework of state-sponsored multiculturalism than their Dutch counterparts.

Regarding the motivational impetus of Muslim group demands, we find a strong tendency for proactive claims in Britain, with twenty proactive cases, five reactive, and two unclassifiable, which is similar to the Dutch. This shows that British Muslims like their Dutch counterparts have sufficient incentives from their country’s multicultural policies to assert themselves autonomously, instead of simply reacting to issues raised by the state and host society. However, in contrast to Dutch Muslims’ assertiveness which was almost entirely acculturative and for parity demands, a significant proportion of assertiveness by British Muslims is dissociative and for exceptional demands (all nine cases of exceptional demands are proactive). Dutch multicultural policies appear to stimulate a type of Muslim pro-activism for group demands that is easily absorbed by state authorities in a non-contested way. In contrast, the more restrictive British definition of multicultural group rights seems to produce a different type of pro-active Muslim group demand, which is more confrontational than those in the Netherlands.

This confrontational nature of Muslim group demands in Britain is underlined by their action forms. In seven out of twenty seven cases, Muslims use protest to mobilise their group demands, and five of these are confrontational or violent events. In one protest, Muslim youths petrol bomb a Bingo hall in Luton. They are protesting against a company called “Mecca” using its brand name on public display to promote gambling. In another, Muslim tenants launch a petition against Blackburn Council requesting that their toilets be repositioned so that they no longer face Mecca. In a further two cases, Muslim parents organise boycotts by their children of state schools against what they see as the harmful effects of comparative religion lessons in the national curriculum. In the last of the confrontational/violent protests, two hundred people attend a Nation of Islam (UK) rally, a black rights group.12

---

12 This case is the only group demand in our British sample that is not by Muslims of Indian subcontinent origin. Although scholars of religion often do not include Louis Farrakhan’s Nation of Islam movement as a form of Islamic belief (e.g. Robinson 1997), our selection criteria is on how groups label themselves and are visible in the public domain, which necessitates inclusion. The Nation of Islam movement has been imported from the United States to Britain and finds support among some sections of the African Caribbean community.
Turning to the nine exceptional group demands, all of which are proactive, three refer to the Rushdie affair and challenge the sovereign authority of the British state. In one case, the Muslim Parliament\(^\text{13}\) appeals to the authority of Islamic law above British law: “He (Rushdie) has committed a capital offence. An Islamic legal authority has passed a judgement. It’s just like a court passing a judgement in this country. The Muslim community feels that this judgement is right and legal”. In others, again by the Muslim Parliament, but also by the Bradford Council of Mosques, anti-Rushdie sentiments are tempered by emphasising that campaigns against the Satanic Verses should remain within British law. In another, a Muslim prisoner challenges the state’s “strip search” method, arguing that he was entitled to maintain his religious beliefs and that a decision not to provide him with modest clothing was “unlawful and unreasonable”. The boycott against comparative religion classes in the national curriculum, already mentioned, was supported by the Association of Muslim Schools who argued: “If they get bombarded with different ideologies and different thinking, the Muslim child gets so clicked on to what the teacher is saying, that he or she thinks whatever the teacher is saying is the truth.” The welfare provision of state authorities is the target of criticism in the other demands. For example, the Muslim Parliament argues that the Commission for Racial Equality is inadequate for addressing discrimination against Muslims and advocates the setting up of a Muslim welfare state. In one case, however, a non-state actor is the target. Muslims in Nottingham criticise a shop-owner for displaying shoes in his window that have verses from the Koran printed on them: “It is more serious than Salman Rushdie. Rushdie wrote a book which you carry in your hand. Here the holy name goes on the feet!”

These examples show that exceptional group demands by Muslims do not fit easily in British Race Relations politics, and are not easily accommodated by it. The demands we cite, in particular those on Rushdie, are highly incommensurable with the values of minority politics sponsored by the British state. This finding is evidence that there are aspects of Islamic religious belief, that require rituals, practices and the expression of beliefs in the public domain, which British policies have difficulty in accommodating and which lead to

\(^{13}\) The name of this organisation the “Muslim Parliament” is somewhat misleading because it is neither a broad-based nor representative organisation for Muslims in Britain. It is entirely nominated and self-selected, and exists as a forum for expression of more radical forms of Islam and for ideas that suggest secession, or at least isolation, from British society (Rex 2002).
conflicts. According to our interpretation, this British Muslim assertiveness is not simply an inherent characteristic of the Islamic belief system, but is an outcome that is importantly shaped by the type of political opportunities with which minorities are confronted by British-style cultural pluralism. As we discussed earlier, British Muslims achieve group rights as racial, ethnic or national minority groups, but not as a religious minority group. Hence Muslims are included as a special group in the political community only indirectly, as ethnic or racial minority groups, and not directly as Muslims, which is how they see themselves. Living in a country with which they identify as much as other ethnic minorities, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims feel aggrieved, that their preferred form of self-identification is not legally sanctioned. Muslims perceive that this leaves them as “second class” minorities. They see themselves as less protected from discrimination by the state than other minority groups, and as believers of a faith that the state has been unwilling to uphold on a par with other minority religions. The comparison with the Netherlands is instructive. Whereas Dutch multiculturalism creates pressure for too many types of groups to be included in society causing competition between minorities, British Race Relations leaves Muslims feeling excluded as group, and they assertively make demands on a state which they perceive as relegating them to a “second class” status in the national community.

This interpretation receives further support from our examples of parity group demands, which are more acculturative, and construct a vision of how Muslims would like to position themselves within the Race Relations framework. A first case appears in the context of the Runnymede Trust’s consultation document on “Islamophobia”, which calls for radical changes in the attitudes of politicians, media and community leaders to fight discrimination against “British Muslims” (sic). Here the Muslim College criticises the state for not extending the same anti-discrimination measures to Muslims as it does for others, arguing that, “the vast majority of our community want to live in this country and want to be citizens of this country. It is our right as citizens to be able to say to the country, “Here, we think your policies are wrong”. In another after the 1995 Bradford “race riots”, Muslim Community leaders and the Muslim Parliament claim that “Pakistanis are twice as likely to be unemployed than Afro-Caribbean or Indian

14 Asked whether they thought of themselves as British, 66% of Pakistani and 60% of Bangladeshi minorities (predominantly Muslim) answered in the affirmative, compared to 62% of Indian (predominantly Hindu) and 64% of Caribbean minorities (Modood et al 1997: 329).
people, there is no other reason for this than discrimination or demonisation of Muslims.’ In similar vein, two editors of Muslim newspapers criticise the suitability of the Commission for Racial Equality for “Muslim racial problems”, with one stating, “the Muslim population is doubly discriminated against firstly because of their skin colour, and secondly because of their religion.” Such claims are not confrontational expressions of cultural difference per se, but constitute reasoned arguments for more space to be granted within British multiculturalism so that Muslims can act as full and equal citizens in the national community. The examples are not atypical, in others, the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs calls on political parties to court the Muslim vote or face a profound cost to social harmony, and a local Islam society liaises with the Borough Council to better understand why there is less usage of leisure facilities by the Muslim community than other sections of the population.

Although these parity demands often use the “civic” language and terminology of Race Relations and express the aim of improving the integration of Muslims in British society, this does not mean that accommodating such group demands would be unproblematic. The Muslims’ perceived grievances are not just about higher levels of discrimination than other minority groups in society, but about how to fit their religious faith community into the landscape of British civic values. This is what is meant by “double discrimination” as a minority and as a religious group. In Britain, where the state relegates religious practice to a matter of private individual conscience, it is difficult to accommodate organisations which integrate the functions of civic association and religious faith provision in the public domain. As we discussed earlier, the public nature of religious practice and its overreaching into associational and political activities makes Islam a special case among British minority religions.

In the last two cases of parity demands, the state’s drive to provide a universal national education comes into conflict with Muslims for whom religion and faith is a way of life, and not simply a ritual act. In one case, a Muslim father believes that Trafford Council discriminated against his daughter by paying fees for Catholic pupils to attend an independent Catholic school, but not for his daughter to attend an independent Islamic school. An important difference between Catholics, and for that matter Jews, —other minority religions— compared to Muslims, is that in practice their religious denominational schools are for the most part religious in name but serve a largely secular population. The British state has been fairly consistently resistant to granting funding for Islamic
schools. The reason for this is the fear that through Islam ways of life that are founded on non-British values will be promoted by Islamic schools. Such a stance contrasts sharply to that of Dutch policy-makers prior to their recent policy shift, and it defines the cleavage of Race Relations vis à vis Muslims. On one side, Muslims assert their civic credentials as “British Muslims”, aggrieved at what they perceive as the discrimination against them by the state and native society. And on the other, the state pretends that Muslims are part of the British community, but steadfastly refuses to grant them the group rights that they fear would foster a segregated community of religious zealots living outside of British law.

Conclusion

This article set out to address the challenge to social cohesion presented by migrants’ group demands, by looking at empirical evidence in Britain and the Netherlands, two countries which in different ways and to different degrees had proceeded down the path of attempting to accommodate cultural difference within their national political self-understandings.

First, we demonstrated that when viewed quantitatively, the level of controversy about group demands is rather modest within the politics of claims-making about immigration and ethnic relations, accounting for only 7.7% of claims in Britain and 5.5% in the Netherlands. This seems to indicate that the strong emphasis on group demands within the migration literature over the last decade has not been matched by reality. Far from the images of societies pulling themselves apart at the cultural seams (see e.g., Huntington 1996), the cultural difference of migrants in their European societies of settlement does not appear to be the main characteristic of their own claims-making nor does it appear to be on a scale that would threaten the social cohesion of societies. However, this should not be interpreted as meaning that migrants’ group demands are easily accommodated and unproblematic.

Second, we found that controversies about group demands were to a large extent about the position of Muslims in western societies.

In England and Wales, about 7,000 of the 25,000 schools are faith schools which receive state support. In 2002, there were 4,716 Church of England, 2,110 Roman Catholic, 27 Methodist, 32 Jewish, 4 Muslim, 2 Sikh, 1 Seventh Day Adventist, and 1 Greek Orthodox faith schools. Despite longstanding requests, it is only in the last couple of years that this funding status has been granted to Muslims.
This resilience of Islam to political adaptation was demonstrated by comparison with another migrant religion Hinduism. Muslim and Hindu migrants share similar characteristics: they settled in the same waves of post-war migration, they come from the same regions of origin, with the same postcolonial traditions, and have the same type of community structure based on familial ties and patron-client relationships. However, in contrast to Muslims, our data shows that Hindus are largely conspicuous by their absence in public. We argued that this Muslim exceptionalism was due to the more visible and public nature of the religion, and the demands which it placed on followers’ and their interactions with the core public institutions of the society of settlement.

Our qualitative analysis of group demands by Muslims showed that the more open Dutch and more restrictive British attempts to accommodate cultural difference had both encountered problems that are difficult to resolve. Close inspection revealed that the outcomes of Dutch multiculturalism do not support the notion that granting multicultural rights strengthens political integration in multiethnic societies. For a start, we find the Dutch state pushing group rights down the throats of Muslims, which at least some important sections of the Muslims community do not want. The Secretary of Justice’s Bill to allow one-sided marriage dissolution, puts group law above national civic law by denying the individual equality of women. Here the famous Dutch tolerance seems prepared to sanction similar attitudes among the Islamic faith community —i.e., inequality of women— to the illiberal ones that it has long tolerated for decades from Protestant fundamentalists. This is only one case, but it is instructive about the impact of Dutch policies on associational activity by Muslims. The state grants so many group rights that being acculturative in the Dutch political context, does not substantively mean being integrated into the national community, but in some cases being separated from it. Dutch multiculturalism’s toleration of Islam may lead to less public conflicts, but this can also be read as a lack of care for ensuring community cohesion. If the native Dutch communities are self-organised in their own “pillars” and their lives do not come into any institutional contact with Muslims, then why should they be bothered by Muslims’ strange demands and odd-sounding customs? Precisely these problems and the fear that policies were structuring the disadvantage of minorities lead to the shift in Dutch policy-thinking toward a more British-style integrationist approach.

British Muslims are similarly assertive to their Dutch counterparts. However, in contrast their group demands are more often for
exceptional rights and dissociative. We find British Muslims mobilising assertively, sometimes violently, and often in ways that directly target the workings and principles of state authorities. On one side, the state remains unwilling to grant rights to Muslims fearing that the associational activities of the Muslim community cannot easily be included within its secular integrationist formula, not least because they aim to promote a political role for the Islamic faith. On the other, we find incommensurable demands by Muslims that appear to make such fears well founded. To be fair, we do also find a significant number of British Muslims’ group demands that are made within the Race Relations framework and that would be relatively easily accommodated if Muslims to were categorised as an “ethno-religion” in British law. Nonetheless, we consider that it is unlikely the British multiracial politics will be able to accommodate Islam, without ongoing conflicts.

In short we have tested two national approaches for the accommodation of Islam, and found them to be problematic, but in different ways. This gloomy conclusion in part arises from the fact that Islam cannot simply be confined to religious faith but advances into the realm of politics where the state’s authority and civic citizenship obligations reign supreme.

Perhaps the lesson to learn from the British and Dutch experience is that there is no easy blueprint for multicultural policies, especially with regard to Muslim migrants. Although accommodating Islam will be marked by conflicts, it is still perhaps better to have political conflicts over being part of a national community, than to have resident minorities who see themselves apart from the native civil society. In addition, the passage of time may bring more “domesticated” nationalised forms of Islam, whose demands are more easily included within existing frameworks, and whose believers share more of the secular core values of the native majority publics. Much depends on the willingness of the Muslim communities to adapt and the states in their societies of settlement to negotiate viable, practical, and pragmatic forms of accommodation.

References


National Modes of Immigrant Integration

Friedrich Heckmann

European Forum for Migration Studies (EFMS), University of Bamberg

Introduction

The integration of immigrants is one of the major aspects of the overall integration of European societies. From the perspective of a future common EU immigration and integration policy it is important to know whether there are still different national patterns of immigrant integration, and if so, what effect they have on integration.

This research question was the main topic of the so-called EFFNATIS project (1998-2000), sponsored by the EU and coordinated by the European Forum for Migration Studies at the University of Bamberg. A comparative empirical study on possible effects of national modes of integration was done in France, Germany and Great Britain. Policy analyses were made for these three countries and in addition for Finland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and The Netherlands.

A promising approach to examining the research question is to study the integration of children of international migrants, often called the “second generation of migrants”, although they are not migrants themselves. Their situation reflects whether the incorporation of immigrants is progressing, stagnating or even regressing, a process which may last for several generations. A lack of integration of migrants and of the children of migrants may lead to forms of deviant behaviour and to an “ethnicisation” of social problems involving a “balkanisation” of society and along ethnic lines. It may also lead to ethnic mobilization and to ethnic conflict.

In this situation a research for “models” has taken place and different national patterns of integration are being discussed as to their relative merits or problems. A prevailing discourse in Europe compares different national patterns: for instance, a culturally unifying, French Republican model is confronted with British or Dutch so-called “multiculturalism”, and with a German orientation of social policy towards migrants.
According to this “national difference paradigm”, there is an “Intégration à la Francaise” which has been linked to the tradition of nation building since the foundation of the Republic and which aims at a culturally homogeneous nation. British or Dutch “multiculturalism”, on the other hand, supposedly is willing to retain cultural differences and the ethnic identities of immigrants. And Germany, due to its “Volk”-centred ethnic nation concept, supposedly will not accept immigrants as citizens, but nevertheless includes them in almost all social policy measures.

Three countries were chosen to inquire into the relevance of the national context for an empirical study of the integration of Children of International Migrants (CIM): France, Germany and Great Britain. Five other countries were chosen for secondary analyses of this question: Finland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and The Netherlands. While new and comparable data were collected in the first case, “secondary analyses” comprise the interpretation and evaluation of different kinds of existing sources. The three empirical country surveys aiming at a detailed picture of integration were supplemented by an analysis of European Labour Force data relating to the education and employment of CIM. Descriptions of integration policies or rather of “national modes of immigrant integration” were made for all eight countries involved. While much discussion has taken place in the literature concerning the assumption that different outcomes will result from national modes of integration, this thesis has never been empirically tested to our knowledge.

The concept of integration has been defined as the inclusion of new populations into the existing social structures of the immigration country with a consequent reduction of differences in their positions and relations. Four dimensions of the process have been differentiated: structural integration, which is the acquisition of rights and the access to membership, positions and statuses in the core institutions of the receiving society (education system, training system, labour market, citizenship, housing). Cultural integration is a pre-condition of participation and refers to processes of cognitive, cultural, behavioural and attitudinal change in people. This change concerns primarily the immigrants and their descendants, but it is an interactive, mutual process that changes the receiving society as well. Membership of immigrants in the new society in the private sphere is reflected in changes in peoples’ private relationships and group memberships (social intercourse, friendships, marriages, voluntary associations): that is, in their social integration. Membership of a new society on the subjective level shows in the sense of belonging and identification,
particularly in the form of ethnic and/or national identification: that is, identificational integration.

The main research task has been to look into different national kinds and degrees of integration of children of international migrants in France, Germany and Great Britain; in other words, to test the national differences paradigm. A major argument for the relevance of the nation as a context for integration is that it stands for different opportunity structures and conditions for actions for the immigrants and their descendants. The national difference paradigm is a context-related explanation. Alternative or complementing explanations could be related to the individual characteristics of respondents. Of these the project has tested a family resources and an ethnicity paradigm, and looked at gender, (perceived) discrimination and marginality as other explanatory concepts. The family resources paradigm represents the material, cultural and social resources that families and individuals possess. Ethnicity or ethnic difference relates to differences between ethnic groups among immigrants and the different characteristics of these groups. The discrimination approach (perceived discrimination) claims that integration may be blocked or hindered by discrimination on the part of the receiving society. According to the classical marginality paradigm, international migrants and their descendants suffer from problems of belonging and insecure identities, i.e. from problems of social, cultural and identificational integration. This may hinder their abilities to achieve the goals they have set for their immigration project and result in problems of structural integration.

The description and analysis of national modes of integration for the eight countries involved in the EFFNATIS project was done by looking at the immigration process to the country, by analysing the “societal definition of the immigration situation” and by describing the relationship between the “social order” and the “sense of nationhood” to the specific integration policies in a particular country.

Modes of Integration in Eight European Countries

In France there is a tradition of an “assimilation” policy, as it is known, with regard to foreign migrants. The nation has been historically constructed through the “assimilation” of populations from various regions (Burgundy, Brittany, Provence for example). Although these populations had their own cultural identities and in some cases religious identities, as well as traditional dress codes and languages, they were transformed into French citizens. The same policy has been
implemented with regard to migrants, who have gained the right to participate in political life and become part of a “community of citizens”. Whatever their origin, the main implicit principle of the French Republican approach is that the lack of any specific integration policy is the best way to integrate migrants and their children. The school system as modelled by the Third Republic, along with nationality legislation, has been considered the best instrument to integrate young people into the nation.

Immigration and integration policies in Germany up to the present have been influenced by a denial of the immigration situation. The long-lasting official denial of the immigration situation cannot, however, be equated with the lack of an integration policy. From the mid-1970s onwards integration policies—which are different from temporary measures of accommodation—can be identified. But, due to the denial of the immigration situation, integration measures for “foreigners” were of an ambiguous character. Fundamental changes occurred in Germany during the same time span of the EFFNATIS project (1998-2000). The definition of the situation changed with the denial of the immigration situation being abandoned. The nationality law was changed and an element of ius soli was introduced. The main feature of the German mode of integration has been to open the core institutions (labour market, self-employment, education and training system and housing) to the immigrants and to include them in the general welfare state and social policy system.

In Great Britain the immediate post-war period was characterised by accelerating immigration from the Caribbean, the Indian sub-continent and elsewhere from the former British Empire. Parallel to the restrictions of entry which later followed, policies have been developed across many areas of society to promote equal rights and opportunities for ethnic minorities, as the new immigrants have been termed. Central to this policy has been legislation to outlaw racial discrimination. There has been considerable tolerance of cultural difference within British society: Ethnic minority groups are free to create and recreate whatever private cultural forms they wish as long as they are legal. The discourse on ethnicity and the incorporation of migrants, however, is strongly racialized.

Finland has only recently become a country of immigration and developed an official integration policy in 1999. Most of the immigrants are “ethnic return migrants” from the former Soviet Union. One of Finland’s interesting features is the drawing up of individual integration plans for immigrants. Stимulated by the very high rate of unemployment among refugees from Third World countries, a discussion
has begun to introduce a system of competence assessment of migrants to support their integration into the labour market.

The recent emergence of an immigration situation is also true for Spain. The immigration situation has been characterised by large numbers of illegal migrants and ensuing amnesties. Measures to support the integration of immigrants embrace the following: setting up special channels to inform immigrants about the regulations affecting them, regulating the regrouping of families and providing complementary schooling in the language and culture of their country of origin or in their religious beliefs. Due to the fact that the immigration situation is still a new phenomenon, much of the discourse on integration relates to questions of schooling. The children of immigrants will normally be enrolled in a school within the general education system and will be expected to follow the same curriculum as Spanish children.

Sweden has had a history of immigration since World War II. Since the mid-1970s there has been a clear and distinct immigration and integration policy in Sweden, characterised by a tendency to limit the intake of new immigrants while allotting increasing resources to promote the integration of those already accepted. In this context, children of international migrants are a particular group whose integration is favoured. The Swedish integration policies rely heavily on the general welfare policies administered by the public sector. It has therefore been considered normal that the role of the public sector in promoting integration is large in comparison with many other European countries, where non-governmental organizations have a larger role to play.

Switzerland is a multicultural society with one of the highest immigration rates in Europe. However, Switzerland does not recognize that it has become an immigration country and has no real immigrant policy on the federal level. Another paradox is the fact that, in spite of the absence of most of the problems of other European immigration countries, the immigration issue has almost uninterruptedly been on Switzerland’s political agenda since the 1960s. The same factors which can be considered as crucial for the political integration of the country are also responsible for the specific ways Switzerland treats its migrants. These factors are federalism, municipal autonomy, consociational and direct democracy and the specific character of Swiss national identity. Concerning the integration of immigrants and their children, these principles have had much more ambiguous influence than on the political integration of the country.

The Netherlands: The tradition of a consociational democracy and the “pillarisation” of society have been important principles of the
social order that have influenced not only the sense of nationhood, but the integration of migrants as well. The main characteristic of consociational democracy is that conflicts are settled by pacification and compromise, leading to equal access to the state’s resources for all groups involved. This principle has been extended to the newcomers and has been conducive to formulating the idea of a Dutch multicultural society. Thanks to this multicultural society, special programmes for immigrants were started. But many special policies aimed at the integration of immigrants that were instigated in the 1980s have been substituted by general policies for all disadvantaged people, Autochthonous and migrants alike.

**Surveys in France, Germany and Great Britain**

A common questionnaire was constructed for the surveys on CIM’s integration in France, Germany and Great Britain. Representative samples of 16-25 old young people of migrant background and comparable groups of autochthonous respondents were interviewed in the cities of Vitry (metropolitan area of Paris) and Tours in France, Nürnberg in Germany and Blackburn and Rochdale in Great Britain. CIM in France were of Maghrebian and Portuguese background, in Germany of Turkish and ex-Yugoslavian and in Great Britain of Pakistani and Gujarati descent. The common data set comprises about 2,400 cases. The main line of interpretation is to regard differences in indicators between CIM and Autochthonous as the central measure of integration. The smaller the differences, the “better” the integration. The main instrument of statistical analysis was logistic regression. For a dependant, dichotomous variable we analyzed the relative size of influence of national differences vs. alternative or supplementary variables.

The major results of the surveys are as follows

Structural integration (education, training, employment): Compared to Britain and Germany, France has expanded its system of higher education the most. What is particularly interesting is that the Portuguese CIM outperform the French autochthonous group in educational attainment. The Maghrebian group’s position, however, is below the native French group. In addition, not only are there more people attending universities in France, but also the differences in attainment between CIM and autochthonous youth are the lowest.
In Germany the differences in educational attainment between CIM and the native reference group are largest, while Britain holds an intermediate position.

As to training and integration into the labour market, CIM in Germany seem to be relatively better off. They are under-represented on the academic track, but over-represented in the vocational training area which normally leads to respected positions in the labour market. Also, their unemployment rate is comparatively low. Young people in France — both Autochthonous and CIM — often cannot translate their formal educational status into a labour market position and their rate of unemployment is extremely high. It is likely that there is a kind of “over-academisation” in the French system and most likely a lack of labour market-oriented vocational training which affects both native people and CIM. Britain has the largest differences between CIM and Autochthonous regarding employment: almost three quarters of autochthonous young people are in employment or vocational training in a firm, while Pakistani and Indian CIM remain mainly in the educational system or are unemployed. The apprenticeship system is a clear domain of the British autochthonous youth, although it is a relatively small sector of the labour market.

Summarizing structural integration with education, training and labour market integration, we find a confirmation of the national difference hypothesis. Logistic regressions, testing national differences against alternative or additional explanations, confirm the national difference paradigm, with family resources, gender and ethnic group membership as additional influences. It is remarkable that these results on the basis of urban samples are fully confirmed by the analysis in the EFFNATIS project of Labour Force Survey Data for France, Germany and Great Britain which are representative national micro-census data with a huge sample size. The Labour Force data exist only in the structural dimension of integration.

Cultural integration is a rather heterogeneous area, relating to values and beliefs, cultural competences, popular culture and everyday practices. On the one hand we find a high degree of acculturation between CIM and the autochthonous population in all three countries — i.e. the groups are becoming very similar —, on the other hand there are rather stable structures of differences. Most acculturation has occurred in popular mass culture. Most CIM and autochthonous youth watch the same or similar TV channels, listen to the same “youth” radio stations and watch the same films in the cinemas. On the whole, relevant national differences between France, Germany and Great Britain do not appear in this area of cultural integration. In other forms
of everyday practices such as eating certain foods, drinking alcohol, leisure-time activities, we find more differences between CIM and autochthonous youth, particularly between Muslims and native people, but also marked national differences in that the CIM in Britain adhere more to ethnic tastes and preferences than the CIM groups in Germany and France do. As to competences, almost all CIM in all three countries rate their ability to speak and write the language of the immigration country as good or excellent. As to language preference and use in different relationships and situations, there is a clear national difference: CIM in Germany use their parents’ language much more often in the family and with friends compared to CIM in France and Great Britain. This probably reflects on the past “Ausländerpolitik” in Germany which forced migrants to retain strong ties to their country of origin. Religion is an area in which CIM remain much more like their parents than in the other areas that we looked into. On the whole, CIM are more religious and more conservative than the native groups. Regarding national differences, we find that British CIM adhere much more to the conservative religious practices of their parents compared to the CIM in France and Germany. This is in line with British ethnic minority policy.

Social integration: We looked at inter-ethnic friendship-patterns, partners and membership of organizations. In France and Germany there are substantial proportions (from 35 to 53 %) of inter-ethnic friendships among CIM, meaning at least one friend is not from one’s own ethnic background. Britain, however, stands out as being particularly ethnically homogeneous which corresponds to a high degree of ethnic residential segregation. As to partners (marriage or boyfriend/girlfriend) France and Germany again have a similar pattern with sizeable numbers of partners from a different ethnic group and Britain again has a pattern of high endogamy. Membership of organizations is another aspect of social integration. The general tendency of young people in Western societies to be sceptical about membership of organizations and associations is reflected in our data for all groups —CIM and Autochthonous— in all three countries. Those among the CIM who are members of an association are mostly members of non-ethnic sports clubs.

Social integration is a two-way process. Apart from possible processes of self-segregation on the part of the immigrants, discrimination and racism (self-reported) on the part of the receiving society may block social integration. The results of the EFFNATIS survey in this respect are that a clear majority of CIM in all three countries has not been affected by discrimination and /or racism. CIM in France report the least discrimination
and racism. This is due to the Portuguese group who reports hardly any
discrimination while a substantial amount of discrimination was reported
by the Maghrebian CIM. Belonging to a Muslim group is strongly related
to reported discrimination in all three countries. As to anti-discrimination
laws (Great Britain and France have such laws), our data do not lend
support to a preventive effect of this legislation.

Identificational integration: For the CIM in all three countries, when
asked for their “primary” identification in an open question,
identification with the country they have been born and live in is quite
low. The prime modes of identification in all three countries are with
their parent’s home country and multiple forms of identification, that is
“hyphenated” identities relating both to the country of origin of their
parents and the immigration country. There is a national difference
here, as we expected: identification with the parents’ home country is
strongest in Germany, multiple forms of identification are more
prominent in France and Great Britain.

In this first step we had asked people for their primary identification.
When we asked further how strongly they felt as belonging to several
different social categories (local, national, European) it became clear
that a large majority of the CIM in France and Britain —in addition to
identifying with their parents’ home country— felt quite strongly that
they were French (c. 55 %) or British (c. 85 %) as well, whereas in
Germany only about 37 % felt German as well. As expected this was
another confirmation of the national difference hypothesis. The
regression analyses, testing the relevance of individual variables against
contextual ones, confirmed that there are indeed stable differences
between the national groups of CIM: Compared to Germany, France
and Great Britain are more able to give their CIM a sense of national
belonging and identity. But in all three countries the primary identification
is not with the immigration country.

Finally, we shall briefly draw attention to a few results of the
surveys in France, Germany and Great Britain which could interest a
broader political and scientific public because they touch upon issues in
discussion or because they are counter-intuitive:

—CIM are not “time-bombs”: the media and politicians sometimes
refer to the situation of CIM as that of a “time-bomb”. However,
our data show a very high degree of general satisfaction with life
in all three countries.
—Upward mobility: despite many problems, the large majority of
CIM reach higher educational and occupational levels than their
parents did.
—No widespread radicalism among CIM: contrary to the image of widespread political or religious radicalism among Islamic young people our findings are that such phenomena are only a marginal phenomenon.
—Discrimination: About 70 % of CIM in all countries do not report discrimination.
—Anti-discrimination laws: our data do not lend clear support for the preventive efficacy of anti-discrimination laws.
—Little influence of ethnic media: in contrast to reports that the integration of CIM is slowed down by intensive exposure to foreign media, especially satellite TV, our data show that CIM have the same media or very similar preferences as their comparative autochthonous age group.
—Language competence: More than 80 % of CIM rate their competence in the language if the immigration country as excellent or good.

One must add, however, that our data could be somewhat too “optimistic”, because cooperating in an interview is already some expression of being “integrated”, while lesser integrated persons may have refused to be interviewed. This must, however, remain a speculation, which we cannot put to a test.

Summarizing the foregoing analyses, we can state that the national difference hypothesis has been confirmed. The national context systematically explains much more variance than individual variables. The overall confirmation of the national difference hypothesis does not mean, however, that we can identify one national context as being systematically more effective than others in all areas of integration. In that sense there is no single “national model”.

Strengths and Weaknesses of National Modes of Immigrant Integration

France has comparative strengths in the expansion of education, in acculturation and in identification, but shows weaknesses in training and employment. This means that the “assimilationist”, universalist French mode of integration with open citizenship policies seems to have produced structural integration in the education system with rather strong acculturative and identificational effects on CIM. Problems in training and employment of CIM in France are apparently a function of general system properties rather than of a specific mode of immigrant integration. Housing segregation on the other
hand —probably the most serious problem of structural integration—
concerns only the immigrants and descendants.

Germany has comparative strengths in training and employment of
CIM, but weaknesses in legal and identificational integration. An
ambiguous policy seems to have produced ambiguous results. The
German mode of integration that has affected the CIM of our sample
was characterised on the one hand by open policies in relation to the
core institutions of the modern welfare state but on the other hand by
restrictive measures of an “Ausländerpolitik” that did not want to
recognize the realities of an immigration situation and did not invite
the “foreigners” to naturalize and to identify with their country of
residence. During the time of the EFFNATIS project important changes
occurred in this latter aspect that will probably affect the descendants
of present day CIM or immigrants in a different way.

In Great Britain there are tendencies of ethnic preferences of CIM
in the areas of social integration (friendships, marriage partners) and in
cultural integration (values, tastes). Patterns of ethnic inequalities can
be identified in the training and employment of CIM. Housing
segregation of ethnic minorities is quite distinct. At the same time,
ethnic minorities display a high degree of identification with Britain.
The British ethnic minority integration policy seems to have reproduced
ethnic minority structures.

In a concluding remark we shall make some summarizing comparisons
between these national modes of integration. The main motive for such
comparisons comes from an interest to learn something about the kinds,
degrees and relevance of national differences vs. the kinds, degrees and
relevance of convergences in integration policies between European
countries. Is there a trend for a Europeanization of integration policies? Is
there, as we have asked already in the introduction, one national mode of
integration that could serve as a European model? When looking at the
policy level, several findings could be made:

1. All countries adhere to basic democratic values and human
   rights. By their very logic these values and rights cannot be
   restricted to citizens, but must generally be granted to non-
   citizen inhabitants as well.
2. As one consequence, all countries give the right for family
   reunion to migrants.
3. As another consequence, all countries have opened the core
   institutions of their societies for migrants: labour market, self-
   employment, education, housing, training and qualification,
   health services, social security and citizenship.
4. The implication of this is that the inclusion of immigrants in general societal integration institutions and policies is much more important for immigrant integration than any targeted special policies.

5. A policy of temporary labour migration with limited and temporary integration could not be upheld anywhere. Spain that changed only recently into an immigration country repeated the experience of the other European countries: “workers were needed, but human beings arrived”.

6. Not only has the access to citizenship been eased, but the concepts of citizenship and underlying concepts of nation have approached one another. The juxtaposition of ethnic vs. political nation and ius soli vs. ius sanguinis is getting increasingly obsolete.

7. The convergence of citizenship laws includes a convergence in the “philosophy of naturalization” within the integration process: Naturalization increasingly is regarded everywhere as an instrument of integration, not as something finishing the integration process.

8. There is strong agreement between the countries that a restriction of further immigration is a precondition for the successful integration of those immigrants who are already in the country.

9. As to policies in relation to ethnic difference, European countries generally do not aim at forming new ethnic minorities out of their immigrant populations, but follow policies of acculturation. Great Britain has been an exception to this trend, but in 2001 seems to have started changing its view under the impact of “race riots” and September 11th. Important to note: many discourses on multiculturalism and the so-called multicultural policies in European countries are not meant to form or reproduce cultural and ethnic minorities, but intend to understand and recognize the meanings and values of the migrants’ culture. Multicultural policies in that sense refer to support for cultural activities and tastes (music, dance, film, literature) that are related to the migrants’ home countries.

10. Islam is the religion with most followers among Europe’s new immigrants. All countries make an effort to give Islam a place in their societies’ religious lives.

11. Convergence consists not only of what one does in a common or similar way, but may also consist of what one does not do and evades. To increase the social and economic opportunities
of migrants European states so far have stuck to “conventional” welfare state policies and have not embarked on policies of positive discrimination like affirmative action. Affirmative action would be a complete change of political philosophy as it implies the idea of the equality of groups, not of individuals.

12. Convergence and Europeanization of migration and integration policies are presently accelerated by direct interventions of the EU. Directives against discrimination in the labour market and against racist and xenophobic discrimination are examples of this trend as well as the Amsterdam Treaty that aims at a common immigration and asylum policy.

As a final word: in a statement during a visit to Germany in 2002, Doris Meissner, the former Commissioner for the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, remarked: “Integration is difficult, everywhere”.

References


Religion and Migration

Enzo Pace
University of Padova

1. The Terms of the Problem

Let us assume a provisional definition of religion. It is a system of belief capable of organizing the life-worlds of entire social groups. Organizing means:

a) giving meaning to social and individual action, by persuading human activity to adhere to norms (including dietary rules and those for ritual practices which discipline the mind and body, as well as ethical and socio-political ones);

b) creating places where social ties and representation are facilitated;

c) establishing a principle of authority (which may find expression as an institution—a church or a sect—or in the form of a consolidated tradition, a line of belief which is considered authoritative and transmitted from generation to generation spontaneously and with no significant breaks); it may alternatively be placed at the service of a given political power, thus legitimizing it, or set itself up as a center for criticism of a power structure, which, at a given historical moment is considered illegitimate by a social group or movement.

When a religion is able to function as a belief system, it may become not only an individual or collective strategy for “saving souls”, but also a medium of communication capable of reducing the complexity of the social environment and representing as united that which is divided in society, thus providing a unified vision of reality, notwithstanding existing social differences. The fact that religion claims to “take everything into account” means that it is tempted to create a 360 degree world view, including not only the invisible sphere of salvation, but also the visible world in which we live and where each
individual strives for “social success”. The visible world of society is thus organized. It makes sense in relation to an invisible world of ultimate significance. The social order based on the sacred and the apparatus which administers the sacred (Durkheim) may thus become a complete and organic system of norms and roles. As a system, religion therefore interacts with the various social environments which it attempts to influence. It exchanges “energy” with the social environments, and gives it back as “information” having meaning for those who live in that environment. The exchange of energy for information (Parsons) is, naturally, more powerful and effective when a religion succeeds in linking up with fundamental nodes in the network of social relations, being present in all those places where the social identity of the individual is in practice shaped (and presiding over them with authority). We refer here to the family, the education system, places devoted to worship and later transformed into places for socialization and imparting rules of conduct, the representation of religious symbols which sacred art and the liturgy have the task of keeping alive in the collective memory and so on.

What happens then when the relationship between system and environment is broken because groups of people are forced to emigrate and re-establish themselves in a social environment which is, by definition, alien to the belief system “of birth” or origin. This constitutes a process of disembedding, of social de-contextualization. For those who remain bound to the belief system, the new social environment in which they live becomes much more complex and differentiated than the previous one: the system is unable to dominate this new complexity, i.e. to provide information suitable for the multiplicity and diversity of social norms and relations which prevail in the new context. What is under attack in the unexplored social environment in which especially the first generation immigrant finds himself is, to use a geographical metaphor, the deep water table of social memory, which for a given religion constitutes the force and energy which sustains it over time and gives form to the plasticity of social representations in space (Halbwachs).

2. Social strategies for solving the problem of “religion and migration”

How do social groups of immigrants try to dominate the tensions between their original religious belief system and the new social environment? Quite a number of responses are to be found in society,
but they fall within certain models, to which, for the sake of convenience, we can give the following labels:

a) The **diaspora** model;
b) the **compromise** (“with the world”) model;
c) **individualization of belief** model;
d) the **politicization of belief** model.

These models may be constructed by crossing the degree of adhesion to the principle of authority on which a religious system is based (the NORM) and the amount of freedom conceded to the subjective experience of the individual believer in the religious field (the MEANING), on the one hand, and the adaptation process of the belief system to the new social environment, on the other. They go from attempts to faithfully reproduce the community of origin (frequently superimposing an ethnic identity on the socio-religious one) to liberalization of belief according to the principle of belief through individual choice (such that a belief is valid as long as an individual considers it to be so).

![Diagram](image)

**From Communitarism to Liberalism**

The four quadrants respectively indicate possible abstract models for regulating relations between the belief system and the environment in the case of immigrant groups:

a) In the case of the “diaspora”, the norm is re-interpreted (and at times even re-invented) in order to maintain the group’s own specificity (any difference, no matter how small, is important on principle) with respect to the host society, and also to gain its own independence in terms of rules with respect to its society of origin. In this way, the group is able, to an extent, to construct
the symbolic borders (which are sometimes also physical) of the *disembedded* community, which tends to resemble the society of origin, but is in fact different. It is in any case an ethno-religious colonization of a strip of “foreign territory”, with all the tensions and conflicts which that entails (although it does not necessarily lead to the ghetto syndrome). Due to this collective effort —especially when successful— the new community can maintain network relations with other immigrant communities in other parts of the world and above all continue to have an umbilical connection with the country of origin; [e.g. Habad, the Senegalese community ….]

b) In the case of “politicization” of the religious system, the group not only tends to re-create a community lifestyle (which often no longer exists in so pure a form in the country of origin), but also transforms the group cohesion thus obtained and the re-acquired moral discipline into the will to “change the world”. In this case, religion re-awakens its *faculty of initiating*, the spirit underlying political thought and action, according to the teachings of Hanna Arendt, by mobilizing collective action —in a somewhat utopian manner— to the idea of shaping the *polis* (the State) in the image of and in resemblance to *logos* (the divine word); [e.g. al-Ikhwan al-muslimun, Tabligh…..]

c) In the case of “compromise with the world” (taking Ernst Troeltsch’s classic figure in the sociology of religion ) the immigrant group —especially passing from the first to the second generation— yields part of its own “specific energy” (that which makes it different) to the new social environment, and eventually agrees to comply with the rules of the social and economic game in the host society, while seeking to resist the loss of collective memory and religious identity. The specific social place entrusted with this task of safeguarding “the tradition” is the family environment. The family tends to become a relatively autonomous sub-system, since it is still considered the place where asymmetric gender relations are reproduced, where patriarchal power is perpetuated and where there is attachment to the rites of passage; [e.g. Sikh community; Anglo-Pakistani…]

d) In the last case, the individualization of belief, we have a process of secularization, typical of religious modernity: the individual “becomes his own boss”, in the religious and moral field and no longer feels the need to refer to an authoritative line of belief or to the supposed community of the faithful, pure and united in the faith.
Clearly, according to this abstract scheme of things, socio-religious conflict becomes more likely as we go from quadrants a) and b) to c) and d). Conflicts may involve at least three types of social relations:

—Between generations (the inter-generational conflict concerns the process of social transmission, the social mechanisms of reproduction of collective memory and, lastly, the authority principle, which is manifest from the base to the top, so to speak, i.e. from the family to the religious and political institutions);

—Among groups of “believers” (an infra-religious conflict generally centered on competition for the definition of the authenticity of belief, or in sociological terms, the basis of socio-religious identity and the rules of membership of the religious community of origin or birth);

—Between (immigrant) religious groups and public bodies (central and regional government, local administration) as regards recognition or disregard for cultural and religious differences.

There are other types of conflict, but we prefer to concentrate on those mentioned above, since they seem to sum up the status quaestionis of relations between religions and emigration in western Europe. We use the plural deliberately because, in contrast to what public debate and the media would have us believe, Islam is not the only new religion in Europe which is growing due to immigrants and their descendants. The Orthodox Church, Hinduism, Buddhism, Animism and Afro-American religions are likewise on the increase.

The conflicts briefly described above fall into a more general typology of conflictual social relations involving the relationship between ethnic identification and the sense of belonging to a religion (to a community of believers, an ongoing tradition or an organized religious institution, such as a Church or a sect). It is never easy to tell whether an individual adheres to a given belief system because, in the first place, he or she feels part and parcel of an ethnic or ethno-national group and, therefore, shares the same idola tribus (Bacon) or whether he or she believes in a given symbolic-religious universe, regardless of the sense of identification with an ethnic group. A belief system may be taken as the organized basis, so to speak, of the symbols which enable people to make sense of the everyday life-world—a world where it is taken for granted that one believes in a god or in a series of religious norms, as if believing were a natural gesture and religion a “spontaneous” element which animates everyday social life. Thus, as recent historical events have shown (the wars in the Balkans and the pseudo-ethnic conflicts in the Great Lake district in Africa), the
attraction between ethnic origins and religion is often fatal. For an immigrant to Europe, especially a first generation immigrant, being Moslem or Hindu may mean preserving one’s ties with one’s identity, the feeling of shared membership of an ethnic or linguistic group, social recognition of one’s own identity (language, religion, food, customs, rituals, rules of conduct etc.).

The social, institutional and political handling and mediation of these conflicts does not only concern political actors and social movements in the strict sense of the term, but also immigrant groups, since they compete for the representation of their own vital interests and their socio-religious identity. Interests and norms do not always coincide; the former may at times be the pretext for social action in which collective subjects make use of certain religious symbols to show their misgivings or make a political protest (e.g. the Rushdie affair). Vice versa, religious norms may legitimize rules of conduct, which are presented as absolutely non-negotiable or held to be so by groups of immigrants or their descendants (e.g. Sikhs and the wearing of crash helmets).

3. The process of construction of an “out of context” socio-religious identity

From the theoretical viewpoint, therefore, the religious identity of the various groups of immigrants makes an interesting case for study. Lacking a stable and well-established relationship between a belief system and its social and cultural environment, religious identity has to be somehow re-invented in the alien environment. This is not only because the institutions which traditionally guarantee socio-religious transmission (schools, the State, especially where the State of provenance plays an active role in safeguarding a particular religion —whether it is considered the State religion or not is not our concern here—, the great acknowledged religious authorities or institutions and so on). It is also because, overall, the social environment itself (we are referring to European society, characterized by individualism and pluralism in socio-religious attitudes), certainly does not make it easy to conform spontaneously to religious norms and practices. Even the family, which often becomes the only surviving agent of socio-religious transmission, cannot compete with the surrounding environment, alien and sometimes even hostile to manifestations of faith and religious symbols (e.g. “affaire du foulard” in France). In other words, the immigrant group that wishes to remain faithful to the belief system of
origin has to act in a highly differentiated social environment. The group does not therefore possess the right cultural instruments to reduce the social complexity of such an environment. The traditional codes of symbolic generalization are no longer sufficient. The possible alternatives are either self-defense of the group by building relatively independent “citadels” (perhaps within well-defined territorial confines, as in Berlin’s little Istanbul or Bradford’s little Islamabad), to try and preserve a religious identity through building ethno-national barriers, or inventing new and relatively novel social devices for constructing a socio-religious identity.

In both cases, an important role is played by the political institutions, in the European context, which show an interest in recognizing the religious differences of immigrant groups in the public sphere. Their aims are both to ensure social control and the integration/assimilation of foreigners to the rules and norms of the various European societies. The interests of the political institutions may coincide with those of some immigrant communities (or with the more active minorities among them) in having their rights, duties and possible privileges (fiscal or legislative) recognized at the same level as other religious confessions with a longstanding presence on European soil (the Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox Churches, the Jewish communities and other historical religious minorities). We may speak of confessionalization (Hervieu-Léger). This term is used to indicate two trends to be found in contemporary society in major European countries:

a) European ones, is the result of a compromise between the immigrant community itself and the public powers “that be’ of the European states. It is a negotiation based on the principle of exchange (I give up something in order to obtain something else). On the basis of the system theory (Luhmann), it works according to the rules of power as communication: by agreeing to the reduction by the public power of the cultural complexity and richness of a religious identity, without being bridled or getting thoroughly mixed up in power games and politics. In other words, it suits my purposes to be defined in religious terms in a certain way by the public institutions with whom I negotiate and, therefore, I readily comply with the reduction of the social complexity of my identity, the main objective of any power that wishes to be effective in the complex societies of today. In exchange I obtain legitimization to act religiously, and in many cases, access to rights and privileges which are useful for the community organization itself.
b) When this process of exchange and reduction of complexity occurs, we can expect an increase in conflictual tension “at base”. There are conflicts among immigrants, some of whom do not recognize themselves in the public representation which one group claims for the religious world of the immigrants. This leads either to competition among the various organized groups, or the setting up of an infra-religious pluralism, which certainly does little to reduce the complexity of the social environment concerning a given belief system.

c) The situation in Europe varies greatly from state to state. Some steps have been taken towards a common European line (as regards, for example, regulating the flow of immigrants and their access to citizenship). On the other hand, policies on the recognition of religious differences vary according to the constitutional and political models which each nation has formed in the course of time. (Schnapper). There is a widespread, and highly significant, temptation in Europe to treat “other religions” (i.e. those different from the ones considered on historical and cultural grounds “majority” religions) as “minorities”, and to apply the same rules traditionally applied to well-established religious minorities (Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Assembly of God, the Jewish Community and so on). However, on the statistical evidence, it is ill-advised to speak of the Moslem minority when the Moslem population, at least nominally, is around the 18-20 million mark.

It, therefore, becomes interesting to study —and we define a possible object of analysis as well as a possible methodology for investigation— how public administration in European countries puts into effect policies for the recognition of the socio-religious differences in immigrant communities (from the first to the third generation, where different age-cohorts exist) and the underlying attitudes when forming policies for handling the conflicts of values which inevitably arise in complex modern societies (Habermas, Taylor), involving uncertainty (Barman) or risk (Beck).

The public sphere should be studied in all its ramifications to shed light on the interactions created when the religious factor comes into play in the definitions game: who defines whom? Do the macro-institutions of public power choose and impose “the words” which define the socio-religious identity of any given group? Do those who manage to emerge as the intellectual avant-garde of the group in the end lay down the intangible borders which identify from the socio-
religious viewpoint the identity of the group itself? And finally, do the conflicts which arise in the very heart of the group which seeks to organize itself into a community of believers, on the basis of different hermeneutic assumptions, provide the elements which impair a plural definition of the socio-religious identity of a group of immigrants or their descendants?

The public sphere is, in fact, whenever the religion of immigrants and their descendants is spoken of, packed with social actors. When we mentioned public institutions in (a) above, we were not only referring to predominant bodies, such as local and national government and the apparatus of political power or law enforcement agencies. The term includes religious institutions in a given society which for historical reasons enjoy consensus and a position of respect in their role as public interlocutors par excellence in the public sphere, such as the great national religious confessions. It becomes a question of studying their reciprocal and respective strategies (interests and norms) to map out their possible points of agreement and probable fractures.

In the same way, the public sphere is a multi-layered space (macro, meso and micro, as we saw in the diagram above). Therefore, we have to study the building process of the socio-religious identity from the top and from the bottom, bearing in mind the reciprocal influences among the various layers, which may go from the bottom to the top or vice versa.
The study of the public sphere on a religious basis should undoubtedly be able to avail itself of a comprehensive sociology (Weber), which takes up the social actor’s viewpoint (from the micro to the macro level) and comprehends the tangible and symbolic objectives. At the same time, this methodological choice should be combined with analysis taken from the theory of institution building, since the definition of religious identity is being snatched away from the jealous custody of the community of the faithful (of a given faith) and becomes the subject of public debate and the object of state regulation.

References

This paper seeks to explore an apparent paradox in the current policies of the British Labour Government\(^1\). Whilst pursuing progressive anti-racist policies through primary legislation and developing a transcultural sensitivity and competence within the National Health Service the same Government is simultaneously engaged in a vehement and Draconian anti-asylum seeker border policy. In developing this analysis the current circumstances are placed in a necessary historical framework. This reveals the basis for a British political capacity for managing ethnicity, and accompanying routines of self-regard. As the two contradictory policy initiatives are described the implications of this historical repository of practice and belief are further developed. In examining these apparently paradoxical political agendas the article will seek to argue that common mechanisms can be found underlying the pragmatic Government politics that have sustained this deeply ambivalent multiculturalism. Constrained by popular sentiment the Government is reticent in explicitly advertising its radical progressive intent; whilst driven by a popular moral panic it pursues a xenophobic and racist asylum seeker policy.

Introduction

Britain, like other European states has a unique history of nation building which, in its creative invention of tradition (Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1983) has employed selective retention and a partisan self-aggrandisement in constructing its dominant self-image. Britain attained

national unity much earlier than many extant countries and as a consequence has had a longer time to develop a deeply embedded, and completely nuanced, sense of collective identity. Importantly, the United Kingdom itself reflects a process of conquest, and partial incorporation by the English, of the Irish, the Scots and the Welsh. Memorably described by Hechter (1975) as Internal Colonialism this process laid the foundation for a continuing ambivalent negotiation of Britishness and national identities. An important element in forging and sustaining this British identity has been the suppression of internal differences in combating common external enemies. As Colley (1992) has persuasively argued the meshing of these internal national identities together in armed struggle against common Catholic enemies in Europe helped to forge this British identity. Historically, the French, the Spanish, the Dutch and the Germans, amongst others, have served Britain well in providing out-groups with whom the British could compare themselves. And, compare themselves in the heightened dynamics of conflict and competition in which the powerful social psychological processes of inter-group perception would amplify the sense of in-group homogeneity. (Capozza and Brown, 2000)

Given this heritage it is hardly surprising that Britain as a political entity and an administrative terrain may have emerged without a robust accompanying identity. In fighting the foreign enemy regiments were recruited nationally and regionally. The British army thus, for example, was until very recent times a specific site for strong national and regional identities. However, whilst it is in keeping with current academic analysis to recognise the ambivalence and contingency of any British identity, this does not necessitate a denial of any relevant commonalities. In inhabiting the lived experience of Imperial British expansion and decline the populations of Ireland, Scotland, Wales and England have shared experiences of domination over others, and the deployment of ideologies to legitimate their behaviour. (See, for example, Devine 2003)

Within this historically derived sense of territorial integrity, and tenuous cultural homogeneity, can be found a powerful ideological dynamic. The long and enduring presence of race thinking (Barzun, 1965) in British politics and imagining has provided a significant gel binding the internally differentiated nations of the United Kingdom with a shared sense of “racial” identity. Or, even where “race” distinguished between Celt and Anglo-Saxon, it provided a common language and typology wherein foreign “others” could be located. (Bolt, 1971; Kiernan, 1972) Externally the lived experience of the processes of colonisation and empire provided a practical praxis where ideology was
both discursive and practical. The historical sedimentation of the cumulative management of difference within the British Empire provided a ubiquitous shared experience of British superiority over others. One core element of this process was the progressive elaboration of race theory which developed in response to, and which served to legitimate, British involvement in slavery and the expropriation of other peoples’ lands and resources. (Kiernan, 1972; Husband, 1987) Importantly, central to this history of British race thinking has been the critical presence of colour as a determinant of “race” and worth. (Jordan, 1969) As a marker of difference, colour has become established in the ideological repertoire of the British as one shared language for locating self and others in a framework of affinity and worth. (Walvin, 1973; Fryer, 1984)

A second historically rooted ideological element which has inhabited the imperial and colonial terrain of British experience has been Christianity; and Christian theology and imagery. As a core variable in historically legitimating the exploitation and denigration of other human beings Christian theology was central to the race theory that legitimated slavery. (Jordan, 1969) And, in the late nineteenth century “muscular Christianity” provided a powerful underpinning to British expansion in Africa and elsewhere. Race thinking and Christian theology and idiom continue to exist in British life as two ideological strands in a shared imagery woven together like strands of DNA; with the multiple bridging links being formed in relation to specific issues in ethnic interaction. In recent years, the growth of Islamophobia has been one such highly visible and disturbing linkage.

Locating these processes in contemporary “British life” is almost certainly more analytically appropriate than conceptualising them as part of a shared British identity. A degree of commonality of shared practice and political infrastructure does not necessarily indicate a strong shared British identity. The history of Britain has, amongst other things, involved a continuing marginalisation and exploitation of some regions and the political and economic preferment of others. The idea of Britishness, as of Englishness, is currently subject to much critical analysis. (See, for example, Reicher and Hopkins 2001; Easthope, 1999) However, from within their shared history it remains possible to argue that the British, and perhaps particularly the English, are comfortable with the management of ethnic diversity. It is an established part of their political repertoire and has both the institutional structures and the conceptual language routinely established within the national political fabric. Recognising ethnic diversity and managing ethnic relations does not embarrass the British either personally or politically.
In Britain there is both the political capacity, and a language, for addressing ethnic diversity. Central to this discourse are the concepts, and ideologies, of “race” and of colour. The particularity of this historical underpinning of contemporary British institutional structures and capacities, and of the taken for granted assumptions that render them normal, is central to an understanding of contemporary ethnic relations policies in Britain; and of their difference from other European and non-European states. (Hargreaves, 1995; Koopmans and Statham, 2000; Weimer, 1999).

In the modern phase of demographic change driven by post Second World War migration of labour from the Commonwealth into Britain, the languages of race and colour became routinely employed in Government and the media to define the dominant definition of the situation. (Hartmann and Husband, 1974) It was through a discourse about “coloured immigration” that the British state and the British people developed their understanding of contemporary events. The racialization of British understanding of the ethnic transformation of their population was rapid and has proved to be persistent. In an administrative parallel to this political condensation of global migration into the simplicities of “race” and nationalism the state apparatus rapidly developed a corpus of law and institutional practice based around a series of Race Relations Acts: in 1965, 1968 and 1976. (Solomos, 1993) This institutional use of the language of “race” in British Parliamentary process, and in civil society, was itself a powerful expression of the embeddedness of race thinking in British society. That, in the British political context, we now have over four decades of Parliamentary policy formulation, and bitter public debate, in which the language of race and colour has been normalised as unproblematic and acceptable is fundamental to any understanding of contemporary events. (Miles, 1993; Husband, 1996).

It is particularly important to explicitly address the inevitable distortion of reality, or rather the inevitable construction of a partisan and exclusionary vision of social relations, that follows upon the routine employment of the discourse of race. Fundamentally, “race” is a social construct, not a meaningful biological entity. The arbitrary and perverse construction of racial categories is, for example, exposed by Mason (1986) who, in reviewing historical constructions of racial categories, noted the very many contradictory definitions that existed: each proposing differing numbers and types of “races”. A history of ideas approach to concepts of race reveals the historical specificity of the elaboration of race theories, and their creative adjustment to changing circumstances. And, as Weimer’s (1999) study of Japanese
racism reveals; race theory is not confined to Western European societies.

The significance of the prevalence of race thinking is that great sweeps of human variation can be reduced to one supposedly stable property of an individual: their race. Complex social relations can be “explained” by the self-evident simplicities of race theory. On reason for the resilience of race thinking is its reductionist utility. Omi and Winant (1986, p. 64) define the deployment of “race” as an explanatory system as racialisation; it is:

“the extension of racial meaning to a previous racially unclassified relationship, social practice or group … it is an ideological process, an historically specific one.”

This concept of racialization usefully underlines the distortion inherent in the use of race and points to the historical and territorial specificity of the construction of these ideological packages. Racial meanings have been generated through specific historical circumstances of human relations, and are currently exploited within specific socio-economic circumstances. The dynamic and contingent nature of racial meanings is revealed, for example, in Winant’s (1994) analysis of racial formation as a hegemonic process. From this perspective racialization is revealed to be part of a contested struggle for power in a society structured by social differentiation and inequality. As Winant (1994) argues:

“Such concepts [as “race”] are essentially metaphors for institutionalised social relationships that combine processes of exploitation and domination, on the one hand, with processes of subjection and representation, that is, with struggles over meaning and identity, on the other.” (Winant 1994, p. 113).

Thus, in the last five decades, and currently, in Britain the ubiquity of processes of racialization have provided modes of understanding which have excluded alternative perspectives; and which have effectively obscured acknowledgement of the complexity, flexibility and social nature of human identity and behaviour that would have been potentially available through the language of ethnicity. The impact of the presence of race thinking in contemporary Britain is revealed in the extensive evidence of racial discrimination and racial hostility. (Office of National Statistics, 2002; Strategy Office, 2002) The presence of racism as a powerful ideological force, and behavioural practice, in contemporary
Britain is critical to shaping the social and political environment of the political dynamics to be discussed below.

However, the historical trajectory of Empire and of the management of ethnic diversity that has fuelled this racial ideology has paradoxically also generated a complementary positive self-regard within the British worldview. There is a ubiquitous strand of self-belief and self-stereotyping, which draws in a selective way upon the British historical experience of contact with others in order to construct a positive affirmation of Britain’s inherent decency and tolerance. Building upon a partisan perception of the long continuity of Britain as a Parliamentary democracy this matrix of positive self-regard creatively merges images of Britain “the Mother of Parliaments”, with accounts of Britain’s historical “civilising mission” in the Empire, with fragmented recollections of Britain as an historical “haven for refugees” in order to generate a quiet certainty about the characteristic decency and tolerance of the British. (Husband, 1974, 1987; Holmes, 1991)

That there are historical foundations for these perceptions is important. However, the legitimacy of these self-images is not the sole determining feature of their current relevance. A critically scrutiny of this recalled history would indeed invite a considerable exercise of qualification and appropriate humility. However, the credibility of these claims is more important than their truth. And, their ubiquitous presence as taken-for-granted “knowledge’ is more significant than the availability or absence of any supporting evidence. These ideas and values that were nurtured and ossified in the nineteenth and earlier twentieth century as Britain “took up the White Man’s Burden”, have in the last decades been co-opted and refurbished into the politics of negotiating the changing ethnic demography of Britain.

A recurrent theme in the political discourse of managing the changing ethnic diversity of Britain has been an explicit concern with “maintaining harmonious community relations”. This rhetoric of harmony is itself an apparently benign expression of the fundamental commitment to decency and tolerance in managing ethnic relations in Britain. But, as we shall see below, in its failure to address the rights of minorities it is an essentially paternalistic discourse. In modern history the potential perversity of this concern with harmonious community relations was revealed in its flawed reality through the British Government’s response to the situation of Jews in Nazi Germany. Following Crystal Nacht in 1938, the British Government understood the current, and likely future, circumstances of German Jews, and yet they worked hard and deliberately to limit the number of Jewish people who would be admitted as refugees to Britain. As Sharf (1964) tellingly argued:
“one basic assumption emerged, whether all its implications were consciously understood or not. If more Jewish refugees meant, or might eventually mean, more anti-Semitism in host countries, then the cause of anti-Semitism was - the Jew. And, since anti-Semitism, at least in its more virulent form, was clearly wrong and barbarous, the only course was to prevent any notable increase in our own Jewish population.” (Sharf, 1964 p. 170).

Jews, it seems, were responsible for anti-Semitism, and it is they who must be regulated. This mischievous expression of concern with tolerance in order to justify discriminatory immigration legislation flatters the moral self-regard of the majority population whilst simultaneously denying the rights of minorities. This superficially liberal concern with guaranteeing tolerance of minorities serves to flatter the self-regard of the majority population. It is a formula with endless possibilities, and was invoked by the Labour Government in the 1960’s when immigration from the Commonwealth was rising. In the 1965 words of the Labour Party politician, Roy Hattersley:

“Without integration limitation is inexcusable, without limitation integration is impossible.”

The subtle casuistry of this linkage of a commitment to “harmonious community relations” to necessary restriction on immigration and immigrants has continued to be employed by successive British governments. It has a wonderfully corrupt, but popularly acceptable rhetorical formula which argues that:

— as decent and tolerant people we are naturally opposed to any form of racism or discrimination.
— simultaneously, we are committed to a harmonious society.
— however; immigrants and ethnic minorities have a capacity to generate racial hostility and discrimination from the majority population.
— consequently: in order to guarantee harmonious community relations we must rigorously control immigration.

From within the majority population the consensual reasonableness of this formula leads to the implicit conclusion that Jews are responsible for anti-Semitism and “coloured immigrants” are responsible for creating racism and discrimination. From this perspective the access to discretionary power that permits discrimination against minority ethnic persons and communities remains illusive and obscured by this formulaic rehearsal of British tolerance. This is a formula that has proved to be
routinely irresistible to successive British governments; of the left and right. It has been present in the arguments of politicians advocating controls of immigration over the last four decades, and is actively present in the current politics of anti-asylum seeker policy. As we shall see later in this argument it is not possible to fence off the discourse of anti-asylum seeker rhetoric from the broader discourse of ethnic diversity within the context of contemporary Britain.

The co-existence within British political discourse of the two intertwining ideologies of racism and tolerance are central to an understanding of the current negotiation of ethnic diversity. Whilst the political intent of the rhetorical formula sketched above is to sustain restrictive and discriminatory border policies, it importantly *sotto voce* rehearses the British concern with tolerance and decency. Explicit expressions of racism in Britain are legally and politically unacceptable; and, to a significant extent, they require careful negotiation in everyday life. It is important that politically in Britain unalloyed racism has been defined as extremist and beyond the political pale. The existence in Britain of far-right neo-Fascist parties such as the National Front in the 1970’s, and the British National Party currently, have provided politically expedient foci of racist extremism. It has been politically congenial to pursue a logic which argues that if the BNP racists are extremist then by definition the rest of us are moderates and reasonable citizens. (Troyna, 1981) From that perspective the “genuine concerns” (Husband, 1996) of the majority faced with an expanding minority ethnic population may be treated as reasonable and legitimate. Through the discourse of paternalistic “harmonious community relations” racist policies may be *de facto* pursued.

*Asylum Seeking: as illegitimate demands*

Immigration into Britain in post-World War Two Britain rapidly became a major political issue. (Hartmann and Husband, 1974; Foot, 1965) In 1962 when a Conservative Government introduced the first legislation to restrict immigration into Britain from the Commonwealth the Labour Party were loudly opposed to it. But in 1964, following the defeat of Labour in a Birmingham constituency, against the national trend, by a Tory candidate, Peter Griffiths, campaigning under the slogan “If you want a nigger for neighbour vote Labour” the power of the “race card” for the local electorate was revealed. From that time onward the Labour Party and the Conservative Party have engaged in a cumulative competition to placate the racist sentiments of the electorate. (Solomos, 1993) In 1968, in a major escalation of this populist politics
the Labour Party rushed through Parliament in three days an Immigration Act aimed at radically restricting the entry into Britain of East African Asians. Richard Crossman, a Cabinet member in the Government of the time said of the 1968 Act: that it resulted from the Government’s pragmatic pandering to the racisms of the electorate (see Humphrey and Ward, 1974). Indeed, that Act de facto made some people stateless.

The process of inter-party competition in “being tough” on immigration resulted in a legislative progression through the 1971 Immigration Act until in 1981, under Margaret Thatcher, a British Nationality Act was introduced; which, as Geddes pointed out:

“The effect was that millions of people found their citizenship status amended to deny them access to the country of which ostensibly they had been citizens.” (Geddes, 2003, p. 37).

In common with other European countries primary migration for labour purposes into Britain was radically slashed with the “immigration stop” of the 1970’s. Subsequently, successive governments have been involved in a progressive pursuit of minimising the continuing opportunities for legal entry. In effect, by the 1990’s economic immigration of labour into Britain had exhausted its potential as a means of distinguishing between the dominant political parties. However, family renewal and asylum seeking have remained potential agendas for competition between the political parties.

Over the last decade there has been a fluctuating but upward trend of asylum applications for entry into Britain. For example, the figures rose from 26,205 in 1990 to 71,700 in 2001. This phenomenon has fuelled a classic media “moral panic” (Cohen, 1972) over the perceived threat such immigration represents to British life and culture. In turn, this has funded a renewed inter-party competition to demonstrate their commitment to blocking this “abuse” of British generosity. Consequently, although whilst in opposition the Labour Party had been critical of the Conservative Government’s tough stance on asylum, once in office themselves, following their landslide election in 1997, they addressed the matter of reducing asylum seeker numbers with some vigour. The 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act introduced vouchers for asylum seekers instead of benefits, and introduced a national dispersal system to counter the concentration of asylum seekers in London and the South East of England. This Act has been subsequently superseded by the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, which itself arose from a political ferment in which “being seen to be tough on asylum...
seekers” was a core agenda. In a major review of current Government policy by NGO's in Britain (1990 Trust, 2003) this Act was singled out for criticism. In their view:

“The passing of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 has caused considerable concern as the Act has increased the focus on segregating asylum seekers, restricting their procedural rights and reducing their access to basic necessities. Dispersal policy implies that asylum seekers must be kept separate from the rest of the population and it has contributed to the encouragement of racist attitudes. Antagonism towards asylum seekers has helped sustain a surge in support for the far-right British National Party (BNP) which has been significantly more successful in some local council elections during 2002 and 2003” (1990 Trust, 2003 p. 6, para. 15).

Outside of this primary legislation the Labour Government has been keen to demonstrate its resolve in addressing the issue of asylum seeking with ever more radical proposals relating to the processing of asylum seekers. These initiatives fit very comfortably with the punitive strategies described by Weh (1987) as “the politics of dissuasion”. In this vein the Government has been actively pursuing a proposal to create “regional protection processing” which would take the form of temporary holding centres for asylum seekers entering Europe. These centres would be within the European Union, unlike the proposed “refugee transit processing centres” which would be on routes of entry into Europe; but be outside of the European Union. Perhaps inspired by the Australian Government’s “robust” policy toward asylum seekers these camps would be the United Kingdom’s equivalent of Christmas Island. Importantly, central to these proposals is the intention that asylum seekers arriving in Britain, and seeking to lodge a claim, would not stay in Britain while their claims were being processed: they would instead be transferred to camps outside of the United Kingdom. This is truly the politics of dissuasion expressed in Draconian form. At the European Summit of 19th June, 2003 proposals for such “zones of protection” were rejected.

The fevered politics of asylum seeker policy over the last few years, and the related rhetoric of a determination to “clamp down on abuse of the system” can perhaps be better understood in the light of press coverage of the issue over the same period. A neurotic and xenophobic concern with policing Fortress Britain has remained a recurrently popular theme in British media coverage over the last decade. (Philo, 1999) and in recent years the growth of asylum seeker applications has been paralleled by an increasingly rabid media coverage of the issue. This media agenda was given a specific focus throughout the recent years.
by the identification of a Red Cross reception centre at Sangatte in France as a location from which asylum seekers routinely sought “illegal entry” to Britain via the Channel Tunnel. This issue provided a potent fusion of anti-asylum seeker sentiment with the long established English capacity to resent the French. Consequently, media anger at the French Government was matched by a vehement populist campaign against asylum seekers.

In January, 2003 the Sun newspaper, a populist tabloid newspaper, with the largest circulation of any newspaper in Britain, launched a “crusade” against what it called “Asylum madness”. On the 17th January, under the headline “Asylum Meltdown” it urged readers to “Read this and get angry”. By the end of that month the Sun was able to claim that it had “touched a nerve in the nation”, and that more than half a million people had signed its petition urging the Government to “stop bogus refugees flooding the country”.

The Sun, however, in 2003 was not isolated in its torrid assault upon asylum seekers. Other newspapers such as the Daily Mail, the Daily Telegraph, the Express and the News of the World joined in a spiralling classic media moral panic which resulted in asylum seekers being painted as criminals, welfare scroungers and occupants of extravagantly favourable housing at state expense. These were familiar themes that have routinely been invoked in the past in press campaigns to vilify immigrants to Britain. (Humphrey and Ward, 1974) In the current context of the rhetoric of the “axis of evil” an association with terrorism has added a contemporary gloss to the vilification of asylum seekers. And, if that were not enough, they have also been accused in the press of being vehicles for the entry into Britain of AIDS, TB and Hepatitis B.

It would be wrong to represent the media as uniformly malevolent in their reportage of asylum seeking. The Guardian, for example, with articles with headings such as “Press whips up asylum hysteria”; “Poison pens of racism” and “Lexicon of Lies” has challenged this racist and xenophobic reporting on both factual and moral grounds. And, as one prominent journalist and social commentator said of this vicious reportage:

“I can remember nothing like this. The naked hate is not coded or polite, not iced with concern for domestic race relations.” Polly Toynbee, The Guardian, 31.01.2003.

This sheer vehemence and antipathy of the anti-asylum seeker reportage in its deliberately emotive and extreme xenophobia is calculated to generate hatred against a whole category of people. It makes
an absolute mockery of extant codes of practice on the reporting of ethnic relations. (Husband and Alam, 2001) And, perhaps because of its extremity it reveals something of the psychology and politics of the location of asylum seekers in the contemporary British populist world view. In essence they are doubly alien. They are aliens in the legal/political sense, in as much as they have no formal connection with the state. And, they are alien, like Martians; they are not of us. They are other. It seems that it is this conjunction of an explicit assertion of their lack of political rights2 and the brutal assertion of their social difference that places them beyond the terrain of moral responsibility. They lack the social and territorial connectedness of the existing settled minority ethnic communities in Britain, who whilst possibly distanced by racism and xenophobia within the majority populations, are nevertheless, in Bauman’s (1990) term “strangers within”. The asylum seeker on the contrary has effectively been constructed in the current definition of the situation as “the alien without”: beyond the pale of emotional and moral connectedness.

In its presence within British politics as one of the most pressing policy issues, and in its centrality to the press reporting of ethnic diversity, the issue of asylum seeking has revealed a deep vein of racialized xenophobia and myopic nationalism within British life. The ease with which government policies can render someone destitute, provided they are an asylum seeker, and the ease with which the media can maliciously vilify thousands of people, provided they are asylum seekers, must challenge those notions, discussed earlier, of the natural prevalence of British tolerance. And yet, within the anti-asylum seeker rhetoric echoes of this positive self-regard can be found woven into the justification for resenting them. One of the most recurrent themes in this rhetoric has been the absolutist assertion that “these people” abuse “our generosity”. And, related to this has been the concern to develop Draconian policies toward asylum seekers precisely because, in comparison to other European Union member states the British believe themselves to be perceived as being “soft” on immigrants. In both of these thematic agendas there lurks the barely submerged belief in the historic tolerance and generosity of the British toward minorities. It is as though a half-expressed outrage at the illegitimate exploitation of British decency fuels this exceptionally vitriolic hostility toward asylum seekers. And indeed, in relation to their internal management of ethnic diversity the United Kingdom may indeed have some good grounds to believe in their comparative virtue. For, whilst the Government has

---

2 In international law all persons have a right to claim asylum but no state is under an absolute obligation to grant it.
been vigorously pursuing an anti-asylum seeker border policy it has simultaneously been pursuing a progressive agenda of multi-cultural, anti-racist, initiatives within its domestic policies. However, a striking difference has existed between the robust public rhetoric of the former programme and the quiet modesty of the latter. In order to understand the basis of this apparently perverse policy dichotomy we will now briefly review aspects of this positive programme of managing diversity.

**Quiet Radicalism?**

It is reasonable to assert that in comparison with many other nation states in the European Union, and in the accession states of the expanding European Union, Britain has a much more extensive legislative and institutional framework aimed at challenging racism and promoting ethnic equality within a pluralistic framework. Whilst evidence of discrimination, racial antipathy and racial assault continued to scar the experience of British multiculturalism judged against a benchmark of 1960 or 1970 the nature and extent of such behaviour has changed. Britain in the twenty-first century is a *de facto* multi-ethnic society in which ethnic diversity has been normalised in everyday life in a way that would have been unimaginable to the anti-immigrant populace and racist ideologues of the 1960's and 1970's. Currently, minority ethnic communities and individuals are present in the everyday fabric of society in a way that demonstrates a progressive transition toward an equitable pluralist multiculturalism. It is from within this general context that we can examine some of the current policy innovations in British multicultural policy.

From the 1960’s, British governments have shown a willingness to develop primary legislation in order to manage ethnic diversity within the country, and to employ law, and related sanctions, as a means of pursuing equity and social inclusion. From the outset, British governments have followed the two parallel tracks of Hattersley’s formula discussed above: namely, progressively restrictive border policy and progressively robust legislation to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of race. Primary legislation in the form of a series of *Race Relations Acts* were enacted in 1965, 1968, 1976 and 2000. As an integral component of this process related institutional structures were established: initially the Community Relations Commission and subsequently the Commission for Racial Equality. Thus, in both its choice of language, and its willingness to legislate on the matter, the British state revealed its continuing political competence, and comfort, in managing ethnic diversity.

Whilst the 1965 and 1968 Acts were focused around challenging direct discrimination, the 1976 Act constituted a radical innovation in
addressing indirect discrimination. This signified a legislative and political move away from conceiving of discrimination as being merely an expression of personal prejudice. The 1976 Act removed the issue of individual intent, from the process of demonstrating discrimination and opened up the exploration of institutional discrimination, where the routine practices of an organisation in their effect are discriminatory. (See for example, CRE, 1999) From the perspective of this legislation, and its theoretical core, it is workplace cultures rather than individual actions that become central in exposing the routine discretionary powers of the majority in marginalising, and discriminating against, minority ethnic persons. In effect, the logic of institutional racism asserts the distressing truth that “nice people” can discriminate.

The effect of the 1976 Act has been to progressively reveal complex, and varied, expressions of racism in practice. It has shown that the absence of explicit racist hostility is no guarantee of defending yourself against successful prosecution under the Act for procedural discrimination. In the context of the 1976 Act no large employer or institution could afford to be complacent about the adequacy of their equal opportunities policy and practice.

Whilst it had a significant impact, and was a potentially radical piece of legislation, the 1976 Act has been criticised in its operation. In responding to this criticism the Government introduced the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, which came into effect in 2003. This Act has the potential to significantly advance the anti-discriminatory impact of the legal framework shaping ethnic relations. And, continuing the long established concern with promoting “harmonious community relations” this Act imposes a new regulatory framework which is intended to systematise the response of major institutions to this agenda. Section 71(i) of this Act now imposes on every public authority (or organisation fulfilling public functions) a general duty to:

“make arrangements to ensure that its functions are carried out with due regard to the need:

(a) to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination.
(b) To promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial groups.”

Even sceptical NGO’s who have been critical of the working of the 1976 Act note that:

“If these provisions are working properly they should lead to widespread changes and the prevention of discrimination before it occurs.” (1990 Trust, 2003 p. 37).
Of course, as with previous legislation, the political will and effectiveness of the legal system to drive through these new requirements will be critical in determining its eventual impact. (Lustgarten, 1989) However, as an expression of political intent this Act moves toward a pro-active policy in which institutions must demonstrate that they have anticipated their capacity to respond equitably to the cultural diversity that is present in the world in which they operate. As a significant shift in the State’s intervention in regulating ethnic relations in Britain this Act is at least an indication of a political will to confront racism and discrimination in the mundane practices of the majority; and not just in the vulgar extremism of far right racists. Whilst by no means addressing all the issues of racial discrimination in contemporary Britain, this Act is a wide-ranging piece of primary legislation which signals the Labour Government’s commitment to challenging racism and discrimination. It is, however, not the only means whereby this Government has sought to demonstrate a commitment to pursuing a policy of progressive multicultural pluralism. A parallel process of positive Governmental intervention has proceeded through the policy initiatives of individual government departments where, through departmental directives and policy statements, significant shifts in practice have been promoted. Whilst this process can be identified within a number of government departments I will illustrate this phenomenon in relation to health and social care.

At the grass roots level of individual practice and local initiative grass roots commitment to addressing the distinctive health care needs, and health care beliefs, of minority ethnic populations in Britain have been present in health and social care professions since at least the 1970’s. This, however, was very heavily driven by the personal insight and commitment of isolated individuals and pressure groups. When, in 1996, Gerrish et al published an extensive study of nurse education in England, it revealed that training in transcultural health care was very limited across the country, excessively dependent upon minority ethnic professional initiative; and frequently absent. A recent study of how minority ethnic nursing staff had achieved senior positions within the National Health Service revealed that the supportive actions of isolated individuals had been one of the key variables. (Elliot et al, 2002) A systematic mechanism for addressing the needs of minority ethnic staff had not been effectively put in place. Both of these agendas; that of a capacity to deliver transcultural, culturally safe, care and a systematic concern with the equitable treatment of minority ethnic health care personnel, have in recent years become the focus of a plethora of initiatives from within the Department of Health.
There has been a considerable body of research on the inequality in access to health care, and discrimination within the health care system, experienced by minority ethnic communities. (Ahmad, 1993; Nazroo, 1997) This has been paralleled by an increasing awareness of the differing health care needs, and health care beliefs, of minority ethnic communities. (For example, Henley and Schott, 1999) And, over recent years these insights have been reflected in the actions of the Department of Health which has quietly and cumulatively shifted the policy framework around ethnic diversity and health care provision in Britain. The spread of these initiatives has been extensive and a “feel” of their scope can be indicated with a few examples. In their 2000 paper The Vital Connection the Department of Health clearly stated their intention to ensure that the National Health Service would address the health care needs of minority ethnic users. And, subsequently as the NHS issued its National Service Frameworks, which provide explicit guidance on health care provision and the benchmarking of good practice for specific health care needs, issues of transcultural care and “race” equality have been explicitly built into these prescriptive documents. This commitment to promoting transculturally sensitive health care provision has more recently been confirmed in the Department of Health’s (2002) Essence of Health: Patient Focused Benchmarking for Health Care Practitioners which links the benchmarking of clinical practice to the systematic process of clinical governance.

These examples are just some of the major policy framing documents which are cumulatively repositioning ethnic diversity within health care provision and health care institutional cultures. They are the visible framework of what is becoming a ubiquitous, if uneven, transition in the working culture of the British health care system. As with the “race relations” legislation discussed above; it remains to be seen with what energy and persistence these initiatives are implemented, and monitored, in practice. However, it would be unreasonably cynical not to recognise these initiatives as anything other than a major commitment of this Government to actively engage with addressing the challenge of providing equality of care, and appropriate care, for minority ethnic communities in Britain. Given a starting point of only ten years ago this transition within the health system constitutes a positive and important transition in policy.

In the context of the argument being developed here; one of the most striking features of this transition in health care policy and practice, and in the emergent Race Relations legislation discussed above, has been the relatively low profile these initiatives have been allowed in Labour Government propaganda. It is likely that the expanding trans-
cultural agenda within health care is unknown outside of the National Health Service. And, the role of the Race Relations Act (2000) as a vehicle for publicly asserting the Labour Government’s commitment to equality and justice has been spectacularly absent in Labour Party and Government propaganda. Relative to the very high profile of their anti-asylum seeker rhetoric these substantive expressions of British decency have been barely visible in the public sphere. This contradiction within current policy and practice is revelatory of a more fundamental ambiguity at the heart of British responses to ethnic diversity.

The Paradox Explored

One route into revealing the underlying dynamics beneath these contradictory Government responses to diversity may be found in exploring the values that are being invoked in legitimating these policies. In elaborating the Government’s response to the health care needs of minority ethnic users the Government is going beyond a simplistic commitment to universal equal provision. In recognising the demands of guaranteeing “culturally safe” equitable treatment in the provision of health care to a wide range of minority ethnic communities (Ramsden, 1990, 1993) it has necessarily become apparent to health care professionals that “treating everyone the same” is not a viable option. The univeralism of Taylor’s (1992) “equality of respect” does not provide an adequate basis for guaranteeing an appropriate response to the different health beliefs and priorities contained within Britain’s multiethnic client population. Consequently, in the policy of the Department of Health, and of professional frameworks, there has been an ad hoc, and largely implicit, drift towards a necessary acceptance of Taylor’s politics of difference with its powerful implication that if you want to treat me equally you may have to be prepared to treat me differently. This could well sit comfortably with the normative mantra of British nursing; namely that “we deliver individualised holistic care”. However, it does not sit so well with the generic value of tolerance that often informs the nursing professional’s approach to transcultural practice.

The politics of difference cannot be sustained by a framework of tolerance which is essentially an expressive projection of positive self-regard on the part of the majority professional. The politics of difference does not allow for a benign, essentially paternalistic, expression of respect for the other matched by a willingness to treat everyone the same. It rather demands a willingness to engage in a mutual and reciprocal relation of respect in which the difference remains substantive.
and salient in the interaction. This is not consistent with the egocentric logics of tolerance.

It is a reasonable hypothesis to argue that the progressive shift in health care policy in responding to ethnic diversity has, in effect, moved the benchmarks for clinical practice beyond the popular value framework which can sustain them. It starts from an acceptance that equality of respect may require recognizing difference in need. And, in recognizing the rights of minority ethnic citizens, it confronts the racialized tolerance that allows health care professionals to resent the “privileges” given minority clients. This would be a sufficient reason in itself for the Government to be cautious in publicly lauding their achievement in significantly advancing the politics of multiculturalism in British health care practice.

It is appropriate to explore this in a little more depth since this same conflict of practice and available legitimating values would seem to just as adequately account for Government reticence in popularly publicising the intent, and potential, of the Race Relations Act (2000). We noted at the outset that the British have a strong, positive self-regard about their own decency, and that tolerance has been a key feature of this imagery. However, in terms of its adequacy for framing and underpinning pluralist multicultural policies, tolerance is fundamentally limited. As I have argued previously:

“For tolerance to be necessary, there must be a prior belief that the person to be tolerated has an intrinsically undesirable characteristic, or that they are not fundamentally entitled to the benefits which are to be allowed them. Those to be tolerated, by definition, possess some such social stigma.

Tolerance is the exercise of largesse by the powerful, ultimately on behalf of the powerful. It is the generous extension of forbearance toward someone who is intrinsically objectionable or not deserving of the privilege being allowed.” (Husband 2000, p. 228).

Tolerance presupposes a power relation in which the tolerator has discretion over whether or not they should act for the benefit of those to be tolerated. (See, for example, Mendus, 1989.) It has an egocentric dynamic that is incompatible with the logics of the politics of difference. Additionally, tolerance as a basis for British multicultural policy fatally ignores a key reality of British ethnic demography: namely, that the very great majority of the minority ethnic population are full British citizens. Consequently, they do not require the generosity of the majority to allow them the resources and freedoms they demand: they have these as of right as citizens. It is apparent that in the developing
policy framework of the Department of Health, and in the emergent practice that follows from it, this reality has been recognised and reflected in an increasingly assertive policy framework. Unlike in the paternalistic scenario revealed by Gerrish et al’s (1996) research, where “nice people” could choose to develop a professional interest in transcultural health care, increasingly transcultural competence is being defined as a required professional competence of all health care staff. Transcultural care is being promoted as a response to the rights of the client; not the benevolent interest of the practitioner. This does not sit comfortably with a workforce, or a wider population, nurtured on an unquestioning belief in the positive value of their distinctive tolerance.

However, if belief in British tolerance is a potential hindrance to the take up and implementation of initiatives in transcultural health care it is equally uncongenial to the framing ethos of the Race Relations Act (2000). This initiative also is premised on the rights of minority ethnic persons: now additionally supported by the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into British law through the Human Rights Act (1998). In asserting, and seeking to guarantee, the human rights of minority ethnic persons in Britain, the Government is to a significant extent making the role of tolerance at most a supportive lubricant of the process of change. The flattering largesse of the majority is effectively qualified by the assertion of the legitimacy of the rights claims of the minorities. It is perhaps possible to see here the basis of Government reticence in popularly advertising its substantive commitment to minority ethnic rights.

Paradoxically, as we have seen above, restrictive border policies have been legitimated in the past, and currently, in the name of tolerance and a commitment to harmonious community relations. As has been exemplified on a grand scale by the contemporary anti-asylum seeker furore, such tolerance clearly has its limits. Nation states appear to be very comfortable with the notion that there is a natural limit to their tolerance: that they should not be pushed too far in the name of equality and decency. Blommaert and Verschueren (1998) in developing their analysis of the Belgium situation developed the concept of “the threshold of tolerance”. In their words:

“The threshold of tolerance is an objectifying socio-mathematical concept that defines the conditions under which the all-European tolerance and openness may be cancelled without affecting the basic self-image. The European does not become intolerant, until this threshold is crossed. Just let him or her step back over the same threshold, i.e. just reduce the number of foreigners again, and the...
good old tolerance will return. In other words, even in moments of intolerance the European is still tolerant at heart, and the observed behaviour is completely due to the factual circumstances which render it impossible to exercise this essential openness. Needless to say, the threshold of tolerance is not an exclusively Belgian notion. It is commonly used in other European countries.” (Blommaert and Verschueren 1998, p. 78).

The awesome potency of this invocation of a threshold of tolerance lies in its ability to define tolerance as an on-going property of the majority; which may “regrettably” have to be curtailed due to external circumstances. From this perspective the proper, and responsible, politics of managing ethnic diversity is founded in creating an environment in which tolerance can reign free. This, of course, may require Draconian border policies which exclude asylum seekers, or may necessitate the restriction of access to citizenship of those minority ethnic persons resident in the country. Hattersely’s formula has a potent spurious legitimacy when framed within the logics of the “threshold of tolerance”.

Thus a perverse consequence of the historically derived British ease in being prepared to manage ethnic diversity would seem to be that the continuing drive to sustain the salience of tolerance in the collective culture of self-regard places limits on an explicit engagement with the politics of difference, and under-pins a righteous indignation directed toward repelling asylum seekers from entering the country. Within this general framework it is possible to discern two distinct identity dynamics which construct quite different orientations toward those minority ethnic communities that are settled and established in Britain; and those asylum seekers who wish to enter Britain. To refer back to Bauman’s (1990) juxtaposition of the stranger and the alien it is possible to argue that it is a reflection of the maturity of British multiculturalism that there is a de facto acceptance by the majority communities that minority ethnic communities are now an integral part of the British population. Their presence here has a matter-of-fact acceptance and consequently the state’s recognition of their rights has a generic degree of legitimacy; qualified by the racialized construction of their difference.

Asylum seekers are perceived as an external threat. They do not carry with them, in popular consciousness, any affinity with Britain either territorially or culturally. Consequently, in the popular view their demands upon the British state, and British people, are perceived as being lacking in legitimacy.
From this perspective it is possible to develop a typology which links the themes of this paper. Table 1 below sketches the dynamics between the perceived legitimacy of minority claims and the value framework that is invoked to legitimate the majority’s response.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Base of Majority Response</th>
<th>Legitimate Claims</th>
<th>Illegitimate Claims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights/Justice</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In cell A we can locate the benign, paternalistic acceptance of the minority ethnic presence in Britain. But, it is a socio-political framework that fits a universalist politics of respect. It facilitates a majority self-regard in the exercise of their tolerance in treating everyone equally.

Cell C, on the other hand, is close to the politics that informs the Race Relations Act (2000) and the underlying ethos of the Department of Health’s initiatives. Again, the claims of minority ethnic persons are accepted as legitimate; but here the basis of these claims is understood as being derived from the rights which underpin these claims. Where the demand is for justice the paternalistic myopia of tolerance is all too easily exposed in all its egocentrism and myopia. The politics of difference, as a model of mutual and reciprocal respect most adequately fits this scenario.
Cell B encapsulates the British liberal conscience negotiation of the rejection of asylum seekers claims to enter Britain. Whilst the basis on which asylum seekers seek entry is regarded as spurious, since they are “welfare scroungers” or “economic migrants” the majority person is able to maintain a positive claim to their tolerant credentials. It is their concern for “harmonious community relations” that fuels their anger at these “bogus” asylum seekers. And, it is the concern for the minority of “real” refugees that stiffens their resolve to maintain harsh border policies in order to weed out the mass of fraudulent applicants. Cell B is an ideological package that sustains a self-regarding virtue in the presence of racist and xenophobic policies.

Cell D offers the prospect of an absolutist rejection of minority claims. It is the cell in which far-right Little Englanders who have never accepted the presence of minority ethnic communities in Britain reside. Invoking a strong rights view of who is “one of us” there is no space for the ambiguity of tolerance: these people have no right to be here and consequently “we” are justified in our outrage. Equally, this scenario applies to a more widespread rejection of asylum seekers’ claims. An arbitrary, and ad hoc invocation of a rights discourse allows majority ethnic citizens to override their tolerant sensibilities. The absolute perceived illegitimacy of asylum seekers claims constitutes a classic instance of the conditions for triggering the threshold of tolerance syndrome. From this perspective tolerance is irrelevant and foolhardy given the total illegitimacy of the asylum seekers’ claims.

From a heuristic application of Table 1, it is possible to see an underlying logic to the paradoxical politics of the British management of ethnic diversity sketched above. In essence, the impetus for change coming from minority ethnic pressure groups, from NGO’s and even from within the Government, is promoting a de facto shift towards a politics of difference that sits uncomfortably with the historically embedded British perception of their distinctive capacity for tolerance and paternalistic decency. The continuing ubiquity of “race thinking” and the racialisation of majority perceptions of minority ethnic citizens creates a framework in which “tolerance” of their difference fuels a resistance to explicitly addressing minority ethnic rights. By making an arbitrary distinction between the qualified legitimacy of settled minority ethnic populations and the absolute rejection of asylum seekers, the contemporary moral panic around border policy has allowed for an extreme rehearsal of racialized nationalism that evokes values and practices entirely contradictory to other current progressive policies. Political pragmatism has consequently determined the contradictory dynamics reviewed in this paper.
References


III
Methods
On methods

Matti Similä
Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki

This chapter provides a reflection on methods from my own experience but also to take up two special themes, namely the use of correlation methods in research and the different approaches within comparative analysis available to us.

Let me begin with some general reflections on the teaching of methods and methodology.

Many teachers, as well as students, have found lessons on methods difficult and even boring sometimes. The problem is to talk about things one ought to do. To learn about methods is like learning to play the piano. You don’t learn to play by reading books about piano playing, at least not by only reading books. What you need is a teacher supervising you as you try to play. “Good, that’s right, not so, try this…”

Another thing to bear in mind is that the logic of science is the same logic as the logic we use in everyday life. There is nothing magical about science; it is only a matter of reflecting more on what we do and to use logic in a more systematic and critical way than normally. But the logic itself is the same.

What is difficult is to link theoretical concepts to data. What is difficult is to bridge the gap between the micro and macro level. What is, sometimes, difficult is to assess the representativity of the data. What is difficult is to assess contextual effects. What is difficult is to avoid measurement errors. What is difficult is to understand the processes and mechanisms behind the patterns that we can observe. What is difficult is to explain our results, taken into consideration how difficult it is just to make a correct description. The list of difficulties could be made much longer. Many things in research are difficult, but there is no magic involved.
My own experiences - pros and cons of different approaches

My first major study was not related to ethnicity, migration or minority questions, but was a study on the general opinions and knowledge about the law and legal matters in Sweden. We used a structured questionnaire sent out to a representative sample of Swedes in the ages 18-65 years old. The sample size was 2 865 persons.

What did I learn and what problems did I face?

Firstly, I learnt a lot technically, for instance, how to do a questionnaire, how to use a computer program, building indices, doing factor analysis, using multivariate methods. How careful you ought to be when trying to obtain valid indicators on theoretical concepts.

I also learned that all people were not flattered by the fact that they had been chosen to belong to our sample. In fact, the biggest problem we had was the low response rate. Why? Of course there were technical reasons. The good thing with survey research is that you can ask a lot of people a lot of questions. You can ask a lot of questions, but not too many questions. Maybe we had included too many in our questionnaire, we later made a shorter version. But the main reason for non-response was simply this: if you ask people about things they neither find personally relevant in their every day existence nor do they find the questions exiting (like questions about crime or sexual behaviour), then they will not be too eager to participate. This insight was confirmed in my next study (which I will not talk about here) where the questions were centred on people’s own experiences. In this case we had no response problems at all.

So I also learned a lot about response problems and how to try to analyse the effects of non-response. We sent out three reminder letters, the third including a new questionnaire. Then we sent a reminder letter with a shorter version of the questionnaire. Finally we took a sample among the remaining respondents who were then interviewed by telephone. There was a lot of work and a lot of time involved in this. And lots of time spent making comparisons between respondents and non-respondents and looking at differences between early answers and late answers, etcetera. The response rate was 58 %. We analysed the non-respondents and made a lot of work, which confirmed that there were no evident serious differences that could be established. But as always with non-respondents it was also clear that you cannot know for sure about the effects. What you cannot study you cannot know. But do the job as well as possible!
I also learned that open-ended questions demand a lot of labour and that you cannot carry out a large survey with many respondents and many questions and try to make a semi-qualitative study at the same time. It is simply too much.

I also remember one classical example of the difficulty of interpreting findings. We found that younger people did not think it was as important to follow rules, as compared with elder people. This is a good example of the limitation of surveys. You cannot study processes over time and, therefore, you cannot know if this is a cohort effect indicating social change or if it is a life-cycle effect, indicating that when you grow older your views will change.

The second study I will tell you about had to do with young immigrants in Stockholm. The aim was to study their life-styles, identification patterns and integration into the Swedish society. This was also a survey study, but here we used structured interviewers. We had a non-response problem here too, but for other reasons. The non-response problem this time was connected with difficulties to get in contact with people. The sample consisted of 114 young immigrants from Yugoslavia and 110 from Turkey. The response rate was 68%.

One technical problem was to translate the questionnaire into Turkish and Serbo-Croatian in case the respondents did not speak Swedish well enough and to find interviewers who spoke both Swedish and one of the other languages. To translate is not easy if you really want to be sure that the connotations and the stylistic impact is the same in all languages.

One reason behind the non-response problem had to do with the high mobility in the sample. Many addresses turned out to be outdated and many of the persons were no longer living in the area. Also, some of the respondents were not at home at the appointed time, although they had promised to be there.

One problem of validity was that it was not always possible to be alone with the person who was interviewed. Other family members were there at the same time in several cases. Cultural assumptions and practices about space, privacy and who has the right to speak frequently impact directly upon data collection.

A classical problem of interpretation was that we found that immigrants living in areas with a high percentage of immigrants identified more strongly with their ethnic background and less with Sweden. Should this be interpreted as an “area effect” or as an effect of selection? This is another example of the limitations of the survey approach.
Despite the difficulties, there were a lot of interesting results. We studied the integration process from a cognitive, social, structural and identificational perspective. We could show the multiple and contextual character of identity and also find determinants of importance for different aspects of the integration process. One finding was that “feeling ethnic” and “social distance to Swedes” were not two sides of the same coin. In fact they were rather independent, as they came out as independent factors in a factor analysis. In other words, “feeling ethnic” could be related both to “small social distance to Swedes” and to “big social distance to Swedes” and so on. However, while “social distance to Swedes” could be well explained with “rational factors” like time of residence, knowledge of Swedish, amount of Swedish friends, etc, “feeling ethnic” was much more difficult to explain and was interpreted to be more dependent on qualitative relations to significant others (see Similä, 1988 a and b). I used path-analysis and despite the problems of the ordering of variables, I think the technique gave insights and the possibility to disentangle simple correlations into direct effects, indirect effects; and (in some cases) spurious effects was valuable.

This study was a part of a larger comparative programme. The same type of study was carried out in Germany. From the beginning there were also plans to include the sending countries, Turkey and Yugoslavia. However, comparative efforts are difficult in many ways. I will come to methodological aspects on comparative research in a while, but here I will also mention other difficulties. They are about time and money. Difficulties in funding left out Turkey and Yugoslavia. The comparative part of the study was never worked out after the initial intensions. I think it was mostly a question of time and money. Time runs out and people get involved in other projects. In both countries good national reports were produced, but the last step failed. Such things sometimes happen.

The third study I will mention was of another character. It was a part of a research project about the reception of refugees in Sweden. In this study we investigated six Swedish municipalities (new and old as regards reception of refugees). We carried out thematic interviews with key persons in the reception programme.

The first problem to solve was the selection of municipalities and the selection of people to interview. We selected six municipalities from different parts of Sweden to get a variation regarding size, experience of refugee reception, region, educational resources and so on. In the municipalities we concentrated our interviews on persons who were in
near contact with the refugees and asylum seekers. Personally I did 65 tape-recorded interviews of varying length, but the mean time was 1.5 hours. With some persons I had the possibility to make two interviews. This was in many cases very valuable. One reason was that many of the persons had to “defend” what they were doing in the first interview. In the second, they often told much more about their problems. The second time I was regarded as “an old friend” who bothered to listen to them. There was a trust that sometimes was lacking during the first interview. But it was not only a question of trust. The first interview had in many cases started a process of reflection. The persons had been thinking a lot about what they really were doing! So, all in all, a follow up interview can be very rewarding, not only to get to know “what has happened since the last time” but also the above mentioned reasons.

One problem I thought a great deal about was possible interview effects. How can you combine a good contact with a minimised interview effect? Some persons you really liked, others not. Some answers awakened your interest, while other possible themes perhaps never came up, but could have come up with another interviewer. I have no simple solution to this problem and think one should admit that an interview situation is an interaction between two persons. In most cases there are (most probably) interview effects. Also, *nota bene* that the process of reflection that the first interview started was an interview effect too. But was it bad and are all interview effects bad?

I transcribed the interviews word by word. It was a rather time consuming process. However, it also was a way of learning to memorise the content of the interviews and I believe that it was worth the effort.

Sometimes I thought that we had chosen to study too many municipalities. There was not enough time to study all the places intensively enough and there were high costs for travel and hotels. Since the municipalities were very different in so many respects (size, structure, number of immigrants and refugees, immigration history, labour market conditions, educational opportunities, etc) there was no way to explain differences between them. What we could do was to search for *invariance*, what was common for the reception in all municipalities, despite the fact that they were so different. Thus the strategy was to search for *universals*, not trying to explain variation (although describing it).

Some of the main findings were that the staff in the reception programmes mostly consisted of social workers and that the practice used to take care of “normal” Swedish clients was not always the best one, when dealing with refugees, i.e. the models often led to an
unnecessary passive and isolated life for the refugees. The role conflicts among compatriots to the refugees employed as interpreters or assistants by the municipality were also quite striking.

Practical problems were connected to the interdisciplinarity of the research team. The different perspectives of different researchers from different disciplines and with different competences made us try to explain too much sometimes. Another practical problem was connected with timing. The intention that researchers could also use data collected by other team members was hard to realise, since people were collecting and analysing with different speed and some could work full time within the project, while others were engaged in other activities too. Sometimes there also seemed to be a reluctance among some team-members to hand over their data to someone else. As a result, there were published many good reports, but the final synthesis never emerged.

The fourth study was of a quite different kind, built on the possibility to merge register data from several registers (census data and school data). The aim of the study was to analyse the second-generation immigrants’ recruitment to higher education. Here we could study total cohorts of the population, i.e. all persons living in Sweden 1990, who were born 1953-70, a total of 1.9 million people. The large data base made it possible to separate immigrants from different countries, which would not have been possible in a normal survey study, since many groups are very small. The limitations of this approach is that the number of variables are rather restricted and that you cannot redefine concepts, but have to accept the definitions made by others for their purposes.

We used logistic regression analysis and I think that this possibility to use multivariate analysis really gave new insights, since we could reveal what was not obvious from the beginning. Under “equal circumstances” immigrant children had a higher rate than Swedish ones to go to higher levels of education, although their total rate was lower. But taking into consideration parents’ education and SES, the child’s age (since the opportunities to study have grown rapidly over time) and the child’s age at arrival, showed that children who had arrived before the age of seven had higher rates than Swedish children. The study also showed considerable differences between different immigrant groups. Those differences could to a great part be explained by the same factors. Not entirely however. The only groups that had a lower probability than Swedish children, ceteris paribus, were children from other Nordic states, Denmark, Finland and Norway. Especially Denmark
showed lower figures, while children from “remote cultures” performed much better.

We had to think a lot about “hidden” effects in the data. Could, for instance, the low figures for Denmark be an effect of a selection process where many Danes with ambitions regarding the education of their children moved back home? After all, Southern Sweden and Denmark are very close and it is easy to move between the countries. So we had to identify all persons who had moved back in the school age and omit them from the analysis. The result, however, remained the same. Another problem was that the Swedes were such an overwhelming majority in the sample. Could their impact lead to the fact that factors important for Swedish children seemed to be important for all children. So we also made the analyses without the Swedish children. Again, the patterns were the same for immigrant children, when Swedish children were omitted.

The good thing with such a big study was the possibility to do multivariate analysis and being able to distinguish between different immigrant groups. Some results were far from obvious and couldn’t have been obtained from raw data or by simple correlation analysis.

What we did not study was local variation, e.g. if the picture was different in areas with high and low percentages of immigrants. Nor did we have data on how well the children performed in their studies or what happened later on the labour market. Register data have their limitations, of course.

The last study I will mention is a study on the role of bilingualism in the relations between Finland and Sweden. Here we used structured questionnaires in a first stage and thematic interviews in a second stage. We studied Swedes in Stockholm and Swedish immigrants in Helsinki, Finnish immigrants in Stockholm, Swedish speaking Finns and Finnish speaking Finns in Helsinki/Helsingfors and Pietarsaari/Jakobstad (where Helsinki is dominated by Finnish while Pietarsaari has a large group of Swedish speakers). We drew random samples of all groups and sent them the questionnaire.

The importance of interest in the study for the response rate was again obvious. While the response rate among Swedish speaking Finns in Pietarsaari was 75 %, it was as low as 55 % among Finnish speaking Finns in Helsinki. The questions about bilingualism are experienced as more meaningful in the “life-world” of minority members in a bilingual town, than among majority members in a town dominated by the majority language.

Another thing to note is that we started with the structured questionnaire. We then used the information for finding people to interview
who had “interesting profiles”. In other words: first a random sample and hard data, then the selection of people and qualitative methods. This worked out very well.

Maybe one should end this section with some self-criticism. Again, on reflection, I think that we had too many questions in the questionnaire and that we had too many groups in our study. But sometimes descriptive interests and analytical interests can be in conflict.

Some thoughts about correlation analysis

Since survey analysis is very common I would like to remind you about the major difficulties with correlation analysis (be it OLS, logistic regression or something else), since correlation coefficients are what we use when trying to interpret the data. The problem is, as you know, that we cannot study the processes, we just have the outcomes and that correlations are affected by so many different kinds of factors. If we find weak correlations between the variables studied, this can be a result of many different factors. Firstly, of course, the variables studied may be relatively independent in relation to each other. But we must ask ourselves if there could be other reasons, if the weak correlation is a statistical artefact?

I will take up some of these issues here. I am not pretending to say something new, but sometimes old truths can be repeated.

The first problem has to do with measurement errors. Although weak reliability means that errors are random (and do not affect means, for instance) those random errors do have systematic effects on correlations, i.e. they weaken them (the problem of attenuation). If we could assess the reliability exactly, we could correct for this effect. The problem is that we in many cases lack the possibility to estimate the reliability in a precise way.

As regards validity, lack of validity in most cases affect the correlations too. Here I think one could make a distinction between “validity 1”, which is the relation between concept and indicator and ”validity 2”, where true values are affected by a systematic error. As regards “validity 1” it is clear that the correlation is affected if we in fact are studying something else than we intended. As regards “validity 2” the effects vary with the kind of systematic error, but in most cases the correlation is affected (besides the theoretical case that the error is constant for all values). Particularly delicate is the case where the error term is correlated with the true value. A good example of such a case is when we ask people about their alcohol consumption, where the
error increases with increasing consumption. If your aunt just takes a
glass of port at Christmas, she will probably be able to estimate her
consumption very exactly, whereas a person who drinks more often will
tend to forget some drinks. If you are a heavy consumer, you will
probably forget many glasses and in addition to that perhaps reduce
the number further to be able to give an answer which is socially
desirable. Such an effect will weaken the correlation.

But there are more possible reasons for a weak correlation. One is
lack of variation in your data set. If the independent variable does not
vary, you cannot get a strong correlation, even if there is a strong
causal relation between the variables. This may be self-evident, but is
sometimes forgotten.

Another thing to remember is the well-known problem of spurious-
ness. We all remember the examples of spurious relations of the type
“people with big feet write better than people with small feet” a
correlation that would disappear if we controlled for age. But what is
sometimes forgotten is that factors “behind” do not only create a
correlation, they can also hide (or weaken) a correlation!

The “normal” correlation coefficient demands that a “perfect”
correlation means that a condition is both a necessary and a sufficient
condition. It is not enough to be only sufficient or only necessary. This
means that when we study rare events the correlation is not especially
strong, even if the over-risk for some categories are much higher than
the mean. For instance, dying of lung cancer is only one of many ways
to die and therefore relatively rare. Smoking is (almost) necessary to get
lung cancer, but not sufficient! Many smokers die from other causes
and the correlation, therefore, is not so strong. When dealing with rare
events, we should use also other measures than the correlation, for
instance over-risks or odds.

When choosing between the correlation coefficient and the re-
gression coefficient I think one should choose both! The first tells
about dependency (explained variance) in terms of predictive power of
the independent variable, the second tells about “effects” (differences).
Both are interesting.

As for multivariate methods one can sometimes hear the argument
that one should not “control away” reality. I agree, and that is not the
purpose of multivariate analysis. Raw data tell the truth about reality.
That is how it is. The purpose with multivariate analysis is not to deny
reality, but to seek for explanations of the reality. The analysis about
the second generation in the Swedish school system did not show that
immigrant children had a higher propensity to go to higher studies.
They had not. But the analysis revealed the main causes to this fact and
could, for instance, rule out “cultural distance” as a cause and show that the causes by and large were the same kind of factors that cause differences within the host population.

When shall I use standardised coefficients and when non-standardised? There is no simple answer, but as a “rule of thumb” I would say that if I want to assess the relative importance of several predictors in the same data set, then I use standardised coefficients, but if I want to compare the effect of one specific factor in two (or several) different data sets (for instance in two countries) then I use non-standardised coefficients. Otherwise I would “standardise away” the difference that I am interested in.

A correlation can also be weak because of a misspecified model of analysis, e.g. assuming linearity when relations are logarithmic. Here we always have to make a choice between truthfulness and simplicity. Oversimplification leads to errors, but truthfulness can lead to very complicated models, requiring large data sets (for instance if we want to assess all possible interaction effects) and ending up in very complicated results that are hard to interpret. I often try to compromise, starting with simple models. However, I always try to check if a model with less “simplifying assumptions” fits the data better. If the difference is significant one has to accept it, but if a more complicated model only leads to slightly better fit of data I prefer to keep to my simple, “untrue” model!

Problems with comparative research

Since we are brought together here as researchers from different countries in Europe, I think it is appropriate to end by saying a few words about comparative research. I believe that one aim with this programme is to enable many of us to co-operate in joint comparative projects in the future. One could, of course, say that social science is always comparative. What I am referring to here is research that involves at least two, often several countries.

Sometimes I think it would be worthwhile to reflect more on the selection of the countries that are involved in a comparative project. Sometimes I have the feeling that the selection is more or less made on an ad hoc basis, dependent more on acquaintances between researchers with similar interests from different countries than on qualities within the countries themselves. If so or not, it is always good to reflect not only on the differences between the countries involved, but on the purpose of the comparison and how the countries are perceived (for example as “different sets of variables” or “real things”).
As you know, there are two basic research designs to choose between, namely *most similar* design or *most different* design.

In the *most similar* design the focus is on *intersystemic* similarities and differences. Common systemic factors are conceived as “controlled for”, whereas intersystemic differences are viewed as explanatory variables. The number of common characteristics is maximised and the differences to explain are minimised. The resulting statements are in the form: “Among the Mediterranean countries, which share the following characteristics... differences with regard to attitudes towards immigrants can be attributed to the following factors...” Of course, there may be that we find not only differences in xenophobic attitudes, but also different patterns as regards the correlation between the attitudes and other factors, like age, education or class.

The problem with this design is that countries differ in so many respect, even when they are similar, and on so many different dimensions, that the conclusion about the causes behind the intersystemic differences is hard to make.

In the *most different* design the starting point is variations on a lower level than the system level, most often the behaviour of individual actors, or of different groups in the society. Here, systemic factors are not given any special place among possible predictors of behaviour. For instance, we may be interested in explaining variations in young immigrants’ attitudes towards the school and the importance of education. Here, we do not consider intersystemic differences to start with. Instead, we make an analysis on the *intrasystemic* level. Although the samples are derived from different systems, they are initially treated as if the population from which they were drawn is homogenous. If different immigrant groups differ from each other in the same way in different countries, those differences cannot be explained by systemic differences. However, if the patterns change for different systems, then systemic differences must be taken into consideration. If systems are very different, the task will be hard. To that comes, that not only the societies we compare are different, but so are also, for instance, the immigrant groups studied, as regards history in the country, social organisation, resources, etc. What we probably hope for is the finding of *universals*. If the rate of xenophobia were the same in India, Finland and Japan, this couldn’t be explained by systemic factors. And: even if the rates were different, if the patterns are the same, for instance, that middle aged and well educated people were least xenophobic in all the countries studied, this would tell us something about universal factors explaining xenophobia. (Cf. also my study on refugee reception).
If we combine the purpose of comparison with how the context (country) is understood we get the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose of Comparison</th>
<th>Context as a “real thing” (entity)</th>
<th>Context as a set of variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Find identicals</td>
<td>identification of “universals”</td>
<td>show universality of a statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Murdock: incest taboo</td>
<td>Whitings study of birth control explained as regulation of food control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show differences</td>
<td>specify the unique property of a society</td>
<td>specify time-space coordinates for a phenomenon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weber comparing world religions to show the specificity of Western culture</td>
<td>Cross-national surveys seeing, for instance, different countries representing different degrees of modernisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also the Finnish sociologist Risto Alapuro has discussed these matters, making a distinction between *endogenous* and *exogenous* models. In endogenous models both possible causes and possible effects are assumed to be located within the country. Using general concepts makes one object comparable to other objects of study.

In exogenous models countries are viewed as a system of interdependent units, and the position of a country within this larger system is considered to be an external factor, affecting the processes under study.

Thus a country can be studied for different reasons, which also can be summarised as follows:

The country can be:

1. **object of study**, the main interest lies in investigating the chosen countries;
2. **context of study**, interest is in testing the generality of results concerning social phenomena, by studying the same thing in two or more countries;
3. **unit of analysis**, interest is chiefly to study how social phenomena are systematically related to characteristics of the countries;
4. **trans-national**, treating nations as components of a larger international system.
One of the difficulties with comparative research can be called Gaulton’s problem: can a given culture be seen as “causing” something, or is it rather a result of diffusion across cultures? If the latter holds, then patterns in different cultures may have a common source.

To this we can add technical problems like differences in definitions behind statistical data, different administrative structures and practices. We also have translation problems where difficulties have to do with problems such as where there are different connotations of the same “word” in different languages and whether the two texts are stylistically “the same”.

If we want to compare European states we can ask: what do they have in common and in what ways do they differ? Some possible dimensions of importance could be: north-south, west-east, Catholicism-Protestantism, Nordic welfare states, Mediterranean culture, Mitteleuropa, post-communism, states with a colonial history, wine-belt and vodka-belt, old and new states, states with long immigration history, states with long emigration history. Besides, we have regions within states or transgressing states. This list can be made much longer but I think it is clear that in explaining differences between nation states there is always a great risk of ad hoc explanations. Therefore, while comparative research is fruitful in many ways, it is also demanding and we should make clear to ourselves how and why we are carrying out a particular comparative study.
1. Introduction

Research on migration and integration of migrants, as well as the political discourse on migration, usually has to rely on official statistics and data as a background frame, even when within the research project empirical data has been generated. It is of critical importance therefore to have a good knowledge of the, usually administrative, context in which the official data was generated, of its methodology, and of the concepts and, usually legal, definitions used. A critical analysis of these aspects is essential in order to avoid serious flaws arising from the shortcomings and weaknesses of the official data, as well as for interpreting the data within a valid range. This paper discusses serious problems in the use of official data, mainly using the example of German official data on migration, and gives examples and criteria for a critical analysis of such data. It is based on results from two research projects conducted at the european forum for migration studies, University of Bamberg: A doctoral thesis by my colleague Harald Lederer on indicators of migration, and a research project of my colleague Edda Currle on migration data and their background, comparing eight European countries.

2. Basic aspects of official data

Migration related statistics can be divided into two main groups: quantitative data on migration movements and on population stocks. Each of the two groups has specific methodological and definition problems, and linking them is difficult.
For migration movement data, one firstly has to consider a definition of migration which is more or less common sense in migration studies: Migration is

— a spatial movement,
— over a significant distance,
— of single individuals, groups or collectives,
— for a change in their centre of live.

These criteria are usually understood as a change of residence over an international border. They exclude tourist or short term visits and business movements, nomad groups, military and diplomatic staff abroad, as well as commuting. United Nation recommendations for migration statistics consider a period of stay greater than three months as short term migration and greater than one year as long term migration. Neither this definition of migration nor the time frame given by the UN recommendations are necessarily used for official data on migration movements; both usually vary within migration statistics of different nations, and may vary even within the national statistics on different migrant groups. Furthermore, different concepts may be used for data on inflow and on outflow migration of the same group.

For population stock data of migrant populations, in addition to the points mentioned above, the legal status and duration of stay as well as demographic developments have to be considered. Stock data on the population with migratory background is usually available only for certain groups; often citizenship is the criterion which only partly overlaps with migratory background (see fig. 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship (child or parents)</th>
<th>Place of Birth (children or parents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>(a) Native Born German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-German</td>
<td>(c1) Native Born Foreigner “Second and Third Generation”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 1

Immigration status in Germany

For example, the relevant factors for the link between migration movements and the population stock of foreign population are shown by fig. 2 below.
A general problem of official data on migration is that they are usually derived from working statistics which reflect administrative procedures and therefore legal categories. The latter may differ considerably from the social reality of migration movements, rendering major problems for a valid interpretation of official data.

3. **Official data: The German case**

![Diagram of migration inflows to Germany](image)

**Fig. 3**

Type of migration inflows to Germany
Migration into Germany is taking place by various legal categories of migrants. The most relevant groups are shown in fig. 3 below; the size of the symbols represents approximately the size of the migration flows. In Germany, official data on migration is compiled by various organizations. The most relevant ones are:

—Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden (Federal Statistical Office):
  - Inflow and Outflow (3.1)
  - Census Data (1987 census) (3.5)
  - Annual Micro Census (Labour Force Survey) (3.6.)
  - Educational Statistics (3.10)

—Bundesverwaltungsamt Köln (Federal Administrative Office)
  - Inflow of Ethnic Germans (3.2)
  - Central Register of Foreigners (AZR) (3.4)
  - Immigration of Jewish Refugees from CIS countries (3.8)

—Bundesamt für die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge Nürnberg (Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees):
  - Administrative Statistics on Refugees and Asylum Seekers (3.3)

—Auswärtiges Amt Berlin (Foreign Office):
  - Visa Statistics (3.7)

—Bundesanstalt für Arbeit Nürnberg (Federal Labour Office):
  - Labour and Employment Register and Statistics (3.9)

The various data on migration, the administrative context of their generation and their specific limitations will be discussed in the following sections. The respective number of the chapter is given in parenthesis in the list above.

3.1. Inflow and Outflow Data

Inflow and Outflow data are generated out of the local registers of residents at the local district authorities (Einwohnermeldeamt, Ausländeramt). According to German law, every resident has to register and to deregister within one week after a move of the centre of their residence other than being a tourist and staying less than two months (the latter figure varies between the German Laender). The registration covers also the nationality and the country of departure (or new residence). Out of these local registers, the Statistical Offices of the
Laender compile reports on annual inflow and outflow, which are the basis for the statistics of the Federal Statistical Office. There exists no case-based federal register of residents, all individual data are available only on the local level except data on foreign residents (see Ausländerzentralregister, 3.4).

The significance of official data on inflow and outflow, both on German nationals and foreign citizens, suffers from three main problems:

—There exists in general a tendency not to deregister, especially if the foreign citizen would loose the acquired residence status in case of formal deregistration. Thus, stock data compiled out of these flow data tend to severely overestimate the number of residents.
—This tendency also meets the interest of the local communities and districts since high population figures are the basis for the distribution quota for certain taxes and financial support from the federal and the Laender level to the local communities.
—The data on inflow and outflow is a case statistic, not a person statistic. If the same person moves more than one time (as for example seasonal workers who can get a work permit twice a year), each move contributes to the flow data. Thus, especially the data on inflow migration overestimates the real immigration of individuals by the aggregated counting of movement cases (multiple counting of the same person in case of multiple moves).

3.2. Inflow of Ethnic Germans

The Bundesverwaltungsamt (in charge of a heterogenous scope of federally administrated affairs) compiles statistics on the inflow of Ethnic Germans out of the processing files. Upon naturalization which usually is achieved along with the Ethnic German status according to Article 116 of the German Grundgesetz, the migrant status of this group is not registered in any stock data except in labour office data for a period of five years after naturalization. Thus, no stock data on Ethnic German Immigrants exist.

3.3. Administrative Statistics on Refugees and Asylum Seekers

The Bundesamt für die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge (BAFi) compiles case statistics on asylum applications filed and processed. These statistics are the only German statistical data which encompass
in addition to the nationality also ethnic belonging (i.e. differentiating Kurdish migrants among Turkish or Iraqi nationals). Being a case statistic, multiple counting of the same individual is possible in case of follow-up applications or in case of parallel applications using different identities. Since 1995, the statistics differentiate between first asylum application and follow-up applications after a rejection; thus, comparison with pre-1995 data which include follow-up applications is problematic. Post-1995 data shows that about 25 % to 33 % of all applications are follow-up applications and do not reflect a real inflow of individuals. In addition, the number of multiple applications is considerably high: Due to intense checking in 1995, 12.3 % of all application were discovered as being filed by persons registered already in one or more other applications in order to gain multiple chances for a recognition in one of them.

As a consequence, the indicator of asylum application numbers considerably exceeds the real inflow of migrants via the asylum scheme. Another problem with regard to longitudinal analysis is that until the early 1990s, asylum applications were included into the total inflow data compiled by the Federal Statistical Office (3.1) only after a decision upon their claim. Different to the current practice, the applicants had not been counted in this data during the time their application was under process, a time span which could last for several years.

### 3.4 Central Register of Foreigners (AZR)

The Bundesverwaltungsamt maintains a central register of resident foreign citizens (including European Union nationals). This register is updated by registration and deregistration notices from the local foreigners’ authorities sent to the Bundesverwaltungsamt. As a consequence, the central register data suffer from the same methodological problems as the inflow and outflow data of the Federal Statistical Office (3.1). This calculation of stock data out of the flow figures results in a massive overestimation of the resident foreign population: a comparison of the central register with the 1987 Census data showed that 400,000 foreigners registered in the stock data were not present in Germany anymore (excess of the real figures by 9.4 %). This error differed considerably among various nationalities from 1.9 % (Turkish nationals) up to 18.9 % (Other states/stateless). The AZR data were corrected according to the Census findings for 1989 only, and previous statistics have not been revised, thus the data are problematic for longitudinal analysis. The calculation methods have been improved since 1990, but nevertheless, the methodological problems discussed persist and experts
estimate an excess of foreigners registered but not being resident anymore in 2000 as about 500,000 cases (an overestimation of 6.5% by the AZR stock data): Instead of the official figure of 7.3 million foreigners in 2000, the real number is estimated to amount to 6.8 to 6.9 millions only.

Another problem with the Ausländerzentralregister as indicator for migrant population is the differing concept of foreigner and migrant in Germany (see fig. 4).

The central register of foreigners does not encompass migrants who are naturalized or are German nationals (i.e. the large group of Ethnic Germans) as well as residents with dual nationality, if they also have a German citizenship. On the other side, until the reform of the German citizenship legislation in 2000, children of foreign parents born in Germany became registered as resident foreigners although not being migrants.

3.5. Census Data

In 1987, a federal census was performed in Germany after several years of controversial debate. Due to a Federal Constitutional Court ruling in December 15, 1983, no crosschecking of the census data with the local register of inhabitants on the basis of individual records could be made. Since the 1987 census, no federal census was realized, resulting in serious problems of the reliability of the stock data projected from the 1987 census. This is especially true for foreign residents since the local register for nationals are usually maintained by administrative acts for German citizens only; such as issuing of passports or the delivery of electoral registration cards for local, state and national elections.

A representative sample of 1% of the German population based on the results of the 1987 census is covered by an obligatory annual micro census. Within this Micro Census, 85% of the sample is interviewed face-to-face by staff of the statistical offices of the states (others by mailing the questionnaire). A sub-sample of the Micro Census also includes the items of the European Labour Force Survey, thus generating internationally comparable data of high quality. The Micro Census focuses on labour related and socio-economic dimensions. A major problem of the Micro Census as a data source for migration analysis is that it encompasses items on nationality, duration of the stay and country of origin of family members, but does not contain any item on the country of birth of the interviewed person. Thus, migrants with German citizenship (naturalized immigrants, ethnic Germans) cannot be identified. In addition, the additional items for foreign nationals are not obligatory, resulting in a non-response rate of about 20%. Nevertheless, the Micro Census provides reliable data on the current social and economic situation of foreign citizens being resident in Germany and is one of the best data sources for statistical analysis.

3.7. **Visa Statistics**

Since 1996, the German embassies compile visa statistics on issued visas for the purpose of family reunion. Until then, no data had been available about the extent of immigration by family members of permanently resident foreigners in Germany, although this scheme was a very relevant path for immigration to Germany. Nevertheless, this data does not reflect the full extent for immigration by family reunion. It seems to be common practice to enter Germany via a tourist visa and to apply for a stay permit under the family reunion scheme during the stay in Germany. No data are available on these cases; experts estimate that these cases exceed the regularly issued visa numbers by the factor two; data on the total amount of immigration via family reunion does not exist.

3.8 **Immigration of Jewish Refugees from CIS countries**

The **Bundesverwaltungsamt (BVA)** processes also the immigration of Jewish Refugees from former CIS countries and maintains statistics on an individual basis. As one of the few legal initiatives of the last democratically elected East German government during the short period between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification in 1990, a law was enacted which granted the right to immigrate for Jewish citizens.
of the former Soviet Union states. With the reunification, this regulation has been integrated into the Quota Refugee Scheme of the German Foreigners’ law.

3.9. Labour and Employment Register and Statistics

The Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Federal Labour Office) regularly publishes data on unemployment and cases who got a job mediated by the employment agency. Among these data, specific data on foreign citizens are also compiled. Since these data refer to citizenship, they cannot be taken as an indicator for the employment of migrants. Directly migration-related data are only available on specific categories of labour migration such as contract labourers, seasonal work permits and guest worker permits which were introduced in 1991 on a quota basis.

3.10. Educational Statistics

The Ministries of Education of the Länder compile statistics on the performance of foreign citizens in German schools and on foreign students at German universities. As well as other data which uses citizenship as criteria, the data does not differentiate between long term resident foreigners or foreign citizens born in Germany and recently immigrated foreigners, i.e. children of war refugees from former Yugoslavia. Neither are statistics available on the school performance of Germans with migratory background such as Ethnic Germans. Thus, the data on foreigners cannot be taken as an indicator of the relation between migration and performance in the educational system.

The statistics on foreign students, in addition, refer to students who acquired their university entry qualification outside of Germany, not to students with foreign citizenship; they encompass therefore German citizens who got their university entry qualification in a foreign country and exclude foreign citizens who successfully passed German Abitur or Fachabitur at a German school (second generation).

4. Problems of analysis of available data

In Germany, the Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office) compiles out of the various data sources national data on migration (flows) and on the population of migrants (stock). These statistics contribute to international comparative statistics such as the Eurostat data or the SOPEMI data.
When using such data, one has to bear in mind several problematic aspects of these statistics:

— **Citizenship equals not migratory background**: Most data use the category citizenship. As shown before, foreign citizenship only partly overlaps with a migratory background. In addition, the degree of overlapping is a function of the national naturalization policy and practice, thus complicating the comparison of such data on an international level.

— **Definition of migration**: A criterion for migration in distinction to other forms of mobility is the residence principle. The United Nations recommend a duration of stay of longer than 3 months as the criterion for short term migration, and longer than one year for long term migration. The European countries differ considerably in their definition of migration for statistical analysis (see fig. 5). This variation further complicates the comparison of national migration related statistics on an international level.

— **Case based data**: Most migration-related data is compiled out of administrative data referring to cases, not to individuals. Consequently, multiple counting is likely to occur within a period of analysis, depending on the administrative procedure which is the basis for the data.

— **Remigration is usually under-represented**: As shown above, remigration is usually under-represented in official data; thus, stock data compiled out of flow data systematically tend to overestimate the real figure of resident migrants. The compilation
of stock data out of flow data is a complex process which is influenced by various factors (see fig. 2).

The problems mentioned above have already to be taken into consideration when using official data on migration in a specific national context. For the purpose of comparison of such data on an international level, further problematic aspects have to be considered:

—**Official data are strongly linked to the legal categories**: Legislation and the historical background of legal categories usually differ considerably among nations and create a bias which is difficult to control. This effect is especially important with regard to the citizenship and naturalization law. For example, the restrictive citizenship law of Germany until 2000 (predominance of the *ius sanguinis*) and the consequently low naturalization figures would have resulted in an increase of the foreign population even at a zero net immigration rate.

—**Method of data acquisition**: Official data on specific dimensions of migration can be generated by very differing methods, if they are available at all. The data can be compiled out of administrative statistics, it can be calculated by sample methods (i.e. the UK International Passenger Survey) or can be compiled by indirect estimation methods out of several indicators. Thus, the method of data acquisition has to be considered when comparing migration data on an international level.

—**Quality of data**: The latter aspect also has an impact on the reliability of the data available. Statistics generated by administrative activities also reflect the efficiency of the authorities and the intensity of the executive activities. For example, the figures of apprehensions of irregular migrants are a direct function of the intensity of control. Especially for longitudinal analysis, changes in these patterns, in the methodology and in the legal framework have to be taken into consideration.

—**Exclusion of specific groups**: In some countries, migration-related official data may exclude specific groups (i.e. own citizens, seasonal workers, asylum seekers etc.) which are not included in the overall figures. In addition, case data may count the head of family only and ignore family members (i.e. some asylum statistics).

—**Territorial basis of official data**: In some countries (i.e. France), the official data include also overseas territories. In the German case, due to the reunification the territorial basis was changed in 1990, resulting in a drop of the percentage of foreign residents from 8.4% to 7.3% of the total population. Such effects have
to be taken into consideration for international comparison or longitudinal analysis.

5. **Conclusion**

Official data are an important source for migration-related indicators and often the only data available for research in the field of migration and integration of migrants. Apart from the methodological problems discussed in this paper, official data is usually aggregated and not available on a case basis. Thus, advanced statistical analysis on a national or international level is possible only with very few statistics available such as the Labour Force Survey. Nevertheless, case based data is often available on the local level (statistical offices of large cities, local research project) and eventually accessible for secondary analysis. Also when using such data, one has to consider the problems of categories and data generation discussed above.

In the German case, one can expect a reform on the official data in the field of migration in the context of the upcoming new immigration law. As the awareness of migration by societies and the political discourse changes over time, also concepts and categories reflected by official data are changing. Naturally, this process develops with major delay, and official data, if they cover migration, usually still adopt a traditional concept of migration. In social reality, migration patterns are changing; the creation of transnational social spaces, the presence of multiple or hybrid identities and the social change in receiving societies itself might render the use of official data increasingly problematic. It is important to revise critically the meaning and background of official data when using it for scientific research and analysis.

6. **Annex**

**Selected Literature**


**CURRLE, Edda:** *Migration in Europa. Daten und Hintergründe.* Research report, Bamberg.


## Official data available on the Web

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Statistical Office</th>
<th>Relevant Publications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Statistical Office</td>
<td>Relevant Publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—Ethnicity in the 1991 Census, Volume 1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—Internal Migration (quarterly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—International Migration 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—1996-based Subnational Population Projections CD-ROM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—Labour Force Survey Historical Supplement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—Social Focus on Ethnic Minorities (Disk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—International Migration: Migrants entering or leaving the United Kingdom and England and Wales, 1996 ISBN 011621036 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica)</td>
<td>—La presenza straniera in Italia: caratteristiche demografiche, permessi di soggiorno, residenti, nascite e matrimoni al 1.1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Statistics Netherlands</td>
<td>—Netherlands Official Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt</td>
<td>—Wanderungsstatistik 96 und 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.statistik.at">www.statistik.at</a></td>
<td>—Demographisches Journal Österreichs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Polish Official Statistics</td>
<td>—Basic information on demographic development of Poland in 1989-1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—Demographic Yearbook 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—Statistical News in 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—Statistics in transition (Journal Of The Polish Statistical Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.scb.se">www.scb.se</a></td>
<td>—Population in the Whole Country, Counties and Municipalities on Dec. 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—Reports on Statistical Co-ordination for Swedish Official Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—Statistical Reports: “Asylum Seekers and Residence Permits Granted”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Bundesamt für Statistik</td>
<td>—STATINF. Statistische Datenbank der Schweiz, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.bfs.admin.ch/content/bfs/portal/de/index.html">www.bfs.admin.ch/content/bfs/portal/de/index.html</a></td>
<td>—Bevölkerungsbewegung in der Schweiz, 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—Vom Einwanderungsland zur multikulturellen Gesellschaft. Grundlagen für eine schweizerische Migrationspolitik, 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—Ausländerstatistik 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>—Asylstatistik (Bundesamt für Flüchtlinge (BFF))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Hungarian Central Statistical Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.ksh.hu">www.ksh.hu</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>